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REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR?  
 
Aviva Abramovsky* 
 
 
*** 
This article suggests that a discussion on insurance regulation 
should include a consideration of the effect that reinsurance may 
have on the behavior of insurers.  The traditional types of 
reinsurance are reviewed, and the ability of private reinsurance 
contracts to produce insurer action is considered.  If reinsurance is 
not included in a holistic examination of the field, its realities have 
the capacity to misdirect insurance regulatory assumptions.  
Moreover, reinsurance works as a source of independent and often 
unexamined contractual influence on insurer activity, and as a 
potential source of interference with regulatory proposals.   Even 
though reinsurance is initiated by private contract, those contracts 
have the potential for regulatory effect sufficient to provide a positive 
answer to this Essay’s main query: may reinsurance correctly be 
termed a “silent regulator”? 
*** 
 
“The first principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write 
rules; and markets develop ways to circumvent these rules without 
violating them.”1 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law.  The author would 
like to thank the Searle Center for its generous support of this research and for the 
author’s inclusion in its symposium.  The author would like to recognize the staff 
of the H. Douglas Barclay Law Library at the Syracuse University College of Law 
for their invaluable help in producing this work. 
 
1 Allan H. Meltzer, Regulatory Overkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008 at A14. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When evaluating the efficacy of insurance regulation, the nature 
and availability of reinsurance is not often considered.2  Yet, as “the 
insurance of insurance companies”3, reinsurance should not be so quickly 
dismissed as irrelevant in the regulatory discussion.4  Just as insurance is 
often viewed as having a regulatory effect on insured industries, so too 
should reinsurance be considered as having a regulatory effect on its 
reinsureds.  
Initially, a brief discussion of the concept of regulation is 
necessary.  The term “regulation” commonly evokes thoughts of 
governmental action and visions of the regulatory state.  For good or ill, 
thoughts of regulation are usually linked with thoughts of state power.  Yet 
such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and ignores the capacity 
of private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths of social 
actors.  This ability has led to the development of a fascinating body of 
literature which examines the myriad ways private or quasi-private 
insurance can regulate private behavior.  With the concept of power not 
limited to overt government action alone, insurance takes its place among 
regulators of social behaviors with surprising force and scope.  Indeed, it 
has been stated that “looking at twentieth century governance, it is 
tempting to see insurance as the sleeping giant of power.” 5 
Identifying insurance as a private regulator stems from the idea that 
insurance works as a mechanism to set social standards.  Insurance is an 
                                                                                                                 
2 This is not overly surprising since, as one commentator noted, “development 
of reinsurance in the United States has, for much of its history, gone largely 
unrecorded.” See William Hoffman, Facultative Reinsurance Contract Formation, 
Documentation, and Integration, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 763, 777 (2002-
2003). 
 
3 See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
4 See Gary Marchitello, Ignore Reinsurance at Your Peril, RISK MGMT. MAG., 
Dec. 2007, at 46 (“Discounting the importance of the vital role of reinsurance in 
risk spreading and how the pricing, stability and capacity of reinsurance can 
influence the viability of one’s own direct insurance purchases can be a critical and 
potentially costly mismanagement.”). 
 
5 See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 12 (2002). 
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acknowledged gatekeeper of many economic activities, from buying a 
home to driving a car to executing a complex financial transaction.  Some 
of this regulatory effect results from a direct delegation of state power by 
mandating the purchase of insurance as a prerequisite to such things as 
operating a car or entering a certain business, much, however, does not.  
When insurance is purchased without governmental compulsion, the nature 
of the obligations acquired alongside the indemnity function of insurance 
can be viewed as a form of “private legislation” within the regime of 
traditional notions of liberal governance.6 
The corollary of the idea of insurance as private regulator of 
policyholders is to consider the concept of reinsurance as a source of 
private regulation of reinsured insurance companies.  In effect, if insurance 
is a “sleeping giant of power”, how much more so is the power of 
reinsurers to affect the behavior and choices of insurers themselves?  
Through this vantage point, the reinsurance relationship begins to emerge 
as a subject requiring careful review and analysis in the regulatory context.  
Though purely private in origin7 and function,8 reinsurance of insurance 
                                                                                                                 
6 Id. at 13. 
 
7 See 3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: SEPARATE LINES 
OF INSURANCE, § 40.01, at 6 (2007) (“The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by 
a written contract reflecting the negotiated terms.  Although reinsurance contracts 
between different cedents and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes, 
the wording of particular provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties’ 
specific needs, customs and practices.”).   
 
8 See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 142(d), at 
1021 (4th ed. 2007) (“In many respects, the relationship between primary insurer 
and reinsurer tracks that of the original insured and the primary insurer.  The 
primary insurer and reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and 
the reinsurer will have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of 
warranty, fraud, or concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer’s acts 
or neglect giv e rise to the defense.”).  See also STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., 1A COUCH 
ON INSURANCE § 9:17 (3d ed. 2008) (“Duties of good faith and fair dealing run 
between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial insured 
and his or her insurer.  This duty originates from the reinsurer’s need to rely upon 
and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling 
claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.  Accordingly, 
this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which 
may affect the subject risk.  The extension of this duty of good faith is the related 
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policies is common practice of the domestic insurance industry.9   For 
reasons described below, the benefits of reinsurance to an insurer are 
manifold10 and the likelihood that an insurer will seek reinsurance at some 
point great.11  Hence the function of this Essay: to determine whether 
                                                                                                                          
concept that reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured’s good faith decision 
to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the ‘follow the settlements’ doctrine.”).   
 
9 Though reinsurance agreements may use any language the parties may 
choose to effectuate their agreements, commonly found reinsurance clauses 
abound.  See BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.03(b), at 997 (12th ed. 2003) (“Reinsurance treaties 
may contain ‘follow the fortunes,’ ‘errors and omissions,’ ‘notice,’ ‘arbitration,’ 
‘claims cooperation,’ ‘salvage and subrogation,’ ‘allocation of expenses,’ ‘extra 
contractual obligations,’ ‘punitive damages’ and/or ‘cut through clauses.’  The 
wording of these clauses in different reinsurance certificates and treaties can also 
vary substantially.”).   
 
10 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Fundamentals of Property 
and Casualty Reinsurance 4 (2009) http://www.reinsurance.org/files/ 
public/07FundamentalsandGlossary1.pdf  (“Reinsurance provides protection 
against catastrophic loss in much the same way it helps stabilize an insurer’s loss 
experience.  Insurers use reinsurance to protect against catastrophes in two ways.  
First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic financial loss resulting from a single 
event, such as the total fire loss of a large manufacturing plant.  Second, 
reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of many smaller claims resulting 
from a single event, such as an earthquake or major hurricane, that affects many 
policyholders simultaneously.  While the insurer is able to cover losses 
individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer wishes to retain.”). 
   
11 See Anna Walker, Harnessing the Free Market:  Reinsurance Models for 
FDIC Insurance Pricing, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 742-43 (1994-1995) 
(“Reinsurance is sought by primary insurers for various reasons.  From an 
economic standpoint, reinsurance permits an efficient specialization of skills.  In a 
simplified world, primary insurers are small, local, and specialized; reinsurers, on 
the other hand, are well capitalized international corporations with highly 
diversified risk portfolios.  Primary insurers, because of their proximity to and 
knowledge of the insured, have an advantage over reinsurers in soliciting 
customers, pricing policies, and monitoring insureds for moral hazard.  Reinsurers, 
on the other hand, have advantages in raising capital and diversifying and 
managing risk, particularly the risk of a catastrophe which might bankrupt a small 
private insurer. Insurers, therefore, can trade their advantages in pricing and moral 
hazard monitoring for the greater risk-bearing capacity of the reinsurer. Primary 
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reinsurance can properly be understood as a little acknowledged and “silent 
regulator” of the insurance industry.  
To that end, Section II of this article will describe what reinsurance 
is and why insurers seek it. Section III will explore the main purposes of 
reinsurance.  Section IV will review various ways reinsurance has the 
capacity to influence certain insurance industry behaviors.  This will 
include a review of reinsurance’s effects on reinsured’s underwriting and 
claims handling practices, along with a discussion of general consumer 
protection issues. Section V will offer a conclusion.  
Before beginning that discussion, it is important to note that 
insurance is not, of course, an unregulated industry, though it is the only 
major financial industry regulated primarily at the state level.  State 
regulators coordinate their efforts through the highly competent National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).12  Moreover, these state 
regulators share identifiable and reasonably identical goals in the 
performance of their duties.  Among these are the promotion of competitive 
and sound insurance markets and the enforcement of insurance laws to 
assure consumers of fair treatment and protection from unfair trade 
practices13  Throughout the course of this Essay, therefore, mention will be 
                                                                                                                          
insurers also may find reinsurance necemeeting regulatory restrictions that limit 
exposure to any individual risk.  By retaining only a portion of each insured risk, 
the insurer is able to insure a greater variety of risks with the same amount of 
capital, assuming that state regulators permit it to subtract reinsured risk from its 
reserve requirements.”). 
 
12 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, http://www.naic.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009).   
 
13 Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk 
containment and default.  However, risk of default is not the sole purview of 
insurance regulation.  Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest, 
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and 
equitable normative policies.  For example, the Connection Department of 
Insurance describes its mission as follows: 
 
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve 
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing 
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by 
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient manner which 
promotes a competitive and financially sound insurance market for 
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made of reinsurance’s potential as a source of support or hindrance to 
insurance regulatory interests. Such review gains added importance with 
the recognition that, other than as regards some issues of solvency, the 
reinsurance industry is generally unregulated at all. 14  
 
II. REINSURANCE: WHAT IS IT AND WHY HAVE IT? 
 
At its most reductive, reinsurance is a relatively straightforward 
financial transaction by which an insurance company is indemnified for all 
or a portion of some risk by another insurer.15  This risk transfer, just as 
with common consumer or commercial insurance policies, is effectuated by 
contract, with the reinsurance agreement mainly subject to ordinary 
contract rules and doctrine. Some practices of reinsurance contract 
interpretation are distinct from the practices used in interpreting a more 
common insurance policy, but at this juncture it is sufficient to recognize 
that reinsurance is a creature of contract.16  
 
                                                                                                                          
consumers, and by enforcing the insurance laws to ensure that 
consumers are treated fairly and are protected from unfair practices.  
 
 Connecticut Department of Insurance: Our Mission Statement (Aug. 25, 
2008), http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396.   
 
14 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (“Since 
reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency, it safeguards the validity of 
reinsurance policies and, at the same time, maintains flexibility in the business of 
reinsurance.  By focusing on the reinsurer, rather than on the reinsurance contract, 
primary insurance companies are allowed to purchase reinsurance to suit their 
particular business needs.  Of course, reinsurance contracts are entered into by two 
or more insurance companies – the reinsurer(s) and the insurer(s).  Recognizing 
that there are always some exceptions to the rule, the two companies are generally 
expected to be knowledgeable about the insurance business.  Therefore, the 
oversight necessary in primary insurance to protect consumer interests is not 
essential in the reinsurance business.”) (emphasis added). 
 
15 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 (“Reinsurance is essentially a 
form of insurance for insurance companies.”).  
 
16 PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:6. (“Although some rules of construction do not 
apply to contracts in the reinsurance context, the general rules of contract do apply 
to reinsurance contracts.”).   
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A. WHAT IS REINSURANCE? 
 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the study of reinsurance stems 
from the particularly opaque and obscure language endemic to the 
industry.17  Some discussion of terms is necessary.  As reinsurance involves 
a minimum of two insurance companies, different terms have developed to 
identify the various parties.18  The original insurer who acquired the risk or 
liability is referred to by a variety of designations, including that of direct 
or initial insurer and sometimes, though less commonly, as the primitive 
insurer.19  However designated, once it has entered into an agreement with 
a new insurer for the purpose of reinsurance, the original insurer is 
thereafter most commonly referred to as the reinsured.20  Though that 
seems clear enough, the original insurer is frequently referred to by another 
more exotic definition, that of cedent.21  This designation stems from the 
idea that the function of reinsurance is for the original insurer to “cede” a 
certain amount of its business to the reinsurer, hence the term cedent.22  
                                                                                                                 
17 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 (“The business of reinsurance 
has developed some special terminology.”).  See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE 
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.01, at § 40.05 (2007) (“Reinsurance, like 
many areas of business law, has a language of its own.”).   
 
18 See PLITT, supra note 8, § 9:2 (“There are two parties to a reinsurance 
agreement, but these parties have been bestowed with multiple names which are 
used interchangeably and are all accurate.”).   
 
19 See GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE § 1:1, at 3 (Supp. 
2008) (“The original insurer, sometimes called the direct, or initial, insurer, and 
occasionally the primitive insurer, is commonly called the reinsured or, especially 
in England, the reassured.”).   
 
20 See OSTRAGER, supra note 10, § 15.01(c), at 992 (noting a ceding insurer or 
reinsured is “the insurer that transfers all or a portion of the risk it underwrites to a 
reinsurer.”).    
 
21 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:1, at 3 (“The reinsured is said to cede 
business to the reinsurer, or reassurer, and is therefore also referred to as the ceding 
company or the cedent (or cedant).”).  See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW 
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.01 (“The insurance company purchasing 
reinsurance is called the ‘ceding company’ (or the ‘cedent’ (or ‘cedant’), 
‘reinsured’ or ‘ceding insurer’) because it ‘cedes’ or transfers part of the risk.”).   
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Likewise, a reinsurer may itself seek reinsurance, called retrocessions, in 
the same forms and for the same purposes as any other insurers.23  Hence, 
the reinsurer of a reinsurer is often called a retrocessionaire.24   
 
As a descriptive matter, reinsurance is inherently a contract of 
insurance, albeit a secondary one.25  Reinsurance is commonly defined as a 
contract “by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against 
loss or liability by reason of such original insurance.”26  More generally, 
                                                                                                                          
22 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1054 (“The act of transferring the risk 
is called ‘ceding,’ and the portion of the risk passed to the reinsurer is called the 
‘cession.’”).   
 
23 See  PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:3 (The retrocessional agreement, like any other 
reinsurance agreement, is a contract and will be effective according to its terms.  
These terms need not mirror the specific risks of the reinsurance agreement which 
it is reinsuring.  As can quickly be deduced, with the expansion of the insuring 
scenario from one to three or more separate agreements, all of which may cover 
different risks and have different exclusions, the resolution of indemnity 
responsibility can easily become complex).   
 
24 The preponderance of French terminology likely arises from the early 
statutory action by the French Courts in the reinsurance business.  For instance, 
notice of the 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV provided that: 
 
The insurers may reinsure with others the effects they may have insured, and 
the insured may likewise cause to be insured the premium of insurance, and the 
solvency of the insurers.   
 
STARING, supra note 20,§ 1:4, at 6 (providing translation of Article XX, Title 
Sixth of the 1681 Ordonnance).   
 
25 PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:1 (“Reinsurance is a contract whereby one insurer 
transfers or ‘cedes’ to another insurer all or part of the risk it has assumed under a 
separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a portion of the 
premium . . .  While reinsurance technically qualifies as insurance, it is a contract 
for indemnity rather than liability.”). 
 
26 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:1, at 2 (This definition allows for the 
inclusion of both an existing policy or contract of reinsurance and assumes that the 
requirements of the contract are met.  A “reinsurance policy” can therefore simply 
be understood as a “contract for indemnity one insurer makes with another to 
protect the insurer from risks already assumed.”  Likewise a treaty looking forward 
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reinsurance includes all contractual arrangements where one insurance 
company transfers to another all or some portion of the risk it underwrites 
to another insurer.27  Thus, the common refrain that reinsurance is 
insurance for insurance companies.28  
One of the hardships in understanding reinsurance is that the term 
is sometimes used over-broadly and applied to relationships which are best 
understood as something other than a commonly accepted definition of 
reinsurance.29  Reinsurance is best understood as distinct from co-
                                                                                                                          
to reinsure would constitute reinsurance, though such agreement may be better 
understood as a contract for reinsurance, rather than a contract of reinsurance.  In 
either case, reinsurance policies, reinsurance treaties on specific classes of risk and 
reinsurance treaties entered into for future acquired risk would all come within the 
heading of reinsurance); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01, at 990.   
 
27 See Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 491 U.S. 244 (1989); OSTRAGER 
& NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01[a], at 990.   
 
28 See Cont’l Cas v. Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd., et al., 77 F.3d 16, 17, 20 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  In that case, the Second Circuit offered an additional colorful and 
intuitive explanation of reinsurance adopted in a New York Court of Appeals 
decision of the late 1930’s. See id. at 17. (discussing People ex. rel. Sea Ins. Co. v. 
Graves, 274 N.Y. 312, 15 (1937)) (The concept of reinsurance “dates back to the 
time the first bookie, fearful that he could not cover all his bets in the event he 
were to lose, decided to spread his risk ‘laying-off’ the risk by getting other 
bookies to share his exposure.”).  Though colorful, that assessment is not entirely 
accurate.  The earliest recordings of the use of reinsurance likely predated the 
iteration of the modern bookie and has been historically identified as predating the 
17th century.  See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4, at 5-6 (“The earliest recorded 
instance is said to have been a policy written on a voyage from Genoa to Sluys and 
reinsured for the more hazardous portion, from Cardiz to Sluys, the insurer 
retaining the Mediterranean portion of the risk.”).  The New York courts were not 
altogether mistaken as England likely recognized the relationship between 
insurance and speculation in the 18th Century and prohibited marine reinsurance by 
the Marine Act of 1745.  Addressing that Parliamentary Act, Lord Mansfield noted 
that, “The statute doubtless was intended to prevent gambling. I suppose that the 
mischief was that policies were underwritten at one premium and reassurance 
affected at another.”  In Re Norwich Equitable Fire Assurance Soc’y 57 LT REP. 
241, 243 (1887). 
 
29 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1053 (“Reinsurance should not be 
confused with the situation where one insured takes out two or more policies 
covering the same risk with two or more insurers.  Also, reinsurance should not be 
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insurance, the proper term for the relationship which forms when separate 
insurers, either jointly or severally, assume direct shares of a given risk; in 
such cases where all the insurers have a direct relationship with the insured, 
the relationship is not within the traditional understanding of reinsurance.30    
Likewise, reinsurance should be distinguished from banking even though it 
may assist in the reinsured’s financing and allow for insurance loss 
amortization.31  
In a true reinsurance contract, the risk indemnified is the risk that 
the insurer will have to pay on the underlying insured risk.32  Reinsurance 
is an aspect of insurance and, to the extent that it is regulated at all, is 
regulated under the rubric of insurance.    By entering into a contract to 
reinsure, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for any 
liability incurred by the insurer that is covered by the reinsurance 
                                                                                                                          
confused with the situation where the insured cancels one policy and substitutes 
another for it . . . Reinsurance only exists where a primary insurer becomes a 
‘reinsured’ by entering into a contract with another insurer, the ‘reinsurer.’”).   
 
30 See STARING, supra note 20,  § 1:5, at 9-10 (“Reinsurance is not 
coinsurance, which is the relationship that results when separate insurers, either 
severally or jointly, assume direct shares of a given risk; in that case, all the 
insurers have a direct contract with the insured.  It also is not a partnership, co-
venture, or syndication, even though the contract may contain clauses creating or 
permitting joint responsibilities or control, as well as joint loss, since true 
reinsurance lacks essential characteristics of those relationships.”).   
 
31 Id. at 10 (“Neither is reinsurance banking, although it performs a function of 
banking by providing the amortization of insurance losses and may, in effect, 
finance the growth of the reinsured.”).   
 
32 Risk is transferred by a variety of financial transactions, not all, or even 
most of which, constitute insurance.  Though insurance itself remains a somewhat 
elusive definitional concept, the indemnity function, particularly when combined 
with some aspect of fortuity is often seen as core insurance principles.  See PLITT, 
supra note 9, § 9:24. (“Because the reinsurance agreement is a contract of 
indemnity, the liability of the reinsurer is inextricably tied to the loss of the 
reinsured.”); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01[a], at  990; Travelers 
Idem. Co. v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1995) (Reinsurance is 
generally understood as a contract for indemnity not one of liability); Transcont’l 
Underwriters Agency v. Am. Agency Underwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
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agreement.33  Importantly for our later discussions, the liabilities covered 
under a reinsuring agreement can extend beyond the cost of direct losses 
accrued by the cedent insurer’s policyholder under the original policy to 
include such things as the cedent’s costs of investigation and settlement of 
claims.34  Examples of other potentially indemnified insurer losses can 
even include losses arising from the reinsured’s own bad faith – such as 
“judgments in excess of loss” costs and extracontractual, tortious bad faith 
liability.35 
 
B. A BRIEF TAXONOMY OF REINSURANCE  
 
As reinsurance is a contractual arrangement, the nature, complexity 
and terms of many contracts stray from the standardization common among 
primary insurance policies.36  In fact, because of reinsurance’s remarkable 
flexibility and its capacity to take on a large variety of risk types and risk 
levels, the policies vary in their purposes and specifics.37  The terms of the 
reinsurance contract and the terms of the policies reinsured determines the 
scope of the indemnity offered by the reinsurer.38  The contracts reflect the 
business needs of sophisticated commercial entities and, as such, the terms, 
                                                                                                                 
33 PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:24 (“It is the language of the reinsurance contract 
that will ultimately determine the extent of the reinsurer’s liability to the reinsured.  
In other words, the sustaining of a loss by the original insured cannot create 
liability for the reinsurer extending beyond the terms of its contract”).  See also 
STARING, supra note 20, § 15:1, at 1 (“It does not necessarily follow that, where 
the first insurer is liable, the reinsurer is also liable.  Whether or not the reinsurer is 
liable depends upon the terms of the contract of reinsurance.”).   
 
34 See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:30.   
 
35See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 16.06[a], at 1045-1048.   
 
36 See id. § 15.03[b], at 997 (“Reinsurance treaties and certificates vary 
considerably in their language and terms of coverage”).   
  
37 Id. (“Reinsurance treaties may contain ‘follow the fortunes,’ ‘errors and 
omissions,’ ‘notice,’ ‘arbitration,’ ‘claims cooperation,’ ‘salvage and subrogation,’ 
‘allocation of expenses,’ ‘extra contractual obligations,’ ‘punitive damages’ and/or 
‘cut through clauses.’  The wording of these clauses in different reinsurance 
certificates and treaties can also vary substantially.”).  
38 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993). 
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conditions and costs of a reinsurance contract are all negotiable.39 Various 
clauses such as “follow the forms” and “follow the settlements”40  or 
clauses for “extracontractual damages”41, all discussed later in further 
detail, are common to many reinsurance contracts.  The interaction of 
various clauses and the reciprocal obligations of good faith will be 
discussed in Section IV as we review the performance standards required 
by the reinsurance agreement.  First, in order to understand the purposes of 
reinsurance, we review a few of the common types of arrangements 
common to those agreements. 42  
 
                                                                                                                 
39 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 
40.01 (“The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by a written contract reflecting 
the negotiated terms.  Although reinsurance contracts between different cedents 
and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes, the wording of particular 
provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties’ specific needs, customs 
and practices.”).   
 
40 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 31 (noting 
“‘follow the settlements’ generally provides that a reinsurer must cover settlements 
made by the reinsured in a business like manner, provided the settlement is 
arguably within the terms of the reinsured’s policy and the reinsurance agreement 
and the settlement is not affected by fraud, collusion or bad faith.  It is an 
expectation that the reinsurer will abide by the reinsured’s good faith determination 
to settle, rather than litigate, claims under a reinsured policy and not relitigate a 
reinsured’s settlements ceded to the reinsurance agreement.  The term is often used 
interchangeably with follow the fortunes, and there may be overlap between the 
affect of follow the settlements and follow the fortunes when the ‘risk’ is what 
generated the loss.  Follow the settlements is focused on ‘loss settlement’, not 
necessarily tied to a ‘risk determination’ arising out of follow the fortunes.”).   
 
41 Id. at 29 (noting the definition of the term extra-contractual obligations as 
“in reinsurance, monetary awards or settlements against an insurer for its alleged 
wrongful conduct to its insured.  Such payments required of an insurer to its 
insured are extra-contractual in that they are not covered in the underlying 
contract.”).  
 
42 See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:3 (“There are two broad categories of 
reinsurance agreements: facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance.”). 
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i. Facultative Reinsurance 
 
Facultative reinsurance is the most discrete form of reinsurance, 
and generally accepted as the likely original form of reinsurance.43  
Facultative reinsurance policies take their name because the contracts allow 
the reinsurance company to use its “faculties” or reason to choose to 
reinsure a specific risk, a specific policy, or a specific group of policies.44  
The ceding insurer and reinsurer agree to the terms and conditions of each 
individual contract.45  In these contracts, the reinsurer often conducts its 
own underwriting to determine the appropriate premium level.46  
Facultative reinsurance contracts provide reinsurance for the unusual; they 
also have the greatest specific effect on the cost of covering unusual or 
                                                                                                                 
43 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 (“Facultative reinsurance of a single risk, 
which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the last half of 
the Nineteenth Century.  A treaty, which is a long term contract covering more 
than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821.  Treaties became common 
around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the excess of loss 
treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San Francisco 
earthquake and fire of 1906”). 
 
44 See JERRY supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054 (“Facultative reinsurance 
involves the primary insurer entering into an agreement for the reinsurance of a 
particular risk.  The reinsurance can be written on a pro rata or an excess basis; the 
root word “faculty” denotes that the reinsurer has a choice of accepting or rejecting 
any risk proposed and of demanding whatever premium it thinks appropriate.”). 
 
45 See  NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at § 
40.04[1] (“The reinsurer and cedent negotiate the terms for each facultative 
certificate.”). See also STARING, supra note 20, at §2:2 (“The prospective 
reinsured, either directly or through a broker, presents the direct policy terms, or a 
summary of them, and the proposal for reinsurance.  If it is accepted at a 
satisfactory premium, a contract is made.  Other terms are negotiated to the 
satisfaction of both parties.”).   
 
46 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6 (“The reinsurer will always have at least 
a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s underwriting 
and claims practices.”).  See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE 
GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.04[1] (“Facultative reinsurance is commonly purchased 
for large, unusual or catastrophic risks.  Reinsurers thus must have the necessary 
resources to underwrite individual risks carefully.”).   
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low-incidence risks.47  Likewise, with its ability to allow reinsurers to 
engage in significant underwriting operations prior to placing the policy, 
facultative reinsurance is often used to cover catastrophic or other low 
incidence – high loss risks.48  Individual risk facultative reinsurance may be 
used in tandem with the second variety of reinsuring agreements, the 
treaty.49   
 
ii. Treaty Reinsurance 
 
Treaties are broad agreements that reinsure multiple contracts, 
often contracts that have yet to be written by the direct insurer.50   Usually, 
treaties cover some portion or class of business of the direct insurer and 
historically may cover a long period of time, usually renewable on a fairly 
automatic basis unless one of the parties seeks a new term.51  Treaties are 
                                                                                                                 
47 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:3, at 4 (“Once, no doubt, all reinsurance 
was facultative.  With the rise of treaties, they account for great amounts of 
reinsurance but facultative reinsurance, which requires individual attention to 
underwriting, remains very important for businesses that fall outside the bounds of 
a treaty reinsurance program.  The reinsured may want to meet competition and 
enter into new lines in which it has no expertise but can gain it through initially 
taking risks and obtaining facultative reinsurance from those who have experience.  
The reinsured may need facultative reinsurance where the risk falls under an 
exclusion in its treaties, either as to type or amount, or because the risk, although 
routine in nature, present a very high loss exposure.  In the end, all these uses serve 
the general purpose of reinsurance to provide stability and promote growth.”). 
 
48 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10,  § 15.01[b] (“The availability of 
reinsurance enables an insurer to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its 
underwriting capacity by allowing the ceding insurer to ‘lay-off’ on reinsurers a 
portion of the risk of loss.  Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of 
catastrophic losses among a larger pool of insurers.”).   
 
49 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, supra note 8, at § 
40.04[1]. 
 
50 JERRY supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054. 
 
51 Id. (“Most reinsurance is treaty reinsurance.  The treaty arrangement, 
sometimes called “automatic reinsurance,” involves a commitment of a reinsurer to 
assume part of the risk of the primary insurer, either on a pro rata or an excess 
basis, for a stated period.”). 
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particularly useful reinsuring mechanisms since they can be structured to 
reinsure losses on direct insurance which either were written during the 
term of the treaty but occur later, or they can be structured to reinsure 
losses that occur during the term of treaty but were written earlier.52  
Likewise, the premiums may be calculated in a variety of ways including 
structuring the reinsurance premium in some way directly related to the 
premiums on the underlying policies or assigning a single sum or some 
other variable amount as the parties wish and which reflect their business 
purposes.53  Generally speaking, the treaty reinsurance contract forms when 
the original insurer cedes part of the premiums for its policies and the risk 
of losses on those policies to the reinsurer.54  Treaty reinsurance usually 
involves multiple reinsurers taking part of a book of the business’ risks, 
with each agreeing to assume a portion of the risk in some pre-determined 
manner.55 
Importantly, reinsurance treaties cover all risks written by the 
reinsured that fall within their terms unless specifically excluded.56  For this 
reason, treaty reinsurers generally do not review the individual risks 
underlying the treaty and do not conduct their own underwriting of the 
                                                                                                                 
52 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:4, at 4-5.  
 
53 Id. at 5 (“Depending again on its structure and purpose, the premiums may 
be directly related to the premiums on the underlying insurance or may be lump 
sums, or variable amounts, not based on direct participation in the underlying 
premiums.”). 
 
54 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.03[a], at 996. (“The reinsurer, 
under a single contract, agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer with respect to an 
entire ‘book’ of the ceding insurer’s underwriting activities for designated lines of 
insurance.  A treaty reinsurance contract is formed when the primary insurer cedes 
part of the premiums for its policies and the losses on those policies to a 
reinsurer.”).   
 
55 Id. (“Arrangements typically involve the participation of numerous 
reinsurers, each agreeing to assume a percentage of the total liability under a single 
treaty.”). 
 
56 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 
40.04, at 17. (“Reinsurance treaties cover all of the risks written by the ceding 
insurer that fall within their terms unless exposures are specifically excluded.  
Thus, in most cases, neither the cedent nor the reinsurer has the ‘faculty’ to 
exclude from a treaty a risk that fits within the treaty terms.”).   
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risks.57  Rather, they rely on the underwriting experience of the original 
insurer, with a prudent reinsurer investigating the underwriting philosophy, 
loss experience, attitude towards claims management and other business 
practices.58  Facultative reinsurance can be combined with treaty 
reinsurance to cover exclusions in the treaty or for other business purposes, 
some of which we explore later.59  
 
iii. The Verticals and Horizontals of Reinsurance:  Pro-
rata and Excess of Loss 
 
Again, we recognize along with the United States Supreme Court 
that:  
 
In indemnity reinsurance . . . [the reinsurer] agrees to 
indemnify, or reimburse, the ceding company for a 
specified percentage of the claims and expenses 
attributable to claims that have been reinsured.60   
 
                                                                                                                 
57 Id. (“Treaty reinsurers rely heavily on the cedent’s underwriting.”).  
 
58 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 7.  (“While 
treaty reinsurance does not require review of individual risks by the reinsurer, it 
demands a careful review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and historical 
experience of the ceding insurer, including a thoughtful evaluation of the 
company’s attitude toward claims management, engineering control, as well as the 
management’s general background, expertise and planned objectives.”).   
 
59 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 29, 54. 
(Noting the definition of treaty reinsurance is “is a reinsurance contract under 
which the reinsured company agrees to cede and the reinsurer agrees to assume 
risks of a particular class or classes of businesses” and the definition of facultative 
reinsurance is “reinsurance of individual risks by offer and acceptance wherein the 
reinsurer retains the ability to accept or reject each risk offered by the ceding 
company.”). 
 
60 Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 491 U.S. 244, 247 (1989).  See 
also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993). 
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The insured’s indemnification by the reinsured need not be total or 
complete.61  In fact, the ability of reinsurers to take only a portion of a risk 
or book of risks is one of the particularly useful risk spreading-elements of 
reinsurance.62  There is nothing to prevent a single reinsurer from taking all 
indemnity responsibility for a policy or group of policies, but most 
reinsuring agreements take responsibility for only a portion of those 
losses.63  Traditionally, the responsibilities divide into two basic divisional 
structures most easily visualized as either a vertical or horizontal slicing up 
                                                                                                                 
61 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1 
(“Reinsurance is a transaction in which one insurance company indemnifies, for a 
premium, another insurance company against all or part of the loss that it may 
sustain under its policy or policies of insurance”).   
 
62 Id. (“The fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk so that no 
single entity finds itself saddled with a financial burden beyond its ability to pay, is 
enhanced by reinsurance.”).  See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE 
GUIDE, supra note 8 (“Reinsurance relationships can be simple or complex.  A 
cedent can cede certain loss exposures under one contract or purchase several 
contracts covering different aspects or portions of the same policy to achieve the 
desired degree of coverage.  A layering process involving two or more reinsurance 
agreements is commonly employed to obtain sufficient monetary limits of 
reinsurance protection.  When a claim is presented, the reinsurers respond in a 
predetermined order to cover the loss.”). 
 
63 See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:1, at 3-4 (“Reinsurance is a contract whereby 
one insurer transfers or ‘cedes’ to another insurer all or part of the risk it has 
assumed under a separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a 
portion of the premium.”).   
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of the losses from particular risks assumed.64  Both facultative and treaty 
reinsurance can be written in either a pro-rata or excess of loss basis.65 
 
C. PRO-RATA AND EXCESS OF LOSS  
 
If a reinsurer does not want indemnification responsibility for an 
entire risk classification or group of policies, it can structure the treaty to 
take on only a specific portion of each risk to which it applies.66  Using a 
pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding 
insurer for a percentage of original risk losses in exchange for a 
corresponding portion of the premium.67  Generally, pro-rata agreements 
                                                                                                                 
64 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1 
(“Reinsurance may be written on either a proportional basis or excess of loss basis.  
A reinsurance contract written on a proportional basis simply prorates all 
premiums, losses and expenses between the insurer and the reinsurer on a pre-
arranged basis.  The proportional approach is used extensively in property 
reinsurance.  Excess of loss contracts, on the other hand, require the primary 
insurer to keep all losses up to a predetermined level of retention, and the reinsurer 
to reimburse the company for any losses above that level of retention, up to the 
limits of the reinsurance contract.  In simplest terms, a retention is analogous to the 
deductible a policyholder may have on a personal insurance policy, such as an 
automobile or homeowner’s policy.”).   
 
65 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, §15.03[a], at 996 (“Both treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance can be written on either a pro-rata or 
excess-of-loss basis.  Treaty reinsurance involves an ongoing agreement between 
two insurers, binding in advance one to cede and the other to accept specified 
business that is the subject of the treaty.  Facultative reinsurance is negotiated with 
respect to a specific risk insured by a particular policy or policies.”).  See also 
REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 7..   
 
66 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 10  (“Under 
proportional reinsurance, the ceding insurer and the reinsurer automatically share 
all premiums and losses covered by the contract on a pre-agreed basis, thus there 
are no characteristics uniquely attributable to the risk associated with proportional 
reinsurance.”).   
 
67 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (“Pursuant to 
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer 
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding 
portion of the premium for the original risk.”).   
 
2009]      REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR? 363 
 
 
obligate the reinsurer to indemnify an insurer without requiring any 
retention by the reinsured.68  Commonly, this type of pro-rata arrangement 
is called Quota Share Reinsurance, where the ceding company indemnifies 
the cedent insurer for a fixed percentage of loss on all policies of a defined 
risk type.69  This easily visualized apportionment can become somewhat 
more complex in that a “pro-rata” treaty can also be horizontally segmented 
within each “slice” by requiring the ceding insurer to retain some portion of 
the loss with the reinsurer only responsible for the surplus.70  This type of 
pro-rata reinsuring up to the amount of insurance originally written, minus 
the ceding insurer’s retention is commonly called Surplus Share 
Reinsurance.71  With the entrance of additional retrocessionaires there can 
be quite a bit of segmentation in this surplus line.   
                                                                                                                 
68 See Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 299 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Wis. 1981); Central 
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Corp., 426 F. Supp. 7, 11 n. 5, 21 (D. Neb. 
1976), aff’d in part and remanded, 565 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1977).  See also 
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (“Pro-rata reinsurance 
arrangements generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that 
occur with no retention by the reinsured.”).   
 
69 See JERRY,  supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054-1055 (“Pro rata reinsurance, 
sometimes called ‘quota share’ reinsurance, means that losses, premiums, and 
expenses are divided pro rata by the primary insurer and the reinsurer.  For 
example, the primary insurer may retain sixty percent of the risk and transfer forty 
percent.  If any loss occurs, whether large or small, the primary insurer is liable for 
sixty percent of the loss and the reinsurer is liable for forty percent.”).  See also 
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,  supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting quota share 
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of loss for all 
policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.”).   
 
70 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b] at 1055. (“A special kind of pro rata 
reinsurance is ‘surplus reinsurance.’  Under surplus reinsurance, the reinsurer 
agrees to cover a share of the risk that varies with the size of the exposure.  For 
example, the treaty might specify that losses under $50,000 are covered in full by 
the primary insurer, that the first $50,000 of losses between $50,000 and $250,000 
is paid by the direct insurer and the rest by the reinsurer, and that losses exceeding 
$250,000 are paid 20 percent by the direct insurer and 80 percent by the 
reinsurer.”).  
 
71 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,  supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting 
surplus share reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of 
loss for all policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.”).   
364 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
Another interesting aspect of pro-rata treaties is the reinsured’s 
obligation to automatically accept its portion of the risks insured.72  Pro-
rata treaties come in a variety of broad types, knowledge of each of which 
is useful for our later discussion.  For instance, the treaty can be pro-rata 
and obligatory.73  Through this structure, all risks in a specified category 
are shared automatically by some proportion agreed to.74  Pro-rata treaties 
often allocate a portion of the original premium to the reinsurer.75  
In the excess of loss reinsurance scenario, the reinsurer’s obligation 
is defined in relation to the reinsured’s retention.76  In this structure the 
reinsurer, subject to specific stated limits of coverage, indemnifies the 
reinsured for all or a stated portion of losses in excess of the agreed upon 
retention. 77  The agreements can be structured so that the reinsurance can 
                                                                                                                 
72 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 
40.04[2], at 16 (“Proportional or pro-rata reinsurance is characterized by a 
proportional division of liability and premium between the ceding company and 
the reinsurer.”).   
 
73 Id. (“The cedent pays the reinsurer a predetermined share of the premium, 
and the reinsurer indemnifies the cedent for a like share of the loss and the expense 
incurred by the cedent in its defense and settlement of claims (the ‘allocated loss 
adjustment expense’ or ‘LAE’”).  
 
74 Id. (“According to the percentage agreed, the cedent and reinsurer share the 
premium and losses from the business reinsured.”).  
 
75 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,  supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (“Pursuant to 
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer 
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding 
portion of the premium for the original risk.  Pro-rata reinsurance arrangements 
generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that occur with no 
retention by the reinsured.”).   
 
76 See STARING, supra note 20, at 4 (“Whether the contract is pro rata or 
excess, the reinsured will…be expected ordinarily to retain a sufficient amount of 
the risk to give the reinsurer confidence that the policy will be well 
administered.”).   
 
77 See Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de France v. New England 
Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 998 n.17 (D. Mass. 1996).   
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be excess to the specific risk, specific occurrence, an aggregate dollar 
amount or specified loss ratio.78 
 
III. PURPOSES OF REINSURANCE 
 
A comprehensive review of all the reasons an insurer may seek to 
reinsure is not possible or necessary for the purposes of this Essay.  Suffice 
it to say that as reinsurance is a flexible medium and supports a variety of 
functions, the purpose of acquiring it will differ in accordance with the 
business interests of the insurer seeking it.79  Likewise, as reinsurance 
serves a variety of purely financial and accounting purposes, reinsurance 
may be employed for purposes slightly beyond the scope of this Essay’s 
interest in its potential regulatory effects on insurance companies as 
insuring companies, rather than as financial institutions.  Regardless, in 
accordance with our focus on the potential effects of reinsurance on 
primary insurers, it is useful to review the four main purposes for which 
reinsurance is generally sought in relation to the primary insurer’s 
insurance function.80  
 
                                                                                                                 
78 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, § 15.02[b], at 994 (noting per risk or specific excess 
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the 
amount of loss in excess of a specified retention with respect to each risk covered 
by a reinsurance arrangement”; per occurrence reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding 
insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the amount of loss in excess of a 
specified retention with respect to each occurrence”; aggregate excess of loss 
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for the amount by which the ceding 
insurer’s loss during a specified period exceeds either (a) a specific dollar amount 
or (b) a percentage of the company’s subject premium”; and stop loss reinsurance 
“indemnifies the ceding insurer for losses in excess of a specified loss ratio up to a 
predetermined loss ratio limit.”).   
 
79 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 
(“Depending on the ceding company’s goals, different types of reinsurance 
contracts are available to bring about the desired result.”).   
 
80 Id. (Insurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit 
liability on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against 
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity.”).  
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A. RISK ALLOCATION 
 
For some purposes, reinsurance serves the almost identical purpose 
for the reinsured insurance company as that of many other common 
commercial insurances.  Thus, reinsurance’s initial purpose may be viewed 
as a basic reallocation of risk and as an additional way to spread risk.81  Just 
as any commercial entity might enter the insurance market seeking 
indemnity for specific types of loss, so too does the insurer seek a 
mechanism to transfer the risk it chose to underwrite to another party.82  In 
a reinsurance situation, the risk acquired by the ceding insurer transfers to 
the reinsurer to the extent and within the limits of the negotiated contract; 
to the extent that those risks are allocated among numerous reinsurers, the 
risk is spread even further. 83  
This risk transfer benefits the insurer by allowing the reinsured to 
take action that might otherwise be prohibited or disallowed sans 
reinsurance.84  For instance, through the medium of reinsurance, the ceding 
                                                                                                                 
81 Id. (“By providing a mechanism through which insurers limit their loss 
exposure to levels commensurate with their net assets, reinsurance enables 
insurance companies to offer coverage limits considerably higher than they could 
otherwise provide.”).  
 
82 Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcora (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 590 N.E.2d 1186, 
1188 (1992).  
 
83 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 6.  Importantly, 
it must be remembered that reinsurance does not actually lessen total risk 
exposure: 
 
In any discussion of reinsurance, the limitations must be 
considered along with its advantages.  Reinsurance does not 
change the inherent nature of a risk being insured.  It cannot make 
a bad risk insurable or an exposure more predictable or desirable.  
And while reinsurance may limit an insurance company’s exposure 
to a risk, the total risk exposure is not altered through the use of 
reinsurance. 
 
Id. 
 
84 JERRY, supra note 9, § 141, at 1056 (“[R]einsurance permits an insurer to 
transfer large risks that it is unable to manage or that are simply too risky to 
another insurer.”).   
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insurer can underwrite business that it might otherwise not have been able 
to undertake.85  Either the risk itself may simply be too large or the risk of 
loss might be unusual in some other way.86  By limiting their loss exposure 
through reinsurance, the reinsured can offer higher coverage limits than 
they could otherwise afford.87  Through this mechanism, smaller insurers 
have the capacity to compete with larger companies and offer their 
policyholders a broader array of coverage options.88 
Likewise, the insurer may want to enter business lines that present 
the possibility of some future unexpected losses the insurer is unwilling to 
retain beyond a specific retention.89  Either the possibility of a very great a 
                                                                                                                 
85  Id. (“For example, an insurer that has a portfolio of coverage faces the risk 
that a large number of small losses of an unexpected, unexceptional nature may 
occur, thereby exceeding the insurer’s capacity to pay for them without suffering a 
loss.”). 
 
86  Id. (“[T]he insurer faces the risk that a single catastrophic event, the precise 
timing of which is uncertain (e.g., an earthquake) may occur with devastating 
consequences to the insurer’s balance sheet.”).   
 
87 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 (“In 
calculating an appropriate level of reinsurance, a company takes into account the 
amounts of its own available surplus, and determines its level of retention based on 
the amount of loss it can absorb financially.  Surplus, sometimes referred to as 
policyholders’ surplus, is the amount by which the assets of an insurer exceed its 
liabilities.  A company’s retention may range anywhere from a few thousand 
dollars to one million dollars or more.  The loss exposure above the retention, up to 
the policy limits of the reinsurance contract, is indemnified by the reinsurer.  In 
this manner, reinsurance helps to stabilize loss experience on individual risks, as 
well as on accumulated losses under many policies occurring during a specified 
period.”).   
 
88 Id. (noting reinsurance’s goal of limiting liability “is crucial because it 
allows all companies, large and small, to offer coverage limits to meet their 
policyholders’ needs.  In this manner, reinsurance provides an avenue for small-to-
medium size companies to compete with industry giants.”).   
 
89 JERRY, supra note 9, at § 141, at 1056-57 (“Just as reinsurance enables an 
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer 
to leave a particular kind of business quickly.  An insurer that wants to rid itself of 
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the 
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and 
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.”).   
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number of small, unexpected losses or the possibility of a single, 
catastrophic loss which could overwhelm the insurer’s balance sheet might 
cause a prudent insurer to acquire reinsurance to offset the risk of loss.90  
This prudential risk-transferring purpose of reinsurance appropriately 
supports a decision to reinsure, even though the insurer believes (as it must) 
that its underwriting decisions are prudent and the premium appropriate.  
After all, sufficiently imprudent underwriting could well be a defense to 
reinsurance coverage.91  Still, even the most perspicacious of underwriters 
cannot foresee the unexpected; thus the prudential purpose of reinsurance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
90 Id. at 1056 (“When the primary insurer purchases reinsurance, it reduces the 
size of its potential losses, which reduces the size of the reserves it must maintain.  
Insurers, however, are not as interested in reducing reserves as they are in 
increasing their business.  An insurer with the minimum allowable level of reserves 
and surplus (the amount an insurer is required to maintain in excess of reserves to 
meet unexpected losses) could not take on new business or enter new fields.  
However, reinsurance provides a solution: the insurer could write the coverage, 
transfer the risk to a reinsurer, and receive a commission from the reinsurer.  The 
primary insurer adds no new liabilities, but its surplus increases by the amount of 
the commission.  This increased surplus enables the primary insurer to write and 
retain additional coverage.  Another way to view this transaction is that some of 
the excess capacity of the reinsurer is utilized by the business-garnering efforts of 
the primary insurer; in essence some excess capacity is transferred from the 
reinsurer to the primary insurer.  For the small insurer who wants to grow, 
reinsurance is an important way to take on new business beyond its means and 
simultaneously increase its capacity.”).  
 
91 PLITT, supra note 9, at § 9:31, 80-1 (“The duty of good faith that runs 
between the parties to a reinsurance contract is essential to the reinsurance 
relationship. Stemming from the reinsurer’s need to rely upon and not duplicate the 
reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling claims, and reducing 
costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.  Due to these specific needs of the 
industry, the duty of utmost good faith in this context connotes a higher duty than 
the ordinary duty of good faith that is inherent in general contract law.  
Accordingly, it requires that the reinsured must disclose to the reinsurer all 
material facts which may affect the subject risk.  The failure of a reinsured to 
disclose material facts to the reinsurer will warrant the rescission of a reinsurance 
contract.”).   
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B. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
 
A second purpose for reinsurance, one particularly importantly in 
the insurance regulatory context, is using reinsurance to reduce the amount 
of reserves an insurer must  maintain, thus freeing the insurer up to write 
more policies.92  In purchasing reinsurance, the primary insurer reduces the 
size of its potential losses, which allows it to reduce its statutorily 
mandated reserves.93  Hence, if a primary insurer hits the threshold for the 
minimum allowable level of reserves plus surplus that it is statutorily 
required to maintain, the amount of new business open to it would be 
restricted.  But, if the primary insurer purchased reinsurance, the primary 
would still be able to write new policies so long as it could transfer the risk 
to the reinsurer.94  In fact, since the reinsurer swaps the new risk in 
exchange for a commission, the primary insurer is frequently seen as 
acquiring no new liabilities, while its surplus is viewed as increasing by the 
amount of the reinsurer’s commission.95  The majority of public regulation 
governing reinsurers  concerns itself with this aspect of the reinsuring 
relationship.96   
                                                                                                                 
92 See Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 N.Y.2d 
255, 258 (1992) (noting reinsurance allows “a primary insurer to reduce the 
amount of legally required reserves held for the protection of policyholders, and to 
increase the company’s ability to underwrite other policies or make other 
investments”).  
 
93 See STARING, supra note 20 (“For the individual insurer, the purchase of 
reinsurance has any or all of a number of objectives.  It will desire to limit the 
reserves it must maintain for losses on its ordinary business.”).   
 
94 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4-5  (“When an 
insurance company issues a policy, the expenses associated with issuing that 
policy, such as taxes, agent commissions, and administrative expenses, are charged 
immediately against the company’s income, resulting in a decrease in surplus.  
Meanwhile, the premium collected must be set aside in an unearned premium 
reserve to be recognized as income over a period of time.  This accounting 
procedure allows for strong solvency regulation; however, it ultimately leads to 
decreased capacity.  As an insurance company sells more policies, it must pay 
more expenses from its surplus.  Therefore, the company’s ability to write 
additional business is reduced.”).   
 
95 Id. (“Insurers purchase reinsurance…to increase capacity.”).  
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i. Regulation of  Reinsurance for Purposes of Solvency 
  
Though by no means its sole purpose, much insurance regulation 
exists simply to decrease the likelihood of unexpected insurance company 
failure.  Regulators typically identify the fiscal ramifications of wide-scale 
insurance failure as their justification for proper insurance regulation.  
Therefore, though permitting reinsurers to go unregulated in other aspects, 
regulators recognized that the potential insolvency of a reinsurer could 
affect the solvency of its reinsureds, and have therefore taken legislative 
action to minimize that risk.  
This is no idle matter.  Both the Transit Casualty Company and 
Mission Insurance Company failed due to insurance insolvency in the 
1980’s.97  The failure occurred in part because they could not collect from 
their reinsurers.  To address this risk, the states all have various techniques 
in place to assure reinsurer solvency.  If admitted or licensed in the state, 
the reinsurer must comport with certain reserve requirements of its own or, 
if foreign or unadmitted, states require the reinsurer to offer a bond 
sufficient to allay fears of not collecting on reinsurance agreements.98   If 
the company does not post a bond, the insurer cannot take advantage of 
reinsurance’s ability to grant credit and expand reserves. 
                                                                                                                          
96 Since reserves are the primary way public regulators attempt to reduce the 
risk of insurer insolvency and default, a great amount of activity has occurred 
amongst and between regulators to devise statutory schemes that allow for 
protection of the reserves.  See, e.g., INVESTMENTS OF INSURERS MODEL ACT § 22 
(NAIC 2007). There has been some very interesting work on reinsurer chartering 
and on bonding requirements for foreign insurers reinsuring domestic primaries.   
 
97 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: State Reinsurance 
Oversight Increased, but Problems Remain 8 (1990).  [Hereinafter 1990 GAO 
Report].  
 
98 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (“When 
overriding public policy concerns require regulatory involvement, however, nearly 
all states have adopted regulations affecting reinsurance contracts.  An example of 
this type of regulatory involvement is the requirement of a standard insolvency 
clause, which allows the receiver of an insolvent insurer to collect on reinsurance 
contracts.  While few states require the filing or approval of reinsurance contracts, 
indirect regulation of reinsurance contracts and rates does exist.  For example, 
restrictions on insurance rates affect reinsurance rates.  Generally, if the amount 
paid in the premium to the insurer is limited, the amount of premium paid under a 
quota share reinsurance contract may also be limited.”).   
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Still, the multi-state system leads to some fears of inadequacy and 
redundancy.  To address these issues, along with the perennial problem of 
construing the appropriate way for the states to share in the taxation of 
these transactions, the House of Representatives in June 2007 passed HR 
1065, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act.99  The Senate 
companion bill, S 929, awaits consideration in the Senate.100  That 
legislation would create a single state authority to determine the 
appropriateness of reinsurance credit and reinsurer solvency assessment.101  
The solvency assessment would be conducted by the reinsurer’s home state 
and the credit determination would be made solely by the ceding insurer’s 
domiciliary state.102  It is unclear how this alters the current regulatory 
system other than to encourage reinsurers or insurers to change their 
domiciles in search of a state whose regulation best comports with their 
needs, though it likely will assist in clarifying taxation.  In any event, these 
Congressional efforts reflect an understanding of reinsurance’s direct effect 
on insurer’s solvency. 
By this legislative activity, it is apparent the regulators are not 
entirely unaware of the financial effects a reinsurer default could have on 
reinsureds.  Yet, this type of legislation is still limited to regulation of 
reinsurance only as a source of funds for the domestic insurer.  Basically, it 
reflects a conceptualization of reinsurance as a mere contractually acquired 
source of capital.  There is no attempt in the regulatory legislation to move 
beyond solvency and to address the effects the terms a reinsurance 
agreement may have on their reinsured’s performance as regards their 
underlying policyholders.  So far as regulators appear concerned, their 
responsibility to regulate reinsurance ends with regulating solvency.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
99 National Association of Insurance Commisioners, Current Issues: 
Nonadmitted Insurance and Reinsurance, http://www.naic.org/topics/topic_ 
surplus_lines.html (last visited February 19, 2009). 
 
100 Id. (That legislation would grant exclusive regulatory authority for multi-
state surplus lines and to the insured’s home state so as to restrict each transaction 
to a single set of regulatory oversight, rules and taxation). 
 
101 Id. 
 
102 Id.  
 
372 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
C. RISK EXITS AND FRONTING 
 
A third commonly accepted purpose of reinsurance allows the 
primary insurer to cease writing some policies.103  An insurer that seeks to 
exit a certain risk stream can be relieved of the risks of loss from those 
policies and exit that insurance market via appropriate reinsurance.104  This 
allows a certain amount of flexibility to insurers by allowing them to shift 
direction in their future business choices.105   
A few caveats are necessary here.  By reinsuring the entire loss, the 
primary insurer generally has not freed itself from its direct responsibilities 
to its policyholders, despite even a 100% risk transfer to the reinsuring 
companies.  In other words, though it may have successfully transferred the 
risks of loss, it did not transfer its servicing responsibilities to the reinsurer.  
Again, reinsurance is generally defined as a secondary indemnity 
agreement and the reinsurer does not usually assume a direct claims 
handling relationship with the policyholders of the reinsured.106  Reinsuring 
agreements can, however, include “cut-out” provisions, which allow a 
direct action by the policyholders against the reinsurer; provisions like 
these change the reinsuring relationship.107  
                                                                                                                 
103 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1056-57 (“Just as reinsurance enables an 
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer 
to leave a particular kind of business quickly.  An insurer that wants to rid itself of 
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the 
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and 
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.”).   
104 Id.  
 
105 Id.  
 
106 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at § 
40.01 (“In essence, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.  It is a 
contractual arrangement under which an insurer secures coverage from a reinsurer 
for a potential loss to which it is exposed under insurance policies issued to 
original insureds.  The risk indemnified against is the risk that the insurer will have 
to pay on the underlying insured risk.  Because reinsurance is a contract of 
indemnity, absent specific cash-call provisions, the reinsurer is not required to pay 
under the contract until after the original insurer has paid a loss to its original 
insured.”).   
 
107 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 27 (noting 
the definition of the term ‘cut-through endorsement’ as “an endorsement to an 
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One benefit of the reinsurer’s role instead of the primary insurer 
role is that the reinsurer is generally free from direct original policyholder 
action.  For this reason, the standards of contract performance and the 
mutual obligations of the reinsured and reinsurer differ in type and 
structure from that of policyholder and insurer.  Some of these relationships 
and the differences of obligations are described in Section IV of this Essay.  
Too much direct interaction by the reinsurer and the original policyholder 
will force the reinsurer to be treated simply as an insurer of the 
policyholder, obviating some of the benefits and performance obligations 
associated with the reinsuring agreement, usually to the reinsurer’s 
detriment.  Likewise, though there is nothing to prevent the kind of direct 
assumption of the primary insurer’s role, such a situation really is better 
understood as a novation of the original primary insurance policies, rather 
than the type of reinsurance agreement for business agility that is the more 
common purpose of seeking reinsurance for indemnity purposes.  
Another brief caveat is also useful here.  Placing reinsurance for 
100% of a certain type of underwriting business for the purpose of exiting 
the business is likewise different from another type of 100% reinsuring 
agreement that displays certain similar characteristics.  In “fronting 
agreements”, an insurer will enter into a policy with the understanding that 
another party, a reinsurer, will be responsible for the entire amount that it is 
required to pay under the policy.108  One New York court described a 
fronting agreement or “fronting cessation” as an arrangement where an 
insurer issues a policy on a risk “with an understanding that another party 
will insure it”.109  The purpose of these “fronting agreements” is to allow a 
reinsurer not qualified or licensed to do business in the state, the 
                                                                                                                          
insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the 
insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have 
been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory 
receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee, 
as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer.”).   
 
108 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(describing a fronting agreement as a “well established ad perfectly legal scheme” 
where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance companies and then 
immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value).   
 
109 Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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opportunity to profit from the sale of insurance transactions in that state.110  
Generally, the licensed insurer will receive a fee for acting as the “front”.111  
Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is 
nothing illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unauthorized 
insurer.  In fact, so long as all other regulatory goals are met, these 
relationships can allow for a significant increase in insurance capacity.112  
 
D. LOSS STABILITY  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reinsurance is a mechanism 
for insurers to stabilize their profits and expected losses.113  Insurance does 
and always has concerned risk.114  Using reinsurance, the primary insurer 
can set a limit on its exposure by facultative insurance for any given risk, 
use a surplus treaty to create a ceiling on aggregate loss or determine its 
percentage of risk retained through a pro-rata arrangement.115  In this way, 
                                                                                                                 
110 See Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F. 
Supp. 481, 484 (S. D.  Miss. 1993). 
 
111 See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1336 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
 
112 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at § 
40.04[5] (“A licensed reinsurer can front for an unauthorized reinsurer or a 
reinsurance syndicate, to permit the ceding insurer to take credit for the reinsurance 
without need for security.”).   
 
113 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 (“A fourth purpose of reinsurance is 
to stabilize insurers’ profits and losses.”).   
 
114 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 49 (noting 
the definition of the term ‘risk’ as “a term which defines uncertainty of loss, 
chance of loss, or the variance of actual from expected results as it relates to 
coverage provided under an insurance or reinsurance contract.  Also the term is 
used to identify the object of insurance protection, e.g., a building, an automobile, 
a human life, or exposure to liability.  In reinsurance, each ceding company 
customarily makes its own rules for defining a risk.”).   
 
115 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (“Insurers 
often seeks to reduce the wide swings in profits and loss margins inherent to the 
insurance business.  These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of 
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known 
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even cumulative losses can be restricted to designated limits.116  The 
insurer uses reinsurance as a form of stability control, enabling them to 
fulfill their obligations to policyholders in a continuous manner117 and 
potentially stabilize their profits.118 
 
IV. REINSURANCE AS PRIVATE REGULATOR 
 
As we have seen, reinsurance is a flexible and multifunctional 
arrangement.  If the benefits of reinsurance to insurers were not so 
attractive, this multinational, trillion dollar industry would not be nearly 
such a popular choice of insurers.  Yet, the potential for reinsurance to 
affect the business conduct of insurers has not been among insurance 
regulatory concerns. This is likely because reinsurance is considered to 
consist of agreements between sufficiently sophisticated parties so as to 
require little formal regulatory oversight of the relationship.  That 
conclusion, however, precludes the understanding that through the medium 
of contracting for reinsurance, the insurer subjects itself to limitations – a 
kind of private legislation- similar to that of a consumer policyholder with 
its insurer.  Just as with primary insurance, the existence of a reinsurance 
agreement limits the options of insurer action if they wish to benefit from 
the reinsuring agreement.   
                                                                                                                          
until sometime in the future.  Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these 
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company’s overall operating 
results.”).   
 
116 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 (“Through reinsurance, the 
maximum losses on policies can be kept to manageable levels, and cumulative 
losses over a period of time can be kept within a designated limit.”).   
 
117 Corcoran v. Universal Reins. Corp., 713 F. Supp. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(“Insurance companies depend upon reinsurance contracts for financial stability 
and hence their ability to fulfill their obligations under their policies.”). 
 
118 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4  (“Insurers 
often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent to the 
insurance business.  These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of 
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known 
until sometime in the future.  Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these 
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company’s overall results.”).   
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This is so because the reinsurance agreement is not one without 
conditions.  Those conditions include everything from offering the 
reinsurer access to its underwriting philosophy119 and underwriting success 
rates, to providing defenses to reinsurance performance based on 
inadequate claims handling.  Moreover, the sheer breadth of the advantages 
available to an insurer from reinsurance make it likely that a prudent 
insurer will keep in mind the requirements and interests of the reinsurance 
industry while setting its underwriting and claims handling mechanisms in 
place.120  Just like a consumer policyholder will seek to keep his losses 
down to attract lower cost insurance, so will an insurer strive to make itself 
attractive to reinsurers.   
Importantly, it must be recognized that reinsurance is generally not 
a one-off deal.  Rather, reinsurance agreements are entered into for a 
specific time and are often then renegotiated.121  When a party is aware that 
its conduct under one agreement will affect the terms of its next agreement, 
it can only be assumed that the party will seek to mitigate activities which 
could have a future negative financial effect.  If one can agree on nothing 
else as regards the insurance industry, the capacity for these companies to 
consider their long term financial interests should be somewhat obvious. 
Another aspect of this discussion is not just that insurers seek to 
make themselves fiscally attractive risks to their reinsurers, an activity that 
                                                                                                                 
119 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 57 (noting 
the definition of underwriting capacity as “[t]he maximum amount of money an 
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a 
given period.  The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be 
imposed by law or regulatory authority.”).   
 
120 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 (noting 
“[i]nsurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit liability 
on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against 
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity.  Depending on the ceding company’s 
goals, different types of reinsurance contracts are available to bring about the 
desired result.”).   
 
121 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (noting 
“reinsurance contracts must be shaped to the ceding insurer’s unique requirements.  
No two contracts are alike – all have marked variations in retention levels, 
coverages and exclusions.  An insurance company’s needs for reinsurance depend 
on its book of business and financial and underwriting strategies.  The reinsurance 
contract, and hence reinsurance premiums, must be individually tailored and 
determined by the parties.”).   
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any party seeking capital would undertake.  Rather it is the identification 
that terms and standards common to the reinsurance relationship have the 
potential to affect insurance company action as regards their primary 
policyholder in areas that come within the bounds of current insurance 
regulatory interests.  Specifically, insurer practices in underwriting and 
claims handling.   
 
A. A BRIEF LOOK AT INSURANCE REGULATORY GOALS: THE 
IDEA OF “AEQUUM ET BONUM”.122 
 
Insurance regulation seeks to achieve a complex set of goals 
through the regulation of insurance.  Regulation, as discussed earlier, 
frequently concerns itself with issues of insurer solvency.123  This interest is 
not conceived of solely as an attempt to keep a lucrative industry 
functioning.  Rather, insurer solvency regulation exists in large part to 
obviate the harm to insured policyholders who would be hurt as a result the 
insurer’s insolvency.124   Unlike many other types of transactions, insurance 
does not lend itself to being the type of product that can be replaced if, just 
as a policyholder should come to need the insurer to perform, the 
policyholder were to learn that its company has defaulted as a result of 
insolvency.  Put even more plainly, if insufficient reserves cause an insurer 
to default as a result of too many claims being made, in a catastrophe 
scenario for example, the negative externalities of that default are 
potentially extreme.125  
                                                                                                                 
122 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (8th ed. 2004) (noting the term 
secundum aequum et bonum means “[a]ccording to what is just and good.”).   
 
123 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (noting 
“reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency.”).   
 
124 See STARING, supra note 20, § 19, at 19-1(noting “[r]einsurance has certain 
advantages which accrue to the insured public as well…reinsurance coverage 
represents an added shield protecting a policyholder against uncompensated loss.  
This advantage to the insureds is realized most obviously in the event of the 
primary insurer’s insolvency.  “Thus, from the perspective of an insured or 
policyholder, the insolvency of the primary insurer may make any reinsurance the 
only or de facto source of at least partial compensation for losses incurred.”).   
 
125 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (noting 
“[r]einsurance provides protection against catastrophic loss in much the same way 
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Solvency, however, is not the only goal of insurance regulation.  
Rather the mission of insurance regulators is also to assure consumers of 
fair treatment and protection from unfair trade practices.126  Fairness can be 
seen to include appropriate access to insurance and the prevention of 
impermissible discriminatory practices and other notions of consumer 
protection. Taken as a whole, this amorphous “public policy” regulatory 
interest has perhaps been best characterized by some academics as the 
insurance regulatory principle of “Aequum et Bonum”.127   
Used to encompass a spectrum of “public good” regulatory 
objectives, the identification of this principle is a  useful shorthand. These 
“public good” regulatory goals are translated into regulatory policy in a 
                                                                                                                          
it helps stabilize an insurer’s loss experience.  Insurers use reinsurance to protect 
against catastrophes in two ways.  First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic 
financial loss resulting from a single event, such as the total fire loss of a large 
manufacturing plant.  Second, reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of 
many smaller claims resulting from a single event, such as an earthquake or major 
hurricane, that affects many policyholders simultaneously.  While the insurer is 
able to cover losses individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer 
wishes to retain.”).   
 
126 Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk 
containment and default.  However, risk of default is not the sole purview of 
insurance regulation.  Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest, 
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and 
equitable normative policies.  For example, the Connection Department of 
Insurance describes its mission as follows: 
 
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve 
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing 
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by 
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient 
manner which promotes a competitive and financially sound 
insurance market for consumers, and by enforcing the insurance 
laws to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and are protected 
from unfair practices.  
 
Connecticut Insurance Department: Our Mission Statement, 
http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396.   
 
127 See Howell E. Jackson & Edward L. Symons Jr., Regulation of Financial 
Institutions 452 (1998).   
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variety of ways and it has not escaped notice  that “the objective of aequum 
et bonum is present in some degree to most systems of insurance law and 
regulation.  It has many facets:  It is equality.  It is morality. It is fairness, 
equality, reasonableness.  It may even be efficiency, economy, 
parsimony.”128  
Generally this principle is reflected in the tripartite goals that rates 
not be “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory”, the standard 
language in nearly every state’s regulatory legislation.129 Likewise 
regulations prohibiting unfair trade practices in the handling of a claim are 
created in the interest of consumer protection and fairness.130   This can be 
seen to reflect a somewhat disjointed effort to stay true to the “public 
interest” as best as it can be defined by regulators and courts while at the 
same time offering a private industry an opportunity for profit in an 
industry demanding regulated solvency.  For this reason, underwriting 
practices, the assignment of rates to the sale of insurance, and its corollary 
– claims handling – are within the purview of insurance regulatory 
interest.131   
In their regulatory efforts Insurance Commissioners have not 
apparently considered the potential effect reinsurance agreements could 
have on insurers performance of their obligations to their policyholders, nor 
does there appear to have been any systemic review of the public policy 
                                                                                                                 
128 Id. 
 
129 This authorization for regulatory efforts in these identifiably somewhat 
conflicting and unclear goals is supported by the long standing identification of 
insurance as something other than a purely private contractual affair.  As courts 
have long noted, “It is no longer open to question that the business of insurance is 
affected with a public interest . . . Neither the company nor a policyholder has the 
inviolate rights that characterize private contracts.”  Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 74 P.2d 761, 774 (Cal. 1937). Thus, “[t]he contract of the policyholder is 
subject to the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.”  Id. at 774-75. 
 
130 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 13 
(noting the NAIC works in conjunction with state insurance regulators in serving 
the public interest and facilitating “the fair and equitable treatment of insurance 
consumers.”).   
 
131 See id. (noting fundamental insurance regulatory goals include protecting 
the public interest, promoting competitive markets, promoting the reliability, 
solvency, and financial solidity of insurance institutions, and supporting and 
improving state regulation of insurance.”).   
380 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
concerns implicated by the availability of reinsurance for coverage of bad-
faith extracontractual damages132 as a matter of consumer protection.  In 
the next sections, we will identify how the core principle of reinsurance 
agreements- the reciprocal duty of good faith- when taken in concert with 
other common reinsurance doctrines and practices, have the capability of 
influencing insurer behavior on an industry wide scale.  Likewise, we will 
review how the court’s interpretation of these obligations have the potential 
to affect insurance claims handling decisions and practices.  Finally, we 
will review a series of available reinsurance clauses that seem to be 
antithetical to consumer protection goals and reduction of coverage 
litigation.  
 
B. GOOD FAITH AS A REGULATOR OF UNDERWRITING AND 
CLAIMS HANDLING PRACTICES 
 
Reinsurance obligates the parties to act in good faith.133   In fact, in 
can be said that this duty of good faith – enforced by the courts- is the core 
principle by which reinsurance operates in its myriad forms. 134  
                                                                                                                 
132 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 29 (noting 
the definition of extra-contractual obligations as “monetary awards or settlements 
against an insurer for its alleged wrongful conduct to its insured.  Such payments 
required of an insurer to its insured are extra-contractual in that they are not 
covered in the underlying contract.”).   
 
133 See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 56-57 (noting “[d]uties of good faith and 
fair dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between 
the initial insured and his or her insurer.  This duty originates from the reinsurer’s 
need to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating 
risks and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance 
contract.  Accordingly, this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer 
all material facts which may affect the subject risk.”).   
 
134 See STARING, supra note 20, § 12:1, at 1-2 (“The long and well established 
tradition that reinsurance transactions are a matter of ‘utmost good faith’ between 
the parties has had a predictable effect on the preparation of reinsurance 
contracts…The typical reinsurance contract is a relatively short, concise document, 
noticeably lacking in the legalisms so characteristic of other types of contracts.  
This underlying assumption of utmost good faith allows the companies to draft a 
document that assumes both parties are so knowledgeable on the subject matter to 
be dealt with and possess such a degree of sophistication as to preclude the 
necessity got long, expository declarations of intent and implementation.”).   
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Importantly, courts reviewing this doctrine have often interpreted it to 
require specific insurance company behavior as a condition precedent to 
requiring reinsurer performance of its indemnity obligation.135 Hence, 
failure to act in good faith affords the reinsurer a defense to its reinsurance 
obligation.136 Since reinsurance is frequently only triggered by extremely 
large dollar value claims, preventing the release of its reinsurer for a lack of 
good faith behavior will undoubtedly be of paramount concern to a prudent 
insurance company.  
 
i. The Duty of Good Faith in Underwriting  
 
One of the strangest aspects of reinsurance is the often overlooked 
question of how reinsurance could ever exist without becoming cost 
prohibitive.  If one were to simply think about reinsurance in terms of risk 
assessment, there seems little way that the addition of multiple new players 
in the insuring process would not add and continue adding to the cost of 
insurance.  After all, due diligence is an expensive proposition.  How could 
all these different reinsurance institutions capably evaluate the true risks of 
all the policies which they agree to reinsure, particularly in the treaty 
context, without accruing costs as large as, if not larger than, the original 
insurer?137  The answer is simply that in the reinsurance treaty context they 
simply do not engage in that kind of investigation, instead they rely on the 
underwriting skills of their reinsureds.138  Investigation costs are limited to 
                                                                                                                 
135 See e.g. Liquidation of Union Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 
674 N.E.2d 313, 319-20 (N.Y. 1996). 
 
136 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1059 (“The primary insurer and 
reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and the reinsurer will 
have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of warranty, fraud, or 
concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer’s acts or neglect give rise 
to the defense.”).   
 
137 See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 56-57 (“Duties of good faith and fair 
dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the 
initial insured and his or her insurer.  This duty originates from the reinsurer’s need 
to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks 
and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.”).   
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delving into the potential reinsured’s loss experiences, underwriting skills 
and claims handling competence.139 
How is action like that considered prudent?  As we have seen to 
our great dismay in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the consequences of 
opaque risk acquisition can be remarkably severe.  In reinsurance, the 
reciprocal obligations of good faith obviates this problem in the reinsurance 
context.140  In reinsurance, this duty often requires, “the most abundant 
good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; 
[including] the absence of any concealment or deception, however 
slight”.141  Viewing utmost good faith as appropriately sufficient to govern 
trillions of dollars of transactions is interesting in and of itself, yet, as the 
                                                                                                                          
138 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6, at 7 (“The reinsurer will always have at 
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s 
underwriting and claims practices.”).   
 
139 Id.  
 
140 See PLITT, supra note 9, at 57-58 (“[The duty of good faith] requires the 
reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which may affect the subject 
risk.  The extension of this duty of good faith is the related concept that reinsurers 
are generally bound by the reinsured’s good faith decision to pay a claim, 
commonly referred to as the ‘follow the settlements’ doctrine.  The purpose for this 
rule is to prevent situations in which reinsurers, in attempt to deny coverage, use 
against the reinsured the same coverage arguments made by the reinsured against 
the original insured, essentially eroding the good faith relationship needed in the 
reinsurance context.  The limiting factor, preventing the abuse of this doctrine, is 
the determination of whether the reinsured’s payment was made in good faith.”).   
 
141 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. (noting that good faith “is the 
position of reinsurers that their contracts are those of ‘utmost good faith.’  Utmost 
good faith contracts of any kind are so delicate in character and so susceptible of 
abuse that unusual precautions must be observed by both parties in their 
implementation.  The business of reinsurance often involves considerable oral 
exchange of information between primary insurer and reinsurer, and the reliability 
of this information is very important.  The resemblance of the customary practices 
to how business used to be conducted at the Lloyd’s Coffee House of old is 
unmistakable.  The strict law of warranty which applied to the old transactions at 
Lloyd’s probably has something in common with the duty of ‘utmost good faith’ 
which applies in reinsurance.  Both doctrines have the effect of ratcheting up the 
expectations contracting parties can reasonably possess with regard to the accuracy 
of information shared by the other party.”).   
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Second Circuit has noted, it is the core relationship that allows for 
reinsuring to profitably occur.  As they explained: 
 
Historically, the reinsurance market has relied on a 
practice of the exercise of good faith to decrease 
monitoring costs and ex ante contracting costs.  
Reinsurance works only if the sums of reinsurance 
premiums are less than the original insurance premium.  
Otherwise, the ceding insurer will not reinsure.  For the 
reinsurance premiums to be less reinsurers cannot 
duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the primary 
insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims. . . . 
Reinsurers are protected, however, by a large area of 
common interest with ceding insurers and by the 
tradition of utmost good faith, particularly in the sharing 
of information.142 
 
In other words, in exchange for placing the reinsurance at a price 
less than the original premiums, the reinsurer is allowed to rely on the good 
faith of the reinsured.143  In order for treaty reinsurance to function 
economically, the reinsurer cannot duplicate the underwriting functions 
engaged in by insurers at the time they placed the original coverage.144  
                                                                                                                 
142 Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d 
Cir. 1993).    
 
143 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. (“Not all insurance law 
doctrines are ratcheted up when it comes to reinsurance arrangements, however.  
As one court explained, ‘[r]einsurance contracts, unlike primary insurance 
contracts, are not contracts of adhesion.  Rather, reinsurance involves two 
sophisticated business entities familiar with the business of reinsurance who 
bargain at arms-length for the terms in their contract.’  Thus, a rule like the notice-
prejudice rule, which is designed to equalize the relationship between insured and 
primary insurer, may be deemed irrelevant to the reinsurance setting, and an 
insurer that fails to give timely notice to a reinsurer may find itself unable to defeat 
the reinsurer’s late notice defense on the ground that the reinsure failed to show 
prejudice.”).   
 
144 See ERIC M. HOLMES & L. ANTHONY SUTIN, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE § 102.4(a) (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE] (noting “[u]nderwriting is largely retrospective, focusing on the 
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However, that does not mean the reinsurer does not take an interest 
in the underwriting activities of its reinsureds.  As explained by the 
Reinsurance Association of America: 
 
While treaty reinsurance does not require review of 
individual risks by the reinsurer, it demands careful 
review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and 
historical experience of the ceding insurer, including a 
thoughtful evaluation of the company’s attitude toward 
claims management, engineering control, as well as the 
management’s general background, expertise and 
planned objectives.145   
 
Keeping these criteria in mind, it is difficult to imagine insurance 
companies would not create and institutionalize underwriting practices that 
are most likely to attract reinsurers if they want to benefit from 
reinsurance.146  Moreover, the reinsured company would want to ensure 
that it kept particularly good records of its underwriting efforts, as they are 
required by their good faith obligation to “disclose to the reinsurer all 
material facts which may affect the subject risk”.147  
So great is the reinsurer recognition of their risk in relying on the 
underwriting decisions of their reinsured’s that reinsurance contracts 
frequently include a clause which allows the reinsurer access to their 
reinsured’s “books and claims and underwriting files”,148 if it finds such an 
                                                                                                                          
financial condition and expertise of the ceding insurer.  A reinsurer would be well-
advised, however, to undertake a careful review of the practices and standards of a 
prospective reinsured under a treaty.  Many reinsurance treaties embody 
longstanding relationships between the parties and have been renewed many times 
over the decades.”).   
 
145 See Reinsurance Association of America, supra note 11, at 7.  
 
146 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6, at 7. (“The reinsurer will always have at 
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s 
underwriting and claims practices.”).   
 
147 See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 57.   
 
148 See STARING, supra note 20, §15:8. 
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audit necessary.   Known as “audit and inspection clauses”, these clauses 
require “the reinsured’s records relative to the contract sessions to be 
always open to the reinsurer at reasonable times.”149  These clauses offer an 
opportunity for the reinsurer to review their reinsured’s underwriting and 
claims handling practices to assure itself that the reinsured company is 
acting in conformance with its expectations and that the claims made on it 
come within scope of its reinsurance contract.150 By this method, 
reinsurer’s have the capacity to keep themselves abreast of their reinsured’s 
underwriting and claims handling practices in an ongoing manner, when 
such inquiry is reasonable. And, in the event of a dispute it allows them the 
opportunity for a direct audit. 
 
ii. The Capacity of Reinsurance to Stifle Underwriting 
Innovation 
 
The search for information implies the capacity for reaction.  The 
interplay of the duty of good faith and audit clauses offer the reinsurer the 
opportunity to monitor their reinsured’s practices.  Such monitoring has the 
capacity to influence the way in which reinsured’s create and apply their 
underwriting discretion.  Particularly for smaller insurance companies, 
dependant on reinsurance to take on the larger risks, it would not be 
beneficial to adopt underwriting practices which stray too far from the 
industry’s accepted norm.151  Should such a company attempt it, 
undoubtedly the company would have to charge higher premiums in order 
                                                                                                                 
149 Id. (noting that this right is not without limits and does not permit access to 
all the reinsured’s books generally, rather the audit is limited to the scope of the 
relationship between the parties). 
 
150 Id. (noting that audit and inspection clauses are found in both treaty and 
facultative agreements so that treaty reinsured must make available their relevant 
books and facultative reinsured’s must keep the reinsurer “advised at various levels 
of detail with respect to claims under the policy”).  
 
151 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 5-6 (noting 
“reinsurers often provide insurers with a variety of other services.  Some reinsurers 
provide guidance to insurers in underwriting, claims reserving and handling, 
investments, and even general management.  These services are particularly 
important to smaller companies interested in entering new lines of insurance.”).   
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to entice reinsurers to take on their risks.152  Likewise, those companies 
which require greater amounts of reinsurance to comply with their reserve 
requirements could also be discouraged from adopting broader or unusual 
underwriting procedures.153   
The inclusion of the reinsurer’s interest of “underwriting 
philosophy”, “historical experience of the ceding insurer” and “attention to 
the attitude of claims management” suggest that to the extent the industry 
profits from and seeks reinsurance for its business interests, those interests 
will militate in favor of choices which may not be completely congruent 
with all aspects of the regulators objectives; particularly those objectives 
which come within the broad understating of aequum et bonum. It is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that access to insurance could be restricted 
for less profitable groups or only offered at a higher cost, implicating 
notions of fairness.   
Though reinsurance monitoring may have the capacity to 
somewhat stifle or raise the cost of innovation, perhaps even to the point of 
raising issues of unfairness, there may well be some positive public good 
from the effect of reinsurance monitoring of underwriting practices.  
Reinsurers’ interest in the underwriting and claim handling processes of its 
reinsureds might well suffice as a strong financial incentive towards 
maintaining professional and non-biased underwriting practices – a 
regulatory goal.  The reinsurer’s sole interest is its own financial one.  To 
that end, the industry will seek out and reward those insurers who most 
accurately measure and rate risks.  Though the reinsurance industry may 
not have an active incentive to broaden access to insurance for public 
policy reasons, it also has no active disincentive to restrict the sale of 
properly underwritten policies.  As a whole, reinsurers profit from having 
insurance policies available to reinsure.  Given the capacity for reinsurance 
to assist small insurers to compete on an asset basis with larger companies, 
                                                                                                                 
152  New insurance lines are often covered facultatively until a sufficient loss 
history is developed to attract treaty reinsurance.  See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 
771. (“Demand for facultative reinsurance also exists for new insurance lines, 
specialty lines, or insurance products that are developed to cover traditionally 
uninsured risks.  Such risks and exposures, if accepted by a reinsurer, are likely to 
be accepted only on a facultative basis because they transcend existing actuarial 
and ratemaking techniques.”). 
 
153 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 48 (noting 
the term ‘reserve’ means “[a]n amount which is established to provide for payment 
of a future obligation.”).   
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reinsurance’s availability can act to support companies writing policies for 
previously underserviced policyholders.  In any event, reinsurers’ interest 
in the underwriting procedures of those they reinsure undoubtedly serves 
the pseudo-regulatory function of encouraging actuarially sound 
underwriting practices by rewarding those companies with greater access to 
reinsurance.   For this reason alone, reinsurance can be perceived as 
effecting industry practice beyond questions of solvency. 
 
iii. Reinsurer Monitoring of Underwriting History and the 
Potential 
 
For Market Response, the risk of reinsurance rate consequences 
does appear to effect insurance industry practice.  A look to the facultative 
reinsurance market suggests that insurers are very concerned in maintaining 
attractive loss histories and are sensitive to reinsurance costs when making 
underwriting decisions. Remember, facultative reinsurance is used to 
mitigate the effect of the phenomena of the unusual risk costing more than 
the easily forecastable risk and is usually placed when the risk would not be 
accepted under a treaty.154  Again, it is through facultative reinsurance that 
an insurer could acquire reinsurance for a specific risk, a specific policy or 
a specific group of policies.155  It is for this reason that facultative 
                                                                                                                 
154 See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 770-771 (“By definition facultative 
placements involve risks that fall outside the general parameters of a treaty 
reinsurance program.  Facultative reinsurance is purchased by primary insurance 
companies, captives, or reinsurers to cover assumed business that, for one reason 
or another, will not be ceded to a treaty.”).   
 
155 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 at 7-8. (“Facultative reinsurance of a 
single risk, which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the 
last half of the Nineteenth Century.  A treaty, which is a long term contract 
covering more than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821.  Treaties 
became common around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the 
excess of loss treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San 
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906.”).  See also JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b], 
at 1054 (“Facultative reinsurance involves the primary insurer entering into an 
agreement for the reinsurance of a particular risk.  The reinsurance can be written 
on a pro rata or an excess basis; the root word ‘faculty’ denotes that the reinsurer 
has a choice of accepting or rejecting any risk proposed and of demanding 
whatever premium it thinks appropriate.”).   
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reinsurance “usually covers catastrophic or unusual risks”.156  Facultative 
reinsurance, however, will likely be more expensive per risk than broader 
treaty reinsurance because with facultative reinsurance the reinsurer often 
employs “substantial personnel and technical resources” to underwrite 
those risks.157  Treaty reinsurance avoids this kind of cost  
Yet, it is common practice to combine treaty and facultative 
reinsurance to protect an insurer’s loss history with its treaty reinsurer.   
Companies often use facultative insurance to protect loss histories even 
though reinsurance coverage for the facultative risk already existed under 
treaty reinsurance agreements.  The insurer’s strategic decision to enter the 
additional facultative agreement as a hedge against unexpected losses on a 
risk is done with an eye out to protect against losses which would otherwise 
have the capacity to trigger a renegotiation of the insurer’s entire treaty or 
cause future treaties to be reinsured at a higher cost.   
As an example, the Reinsurance Association of America158 
describes a situation where in order to accommodate a policyholder, an 
insurer may agree to provide commercial automobile insurance coverage – 
a higher risk activity.  The RAA argues that  additional facultative 
reinsurance159 would be appropriate in this situation even if the treaty 
reinsurance160 the insurer had already placed  did not exclude commercial 
                                                                                                                 
156 See Reinsurance Association of America, supra note 11, at 7. 
 
157 Id. at 8. 
 
158 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Who We Are,  
http://reinsurance.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3615.  (The RAA describes 
themselves as “…a national trade association, headquartered in Washington, 
D.C., that is committed to an activist agenda to represent the interests of the 
property and casualty reinsurance industry in Congress, state  legislatures, and 
international forums.”). 
 
159 See HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at  §102.4(b) 
(noting “[a] facultative reinsurance contract is written to cove a specifically 
identified risk.  Both the ceding insurer and the reinsurer have the option (or 
‘faculty,’ from the Latin for ability) to affect reinsurance on a risk-by-risk basis.  
Neither is obligated to cede or assume any given risk.”).   
 
160 Id. (noting “reinsurance treaties are blanket agreements negotiated between 
an reinsured and a reinsurer under which reinsurance is automatically provided for 
all policies issued by the reinsured that meet the criteria of the treaty.  Treaty 
reinsurance is sometimes (but rarely) called automatic reinsurance.  When a treaty 
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automobile coverage to “protect its losses under applicable treaty 
agreements”.  As the RAA points out, the facultative “rider” need not even 
be purchased from the treaty reinsurers, allowing those potential 
commercial automobile losses to be handled under a completely separate 
relationship.  This suggests the overall cost of ongoing higher treaty 
premiums is sufficiently grave to encourage the additional cost of “double 
reinsuring” certain risks, even at the relatively higher specific cost of the 
facultative agreement. 
In any event, this common choice to pair facultative with treaty 
reinsurance to protect loss histories161 supports the conclusion that 
reinsurance  monitoring of loss histories does effect reinsurance choices.  
This monitoring of underwriting practices162 has the capacity to effect 
underwriting decisions holistically and possibly industry-wide as insurers 
choose to implement practices that conform to the reinsurance market’s 
interests and prevent them from making underwriting risks which may 
negatively affect their reinsurance opportunities.  To an extent, this natural 
interplay of loss history with reinsurance costs can create a self-regulating 
and self-limiting tendency among certain insurers to produce loss histories 
lower than similarly situated insurers.   
Whether this activity is congruent with all articulated insurance 
regulatory interests is open to question, but there certainly exists the 
potential for segmentation of the market and increased costs for some 
policyholders. The simplest way for insurers to decrease loss histories is to 
restrict their business to lower risk policyholders or limit their dollar 
exposure to those risks.  A “cherry picked” book of business, for example 
                                                                                                                          
is in force, the ceding insurer is obligated to cede and the reinsurer is obligated to 
accept all of the risks within the scope of the treaty.”).   
 
161 See id. (noting “a reinsured can structure an elaborate program of 
reinsurance using a combination of treaties and facultative contracts, using one or 
multiple reinsurers.”).   
 
162 Not only are underwriting practices monitored on a general basis, but in 
conformity with the reinsurer’s need to rely on their reinsured’s underwriting 
expertise, the duty of good faith requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer 
all material facts which may affect the insured risk.  See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, 
supra note 10, at § 16:03[a], at 1036-37 (“It is a basic obligation of a reinsured to 
disclose to potential reinsurers all material facts regarding the original risk of loss, 
and failure to do so renders a reinsurance agreement voidable or rescindable.”). 
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could attract more reinsurance interest; as a result, the cherry-picking 
insurer can charge lower premiums to gain an even bigger bowl of cherries.   
To the extent that this segmentation would not have occurred but 
for the reinsurance interests, reinsurance can be seen as having an effect on 
underwriting.  There would still be an interest in insuring and reinsuring 
lemons, of course, so long as they can and will pay higher premiums which 
could be shared with the reinsurer, but the potential for reinsurance pricing 
to encourage cherry-picking can be somewhat troubling.  The competitive 
advantage an insurer can obtain through reduced reinsurance premiums 
may militate against the traditional benefits afforded by the law of large 
numbers.  The insurer could determine their best option for profit lay in the 
reinsurance cost saving produced by the lower risks.   
An insurer with a sufficiently broad market share and multi-line 
business, of course, could get what would amount to a “bulk discount” for 
placing most of its reinsurance business with one company.  But, if smaller 
insurers took the “cherry” approach and were rewarded with sufficiently 
lower premiums to compete against even the “bulk” advantage, the move 
towards segmentation would start when the big insurer slowly (or even 
quickly) began to loose enough of its cherries to affect its loss history in a 
way significant enough to offset its “bulk” appeal to its reinsurers.  
Remember, the reinsurance market is extremely broad, with at least 50% of 
domestic insurers reinsured by foreign companies.163  There is likely 
always some reinsurer around with a taste for cherries. 
Importantly, reinsurance’s effect on cherry-picked risk premiums 
does not always result in the company actually restricting their business to 
those “better” risks alone.  There is no reason why reinsurance treaties must 
be structured so as to take the entire book of business for a certain type of 
risk, though they often are structured that way.164  An insurer could reinsure 
with one company for their “better” risks at the lower prices, seek a 
competitive advantage on the market, and move the worse risks into a 
                                                                                                                 
163 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1 
(“Reinsurance can be purchased from three distinct sources: reinsurance companies 
located in the United States, reinsurance departments of U.S. primary insurance 
companies, and alien reinsurers that are located outside the U.S. and not licensed 
here.  The ceding insurer may purchase reinsurance directly from a reinsurer or 
through a broker or reinsurance intermediary.”).  
 
164 See HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at § 102.4A, at 
32 (noting “[a] treaty may be written to cover some or all of an insurer’s line of 
business”).   
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different book charged higher premiums; premiums sufficient to entice a 
different reinsurer.  A different insurer could acquire better overall pricing 
by averaging the two pools, but it could face difficulty getting those 
cherries away from the segmented insurer, moving the whole market 
towards segmentation.   
There is also the possibility that certain types of policyholders – 
likely corporate ones- which could be sufficiently attractive to an insurer so 
as to make the relative reinsurance benefits irrelevant.  If, for example, the 
worse risks in one line were restricted to those who proved more profitable 
for the company on some other business basis, like companies interested in 
multi-line policies or companies which in some sense represent loss 
leaders, the higher reinsurance premiums could be offset for even those 
“worse” risks.  This offset provides the book of business with a competitive 
advantage.  Yet, even that potential benefit would have to be consistently 
reevaluated in relation to current market rates and costs of reinsurance.  If 
the advantage of getting the big book of business did not offset the higher 
reinsurance rates, it would no longer be profitable, forcing the insurer to 
raise its rates across the board.  And, just as with the possible loss of 
cherries scenarios described above, if another insurance company could 
convince the multi-line user it was better served by spinning off the 
insurance of its cherry risks for a significantly lower premium; such 
competition could again support a move toward segmentation. 
Unfortunately, in all these scenarios, there exists the risk of 
identification of a certain class of generally unattractive risks with fewer 
insuring options other than higher premiums. Hence, restrictive 
underwriting in the search for lower reinsurance costs can be seen as 
having the capacity to self-support segmentation through beneficial 
reinsurance rates.  To the extent that reinsurance was the “but for” cause of 
this segmentation and increased costs for certain classes of risks, 
reinsurance is acting as a regulator of insurance rates and should certainly 
come within governmental regulatory review.  
It would be extremely interesting to identify empirically whether 
certain state actions, such as prohibiting coverage refusals to certain classes 
of policyholders in their state results in an initial spike in the cost of 
reinsurance for the reinsureds who must extend their underwriting in 
conformity with those new mandates.  Likewise, it would be very 
interesting to determine how long, if at all, such a spike continued to exist 
and whether a new underwriting requirement became sufficiently common 
that the effect disappeared. 
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iv. Reinsurance Clauses, Doctrines and Their Effect on 
Claims Handling 
 
As with underwriting165, reinsurance has the capacity to influence 
the activities of reinsureds, or those seeking to become reinsureds, attitudes 
and actions in the claims handling process.  Because of the manner in 
which the reinsured’s good faith obligation166 has been interpreted by 
courts so as to offer the reinsurer a defense to its indemnity obligations, the 
proper handling of a potentially reinsurable claim is likely paramount to 
any prudent reinsured.  Even though, as described below, the claims 
handling would have to be so poor to constitute some form of “negligence” 
to succeed as a defense, the risk of lost reinsurance funds is no small 
matter.  Further, given the fact that claims handling processes and 
“philosophy” are reviewed  as part of reinsurers  decision to reinsure (just 
as with underwriting),  adoption of formalized claims handling processes 
which would assure compliance with the reinsurance “non-negligent” 
claims handling standard is not unlikely.  As we will see, the actions which 
a court might construe as “negligent” handling and investigation of a claim 
are neither necessarily intuitive nor without cost. 
 
v. Duty of Good Faith in Claims Handling and Court 
Interpretation 
 
In order to understand how the courts became arbiters of insurance 
claims handling sufficiency requires some explanation of a few new 
reinsurance doctrines and clauses – particularly the loss settlements or 
follow the fortunes doctrine.167  Again, a key point to remember is that the 
                                                                                                                 
165 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 57 (noting 
the term ‘underwriting capacity’ means “[t]he maximum amount of money an 
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a 
given period.  The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be 
imposed by law or regulatory authority.”).   
 
166 See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., Ltd., 9 F. 
Supp. 2d 49, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d, 217 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Compagnie De Reassurance D’Ile de Fr., et al., v. New England Reins. Corp., et 
al., 57 F.3d 56, 88 (1st Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995). 
 
167 See William C. Hoffman, Common Law of Reinsurance Loss Settlement 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer’s 
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duty of good faith is mutual and has been interpreted to create a powerful 
judicially-supported standard of care when examining the insurer’s 
performance of its claims handling function.168   
Most reinsurance agreements requires the reinsurer to “follow the 
fortunes” or “follow the settlements” of its reinsureds.  These obligations 
are somewhat intuitively understandably necessary so as to allow the 
proper functioning of reinsurance.169 In short, the “follow the fortunes” 
doctrine170 obligates a reinsurer to follow the underwriting fortunes of its 
                                                                                                                          
Contractual Obligation to Indemnify the Reinsured for Settlements, 28 TORT & 
INS. L. J. 659, 659-60 (1992) (offering an expansive analysis of the reinsurance 
loss settlement clause and the application of the duty of utmost good faith).   
 
168 See PLITT, supra note 9, at § 9:17 (“Duties of good faith and fair dealing 
run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial 
insured and his or her insurer.”).   
 
169 These doctrines are often conjoined in court decisions leading to certain 
amount of confusion in their analysis.  See e.g., Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac Employers 
Ins. Co., v. Home Ins. Co., 991 P.2d 638, 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).  This 
problem has been noted by both courts and commentators.  See Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that 
“[t]he term ‘follow the fortunes” has been used imprecisely to describe the 
reinsurer’s duty to follow the claims adjustment decisions of the ceding company, 
thereby giving rise to some ambiguity as to its meaning.  ‘Follow the fortunes’ 
more accurately describes the obligation to follow the reinsured’s underwriting 
fortunes, whereas ‘follow the settlements’ refers to the duty to follow the actions of 
the cedent in adjusting and settling claims.”). 
 
170 There is considerable debate as to whether there truly exists a “follow-the-
fortunes” or “follow the settlements” doctrine in the absence of a “follow-the 
fortunes” clause.  Some treatises and courts identify a “doctrine”. See PLITT, supra 
note 9, at § 9:17 (“reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured’s good faith 
decision to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the ‘follow the settlements’ 
doctrine”) (discussing ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878 
(8th Cir. 2002) (the follow the fortunes “doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted 
in good faith in handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the 
claims, the reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent”).  
Other commentators are explicit that in the absence of a general loss settlement or 
other “follow-the fortunes clause” the nature of reinsurance as an indemnity 
contract prohibits an implied-in-law obligation to reinsure a loss settlement unless 
the reinsured can prove actual –as opposed to a good faith belief of – liability.  See 
Hoffman, supra note 174, at 679. The courts are aware of the split authority on the 
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reinsured and pay its share of a loss sustained by its reinsured,171 according 
to the terms of the reinsurance contract.172 This clause obligates a reinsurer 
to indemnify its reinsured for its good faith payment of all claims that 
arguably fall within the scope of the agreement – no “second guessing” 
allowed.173  Likewise, a “follow the settlements” clause requires 
                                                                                                                          
matter.  For example, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 
1328, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court, when finding in favor of the reinsured 
Aetna, stated: 
 
Under Aetna's theory, it is the settled custom and practice in the 
reinsurance industry that reinsurers follow settlements entered into 
between a ceding company and its insured, as long as the settlements are 
made in good faith after a reasonable investigation and do not involve ex 
gratia payments. Essentially, Aetna maintains that a reinsurer's 
undertaking to follow the ceding company's settlements is implicit in any 
contract of reinsurance, and enforceable even in the absence of an 
explicit loss settlements clause. Home responds that in the absence of a 
loss settlements clause, a reinsurer is not bound by a ceding company's 
settlement of a coverage dispute without the consent of the reinsurer. The 
court agrees with Aetna (emphasis added). 
The weight of authority appears to favor Aetna's position, although 
the authorities admittedly do not speak with one voice. For example, 
Gerathewohl opines that the "fundamental follow-the-fortunes principle" 
generally applies irrespective of whether it is expressed in the contract of 
reinsurance, i.e., in a loss settlement clause.   
 
171 A reinsurer is not, however, required to pay losses “squarely outside” the 
scope of the ceding insurers coverage.  See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10 
at § 16.01[a], at 1013.   
 
172 See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 413 F.3d 12, 
1231 (1st Cir. 2005).  The reinsurer cannot, however, be found liable for an 
amount in excess of the reinsurance limit of liability stated in the agreement.  See 
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 
1993).  This includes the reinsurer’s liability for “expenses” as well as for the 
amount of the actual loss.  See Excess Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 882 
N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (N.Y. 2004) (finding that a reinsurers obligation for expenses 
incurred while handling a loss is capped by the limit of liability in a facultative 
agreement regardless of the presence of a “follow the fortunes” clause). 
 
173 See N. River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“‘Follow the fortunes’ clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing good-faith 
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indemnification of the reinsured for good faith settlement decisions.174  
Such broad grants of power by the reinsurer to the discretion of its 
reinsured is seen by the courts to require the insurer to comport with a 
standard of care appropriate to that level of reliance and in accordance with 
its good faith obligation.  In its application, a reinsurer will only be bound 
by a reinsured’s claims decision if the reinsured’s decision was made in 
conformance with judicially created criteria for identifying insurer good 
faith .175 Specifically, the claims decision must have been made after a 
“reasonable, businesslike investigation” into the propriety of the claim 
                                                                                                                          
settlements and obtaining de novo review of judgments of the reinsured’s liability 
to its insured.”).  This standard, however, is not always completely clear in its 
application.  See JERRY, supra note 9, at § 142[e], at 1061-62 (“The usual role of 
the reinsurer is to ‘follow the fortunes’ of the primary insurer as if the reinsurer 
were a party to the original insurance.  Some courts insist that the reinsurance 
agreement have appropriate language placing this obligation on the reinsurer, while 
others presume that the reinsurer’s obligations follow the form (although in most 
certificates ‘follow the form’ language will be found).  As the phrase suggests, the 
idea is that the reinsurer is to accept whatever settlements the primary insurer 
makes and participate and pay according to the reinsurance agreement the 
appropriate share of whatever judgments are entered that trigger the primary 
insurer’s liability.  Difficulties can arise in determining exactly what ‘fortunes’ the 
reinsurer agreed to ‘follow,’ in that the reinsurer’s obligation to participate in 
whatever payments the primary insurer makes is not unlimited.”).   
 
174 In general, “[w]hen the reinsurance agreement contains a ‘follow the 
settlements’ provision, the reinsurer will be bound by the settlement or 
compromise agreed by the cedent unless it can meet its burden of proving either 
that settlement was dishonestly arrived at, or that the reassured has failed to take all 
proper and business-like steps to have the amount of loss fairly and carefully 
ascertained.”  OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, at § 16.01[b], at 1020.  
Unsurprisingly, there is some muddling of terms as regards the use of the word 
“settlement” in various clause formulae.   See e.g. Mentor Ins. Co. (UK), Ltd., v. 
Norges Brannkasse, et al., 996 F.2d 506, 508, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1993) (construing a 
reinsurance policy which provided that it was “subject to all terms, clauses, 
conditions and settlements as original to require reinsurance “payment where 
cedent’s good faith payment is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance 
coverage that was reinsured” using a “follow-the-fortunes” analysis.).    
 
175 See Hoffman, supra note 174, at 692-93 (noting “[d]ishonesty, including 
fraud, bad faith, and collusion, is a universally recognized defense to a loss 
settlement clause”). 
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prior to granting it,176 and  where there was a “reasonable basis” to 
conclude the underlying claim was covered by the reinsured’s ’s policy as a 
matter of law.177   
Since the obligation of good faith is mutual, the courts allow that 
certain circumstances, indicative of a lack of good faith, are sufficient for 
the reinsurer to be released from its obligation to reinsure.  In other words, 
the court seeks a way to make sure the reinsurer is not taken advantage of 
by its reinsured.  Particularly in the investigation and handling of the claim, 
in the absence of a reasonable standard, the reinsured could foreseeably 
choose not to investigate the claim properly to the financial detriment of its 
reinsurer. For this reason, the courts require the positive duty of reasonable 
and businesslike investigation of the claim by the cedent company.  In 
theory, this likely only further strengthens the already extant interest of the 
reinsured company to be sure it is actually liable for coverage prior to 
payment – another instance where reinsurance supports a public interest by 
incentivizing prudence.  In practice however, the availability of a defense 
on these grounds may lead to a reinsured cedent being overcautious in its 
claims review and handling at considerable expense.  
 
vi. The Case of Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co.  
 
One “follow the settlements” case is particularly illuminating of the 
capacity of “poor” claims handling to release the reinsurer from its 
indemnity obligation.  In Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co.,178 the court 
focused on claims handling improprieties in its decision to release the 
                                                                                                                 
176 See Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 
93 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 
177 See Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Colum. Cas. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d, 251, 
258 (D. Conn. 2000). 
 
178 Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209 
(D.N.J. July 14, 2006), vacated by, Goldman v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70406.  Though this decision was vacated as a result of 
agreement by the parties prior to hearing by the Third Circuit, for purposes of a 
recent court’s analysis of the requirement of reasonable “businesslike” claim 
handling and investigation it is helpful.  Instances where a court determines that 
the claims investigation was insufficient are rare, making this case of particular 
value for its findings of fact and reasoning. 
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reinsurer of its obligation arising from the reinsured’s settlement.179 The 
underling case and settlements involved product liability tort claims 
asserted against Pfizer, as the manufacturer of allegedly defective heart-
valves, by patients who had received the potentially defective valves.180  
The manufacturer was the original insured which settled claims with the 
consent of Integrity Insurance Company, the original excess insurer which 
sought indemnity from General Accident Insurance Company of America, 
its reinsurer.181   
Interestingly, the “claims handling” improprieties identified in this 
decision were all actually related to the reinsured excess insurer’s legal 
acumen and choices made in evaluating and settling the claim.182  They 
primarily were issues involving the proper acquisition of independent   
coverage counsel and expert medical advice.183 The court determined that 
failure to seek certain types of legal counsel and take certain investigatory 
steps, given the complexity of the case, constituted “gross negligence”.184  
                                                                                                                 
179 See id., at *77–85 (reviewing the actions of Mr. Reive,  the Senior Claims 
Examiner for Integrity Insurance Company, excess insurance company whose 
reinsurance agreement with General Accident Insurance Company was the subject 
of the case).  
 
180 Id. at *13-34.   
 
181 Id. at *8-13 (Pfizer had a classic array of multi-tiered insurance policies in 
place, with the company self-insuring for the first $10 million of liability, followed 
by two primary policies issued by INA, the Insurance Company of North America, 
above which it had umbrella issued by Transit Casualty Company, along with 
excess policies issued by Integrity, the reinsured in this case.  Id.   The Integrity 
Policies “followed the form” of the Transit umbrella policies, making the policy 
language of the Transit policies the subject of interpretation to determine the scope 
of Integrity’s liability.  Id. at *10). 
 
182 Id. at *34-66 
 
183 Id. at *81-85. (“for a case of this legal and medical complexity industry 
standards required Integrity to first obtain expert medical advice as to when bodily 
injury actually occurred and to retain its own coverage counsel for an opinion as to 
the appropriate trigger of coverage.  The failure to do so . . . breached Integrity’s 
duty to Generall Accident to make a reasonable, businesslike determination as to 
whether the Shiley Heart valve claims should have been allowed.”).   
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The court cited the insurer’s reliance on another insurer’s counsel for its 
appraisal of potential liability as inappropriate.185  Likewise, it cited failure 
of the insurer to hire its own medical expert (again it had relied on another 
insurer’s expert) to advise on the heart-valves potential for bodily injury 
and a failure of the insurer to keep up to date on the laws of trigger of 
coverage as determinative factors.186  Relying on these claims settlement 
investigation failures, the court further determined that the insurer had 
failed “breached its duty to General accident [the reinsurer] to make a 
reasonable, businesslike determination as to whether the [heart valve] 
claims should have been allowed.”187  The court also found the Pfizer 
claims beyond the scope of Integrity’s policies and Integrity’s settlement of 
the Pfizer claims to have been so grossly negligent so as to constitute bad-
faith.188  As such, the reinsurer was freed from its presumptively applicable 
duty to follow the insurer’s settlement. 189 
To those familiar with the tort litigation process, this demonstrates 
a privately assumed obligation’s effect on the legal process and litigation 
costs.  By focusing on the insurer’s choice not to hire independent counsel 
or rely on other medical experts as grounds for release from reinsurance 
obligations, even in a case like Suter where such reliance was self-
                                                                                                                          
184 Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at 
*84 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006). The court’s analysis of the “follow the settlements 
doctrine” requirement  that the reinsured’s duty to make a reasonable, businesslike 
investigation noted:   
 
What is a reasonable, businesslike investigation of course must depend on the 
facts of each case. The factual findings support the conclusion that Mr. Reive's 
investigation was anything but reasonable and businesslike. Mr. Reive's 
investigation of the Pfizer claim was superficial, relying as it did on Pfizer's 
position and opinions of Transit's counsel, which were even at times inaccurate. 
The defendant has demonstrated that Mr. Reive did not make the kind of 
reasonable and businesslike investigation that the circumstances required. Id.  
 
185 Id. at *84-5. 
 
186 Id. at *81-85. 
 
187 Id. at *85.  
 
188 Id. at *85-86. 
 
189 Id.  
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evidently imprudent, the court explicitly allows the reinsurance contract 
obligation of reasonable investigation to affect the insurer’s business 
judgment to save the cost of its own counsel or experts.190  In effect, this 
type of decision will require the use of coverage counsel by each insurer 
implicated on a sufficiently “complex” claim that may implicate its 
reinsurance. It also  has the potential to institutionalize the added cost of 
duplicative legal analysis and investigation of claims where reinsurance is 
implicated. 191   
To be sure, the Suter case, involved a significantly complex area of 
bodily injury law where the opinions of qualified legal and medical experts 
would likely have been sensible.  Likewise, the Integrity claims handler 
probably should have kept abreast of legal changes implicating its 
obligations, given that directly relevant decisions had been made.  
However, there is no evidence that Integrity’s claims handler had been 
acting collusively with any party, was attempting to perpetrate a fraud, or 
was not subjectively acting in good faith.  The importance of the decision is 
in its recognition that the standard of competent and businesslike 
investigation will be one of industry standards, as discerned by the courts.  
It identifies how a generally common business practice can transform into a 
legal obligation.  Though the court was not incorrect in identifying that the 
claims handlers ignorance may have been tantamount to malpractice in this 
instance, the decision has the capacity to effect business practices beyond 
the narrow fact situation of the ruling.    
Though the application of the determined standard of care will 
always be fact specific to the situation reviewed for reasonableness, the 
capacity for a standard practice of requiring independent legal experts in 
“complex” cases could easily trickle down to “moderate” cases and then, 
perhaps, to “easy” coverage decisions.  Even in cases where there would 
probably be little disagreement as to the likely value of the claims or 
medical evidence of causation, how could an insurer not be expected to 
cover its risk with duplicative legal opinions when the claim implicates its 
                                                                                                                 
190 Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at 
*85-6 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006). 
 
191 Good faith is a perquisite for application of a reinsurer’s indemnity 
obligations. See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that “doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted in good faith in 
handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the claims ‘the 
reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent’”).  
400 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
reinsurance?  Regardless where the line is eventually drawn as a matter of 
industry practice, one way or another, the litigation costs will eventually be 
internalized by the obligated insurers and passed to policyholders in the 
form of higher premiums.   
Moreover, as the decision in Suter stems from the universally 
applicable good faith obligation of the insurer to reasonably investigate as a 
predicate to the reinsurer’s performance under the reinsuring agreement, 
this duplicative effort could become simple industry practice for most 
claims in an overabundance of caution.192  Even if there is no reinsurer 
obligated on the particular claim, as discussed above, reinsurers investigate 
and monitor claims handling philosophy.  It is possible that an insurer 
thinking about their future interest in reinsurance will take steps to ensure 
their claims handling demonstrates their history of operating in a non- 
grossly negligent manner and, if that requires a showing of the consistent 
use of its own independent medical experts and coverage counsel, such 
would likely be undertaken.   
One caveat: it is of course possible that this added duplicative cost 
could be so cost prohibitive the insurer would prefer to simply avoid 
reinsurers and internalize the litigation savings.  As described above, the 
benefits of reinsurance, particularly the ability to stabilize profits and 
leverage reserves makes such a choice unlikely.193  For various reasons, an 
insurer remains aware of the chance it will in future need reinsurance.  If 
anything, knowingly producing largely duplicative legal work would 
simply lead insurers to pressure their attorneys to reduce the cost of 
redundant legal services, if it cannot reduce the need to complete the work 
in the first place.  Perhaps this accounts for some of the insurance 
industry’s interest in creating legal services compensation structures which 
offer opportunities for “bulk rate” services and long-term billing 
agreements. 
 
                                                                                                                 
192 Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co., 424 F. Supp 2d 781, 784, 788, 792 
(D.N.J. 2006). 
 
193 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (noting 
“[i]nsurers often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent 
to the insurance business.  These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature 
of insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known 
until sometime in the future.  Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these 
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company’s overall operating 
results.”).   
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C. CONSUMER PROTECTION:  DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, BAD 
FAITH AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
Since reinsurance is considered a business to business transaction, 
it is subject to significantly less regulatory oversight beyond issues of 
solvency.  As described above, however, reinsurance’s ability to indirectly 
affect the policyholder though inculcating and rewarding reinsurer-focused 
underwriting decisions and claims handling processes exist and current 
regulatory schemes do not address them.  Yet they implicate issues of grave 
public policy.  As described below, reinsurance clauses have been held 
valid so as to provide reinsurance for the bringing of a declaratory 
judgment action against the original insured to obviate coverage.  Other 
approved clauses even allow for the reinsurance of judgments in excess of 
loss resulting from insurer bad faith and clauses which offer reinsurance for 
extracontractual damages arising from a bad faith tort suits.  Each of these 
has the capacity to support rather than prohibit unfair insurance practices.  
If for no other reason than the moral hazard of reinsuring tortious conduct.    
 As regards declaratory judgments, many reinsurance agreements 
include a clause which states that the agreement covers “all expenses 
incurred in the investigation and settlements of claims or suits”.194  Such a 
clause makes sense in relation to the reinsurer’s interest in not 
indemnifying claims beyond the scope of the policy they are reinsuring. 
These clauses have been construed to reinsure the cost of declaratory 
judgments brought against the primary insured policyholder to obviate 
coverage.  To an extent, it makes sense for the reinsured to seek to lay-off 
these declaratory judgment costs to the reinsurer where much of the benefit 
of the coverage determination would accrue to the reinsurer on the risk. 
However, the availability of such coverage can only incentivize an 
increased use of the declaratory judgment mechanism.  In fact, given the 
broad reaching good faith obligation of the reinsured, failure to bring the 
declaratory judgment action could potentially be seen as negligent.  
These clauses are very common and often interpreted broadly.195  
Moreover, in the absence of an exclusion, the “standard practice” of the 
industry to allow for such costs can create a sufficient question of fact to 
                                                                                                                 
194 See PLITT, supra note 9, at §9:29.  
 
195 See Employers Ins. Co. v. American Reins. Co., 256 F. Supp.2d 923, 925-
26 (W.D. Wis. 2003).  
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support an implied modification of the contract sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.196  Likewise, despite the absence of a 
clause, declaratory judgment costs have been upheld as part of the contract 
as a result of the parties “custom and practice”.197   
Other particularly worrisome reinsurance clauses implicate insurer 
bad faith. For example, one available clause makes reinsurance coverage 
available for judgments in excess of policy limits arising out of the 
reinsured’s bad faith failure to settle or defend a claim and another allows 
for reinsurance of bad faith judgments and other extracontractual damages.  
Called “judgment in excess of policy limits” and “extracontractual 
obligations” clauses, these provisions allow insurers to be indemnified for 
their own bad faith actions against their policy holders.   
As reported in Ostrager & Newman’s Handbook on Insurance 
Coverage Disputes, a judgment in excess of policy limits clause generally 
provides “in word or substance”198: 
It is agreed that should the ceding insurer become legally obligated 
to pay a loss in excess of policy limits by reason of alleged or actual 
negligence, fraud or bad faith in rejecting an offer of settlement or in the 
defense or trial of any action against an insured, the Reinsurer agrees to 
assume ____% of said loss [in excess of the ceding insurer’s] $ _____ 
retention.199  
These clauses are “relatively widely used and provide[] the 
reinsurer will participate in such excess verdicts but not to exceed the 
reinsurance contract limits”.200  Moreover, there are iterations of this clause 
which explicitly provide for coverage of “punitive damages”.201  Other 
courts have found reinsurer’s liable for extracontractual damages even in 
                                                                                                                 
196 See Premier Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 
348, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
 
197 See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reins. Corp., 416 Mass. *839, 
*846 (1994).  
 
198 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, at § 16.06[a].  
 
199 Id. 
 
200 Id. 
 
201 Id. 
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the absence of such a clause, but where the reinsurance agreement does 
contain the common “follow the fortunes” language.202   
The second bad faith related clause covering extracontractual 
obligations or ECO’s differs from that of the “excess judgments clause” in 
that it directly allows for reinsurance indemnification for tortious insurer 
bad faith awards. 203 Its purpose has been described thusly: 
When an insurance company finds itself on the wrong side of a bad 
faith case, a judgment awarding punitive damages often results and 
theinsurance company must pay the judgment out of its own funds unless it 
has insured itself, through reinsurance programs or other means, against 
punitive damages awards. Many reinsurance agreements have a special 
provision called an extracontractual obligations clause, which typically 
provides that the reinsurer will pay some percentage of the reinsured's 
liability for claims brought against it outside of the terms of underlying 
insurance contracts. It is well understood in the industry that the ECO 
clause is designed to respond to bad faith punitive damages awards against 
the reinsured.204 
Prior to the creation of ECO clauses, the ability of insurers to lay-
off the costs of their own bad faith actions had been limited to the 
availability of reinsurance for only judgments in excess of policy limits.  
The ECO clause sought to broaden this limitation by extending reinsurance 
for tortious bad faith judgments as well as judgments in excess of policy 
limits.205  ECO clauses offer reinsurance coverage for an insurer’s bad faith 
                                                                                                                 
202 Id. (citing Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696, 697 (4th 
Cir. 1958)).  
 
204 See Larry P. Schiffer & William Bodkin, Caveat Reinsurer: Reinsuring 
Punitive Damages Under ECO Clauses, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 147 (2001).   
 
205  Id. at 159.  ECO clauses made their first appearance in 1978 in response to 
the desire of primary insurers to secure coverage for the various tort claims that 
had evolved into extracontractual, i.e., bad faith liability. Bad faith liability arises 
separately from the coverage provisions of any underlying insurance policy or 
reinsurance agreement, and results solely from the tortious conduct of an insurer in 
the course of policyholder service or claims handling under the policy.  Tortious 
conduct may include: (1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2) 
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations against the 
insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5) unfair marketing 
practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the policy limits; and (7) 
agent misrepresentation or fraud.  An extracontractual obligation also may be a 
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liability sounding in tort law, rather than arising from breach of the 
insurance contact.  Hence, the reinsurance clause which provides coverage 
for those tortious damages refers to such finding of liability as an 
“extracontractual obligation”.  Such clauses first began to appear in 1978 as 
actions for tortious bad faith liability –and judgments- began to become 
more commonly accepted.   
It appears obvious that the availability of reinsurance for bad faith 
tortious liability has the capacity to influence reinsured companies claims 
behavior.  In fact, it appears to be an obvious moral hazard.  A bad faith 
action can be grounded in a whole host of improper insurer activity when 
servicing a policyholder’s claim.  As one commentator noted, examples of 
bad faith tortious conduct could well include:  
(1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2) 
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations 
against the insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5) 
unfair marketing practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the 
policy limits; and (7) agent misrepresentation or fraud.206 
It seems apparent that so far as there is a regulatory interest in 
preventing bad faith insurer behavior – an interest reflected in both 
statutory and common law – the capacity to reinsure bad faith judgments 
has the capacity to subvert that interest.   
Considering that reinsurance agreements are supported by the 
premiums charged to policyholders, it seems somewhat incongruous to 
allow the cost of insurer’s own bad faith judgments to be charged directly 
back to policyholders in their premiums.  In fact, it seems to severely 
undermine the integral purpose of bad faith legal actions beyond the 
reinsured’s own retention, to allow for them to be reinsurable.    
Clearly, this type of indemnification reduces the deterrent value of 
these actions.  There can be little deterrence through litigation and the 
award of damages, tortious or otherwise, if those judgments are 
indemnified by reinsurer’s as a matter of course.  Granted, reinsurers are 
sensitive to loss histories so too frequent a number of bad faith judgments 
could increase the insurer’s costs to reinsure.  Still, that market based result 
seems somewhat less than the affect contemplated by legislators who enact 
bad faith statutes and somewhat disjointed from traditional understanding 
of the purpose of the tort system.  In any event, these clauses identify yet 
                                                                                                                          
judgment in excess of the limits of an insurance policy, with the insured being 
liable for the excess due to the mishandling of the claim. 
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another possible contractual source of influence on reinsured’s claims 
handling behavior.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Reinsurance agreements certainly have the capacity to influence 
insurer behavior.  The effect of these agreements and the manner in which 
courts enforce their performance likely leads to the institutionalization of 
systems beyond and not necessarily congruent with many of the 
expectations and avowed purposes of some regulatory activity.   
Insurance is often dubbed an industry affecting the public interest; 
if that is so, then reinsurance should acquire that denomination as well.  
Though silent, operating through private contract alone, it has the capacity 
certainly to influence, if not directly regulate, insuring behavior.  To be 
effective, this Essay suggests that regulatory discussions of the insurance 
industry be expanded to recognize the influential capacity of the reinsuring 
industry.  To fail to do so is to ignore a fundamental financial influence on 
the entire insurance industry with the likely result that the silent regulator 
will continue to operate below the notice of our sometimes raucous public 
ones. 
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“FAIR IS FOUL AND FOUL IS FAIR:”  
HAVE INSURERS LOOSENED THE  
CHOKEPOINT OF COPYRIGHT AND  
PERMITTED FAIR USE’S BREATHING  
SPACE IN DOCUMENTARY FILMS? 
 
Thomas Plotkin* 
Tarae Howell** 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, documentary films have served a public purpose, in 
that unlike standard Hollywood fare, they educate and convey news, 
criticism and commentary.  The films shed light on lives that might 
otherwise remain obscure, or on corners of social and political interest that 
are unexamined by the mainstream media.  Because of their capacity to 
convey a sense of unmediated reality, they exert enormous power over 
audiences.  Documentarians routinely rely on copyrighted material in 
telling their stories. This appropriation can take the form of cultural 
artifacts captured incidentally while filming a subject, music or images 
included in the film to establish context, or other material used for critical 
or editorial purposes. 
Copyrighted material is, by definition, protected by copyright.  The 
Copyright Act, which has existed in one form or another since 1790 and 
has its own purpose adumbrated in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, 
grants authors exclusive rights for a limited duration.1  Copyright 
protection serves to incentivize the creation of knowledge-producing 
works, a public good.  Infringement, the violation of those rights, is subject 
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to substantial penalties, including statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and a 
permanent injunction upon the work that was copied.     
The Copyright Act of 1976 contains a counterweight to authors’ 
rights: fair use.2 Recognizing that new works come from old, and that the 
limited term of copyright protection signifies that the public benefit of 
knowledge-producing works may outweigh an author’s exclusive rights, 
fair use permits the reasonable taking of copyrighted material for the 
purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or 
research.   
In recent years, documentarians have found that the cost of licenses 
for copyrighted material has ballooned astronomically, far beyond the 
reach of their meager budgets. This is in large part because the large media 
entities that hold copyrights have awakened to the value of their back-
catalogs as cash cows: since Hollywood and the music industry itself pays 
top dollar for licenses, documentarians are expected to as well.  In addition, 
the ideological slant of many documentaries (historically oppositional), or 
the desire for brand-management on the part of the owner, often results in 
the denial of a license.  Rights-holders have also been abetted by Congress’ 
extraordinary expansion of the Copyright term, which in 1790 was fourteen 
years, but now effectively keeps anything created since the 1920's out of 
the public domain for generations.  
Recognizing they sit on a goldmine, the media accordingly polices 
its copyrights aggressively, threatening documentarians who might take 
material with infringement suits.  Even if a documentarian wins, these suits 
produce litigation expenses beyond most independent film-makers’ means.  
Fair use provides little relief.  The doctrine is an affirmative defense, only 
coming into play once a documentarian has been sued, leaving little room 
for informed decision-making at the time of the taking.   Ex ante planning 
is also problematic because the Supreme Court has stated that fair use 
decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, without regard to bright-
line rules.  The ensuing chaos in the lower courts renders the doctrine 
unpredictable and unstable. 
Finally, documentarians require E & O insurance for their film to 
be distributed, screened or broadcast.  Until early 2007, insurers either 
denied coverage for un-cleared material outright, or submitted the film to 
an unwieldy, ad hoc underwriting process when the film-maker sought 
distribution, when timeliness was most crucial. This underwriting process, 
                                                                                                                 
2 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2009). 
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which already followed time-consuming failed attempts to clear the 
material, made documentarians reluctant to assert fair use.  
The Copyright regime, considering the scale of its subject matter 
and the length and complexity of the Act, is largely a matter of private 
ordering. Enforcement lies with the courts, which may refine fair use 
ambiguities, but only when owners bring infringement suits and defendants 
assert fair use.  Into this regulatory vacuum steps the insurer, who may 
acquire a regulatory role by virtue of its capacity to modify its insured’s 
conduct.  By exercising its gate keeping function to deter filmmakers from 
using un-cleared material or exercising fair use, insurers act as policeman 
for an owner-friendly copyright regime, abetting the monopolies in 
violating the spirit of the Copyright Clause, whose stated purpose is “the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts;” that is, the public good. 
Since February 2007, the insurer’s regulatory role with respect to 
documentaries and fair use appears to have changed.  The four major E & 
O insurers who serve documentarians have publicly embraced fair use, two 
of them offering affirmative endorsements. How this sea change came 
about, and what its effects may be, are the subject of this paper. Part II 
discusses copyright itself, from the dual incentivizing/knowledge-creating 
purpose in the Constitution, to its legislative expansion favoring owners at 
the public’s expense. Part III discusses film-makers travails obtaining 
licenses, and the growth of the “content industry,” the media monopolies 
who use their copyright protection to either extract exorbitant licensing 
fees, or withhold the material altogether.  Part IV discusses the fair use 
doctrine, its common-law roots, statutory enactment, interpretation by the 
Supreme Court, and the nine fair use cases involving nonfiction film, which 
demonstrate the inconsistency and instability of the doctrine. Part V 
discusses the role of the E & O insurer in handling documentarians’ fair use 
assertions prior to 2007. Part VI is a narrative of the events surrounding 
four insurers’ public embrace of fair use for documentaries, assessing the 
differences in their underwriting approaches, and concluding with 
predictions for the future. 
 
II.  COPYRIGHT 
 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT AS A SOCIAL BARGAIN - THE 
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OR THE PROGRESS CLAUSE? 
 
The power to create intellectual property rights is granted to 
Congress in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution: “Congress has 
the power to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by 
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive rights to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  The Copyright Clause is the 
only enumerated Congressional power in Article I, Section 8 that has a 
stated purpose.3  Whereas the other enumerated powers flatly permit 
Congress to do some something (regulate commerce among the several 
states, declare war), here Congress is charged with advancing the 
production of knowledge.4  
That purpose can be re-stated as the Congressional furtherance of 
three policies, whose priority may be divined from their ordering within the 
clause.5  First, the term “Science” in Enlightenment parlance was 
synonymous with “learning,” so, like copyright law’s English prototype the 
Statute of Anne, copyright exists to encourage learning.6 Second, the 
“limited times” allotted to copyright protection denotes the existence of a 
public domain, a future point when rights will no longer accrue to the 
author, and the public may exploit freely that for which it once needed 
permission.7 Third, within that limited term, the author will be vested with 
exclusive rights in her work, thus providing the incentive for the creation of 
new works.8 
                                                                                                                 
3 Lydia P. Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an 
Era of Copyright Permissions Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP L. 1, 3 (1997). 
 
4 LAURENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 215 (2004). 
 
5 Stacy McDonald, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of 
Intellectual Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 
50 HOW. L.J. 541, 546 (2007). 
 
6 The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, was the first codification of copyright.  
It was subtitled “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies 
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies . . . for the 
Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write Useful Books.” Quoted in 
Anne E. Forkner et. al., Pretty Woman Meets the Man Who Wears the Star: Fair 
Use After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music and American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 719, 720 (2007). 
 
7 McDonald, supra note 5, at 546. 
 
8 Id. at 542, 546.   
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Prioritized in this manner, the third policy, the author’s monopoly 
of exclusive rights in the work, is the means for achieving the first two, in 
that the monopoly temporarily rewards authors for their creations, then 
surrenders to the public access to, and use of, copyrighted works.9   Any 
private benefit an author gains through copyright protection is merely the 
vehicle by which a broader public interest is promoted.10 
Laurence Lessig argues that in view of its singular Constitutional 
purpose, the Copyright Clause should instead be known as “the Progress 
Clause.”11   Some indication of the Framers’ intent to avoid benefitting 
authors at the public’s expense can be seen in the words of James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson. Madison believed that copyright had the potential to 
thwart creativity while Jefferson believed that copyright protection is for 
the benefit of society overall, and not individual creators. 12    
Overall, it is clear from the congressional policies regarding the 
“copyright clause” that, at least initially, copyright protection was regarded 
as a protection for both authors and the general public.  
 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT: FROM SOCIAL 
BARGAIN TO COMMODIFICATION 
 
Congressional enactments from the 18th century down to the present 
day have shifted the Constitutional social bargain of copyright into the 
realm of a property regime.13  Propertization came to envelope copyrighted 
works within ownership terms of effectively unlimited duration which 
more closely resembled the exclusive rights granted to an owner of real 
property than the finite zone of protection envisaged by the Framers.14  
                                                                                                                 
9 Id. at 546. 
 
10 Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a 
Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 31,38 
(2007). 
 
11 LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 131-32. 
 
12 JAMES MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 427 
(1884) (Philip R. Fendall ed., R. Worthington 1884). 
 
13 McDonald, supra note 5, at 552. 
 
14 Id. (quoting Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
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The first Copyright Act appeared in 1790. Brief and straightforward, its 
scope was limited to maps, charts, and books, and granted authors 
exclusive rights to print, reprint, publish and sell them for a term of 14 
years, renewable for 14 more.15  Registration was required, and 
infringement triggered statutory penalties.16  In the next 119 years, the Act 
was amended to expand the subject matter of copyright (encompassing 
musical compositions, photographs, paintings, drawings, 
chromolithographs, statues, and works of fine art), as well as the initial 
term, which in 1831 was raised from 14 to 28 years.17   
The Copyright Act of 1909 substantially revised the original statute, 
increasing its length from 7 to 64 sections.18   Copyright’s subject matter 
was expanded to encompass public performance and derivative works (the 
latter defined non-exhaustively as compilations, abridgements, 
arrangements, dramatizations, and translations of copyrighted works).19  In 
addition, the renewal term was extended to 28 years, bringing the total term 
of copyright to 56 years.20 More significantly, corporate copyright was 
created, vesting authorship in an owner who contracted a creator to produce 
a work for hire.21   
Congress next re-visited the Copyright Act in 1976; in the 
intervening seven decades, motion pictures, radio, recorded music, and 
television and the nascent computer software industry had matured into the 
mass media environment we live in today.”22  The new Act now spanned 
                                                                                                                          
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004)). 
 
15 Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L REV 87, 94 (2004). 
 
16 Id. 
 
17 Id. at 95. 
 
18 Id. at 94-96. 
 
19 Id. at 96. 
 
20 Id. 
 
21 SIVA VAIDHYNATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, 102, 214, n. 33 
(2003) (quoting Copyright Act of 1909, § 23).  
 
22 Amendments to the 1909 Act in the 1920's included recorded music and 
motion pictures as protected under copyright.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6)-(7) (2006).  
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several hundred pages, dwarfing its predecessors in complexity.23  It should 
come as no surprise that the Act was the product of over twenty years of 
negotiations with representatives of a burgeoning culture industry, and that 
the Act substantially expanded the scope and terms of copyright 
protection.24   
The exclusive rights of the author now protected “all original 
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium expression” from 
unauthorized reproduction, distribution, public performance, and public 
display.25  The term of copyright was extended yet again, this time for the 
life of the author, plus fifty years.26 Corporate copyrights were extended to 
seventy five years.27  The civil penalties for copyright violation were set at 
between $750,000 and $30,000 per infringement, with courts given 
discretionary authority to raise that to $150,000 per infringement, if 
willfulness was found.28  Additionally, default copyright was adopted, as 
all renewal formality requirements were dropped for works created before 
1978.29  The necessity that copyrighted works be registered and renewed 
prior to 1976 as a de facto matter placed the vast majority of works into the 
public domain after the initial term had lapsed.30  Now, no action beyond 
                                                                                                                 
23 Liu, supra note 15, at 99. 
 
24 See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 48-58 (2001).  
 
25 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544-
45 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(2000)). 
 
26 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2572 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)); McDonald, supra note 5, at 
548. 
 
27 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, § 302(c), 90 Stat. 2572 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000)); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra 
note 4, at 135.  
 
28 Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2004)). 
 
29 LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 135. 
 
30 John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm 
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548 (2007). 
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the mere creation of the work was needed to trigger infringement 
enforcement.31   
The relatively brief term of copyright protection allotted by earlier 
iterations of the Act was consistent with the fact that most creative works 
have a brief commercial existence.32   The combination of limited terms of 
protection with formalities requiring registration and renewal ensured that 
works no longer being exploited passed into the public domain.33  Under 
the extended terms and relaxed registration and renewal formalities of the 
Copyright Act of 1976,, works that hitherto might have been made freely 
available sooner became profitable to corporate owners via the threat of an 
infringement suit, both by reason of “the long tail” of copyright protection 
and the slide from a default regime of non-protection to one of per se 
protection.34  
Congress was still not through with tinkering with copyright, and 
further changes nakedly reflected the influence of industry lobbying.  In 
1998, with the passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), the 
copyright term was extended an additional twenty years.  This brought the 
term for new and subsisting works up to the life of the author plus seventy 
years, and in the case of a work made for hire, ninety-five years from the 
year of first publication or 120 years from the year of creation, whichever 
expires first.35    
CTEA was nominally passed to harmonize United States copyright 
law with its European Union counterpart, which established a term of life 
plus seventy years and denied this longer term to works of non-E.U. origin 
                                                                                                                 
31 Id.  
 
32 LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 134.  
 
33 Id. at 135. Lessig states that in 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright 
owners failed to renew their copyrights, which means the average term of 
copyright in that year was 32.2 years; with the elimination of the renewal 
requirement, the average term becomes the maximum term, which, in 2003 had 
tripled from 32.2 years to 95 years.  Id. 
 
34 Tehranian, supra note 30, at 548. 
 
35 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.  
2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)); McDonald, supra note 5, at 
556. 
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unless the foreign law provided the same protection.36  However, 
harmonization could have been accomplished by reciprocal extension of 
E.U works copyright terms within the U.S.37  The bill’s legislative history 
manifested Congressional concern that the term extension was necessary to 
preserve the dominance of the U.S. culture industry, with scant mention of 
the preservation of the social bargain of copyright envisioned by the 
Framers.38 In fact, it has been widely reported that the bill was a direct 
response to intense lobbying by Walt Disney Studios, who were faced with 
loss to the public domain of Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and their kin in 
2003 unless Congress extended the term.39  For this reason, CTEA has been 
called “a classic instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation.”40   
Justice Stephen Breyer has noted that as a practical matter, CTEA’s 
long tail of copyright protection imposes a “permissions requirement . . 
.[upon those] who want to make the past accessible for their own use or for 
that of others, ” because with the lengthened term comes the lengthened life 
of the licenses attached to that term.41  Breyer argued that the prohibitive 
cost that those licenses imposed on users would affect “historians, scholars, 
writers, artists ... and researchers of all kinds” for decades to come;  
                                                                                                                 
36 McDonald, supra note 5, at 556. 
 
37 See id. at 556-57. 
 
38 Id. at 557. The most notorious expression of these sentiments came from 
Mary Bono, widow of Representative Sonny Bono and successor to his seat in the 
house upon his death. She stated that “Sonny wanted the term of copyright 
protection to last forever. I am informed [...] that such a change would violate the 
Constitution… As you know, there’s Jack Valenti’s proposal for term to last 
forever less one day.” Id. (Valenti was the first president of the Motion Picture 
Association of America, the movie industry’s lobbying group).  
 
39 Chris Sprigman, The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the 
Copyright Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft (Mar. 5, 2002), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html. 
 
40 Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000). 
  
41 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Eldred was a failed constitutional challenge to the CTEA.  Id. at 771-72. 
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additionally, he predicted that this would hinder or prevent the use of old 
works as the costs of obtaining permission has risen drastically. 42  
The negative effects of a restrictive owner-friendly copyright 
system and its corollary, the all-encompassing permissions system which 
Breyer warned of, is best seen than in its effects on documentary film-
makers. 
 
II.   THE DOCUMENATARIAN’S DILLEMA: CREATIVE  
 ENDEAVOR STIFLED BY CLEARANCE CULTURE 
 
A. “HAPPY BIRTHDAY,” THE TEXTURE OF THE REAL, AND THE 
HIGH COST OF CLEARANCE 
 
The song “Happy Birthday to You” was copyrighted by 
schoolteachers Mildred and Patty Smith Hill in the mid-1930's.43  Under the 
Copyright Act of 1909, controlling at the time the Hill sisters registered 
their work, the song would have fallen into the public domain after one 28 
year term, unless it was renewed for an additional 28 year term.44  But the 
Copyright Act of 1976 granted the owners an additional 19 years of 
protection.45  Then CTEA added 20 more years of exploitation to the life of 
“Happy Birthday.”  Music publishing giant Warner Chappell bought the 
rights in 1989.46  The song nets around $2 million annually in royalties.47  
At the time of the acquisition, rumored to have cost $25 million, a Warner 
Chappell executive admitted that motion picture and television licensing 
                                                                                                                 
42 Id. at 250-52 
 
43 K. Matthew Dames, Copyright Conundrum: Documentaries and Rights 
Clearance, INFO. TODAY, June 2006, at 26.  
 
44  Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909) (repealed 
1976). 
 
45  Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1976) (current version at 17 
U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000)). 
 
46 Assoc. Press, “Happy Birthday” and the Money it Makes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
26, 1989, at C26. 
 
47 Id. 
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was the motive, saying “Obviously whenever there’s a birthday scene, 
they’re going to use that song.”48  Warner Chappell Music and the Hill 
estate stand to collect royalties from “Happy Birthday” until 2030, barring 
an additional expansion of the copyright term by Congress.  
“Happy Birthday”is the bete noir of documentarians: wedded to the 
texture of our everyday lives, it is predictable that a director following live 
subjects may stumble upon a birthday party, and the moment when “Happy 
Birthday” is sung could constitute a privileged event in the film.  One such 
scene occurs in Hoop Dreams, when one of the film’s subjects, a teenager 
from Chicago’s housing projects chasing the dream of college basketball as 
a way out of the mean streets, is thrown a birthday party; the song is sung, 
and his mother says offhandedly, “Isn’t it wonderful that he made it to 
18?”49 Director Peter Gilbert called this a “pivotal scene” in the Oscar-
winning documentary.50  He also described the owners as “brutal” in 
exacting clearance, demanding $15,000-$20,000 for one verse.51   
Even a historical documentary can fall into the “Happy Birthday” 
money pit.  In Eyes on the Prize, there is an excerpt of home-movie footage 
of a birthday party thrown for Dr. Martin Luther King by his staff, where 
“Happy Birthday” is sung.52  The films’ clearance budget was so tight that 
the producers had to weigh paying a substantial amount of money for the 
song against dropping a valuable glimpse into King’s private life, as the 
scene would lose meaning if the song were cut.53  
Examples abound of filmmakers capturing copyrighted material 
felicitously, seeing that its presence adds something aesthetically to the 
scene, and then being faced with the choice of paying an exorbitant 
                                                                                                                 
48 Id.  
 
49 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS 11 (2001), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/ 
files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf. 
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. 
 
52 Dames, supra note 43, at 24. 
 
53 Id at 27. 
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licensing fee or leaving it on the cutting-room floor.   In Mad Hot 
Ballroom, a film about urban public school fourth graders who enter a 
ballroom dancing competition, the camera caught a boy going home from 
school with his mother.54  She had just asked how his day had gone, when 
her cell phone rang, and she answered before he could respond.55 The 
producer said the moment “was such an indicator of today’s culture ...The 
look on his face says ‘I don’t get to tell my mom about my day.’”56 Adding 
an additional layer of irony, the ring-tone on the mother’s phone was the 
theme song from Rocky; this, in a true-life Rocky about underdog Brooklyn 
kids competing in a city-wide ballroom dancing competition.57  EMI Music 
Publishing, the rights-holder to the Rocky theme, demanded $10,000 for the 
documentarian’s use of six seconds of music.58  However, after months of 
begging, the producer got them down to $2,500; this on a film whose total 
music clearance costs were $170,000 of a $500,000 budget.59  In Sing 
Faster, in a backstage view of a production of Wagner’s Ring of the 
Niebelung the camera caught stage-hands playing checkers while watching 
The Simpsons on television., oblivious to the opera performance occurring 
in the background.60  The Simpsons clip was onscreen for four-and-a-half 
seconds.61  The image was a perfect collision of high and low culture, and it 
did not make it into the finished film.  Matt Groening, the Simpsons creator 
granted Else permission to use the clip, but advised to him to call the Fox 
network, which airs the show.62  Else was surprised to discover that 
                                                                                                                 
54 Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2005, at A13. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id. 
 
59 Id. 
 
60 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 95-96 (2004). 
 
61 Id. at 96. 
 
62 Id. 
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Groening didn’t actually own the rights to the show, and that his 
permission was no good.63  Fox demanded a $10,000 licensing fee for the 
4.5 seconds.64  Convinced there was a mistake, Else asked if he could get 
the educational rate, and was informed $10,000 was the educational rate.65  
Else digitally replaced The Simpsons footage with a shot from one of his 
own documentaries.66   
Historical and political documentaries, where copyrighted material 
is edited into a mosaic rather than caught on the fly, are also vulnerable to 
the vagaries of copyright.67  A documentarian making a film about 
Hollywood representations of the Holocaust required an hour of clips from 
movies.68  The rights costs wound up tripling the entire production budget, 
even after he received discounts from sympathetic studio executives.69  The 
producer’s argument that long-forgotten films languishing in the licensors’ 
libraries might enjoy a renewal of interest by being featured in the 
documentary left the licensors unmoved.70   
Antipathy to the historical documentarian’s message can be a deal-
breaker for owners.  For his documentary Uncovered: The Whole Truth 
About the Iraq War, partisan political filmmaker Robert Greenwald wanted 
to use a clip of President George W. Bush doing a poor job of defending 
his decision to invade Iraq in an appearance on Meet the Press.71  NBC 
denied permission to use the clip, even when full compensation was 
                                                                                                                 
63 Id.  
 
64 Id. 
 
65 Id. 
 
66 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 97. 
 
67 See generally AUFDERHEIDI & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49. 
 
68 Id. at 14. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 Id. 
 
71 Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting the President, WIRED MAG., Aug. 2004, 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired.archive/12.08/view.html?pg=5. 
 
420 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
offered, on the grounds that the clip was unflattering to the President.72  
The film Smoke and Mirrors illustrated collusion between the tobacco 
industry and Hollywood by showing clips from old movies glamorizing 
smoking by depicting the biggest stars puffing away on cigarettes in scene 
after scene.73  The standard form licensing agreements issued by all the 
studios forbid any use criticizing the studio, its producers, employees, or 
the motion picture industry itself, rendering the clips off-limits.74  As this 
article goes to press, Yoko Ono is seeking an injunction to prevent a 
documentary that touts “intelligent design” and disparages the teaching of 
evolution from critically deploying John Lennon’s song “Imagine” in the 
film and using it without permission (“Imagine no religion....”).75  
Finally, at least one film of vast significance was nearly lost 
completely due to restrictive clearance procedures.  Eyes on the Prize is an 
epic multi-part historical documentary chronicling the Civil Rights 
Movement. Produced independently, it aired in eight parts on PBS in 1987, 
followed by six additional segments in 1990, to high ratings and massive 
acclaim.76  Eyes was an extremely important documentary, important for 
both its scope and its content. 
The film was partially composed of interviews with participants in 
the Civil Rights Movement, and partially compiled from archival and news 
footage, containing 492 minutes culled from 80 archives and 272 still 
photographs.77  For the soundtrack, 120 songs were licensed.78  Each 
                                                                                                                 
72 Id. 
 
73 Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, Donaldson and Callif (Sept. 
12, 2007). 
 
74 Id. 
 
75 Id. 
 
76 Henry Louis Gates, chairman of the department of African American 
Studies at Harvard University called Eyes “the most sophisticated and poignant 
documentary of African-American history ever made.”  Nancy Ramsey, The Secret 
Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A13.  Jon Else, who edited 
the series, called it “virtually the only audio-visual purveyor of the history or the 
civil rights movement in America.”  AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, 
supra note 49, at 19. 
 
77 Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
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episode was about 50% archival, and derived from commercial sources.79  
Due to budget constraints, the clips were licensed for differing terms, some 
in perpetuity, some for terms of three, seven, and ten years.80  When the 
terms began to expire, the film had to be pulled from circulation.81  The last 
broadcast before it disappeared from view was in 1993.82  Video tapes were 
available, sold largely to libraries and schools shortly after the initial 
broadcasts.83  Since that final broadcast, video tape was the only way to see 
the film, yet video tapes break easily, degrade rapidly with use and age, and 
are subject to loss and theft.84   
By 2006, Eyes on the Prize had become a lost film, unavailable on 
DVD, the VHS tapes crumbling and disappearing, commercial sale of the 
tapes ceased long ago due to the lapse of licenses, and exhibition or 
broadcast in any venue legally impossible.85 An entire generation of 
                                                                                                                          
2005, at 2.13. 
 
78 Dames, supra note 43, at 27. 
 
79 AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 19. 
 
80 Ramsey, supra note 77.  The cost of archive footage at $3,500-$4,500 a 
minute has been described by one filmmaker as “extortionate.” AUFDERHEIDE & 
JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 9. 
 
81 Ramsey, supra note 77.   
 
82 Id.  
 
83 Id. 
 
84 Dames, supra note 43, at 24. 
 
85 AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 19.  In 2005, 
following substantial outcry in the media and bootleg copies surfacing both in 
theaters and the internet, the Ford Foundation kicked in $600,000 to pay new 
licensing fees.  Katie Dean, Cash Rescues Eyes on the Prize, WIRED MAG., Aug. 
30, 2005, available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/ 
music/news/2005/08/68664.  In October 2006 the series was broadcast on PBS for 
the first time in 15 years, and soon after the series became available on DVD for 
educational markets only at a cost of $375.  PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex 
/eyesontheprize/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); Hamil R. Harris, Activists Mark 
Rerelease of ‘Eyes on the Prize’, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2006, available at 
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students had been deprived of the chance to see this landmark film, and it 
appeared that Eyes on the Prize would go missing for ever.  
All of these examples of clearance issues not only speak to the 
hazards of filmmakers’ use of copyrighted material, they also illustrate how 
integral such material can be for the purposes of creating the documentary.  
Copyrighted material can find its way into a documentary incidentally, 
when the recording apparatus captures a work of art hanging on a wall, or 
something playing on a TV or radio, or a boombox blaring near a subject, 
or a subject performing a song.  Such uses are part and parcel of the reality 
being captured, and as such can convey the dense texture of that reality by 
placing the subjects amidst the cultural artifacts they live amongst, or, 
when the filmmaker gets truly lucky, adding a felicitous counterpoint and 
commentary to a scene.   
Copyrighted materials may be collaged into a work deliberately as 
well as merely captured.  A film describing an historical event or a matter 
of current public import gains power and resonance when archival or news 
footage is employed, rather than just giving a dry oral recitation of the 
facts.  Cultural artifacts culled from mass media, such as advertisements 
and scenes from movies and television programs, can provide necessary 
context to back up a critique of the norms which produced the artifacts.  
Music, which arguably elicits even more powerful audience associations 
and emotions than images, can provide a similar function; songs can situate 
an audience in the historical or cultural moment it evokes, tell us something 
about the environment the subject lives in, or lend commentary or an ironic 
counterpoint to the visuals.  In any of these instances, a picture, or a piece 
of music, can be worth a thousand words.  
But as we have seen from the examples above, documentarians’ 
use of other authors’ copyrighted material can be so costly as to be 
prohibitive, and in some instances may be rendered impossible by the 
owner’s refusal to license the work at any price.  It must be borne in mind 
that most documentary films budgets are low, and often rely on public and 
non-profit funding until they are acquired post-production: their very 
cheapness is one source of their attractiveness to the broadcasters and 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/15/ 
AR2006111500588.html.  Presumably, widespread commercial sale at a cheaper 
price through standard retail outlets may still be restricted by unresolved clearance 
issues. 
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theatrical distributors who have embraced them so zealously in the last 
decade.86  
A documentarian’s use of copyrighted material breeds delays and 
expense from pre-production until years after the film’s completion, indeed 
for as long as the material remains under copyright.   Licensing fees are 
often inflated by standard “most favored nation” clauses in licensing 
agreements, mandating that all rights holders get the highest price 
negotiated by any other; thus the fees for copyrighted music and images 
used in a documentary may be determined by a single exorbitant quote, and 
often the film-maker’s budget is uncertain until the time that high quote 
comes in.87  The result can either be an untenable budget, or dropping the 
most expensive element, no matter how important it may be to the film.88   
In addition, rights must be cleared anew for each distribution 
channel – telecast, cable, theatrical, DVD, internationally.89  A 
documentary producer who made a film about Los Angeles’ specialty 
cinephile cable station Z Channel, the precursor to HBO,90 relied heavily 
on clips from 53 movies; initially intended solely for broadcast on the 
Independent Film Channel, increasing interest in the film necessitated 
repeat negotiations with the studios as its exhibition prospects broadened.91  
                                                                                                                 
86 Gretchen Stoeltje, Light in Custody: Documentary Films, the TEACH Act 
and the DMCA, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1075, 1079-80 
(2004).  And as documentarian Frederick Wiseman said of Hollywood budgets, 
“You [a documentarian] could make five films for the lunch money.”  Janet 
Maslin, Summer Films: Indies; Visionaries With Their Eyes on the Truth, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 2, 1999, at A2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage. 
html?res=9506E2DD153DF931A35756C0A96F958260. 
 
87 AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 12-13. 
 
88 Kimberly Brown, Copyright vs. Creativity, Realscreen, June 1, 2005, 
available at http://www.realscreen.com/articles/magazine/20050601/ 
copyright.html?word=Copyright&word=vs.&word=Creativity. 
 
89 See Paul Cullum, Freedom of Information: Copyright and its Discontents, 
L.A. WEEKLY, Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.laweekly.com/2006-08-
17/film-tv/freedom-of-information. 
 
90 Internet Movie Database, Z Channel: A Magnificent Obsession (2004), 
available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0405496/. 
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First the clips had to be cleared for North American cablecast; then, when 
the film was entered into the Cannes Film Festival in competition, the 
filmmaker needed “festival rights;” next, to qualify for an Academy Award 
nomination, the film had to have a limited theatrical release, requiring a 
new round of clearances; and finally, international television and 
worldwide DVD rights had to be cleared.92  Of course, the same steps had 
to be repeated for any soundtrack music from the clips, with separate 
negotiations for the actual recording and the publishing rights.93  Following 
these travails, producer Evan Shapiro vowed never again to make a clip-
heavy documentary.94  Overall, the combined television and DVD rights 
came to the nominal fee of $375,000. 95  (This was with substantial 
assistance from two sympathetic studios which cut favorable deals).  
However, it should be noted that even three years later the producer was 
still paying for and clearing film clips; 96 this is evidence of the complexity 
of attaining adequate licensing rights for a production.   
 Inability to pay for licenses results in the loss of crucial material 
within a film, or even the disappearance of an existing film, such as Eyes 
on the Prize.  There are less readily quantifiable losses to the culture as 
well; for example, the phenomenon of “untold stories,” films that go 
unmade because the film-maker has realized that her concept will likely be 
impossible to finance due to a dependence on copyrighted material.97  
Because of rising clearance costs, producers and copyright lawyers alike 
have stated that archive-dependent historical films like Eyes on the Prize 
and PBS’s similarly exhaustive 1983 series Vietnam: A Television History 
                                                                                                                 
92 Id. 
 
93 Id. 
 
94 Elaine Dutka, No Free Samples for Documentaries: Seeking Film Clips 
With the Fair-Use Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/movies/28dutk.html. 
 
95 A single clip from a Hollywood studio film can cost $7000 for broadcast 
clearance alone.  AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 19. 
 
96 Cullum, supra note 89. 
 
97 AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 11, 13, and 23. 
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could not be made today,98 and that documentaries that use Hollywood film 
clips have “become almost impossible.”99 
 
B. THE CONTENT INDUSTRY AND THE RISE OF CLEARANCE 
CULTURE 
 
Film-makers interviewed by the Center for Social Media in 2005 
asserted that rights costs accounted for more of their budgets than a decade 
earlier, and that the process had become both more time-consuming and 
more costly in legal fees than hitherto.100  The reasons for this increase are 
multiple, and interlinked. 
Cultural activists have labeled the combined forces of the movie 
studios, TV networks, recording and publishing fields as “the content 
industry.”101  These businesses are thought of as simply content-producers, 
delivering to the marketplace a steady stream of new TV shows, movies, 
CD’s and books.  However, they have gradually metamorphosed in the last 
two decades into something not quite so simple.   
Authors of original works of the type that documentarians 
appropriate – films, music, television shows, journalism – typically do not 
control the copyrights of their work.102  Most of these works were made for 
hire, and the corporate media entities that commissioned the work holds the 
copyright and control every subsequent use of the work.103  The content 
industry is a high-volume business, but there are a few players controlling 
the vast majority of copyrighted sounds and images.104  This is the result of 
several decades of increased concentration of media ownership, as these 
corporations have consolidated into an ever-shrinking number of large 
                                                                                                                 
98 See Ramsey, supra note 54; Brown, supra note 88. 
 
99 Brown, supra note 88. 
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conglomerates controlling an ever-growing volume of copyrighted 
material.105   
The growth of the content industry has coincided with the 
appreciation in value of the deep catalog of already-distributed copyrighted 
works whose shelf-life has theoretically passed.106  Content producers that 
once made money by creating new programming, films and music 
discovered that their back catalogs as a significant revenue stream, and 
have become content-recyclers.107  As copyright attorney/law professor 
Peter Jaszi has said, what was once seen as “marginal, unimportant, and 
secondary has suddenly become a big focus of private and public 
attention.”108  One media liability insurance broker has likened the response 
of the content industry to the value of long-dormant libraries as realization 
that it was “sitting on a gold mine.”109 
As a consequence, copyright ownership and enforcement is now 
policed more aggressively then twenty years ago; this policing, as the 
examples of film-makers’ struggles above indicates, extends to 
documentarians.110  Nonfiction filmmakers have in part been a victim of 
                                                                                                                 
105 Id.  Senator John McCain, summarizing the FCC’s data compiled in its 
review of media ownership, stated “Five companies control 85 percent of our 
media resources.” Quoted in LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 162.  Lessig 
further provides concrete examples: five recording labels control 84.8 percent of 
the U.S. market.  Id.  Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. is a fully integrated vertical 
monopoly, in that its supplies content via the Fox movie studio and Fox broadcast 
and cable network, controls sports broadcasts and newspaper and book publishing, 
sells its content to the public and advertisers in print, broadcast and cable media, 
and operates the distribution channels through which the content is disseminated 
via movie theaters and television venues, as well as through satellite systems it 
owns in the U.S., Europe, and Asia.  Id. at 163.  
 
106 See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, Will 
Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control 5- 6 (2005), 
available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf. 
 
107 See id. 
 
108 Brown, supra note 88.  
 
109 HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 106, at 6. 
 
110 Paige Gold, Fair Use and the First Amendment: Corporate Control of 
Copyright is Stifling Documentary Making and Thwarting the Aims of the First 
 
2009] FAIR IS FOUL 427 
 
 
their own success and heightened visibility; the high grosses of films like 
An Inconvenient Truth ($24,540,079 domestic box office), the works of 
Michael Moore ($265,310,868 combined for Sicko, Farenheit 911, and 
Bowling for Columbine), and Supersize Me ($11,536,423) have not only 
permitted audiences, theater chains and distributors to view documentaries 
as entertainment, but copyright holders have made the leap as well.111 So, a 
connection can be drawn between the music publisher’s $10,000 demand 
for the use of a few seconds worth of the Rocky theme incidentally captured 
in a low-budget documentary, the success of documentaries at the box 
office, and the content producers new-found role as licensors of 
accumulated copyrights. As Professor Jaszi has said, “Would music 
copyright owners 10 years ago have predicted they’d be making a 
substantial part of their money over ringtones on cellphones?”112   
Movie studios, TV networks, and the music industry are only the 
most conspicuous forces driving up clearance costs.  Archive houses 
preserve and store old newsreel and other functional nonfictional footage, 
and their product can be essential to historical documentaries.  They have 
also been the locus of an inflationary spiral in recent years.  Archive houses 
were once small, independent operations that negotiated with impecunious 
documentarians on a hand-shake basis.113 Today, the small houses have 
been gobbled up by larger ones, mirroring larger trends in media 
consolidation, and the licensing fees they charge, which can run as high as 
                                                                                                                          
Amendment (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 950, 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4599&context=expresso. 
 
111Ramsey, supra note 54.  Top Documentary Box Office Grosses, available 
at http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=documentary.htm (last visited 
3/23/09).  Documentary box office grosses should be scrutinized relative to what 
top-grossing studio fare takes in.  The highest-grossing documentary, Fahrenheit 
911, made $119,194,771 on its theatrical release. Id.  The highest grossing 
Hollywood feature, Titanic, took in almost $601 million.  Id.  Fahrenheit 911 ranks 
at number 295 on the all-time domestic box office scale, and it must be born in 
mind that no other documentary even comes close to that figure.  Id. 
 
112Ramsey, supra note 54.  Sasha Frere-Jones, Ring My Bell: the Expensive 
Pleasures of the Ring Tone, NEW YORKER, March 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/07/050307crmu_music. 
 
113AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 8-9. 
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$3,500-$4,500 a minute, have been called by one documentarian 
“extortionate.”114  Moreover, the explosion of specialty cable channels, 
owned by major media conglomerates (and hence well-funded, unlike 
typical documentaries) produces a never-ending stream of sports, nature, 
and historical shows that have so increased the demand for archival footage 
that licensing costs have risen accordingly.  The “gold mine” effect of the 
value of the back catalog, familiar from film clips and popular music, has 
occurred in the less overtly-commercial context of archive footage.115 
Licensing practices between the big media entities also drive up the 
costs of clearance.116 The same media corporations who demand exorbitant 
fees from documentarians also pay high fees themselves for any uses of 
copyrighted materials in their own original work.117  Movie studios and 
networks are naturally conservative when it comes to courting infringement 
suits, as they are large institutions with deep pockets, and their lawyers are 
well aware that such entities are attractive lawsuit targets.118  Studio legal 
departments often impose in-house guidelines on their producers, 
mandating that the producers clear everything; adherence to these 
guidelines is a defensive litigation-avoidance strategy.119 Accordingly, 
studios mechanically pay high licensing fees, and bequeath an industry 
custom and fee structure to impecunious documentarians, who do not have 
comparable resources for clearance costs.120 
It is this asymmetry between the big media players who can afford 
to clear everything, and do clear everything, and the documentarian who 
would clear everything but will never have the budgetary means to do so, 
                                                                                                                 
114 Id. at 14 (quoting Jeffrey Tuchman). 
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116 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 901 (2006). 
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that renders industry practices problematic. The better-financed private 
interests, such as movie studios, will have the copyrighted material of 
others available when needed to further its creative work, but a less 
powerful actor, such as a documentary filmmaker, will not.121 
And yet, ironically, documentarians who seek clearance for their 
use of copyrighted material may often not even have to seek such 
clearance.  Section 107 of the same Copyright Act of 1976 that reaffirms 
exclusive rights to the content industry also provides the nonfiction 
filmmaker with a fair use defense. 122 
 
III.  FAIR USE 
 
A. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS ENACTMENT 
 
Fair use is a limitation on copyright protection that acknowledges 
that not every secondary use is an infringement upon an owner’s exclusive 
statutory rights.123 Consistent with the idea of copyright’s social bargain, 
the doctrine permits a user to appropriate elements of a copyrighted work 
without express permission, in recognition that new works necessarily draw 
on old works.124  Fair use enables the creation of new works that surpass 
the original work, augmenting our culture and our knowledge in a manner 
that the original does not.125   By refusing to label a transformative126 
                                                                                                                 
121 In addition, documentarians themselves benefit from the same copyright 
protection that creates their own clearance headaches.  In recognition of this, they 
tend to acquiesce in the face of a rightholder’s demands, as they recognize the 
possibility of a situation where the shoe could be on the other foot.  See 
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 22-23. 
 
122 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 
123 See Forkner, supra note 6, at 722-23. 
 
124 Jeannine M. Marques, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and 
Blanch v. Koons, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 331, 334 (2007). 
 
125Id. at 332. 
 
126 “Transformative” joined the lexicon of fair use decision-making in 
Campbell v. Acuff Rose-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), and means a use 
that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character” so as to 
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appropriation an infringement, fair use furthers Lessig’s “Progress Clause” 
by placing the economic benefits copyright confers upon creators beneath 
the primary Constitutional goal of  maximizing dissemination of new 
works for the greater benefit of the general public.127  
Fair use is part of a web of doctrines which restrains copyright’s 
monopolistic tendencies: the limited term of exclusive rights encoded in the 
first Copyright Act; the idea-expression distinction, which denies 
protection to an idea, and only confers copyright on the expression of that 
idea;128  the refusal to recognize facts as falling under the subject matter of 
copyright;129 and the “first sale” doctrine, which “exhausts” an owner’s 
right of distribution by permitting the sale of used books or the rental of 
DVDs after the initial lawful purchase.130 The Supreme Court has stated 
that these limiting doctrines, some of which have their origins at common 
law, are not “unforeseen byproduct[s] of a statutory scheme,” but instead 
balances authors’ “right to their original expression, but encourages others 
to build free[ly] upon ... [their earlier] work.”131  
Though the doctrine of fair use appeared in English law before our 
own copyright regime was in place,132  it was not integrated into U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
alter an original work “with new expression, meaning or message.”  As shall be 
seen, it has often been viewed as dispositive in fair use cases. 
 
127 See Forkner, supra note 6, at 720-21 and LESSIG, supra note 3, at 130-31. 
 
128 Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a 
Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 31, 36-
37 (2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).   
 
129 Id. at 36 (citing Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 
(1991)). 
 
130 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 842-43 (1994). 
 
131 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) 
(quoted in Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Peter Jaszi, Professor, 
American University Washington College of Law). 
 
132 Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in 
an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 15 (1997). 
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common law until Justice Story’s 1841 opinion in Folsom v. Marsh133.  In 
Folsom, Justice Story outlined several factors courts should weigh in 
deciding whether or not a use was fair: “look to the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”134  
Justice Story’s common law enunciation of fair use was followed 
for 135 years before the factors were finally codified in the Copyright Act 
of 1976: 
 
[The] fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work 
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include – 
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; 
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market or value 
of the copyrighted work.135 
 
Fair use may be seen as a “enforced consent” imposed upon the 
original author, who, in return for statutory protection of her exclusive 
rights, is deemed to assent to reasonable uses of her work.  Thus, fair use 
and consequently “enforced consent” satisfy the Constitutional aim of 
promoting expansion of the public fund of knowledge; if second uses also 
further the promotion of the public good.136   
                                                                                                                 
133 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
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135 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 
136 See generally Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 715, 719 (2007) (citing ALAN LATMAN, STUDY NO. 14, FAIR USE OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781, 785 
 
432 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
Between 1909 and 1976, legislative extensions of a copyright’s 
scope, subject matter, and corresponding penalties were paralleled by an 
increase in the number of infringement actions.137  This was due in part, to 
the growth of both reproductive technology (the capacity to copy) and the 
power of mass media. These changes threatened to stifle new works by 
shrinking the public domain.138  Courts in turn responded by embracing fair 
use.139   It is possible that Congress decided to codify fair use in order to 
counteract the effects of its own expansion of copyright protection for the 
benefit of a burgeoning content industry.140  The doctrine’s codification in 
the 1976 Copyright Act  kept copyright constitutional by limiting authors’ 
exclusive rights. Unchecked, these exclusive rights would thwart the very 
progress in arts, sciences, and knowledge that copyright was created to 
promote.141 
Congress acknowledged the role courts played in shaping the 
boundaries of copyright by incorporating the four factors originally 
outlined in Folsom, while allowing for continued refinement of the doctrine 
on a case-by-case basis.142  The House Report stated that the purpose of 
section 107 was to “restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way143. . . [S]ince the doctrine is an 
                                                                                                                          
(Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963)). 
 
137 See generally Loren, supra note 132, at 18-21. 
 
138 Id. at 718. 
 
139 Pat Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame Their Fear of 
Quoting and Learned to Employ Fair Use: A Tale of Scholarship in Action, 1 
INT’L J. OF COMM. 26, 27 (2007); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 
50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A 133, 136 (2003). 
 
140 See generally Loren, supra note 132, at 19. 
 
141 Id. at 21. 
 
142 Liu, supra note 15, at 99-100. 
 
143 While Congress stated that it intended no alteration in the common-law 
doctrine, the language dictating consideration of whether a use was for a 
commercial or non-profit educational purpose appeared very late in the drafting as 
a result of lobbying by educators, and did in fact constitute a contraction of the fair 
use doctrine which has since proven vexatious for documentary film-makers, 
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equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and 
each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”144   
As a practical matter, fair use is an affirmative defense to 
infringement, and not a right, “a shield and not a sword.”145  From a 
documentary film-makers standpoint, this poses a problem; the doctrine 
may only be utilized after one is sued for infringement.146  Therefore, a 
film-maker has to endure the risk, having appropriated elements of a 
copyrighted work, either because the licensing fee was beyond her means, 
or else because the owner denied the license outright for brand-control or 
ideological reasons, of being subsequently sued rather than receiving a 
preemptive determination.147  Even assuming the cost of litigation presents 
no obstacle to a film-maker (a considerable leap of faith, since the cost of 
defending an infringement action can range from $290,000 to $1 million, a 
cost far in excess of the unaffordable license148), applying the mandatory 
four factors as an ex ante predictive exercise does not provide much 
guidance in determining whether the defense will be successful.149  
Most documentaries qualify as “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research.” 150 While, by this 
                                                                                                                          
among other potential users. See Lockridge, supra note 128, at 72-75; see also 
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 68-69 (2001). 
 
144 Maxton-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253,1260 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 
145 MICHAEL C. DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 280. “‘Fair use’ is not 
infringement of a copyright.” Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to 
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1552 (2003).  The most plausible 
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147 See generally Madison, supra note 145, at 1569. 
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definition, fair use should be applicable to documentary films, they may 
also be considered commercial.151  Under the ____, whether the 
documentary is of a “commercial nature” impacts fair use analysis and may 
result in the first factor being found in favor of the owner.  Many, 
documentaries have distribution deals with Hollywood studios, cable 
networks, and DVD producers. These deals create an aura of commercial 
exploitation that hovers over even the most high-minded nonfiction film.152  
Also, the amount of material utilized from the copyrighted work impacts 
analysis under the third factor of the fair use test. Factor three asks “how 
much is too much,” and raises dual questions of “how much and how 
crucial was what was taken relative to the original work,” and “how much 
of the second work did it comprise.”153  Even if the first three factors of the 
test can be satsfied, the fourth factor pre-supposes a licensing market for 
the copyrighted work which may render any abrogation of permission 
harmful, and thus not a fair use.   
Since the four factor test offers little in the way of a determinative 
outcome one may want to consider fair use case-law.  The case-law, 
however, also is indeterminative.  Fair use is an equitable doctrine and as 
such cases were decided on a fact-intensive inquiry.  Courts, following the 
express dictate of the Supreme Court, have refused to offer bright-line rules 
when interpreting Section 107. This has resulted not in doctrinal coherence 
but fragmentation.154  This patchwork judicial application of the fair use 
test has led one of the foremost copyright scholars to label fair use “a fairy 
tale,” and to conclude, after surveying nearly a decades worth of fair use 
decisions, that  “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than [the factors 
in Section 107] . . . the upshot would be the same.”155 
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B. THE FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
The Supreme Court, echoing the legislative history of Section 107, 
has stated that courts, faced with weighing the four fair use factors, are to 
avoid bright-line rule-making and tailor their analysis to each specific fact-
pattern.  In addition, no one factor of the four is determinative, and all are 
to be explored individually and weighed together.156  As a consequence of 
this avowedly ad hoc nature of fair use decision-making, the doctrinal 
jurisprudence has been entirely judge-made, and is thus unpredictable.157  
As an example, two of the three Supreme Court fair use rulings were 
closely decided, and all three involved reversals first in the federal 
appellate courts and then again at the Supreme Court.158   
These three Supreme Court fair use decisions staked out certain 
doctrinal refinements subsequently employed by lower courts.  These 
refinements, however, are not firm guidelines for documentary film-
makers. Rather, they are more like variables in an ex ante calculus 
regarding whether to gamble on incurring an infringement suit resulting 
from a fair use.159  
Universal City Studios v. Sony was a challenge by the motion 
picture industry’s to the video cassette recorder, then in its infancy.  The 
studios claimed private home-taping of copyrighted television 
programming for later viewing constituted infringement.160  The court 
found that such private non-commercial use was fair, but noted that under 
the statutory fair use factor, “purpose and character of the use,” a 
commercial or profit-making private use would be presumptively unfair.161 
Consideration of the commercial purpose of the use does comport with the 
language of the statute, but risks tilting every decision towards the 
copyright holder and away from fair use, especially when weighed in light 
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of the fourth factor, the effect of the use on the marketplace for the 
copyrighted work.162 
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, a 
progressive news magazine “scooped” the forthcoming publication of 
Gerald Ford’s memoirs and an authorized excerpt due to run in Time 
magazine, when it received a pilfered manuscript and published the most 
sensational portion, Ford’s account of his pardon of President Nixon.163  
The Court reaffirmed that commercial use is presumptively unfair, 
stating that the user’s profit motive alone was not at issue, but whether “the 
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without 
paying the customary price.”164  In addressing the third factor, “the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole,” where The Nation had only copied a very small part of Ford’s 
book and had surrounded it with a substantial amount of original reportage, 
the Court applied a qualitative, rather than quantitative analysis, and found 
the use unfair because “the heart of the work” had been copied.165  
Most significantly, the Court termed the fourth factor “undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use.”166 Due to the fact that Time 
cancelled serialization subsequent to The Nation’s scoop, and the book 
publisher’s consequent monetary loss was found to be conclusive proof of 
actual market harm, the Court shifted the burden of proof to the defendant 
for rebuttal. The Nation failed to do so, and the Court found no fair use.167 
The most recent case in the Supreme Court’s fair use trilogy, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc,. has proven to be the most significant 
in terms of providing a fair use guideline to the lower courts.168  Here, rap 
group 2 Live Crew, had copied Roy Orbison’s wholesome early ‘60's 
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country-rock classic “Oh, Pretty Woman” for their gamier parody song 
“Pretty Woman.”169 
In contrast to Sony Pictures and Harper and Row, the Court held 
that the commercial nature of the use was not dispositive, but merely one 
factor to be weighed among the four.170  The Court recognized that the 
enumerated fair uses in the statute – news reporting, criticism, commentary, 
etc. – are invariably paid for by someone, quoting Dr. Johnson’s “No man 
but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”171  In shifting its attention 
away from whether the use was a commercial exploitation of a copyrighted 
work, the Court introduced a new criteria for the first factor’s “purpose and 
character of the use” which seemed to take fair use back to its origins in the 
social bargain of the Copyright Clause: was the secondary work 
“transformative?”172  That is, did the new work, in copying an older work, 
supersede or supplant the older work in the marketplace, or did it : 
 
add something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, 
or message . . . .such works . . . lie at the heart of the fair 
use doctrine’s breathing space within the confines of 
copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the 
less will be the significance of the other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against finding fair use.173 
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its own derivative rap-parody work. Id. at 592-93. 
 
170 Id. at 584-85. 
 
171 Id. at 584. 
 
172 Id. at 578-79. 
 
173 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court 
found that the raunchy rap version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was a parody, and 
hence transformative.  The Court reasoned that for a parody to succeed, it must, by 
definition, take enough from the original to elicit the minimum degree of 
recognition for the joke to properly effect the audience.  Moreover, the Court found 
that the subjects of parody will often be unlikely to want to see themselves 
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Since Campbell, the transformative inquiry has been central to fair 
use decision-making, despite the fact that the phrase appears nowhere in 
the statute.174  In every case in the appellate courts since then, if the court 
found the use to be transformative, it was fair use; if the use was found not 
to be transformative, it was infringing.175 The relevance of the inquiry to 
the documentary context is self-evident, in that a court could arguably find 
that with any given use, a documentarian, by arranging the copyrighted 
materials used within a novel context, had transformed it.  However, a 
finding of transformativeness is necessarily going to be a result-oriented 
inquiry; just about any use that is not mere plagiaristic replication 
transforms the original in some way, and defining the point where copying 
as pure commercial exploitation ends and transformation begins is so 
dependent upon judicial discretion that a potential defendant is in no 
position to guess before she copies.176 
Copyright scholar David Nimmer views the malleability of the four 
fair use factors as enabling results-oriented, and hence subjective and 
imprecise, fair-use decision-making: “At best the four factors fail to drive 
the analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang 
antecedent conclusions.”177  
The tension between two of the factors, which can subsume the 
others, is the reason. On the one hand, the purpose and character of the use 
leads the court to examine whether the use of an older work has 
transformed that material into a novel one. The fourth factor, inquiring as 
to how the use has affected a potential market for the original work leads 
courts to examine whether even the very existence of an actual or potential 
licensing market has been harmed by the use.  But by using harm to a 
potential market as a bar to fair use, courts invite circular reasoning; in this 
era of rapid technological change in media dissemination, cross-licensing 
arrangements, and lengthened copyright terms, it is a simple matter for a 
                                                                                                                          
parodied, and may deny a license for that reason alone, making fair use an 
appropriate defense to infringement when a parody is at issue. 
 
174 DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 288. 
 
175 Forkner, supra note 6, at 745.  
 
176 Madison, supra note 12, at 1558-59. 
 
177 Nimmer, supra note 155, at 281. 
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copyright owner to define its own potential market and thus claim injury, 
and sweep away the transformative inquiry altogether.178 
This tension has played itself out in a circuit split.  Federal courts 
in New York,  taking their cue from Campbell, have held that the first 
factor, under the transformative inquiry, is the most important.179  But most 
federal courts in California have followed Harper & Row in taking the 
position that the fourth factor, harm to the licensing market, is the most 
important factor.180  As a consequence of this uncertainty, one prominent 
copyright attorney advising film-makers considering using copyrighted 
material, has stated “you should always err in favor of asking and 
paying.”181  Thus, to avoid the appearance of market harm, one 
documentarian feels compelled to pay thousands of dollars to use a ring-
tone despite undoubted aesthetic transformation when the sound inhibits  a 
little boy from telling his mom about his school day in Mad Hot Ballroom; 
while the makers of Hoop Dreams similarly feels obliged to pay the owners 
of “Happy Birthday” when the song occurs in the transformative context of 
an 18th birthday party in the Chicago housing projects, and elicits the 
mother’s poignant comment that her son is lucky to have reached 18.182   
 
C. FAIR USE AND NON-FICTION FILMS IN THE COURTS 
 
Since the Supreme Court birthed the transformative criteria in 
Campbell, there have been eight significant fair use decisions relevant to 
non-fiction film and its close cousin, television news reporting.183  All were 
                                                                                                                 
178 See generally Marques, supra note 124, at 340-41. 
 
179 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2nd Cir. 2006);  NXIVM Corp. v. 
Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2nd Cir. 2004); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 
(2nd Cir. 2001); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 
(2nd Cir. 1998); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2nd Cir. 
1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
 
180 DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 282. 
 
181 Id.  
 
182 Forkner, supra note 6, at 744. 
 
183 See Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 
2003); Los Angeles News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002); 
 
440 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
decided in either New York or Los Angeles, which is not surprising, as the 
Second and Ninths Circuits are the twin domiciles to the U.S. media 
industries.  Two salient points emerged from the cases:  on the one hand, 
they express the tension between the application of the first, transformative 
factor, favoring users, and the fourth “effect on the potential market” 
factor, favoring copyright owners. Second, the cases relating to nonfiction 
film at least superficially demonstrates the ad hoc uncertainty which is the 
consequence of the kind of case-by-case analysis called for by Congress 
and the Court. 
 
i. The California Cases:  The King and Chopper Bob 
 
In Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video,184  the defendant, 
producers of a 16 hour video biography of the King of Rock and Roll 
created for retail sale, sought to lift an injunction against their documentary 
won in the District Court by the plaintiffs, amongst whom were the rights-
holders of Elvis Presley’s television Performances.185  The advertising copy 
on the box touted the fact that the film included footage from every film 
and television appearance of Elvis.186  The copyrighted materials provoking 
the infringement action constituted five to ten percent of its sixteen hour 
length;187 the materials include all of his appearances on the Steven Allen 
show, 35% of Elvis’ career-making Ed Sullivan appearances, and three 
minutes of his epochal 1968 comeback TV special.188  The film-makers 
                                                                                                                          
Hofheinz v. AMC Prod.’s, Inc., 147 F. Supp.2d 127 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); 
Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F.Supp.2d 442 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); 
Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 3802 (HB), 2001 WL 
1111970 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters 
Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Los Angeles News Serv. v. 
KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Monster Commc’ns Inc., v. 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. N.Y. 1996). 
 
184 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 
185 Id. at 626. 
 
186 Id. at 625. 
 
187 Id. 
 
188 Id. 
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asserted fair use, and the Ninth Circuit,189 after weighing the four factors, 
affirmed the injunction sought by the plaintiffs.190 
The court performed the four-factor analysis and found no fair 
use.191  First, looking to the purpose and character of the use, the court cited 
Harper & Row’s proposition that a commercial use disfavors a defendant to 
the degree to which the user exploits the copyrighted material for 
commercial gain.192  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the use 
was “not consistently transformative,” and that the presence of the voice-
over commentary was insufficient for any mitigation;193 the court indicated 
the long length of some clips amounted to essentially a re-broadcast of the 
copyrighted materials rather than use as reference to Presley’s career.194   
Moreover, the court believed that the commercial nature and purpose 
outweighed any transformation because the advertising touting the fact the 
video includes every television appearance indicates their inherent desire to 
profit from the copyrighted materials.195 
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, was found 
to be neutral, as the clips were both newsworthy, hence less protected and 
creative expression, which enjoys more protection.196  For the third factor, 
amount and substantiality of the use, the court found that the film-makers 
                                                                                                                 
189 Id. at 626. 
 
190 Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 631 (The court noted in reviewing an injunction, 
an abuse of discretion standard controlled, and that it believed the case was closer 
than the district court had held; had these facts come before the appellate court 
under de novo review, the court acknowledged the outcome may have been 
different). Id.  
 
191 Id. at 627-31. 
 
192 Id. at 627. 
 
193 Id. at 628-29 (citing Monster Commc’ns, Inc.  v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc, 
935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)  and Hofheinz v. A&E Television, Inc., 146 F. 
Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 
194 Id.   
 
195 Id. 
 
196 Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 629-30. 
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had taken the heart of the work197 by copying the material that would likely 
be licensed, the most memorable parts of Elvis’ hits.198  Finally, the court 
indentified the fourth factor, the effect on the potential market, as “the 
single most important of all the factors.”199  The court found no fair use, 
stating that if others similarly used the plaintiff’s footage without paying 
for it, the plaintiff’s market for licensing works would be undermined. 
Effectively, the clips would be used for the same purpose as the plaintiff’s 
original work.200 
Overall, in Presley the Ninth’s Circuits Section 107 analysis 
focused on the harm to the plaintiff’s potential market.  The court 
seemingly dismissed any transformation of the clips when viewed in light 
of the film’s biographical re-contextualization under the vague standard of 
“inconsistency.”201  The result was a documentarian’s fair use worst-case 
scenario:  the death of a film, which had cost $2 million and years to 
produce, by means of a permanent injunction.202   
                                                                                                                 
197 Id. at 630-31. 
 
198 Id. 
 
199 Id. at 630-31. 
 
200 Id. at 631. 
 
201 Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 628-29. 
 
202 Paige Gold, Fair Use and the First Amendment: Corporate Control of 
Copyright is Stiflying Documentary-Making and Thwarting the Aims of the First 
Amendment, 15 U. BALT. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 28, 29 (2006).  Judge Noonan, the 
dissenting judge in Presley, was so disturbed by what he termed the court’s 
embrace of the trial court’s factual and legal errors, particularly with respect to the 
transformative fair use analysis and the protection of the public’s interest in 
copyright’s social bargain, that three months later he amended his dissent to 
broaden his argument to incorporate constitutional questions.  See Elvis Presley, 
349 F.3d at 631-34 ((Noonan, J., dissenting), amended by 357 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 
2004)).  The decision is indicative of the instability of judicial analysis of the four 
factors, because if the district court had weighed them as Judge Noonan suggested, 
and as courts in New York did in A&E and Monster Communications, a fair use 
finding may have resulted.  See generally Krissi Geary, Video Biography Gets All 
Shook Up: Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 
161-64 (2004). 
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The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent fair use decisions clouded rather 
than clarified doctrinal boundaries.  There were three cases involving the 
same plaintiff, the Los Angeles News Service (“LANS”) suing for the use 
of the same film footage.203  While in all three cases the court gave 
substantial weight to the fourth “market effect factor” unlike in Presley, 
transformative fair use was found in one.204 
Robert Tur, owner of LANS and free-lance helicopter news 
cameraman,205 flew his helicopter to the flashpoint of a riot that occurred 
after the 1992 verdict acquitting the police officers who had beaten Rodney 
King.206  Tur managed to film nine minutes of footage of Reginald Denny 
being pulled from his car and beaten nearly to death by gang members. Tur 
scooped all of the local national news outlets and insisted that they do not 
use the footage without a license.207   
LANS had two victories in fair use defense cases against the Los 
Angeles News station K-CAL and international news service Reuters.208  
Both defending parties did not manage to obtain a license and thus tried to 
                                                                                                                 
203 L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2002); 
L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 
1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 
1997).  
 
204 L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d at 940. 
 
205 Matthew Belloni, The Man Who Could Kill YouTube, ESQUIRE, July 
2007, at 71. 
 
206 Id. 
 
207 Id. at 71-72.  17 years later, Tur is still litigating unauthorized use of the 
footage, this time against YouTube, whom he vows to shut down. Id.  He has since 
moved to join his action with numerous corporate media plaintiff’s pursuing 
similar claims. See Tur. v. YouTube, No. CV-4436, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96517, 
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2007).  
 
208 L.A. News Serv., v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 997; L.A. News 
Serv. v. K-CAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123.  
 
444 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
justify their use of LANS footage through the doctrine of fair use.209  The 
Ninth Circuit found that in both cases, the defendant’s use was not fair.210   
With respect to the first factor, the commercial nature and purpose 
of the use, the court found no fair use because LANS and the defendants 
were competitors; this negated the fact that the clips were used for news, 
one of the factors enumerated in Section 107.211   Furthermore, the court 
concluded that transformativeness of the material was absent because the 
voice-over failed to fundamentally change the nature of the video 
recording.212 
Regarding the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
the court favored both defendants because the copyrighted work was 
factual rather than expressive.213  Next, the court found that in both cases 
the amount and substantiality of the use amounted to the heart of the work 
because the images of the beating was exactly what legitimate licensees 
would want the clip for.214  Finally, the court looked at the effect on the 
plaintiff’s market and concluded both that the commercial use was 
presumptively unfair, and using clips that would normally be licensed 
would destroy the plaintiff’s market.215   
                                                                                                                 
209 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News 
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123. 
210 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 997; L.A. News 
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123. 
 
211 LA. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News 
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123. 
 
212 L.A. News Serv. v. KCA_-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1122-23.  In Reuters, 
the court also found with respect to the first factor that the defendant could not 
claim a fair use exemption for news, since a new service does not report news but 
merely collects and transmits it for others to broadcast. 149 F.3d at 994.  
 
213 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News 
Serv. v. K-CAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1122.  
 
214 LA. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News 
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1122.  
 
215 LA. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News 
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123. 
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The Ninth Circuit took a different position in the Los Angeles New 
Service v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., concluding that the there was 
transformativeness of the material and thus the defendant could assert the 
fair use defense.216  In this case, the cable network Court TV used brief 
images of the Denny beating in advertising “teasers” to promote its 
coverage of the trial of Denny’s assailants and in the opening title montage 
for the show “Prime Time Justice.”217   
Regarding the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the 
court found that both instances were commercial in nature because of its 
promotion of the network’s trial coverage.218  The Ninth circuit reasoned 
that though an advertising “teaser” was not transformative per se, this was 
mitigated by the fact that, as opposed to Reuters and K-CAL, Court TV 
was not a direct competitor of LANS.219  Furthermore, the court reasoned 
that the use of footage in the title montage was sufficiently transformative 
because of the creative use of graphics beyond a mere copying of the 
clip.220  On balance, the court found the first factor “weakly” favored fair 
use.221 
The nature of the copyrighted work, here as in the other two LANS 
cases, tilted towards fair use since there were factual materials at issue.222  
Regarding the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the use, LANS’ 
prior fair uses cases came back to haunt the court.223  The court explained 
that unlike in Reuters, where it was argued that the 45 second clip 
constituted the heart of the work, only a few seconds were used by Court 
                                                                                                                 
216 L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d at 942. 
 
217 Id. at 929. 
 
218 Id. at 939-40. 
 
219 Id. at 940. 
 
220 Id. at 939. 
 
221 Id. at 940. 
 
222 L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d at 940. 
 
223 Id. 
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TV and thus did not qualify as the “heart” of the work.224  Finally, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant did not adversely affect LANS 
potential market for two reasons.225  First, they explained that the clip 
montage was unlikely to affect the plaintiff’s market because it was 
transformative,226 and the lack of competition between LANS and Court 
TV mitigated the concern of the teaser footage not being transformative.227 
The Tur trio reveals the importance of the transformative test, 
especially with regard to an owner-friendly court like the Ninth Circuit.  In 
K-CAL and Reuters, where the character and purpose of the use was news 
reporting, an enumerated fair use exception in Section 107, fair use was 
denied; yet in CBS, where the use was purely commercial, the court found 
transformative fair use.228            
       
ii. The New York Cases:  The Greatest and The 
Shlockmeister’s Widow 
 
While the Ninth Circuit advanced Harper & Row’s presumption 
that commercial uses are unfair, and advanced the fourth “market harm” 
factor as determinative, the district courts in New York City emphasized 
the transformative test from Campbell in their fair use decision making.229 
                                                                                                                 
224 Id. at 940-41. 
 
225 Id. at 941-42. 
 
226 Id. at 941. 
 
227 Id. at 942. 
 
228 L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d at 942); L.A. News Serv. v. 
Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d at 997; L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV 
Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123). 
 
229 Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’n, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3802, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14752, at, *10 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  This judicial favoring of the 
transformative test was ultimately embraced by the Second Circuit in two decisions 
handed down in 2006.  Bill Graham Archives., 448 F.3d at 608; Blanch v. Koons, 
467 F.3d at 250. While neither of these decisions occurred within the non-fiction 
film context, commentators and copyright attorneys have recognized their potential 
positive significance for documentarians asserting a fair use defense. In Graham 
and Blanch, the court allowed the transformative inquiry to dominate all other 
considerations. In both cases, minimal aesthetic changes to the copyrighted work 
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In Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting System, 
the plaintiffs were the producers of the documentary “When We Were 
Kings” which told the story of Muhammad Ali’s 1974 fight in Zaire.230  The 
defendants, producers of a cable documentary “Ali-The Whole Story” used 
between 41 seconds and 2 minutes of the plaintiff’s footage without 
permission.231  The plaintiff filed suit and the court found in favor of the 
defendant on the basis of fair use.232     
The court concluded that the first factor, nature and character of the 
use, favored fair use because a biography fulfills many of the enumerated 
purposes set forth in Section 107.233  Specifically, the biography could 
qualify as a comment, criticism, or scholarship and research, and thus could 
be considered fair use regardless of the commercial nature of the film.234  
Regarding the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court 
explained that despite the creativity present in the original work, “Kings,” a 
denial of fair use to a film depicting history would deprive the public of 
information.235   The court, however, determined that the second factor did 
not favor the defendant because the story could have been told without 
using the plaintiff’s clips.236   
                                                                                                                          
and the work’s contextualization within the expressive totality of the second work 
were sufficient for findings of transformativeness.  And once transformativeness 
was found, market considerations were largely mooted. Perhaps more importantly 
for documentarians, the court expanded the statutory enumerated fair use purposes 
to include creative works, mandating looking to the expressive purpose of the use, 
and not merely the functional purpose. In the future, this may open the door for 
courts to make a prima facie finding for documentaries as legitimate fair users.  See 
Marques, supra note 124, at 347-52. 
 
230 Monster Communications, 935 F. Supp. at 491. 
 
231 Id. 
 
232 Id. at 496. 
 
233 Id. at 494. 
 
234 Id. at 493-94. 
 
235 Monster Communications, 935 F. Supp. at 493-94. 
 
236 Id. at 495. 
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With respect to the third factor, the amount and substantiality of 
the use, the court found in favor of fair use.  The court reasoned that 
quantitatively the use was too small such that it was barely noticeable when 
viewing the two films in a back-to-back screening.237 Moreover, the portion 
of the defendant’s film dealing with the 1974 Zaire fight occupied only 
nine minutes of the infringing work.238  On the fourth factor, the court 
concluded that the there was too little use of the plaintiff’s work to have 
any potentially adverse effect its licensing market.239 
The New York decisions, like the Ninth Circuit, also involve a 
trilogy of cases brought by a single litigious copyright-holder.240  The cases 
involved documentarian and TV networks use of clips from films produced 
by American International Pictures (“AIP”).  From the 1950s to the early 
1970s, AIP was famous for creating science fiction and drive-in features.  
Susan Hofheinz, widow of AIP founder-principal James H. Nicholson, 
sued three separate film makers for using clips from AIP’s films.  The 
Southern District of New York found fair use in all three cases.   
In Hofheinz v. AMC Productions, Inc.,241 American Movie Classics 
was producing a documentary history of AIP with the cooperation of Ms. 
Hofheinz.242  Hofheinz licensed six 59-second clips,243 but shortly before 
the film’s theatrical screening, she withdrew her involvement and voided 
all licenses. Further, she warned AMC that any exhibition of the film 
segments would constitute infringement.244  AMC screened the film 
                                                                                                                 
237 Id. at 495. 
 
238 Id. 
 
239 Id. 
 
240 See Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14752 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001). 
 
241 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 
242 Id. at 130-31. 
 
243 Id. 
 
244 Id. at 133. 
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anyway and Hofheinz sued.  In Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, a 20 
second-clip from the AIP film “It Conquered the World”245 was used, 
without permission, in an episode of the cable series “Biography,” profiling 
actor Peter Graves.246  The clip illustrated Grave’s pre-stardom work in 
low-budget films.247  In the final AIP case, Hofheinz v. Discovery 
Communications, Inc., the defendant cable network used the plaintiff’s 
clips in a multi-episode documentary of the history of the horror movie 
genre.248  One segment examined Hollywood’s representation of 
extraterrestrial visitations; three clips totaling 48 seconds in length, with 
voice –over on the soundtrack, were taken from AIP’s “Invasion of the 
Saucermen” without permission from Hofheinz’.249 
In examining the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, 
the district court found fair use in the Hofheinz trilogy.250  The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently transformed the clips, and 
there was a lower presumption against AMC’s commercial purpose 
because the copyrighted materials were not superseded by their 
incorporation in a wholly new work.251  In AMC and A & E, the court 
explained that the use of the clips were per se transformative because as a 
biographical documentary it satisfied many of the enumerated purposes of 
                                                                                                                 
245 The clip was taken not from the AMC Documentary discussed above, but 
from the alien-invasion film from which it took its title.  IT CONQUERED THE 
WORLD (American International Pictures 1956).   
 
246 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 
247 Id. at 444. 
 
248 Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001). 
 
249 Id. at *5-7. 
 
250 A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47; AMC Prods., 147 
F. Supp. 2d 127, 137-38; Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14752, at *17-*18. 
 
251 A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47; AMC Prods., 147 
F. Supp. 2d at 137-38; Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, 
at *17-18. 
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Section 107; namely being a criticism, comment, or research.252  The 
Discovery case extended the transformative analysis beyond the parameters 
of biography.  The court held that transformativeness “forms the basis for 
the entire fair use analysis” and not merely for the first factor inquiry.253  In 
Discovery,  Hofheinz’s clips  were used to establish that “Saucermen” was 
the first film to depict government efforts to cover up the existence of 
UFO’s. The clips fit into the film’s overall examination of common themes 
and political context of science fiction films. Thus the work was 
transformed.254 
Finally, as in the Ninth Circuit’s Presley decision, Hofheinz argued 
that the clips taken by all three defendants were used solely for 
entertainment value, thus acting as competitors with each other and hurting 
the marketplace for AIP films.255  The district court explained that while the 
defendant’s films had entertainment value, they were also intended to 
educate the audience.256  Thus, since Section 107’s enumerated list of fair 
use purposes was non-exhaustive, entertainment value did not preclude a 
second user.257  
In analyzing  the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
the district court was definitive.  In AMC, the court found this factor in 
favor of the plaintiff because the AIP films were creative works.  In A & E 
and Discovery, however, the court did not find in favor of either party.  
                                                                                                                 
252 A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446; AMC Prods., 147 F. 
Supp. 2d at 138. 
 
253 Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *10. 
 
254 Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001). 
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This was based on the fact that Hofheinz had managed to keep the films out 
of circulation.  Thus, the unavailability of the films, according to the court, 
justified the defendant’s appropriation.258  Regarding the third factor, the 
amount and substantiality of the use, the court, in all three cases, found that 
the use of the clips were either brief or fragmentary in nature.  The 
defendants had taken on only what was necessary for their purpose and had 
not appropriated the heart of the work.259 
With respect to the fourth factor, the court, in all three cases, found 
the use too diminutive in when compared to the whole work. This 
proportion was too insubstantial to cause any adverse effect on the 
plaintiff’s potential licensing market.260  The court opined, in all three 
cases, that the defendants’ use of the clips from AIP movies might actually 
stimulate audience interest in these long-dormant films.261  In contrast to the 
Ninth Circuit’s Presley holding, the court in the Hofheinz trilogy dismissed 
the plaintiff’s argument that a finding of fair use would diminish the value 
of her ability to license AIP clips in the future.262  The court in AMC 
believed that this argument would eviscerate fair use because the whole 
point of fair use is to recognize circumstances where a third party is not 
required to obtain a license.263          
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iii. Lessons for Film-makers From the Fair Use Cases 
 
The fair use decisions expressly dealing with nonfiction films and 
television news illustrate the unpredictability inherent in fair use law.  
Further, the decisions highlight courts’ insufficient guidance regarding the 
applicability of fair use law to documentary films.264  When viewed at a 
high level of generality, similar fact patterns produce opposing or 
counterintuitive results. Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Passport Video found 
the use of clips within a biographical documentary not to be fair use,265 
while Hofheinz v. A&E Network and Monster Communications v. Turner 
Broadcasting System strongly suggested, and Hofheinz v. Discovery 
Communications expressly stated, a presumption of transformativeness in 
the biographical film context.266    
All of the courts, however, stated that nonfictional copyrighted 
material utilized in a documentary, is accorded less protection than 
expressive, creative works.  This is contrasted with Los Angeles News 
Service v. Reuters and Los Angeles News Service v. K-CAL, where the use 
of hot news footage of extraordinary public interest was not found to be fair 
use,267 while use of the fanciful and creative films of AIP was found to be 
fair in the Hofheinz trilogy.268  
In Elvis Presley the court found that the documentary’s use of the 
copyrighted material, with respect to entertainment value, was a mere 
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substitute for the owners purpose, but I the Hofheinz cases, the court 
dismissed the entertainment value inherent in the use as a consideration 
altogether.269  The ad copy touting the inclusion of copyrighted material in 
Elvis Presley tainted the use of that material as unfair, but the same court 
accorded the use of the Denny footage in Court TV’s ads as fair – after the 
aforementioned LANS decisions where it had held use of the same footage 
as news was unfair!270 
Lawrence Lessig has suggested that the fair use defense, despite its 
codification in the Copyright Act, effectively does not exist for 
documentarians, because the inconsistent outcomes from litigation has 
rendered the defense too uncertain to rely upon: 
 
The rules of “fair use” are self-consciously not self-
authenticating. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted 
that lower courts not develop simple, automatic rules. The 
effect is that fair use in practice becomes the right to hire a 
lawyer, in contexts in which the defense of fair use rights is 
effectively impossible . . .If a documentary filmmaker 
wants to include a clip from [the news] in her film, the 
standard procedure is to ask permission, regardless of the 
length, and regardless of [its] transformative nature . . . . [If 
permission is denied] the film maker must therefore decide 
whether . . . the use of the clip is . . . “fair.”  That inquiry is 
fundamentally uncertain . . . [and] the expense of error is . . 
. extraordinarily high. The reality for most [documentary] 
filmmakers is thus not a public domain . . . . The reality is 
that while the law effectively secures to writers a broad and 
unquestioned freedom to quote without permission, it 
grants no such freedom to filmmakers.271 
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Further, as motion picture copyright attorney Michael Donaldson writes, 
“court cases are supposed to give us some guidance about how to behave.  
About all you can draw from these cases is that courts want you to 
behave.”272 
And yet behavior may be precisely the element that harmonizes 
these documentary fair use decisions.  It is possible that the documentary 
fair use case-law is but a palimpset beneath which an older and a far more 
useful inquiry lies hidden. An English copyright infringement case from 
1802, pre-dating the seminal U.S. fair use case Folsom v. Marsh, may 
provide a clue.273  In Cary v. Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough framed the fair 
use inquiry in this fashion: “Was the matter so taken used fairly with that 
view [for the promotion of science and the benefit of the public], and 
without what I may term the animus furandi [in effect, an intent to 
pirate]?”274     
The documentary cases, while purporting to weigh the four factors, 
may instead indicate a judicial inquiry into whether a second user’s work 
fits within a privileged category which benefits the public, or whether a fair 
use defense is merely a mask for piracy.275  Thus K-CAL and Reuters 
denied fair use because the defendant were free-riding on the plaintiff’s 
footage, rather than reporting news; and the video biographers in Elvis 
Presley made the key error of boasting in their ad copy of the copyrighted 
film and television appearances within.276  In all the other cases, graphics, 
voice-overs, context all worked not merely to indicate transformativeness, 
but also an intent on the defendant’s part to add to the domain of public 
knowledge.277  The courts deployed the four factor analysis to reassure 
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themselves that they were in fact viewing a documentary and not a mere 
copy sold for the same purpose as the copyrighted work.278  
Even a film-maker who comports herself with the same probity as 
the defendants whose fair use defense carried the day chooses to roll the 
dice, and assert fair use when sued. Though the film-maker may be 
confident in her case because she has competent copyright counsel, she still 
has to reckon with what one film-maker has called the ultimate “chokepoint 
of rights”:279 the Errors and Omissions (E & O) insurer.  
 
V.  E & O INSURERS AND FAIR USE 
 
A. THE GATEKEEPER 
   
Errors & Omission (E&O) insurance, known as a type of media 
liability coverage, is akin to malpractice insurance.  It compensates third 
parties for the negligent mistakes of the insured.280 No film can be 
exhibited and distributed in any venue, be it theatrical, cable or network 
broadcast, or DVD, unless the film-maker has an E & O policy.281  The 
president of one media liability insurer has said, “An uninsured film is an 
un-releasable film.”282   E & O insurance is the most important gatekeeper 
for a documentarian’s fair use assertion.283  
The policy indemnifies and pledges to defend any claims arising 
from infringement suits.  The insurance protects investors, exhibitors, and 
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distributors from either secondary liability, the loss of up-front investment 
and potential profits should the film be subject to money damages, or if an 
injunction is successful established against the film.284  E & O insurance 
thus protects not only the film-maker, but mitigates the risk aversion of 
other parties downstream on the distribution chain.285  Because copyright 
owners have been increasingly aggressive in policing uses of their work in 
the past two decades, the need for media liability insurance on the part of 
content-producers has increased accordingly, and documentarians have not 
been exempt.286 
Documentarians typically defer purchasing E & O insurance until 
the last possible minute, because independent films are often shot without 
distribution in place; typically the distributor is the first interested party in 
the film’s existence who will mandate coverage.287   Film-makers seeking E 
& O insurance do not deal directly with the insurer, but instead fill out an 
application with a broker.288  The application itself begins with the 
presumption that any copyrighted material within a documentary has been 
cleared with formal permission from the owner.289   The form asks if 
copyrighted materials are included within the film.  If so, it then asks if 
permission to use it has been obtained from the owner.  If permission has 
been denied, the film-maker must explain the refusal.290  In addition, the 
film-maker must provide a full clearance history of any copyrighted 
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material included in the film, again explaining any failure to secure 
permissions.291  Finally, the applicant is asked if she has been party to an 
infringement claims, whether brought to fruition in proceedings, pending, 
or threatened; this demand extends to claims the film-maker may 
reasonably believe to potentially exist, within the last five years.292    
The broker then takes the application to insurance company 
underwriters, who assess the risks, and decide whether to issue the policy, 
and for how much.293  Often with the help of counsel, though sometimes 
drawing on experience, the underwriter, on seeing the absence of 
permission will analyze two things.  First, the broker will determine the 
likelihood an infringement suit will be filed.  Second, if the underwriter 
even entertains the possibility of accepting fair use, the likelihood the 
defense will defeat summary judgment is entertained.294  An underwriter 
facing a potential fair use assertion must weigh the fact that only areas of 
settled law can be considered by a court deciding a motion for summary 
judgment.295 As has been shown, the fair use case-law is both scanty with 
respect to documentaries, and is anything but settled; this is palpably the 
underwriter’s perspective.296   As one broker for documentarians has said, 
“we never say fair use to an underwriter. Ever. Fair use is a defense, and 
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underwriters don’t want to get to the point where they’re defending a 
claim.”297 
Prior to 2007, of the four major media liability insurers in the 
documentary field, one, AIG, flatly refused to cover un-cleared material.298 
The other three, Media Professional, First Media, and Chubb, would, on a 
case-by-case basis, accept an opinion letter from the film-maker’s 
copyright counsel for review in the underwriting process.299  Responses to 
the letters varied.  Chubb’s underwriters weighed the opinion against their 
own analysis of the four factors (sometimes turning to clearance counsel), 
and if there was agreement, Chubb assumed the risk and write coverage 
confident that their analysis comported with the law.300  In some instances, 
the policy was priced upwards.301  If there was no agreement, coverage was 
denied.   
First Media stressed that it would always urge the filmmaker to 
work closely with an attorney for clearance issues at the outset of the 
relationship.302  Unlike Chubb, it looked to the quality and strength of the 
opinion letter, rather than weighing the opinion against their own four-
factor analysis.303  Media’s attitude was that if the film-maker (and her 
counsel) showed they had conducted due diligence, they would provide 
coverage.304  Media’s underwriters have even, in the absence of an opinion 
letter, watched the film themselves to determine fair use, and if a problem 
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was evident, would steer the film-maker to counsel for advice that would 
bring the use in line with fair use.305  
Media Professional also looked to a persuasive opinion letter from 
competent copyright counsel in covering un-cleared material.306   The letter 
was important, because MediaPro’s president acknowledged “underwriters 
are not lawyers, they do not view things through the legal lens, are not 
capable of legal judgment.”307 Even if an opinion favored the user, the cost 
of litigation that the use might incur was still the bottom line.308 
Film-makers aver that insurers, even those who will accept an 
opinion letter, will typically not accept uncleared material.309  On the other 
hand, Debra Kozee of C & S Insurance Brokers, who served as an 
intermediary for insurers and documentarians for twenty years, describes it 
as a fallacy to say coverage was not available where fair use was asserted; 
documentarians as a breed are just too poor to pay much beyond the $3500 
E & O policy, particularly when the film had yet to recoup its investment; 
and that as far as underwriters were concerned, $3500 did not cover 
exhaustive legal vetting and subsequent litigation expenses.  Such litigation 
can cost between $290,000 and $1million.310  The consequences of a 
plaintiff’s verdict can run from statutory damages of $30,000 per infringing 
use, up to $150,000 if the infringement is found to be willful, as well as 
actual damages and attorney’s fees.311    
The insurer’s reluctance to endorse a film-maker’s fair use, no 
matter how strong a copyright counsel may believe the defense to be, is 
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inextricably bound up with the uncertainty of a litigation outcome.312  The 
level of uncertainty tolerated by attorneys is not acceptable to insurers.313 
As copyright lawyer Michael Donaldson puts it, “Insurers would rather 
avoid litigation than win litigation.”314 
Documentarians’ fair use assertions were just not worth the money 
from an insurer’s litigation standpoint.315  This may also be true from the 
film-makers standpoint. Even if she can find an attorney to furnish a 
persuasive opinion letter to a sympathetic underwriter, the additional 
expense of getting “lawyered up” stretches a documentary’s slender budget 
to the breaking point.316  Moreover, film-maker’s may have pragmatic 
reasons to avoid pressing fair use assertions on their insurers.317  One 
documentarian has said, “if you ever have a claim on E & O insurance, you 
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might as well go into another line of work. You can never file a claim or 
you get blacklisted – and never insured again.”318 
 
B. THE E & O INSURER AS COPYRIGHTR 
 
E & O insurers shape documentary practice via the power to deny 
coverage to un-cleared material that satisfies the statutory fair use factors; 
what insurers do can determine what winds up on screen, and thus they can 
affect film-makers, either for timidity or boldness.319  Representatives of all 
four major insures who provide E & O coverage to documentarians 
concurred with the characterization that, with respect to fair use, the insurer 
is a policeman for the copyright regime, making certain that the film-maker 
walks the line between fair use and infringement. Because insurers so often 
deny coverage where permission was not granted, their gate-keeping role 
favors copyright holders rather than film-maker.320  This makes them the de 
facto regulator in a copyright system that is, at least with respect to 
infringement actions,  an unregulated matter of private ordering.321 
The unregulated nature of copyright may seem surprising, given 
that it is the creation of a long and complicated Congressional statute, and 
governs a global media industry, whose contribution to the nation’s net 
wealth is vast.  Congress defines copyright’s entitlement, subject matter, 
requirements for protection, exclusive rights due to the creator, and 
penalties for violating those rights.322  The role of the Federal Copyright 
Office is ministerial and non-regulatory, and is largely concerned with 
registering and tracking copyrighted works.323 Enforcement then occurs in 
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the courts, where judges refine any complexities in the application of the 
statute on a case-by-case basis.324   
While infringement enforcement is thus judicially administered, it 
comes about as a matter of private lawsuits.325  The allocation of rights and 
responsibilities in the market, such as licensing, is not regulated, as it is not 
defined in the Copyright Act.  Between Congress’ definitions of the 
copyright entitlement and judicial enforcement (with the attendant 
refinements of doctrines like fair use), the copyright regime relies upon 
private parties to create the structure of the market for expressive creative 
works.326 
Fair use is a captive of this private ordering.  Due to risk-averse 
behavior, notably on the part of insurers, but also on the part of film-
makers and their financiers, it is not a subject of much litigation.327  
Licensing markets tend to dictate the scope of copyright entitlements 
because of the absence of coherent fair use case-law precedent that lend 
authority to owners or users, and because film makers, guided in part by 
insurance considerations, are gun-shy abut asserting fair use. 328  Fair use in 
practice is dictated less by the Copyright Act of 1976 and decisional law, 
and more by marketplace actors’ day-to-day behavior.329  An independent 
licensing culture, where documentarians must seek permission for 
copyrighted materials when they may have a legitimate fair use, supersedes 
positive law as the determinant of the actors’ behavior.330  As James Gibson 
writes, these actors, “look to the internal practices of the relevant industries 
and then apply the same market-referential standards that they would 
expect the courts to apply if they were ever to litigate,” with risk-aversion 
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the primary consideration for film-makers.331 Into this vacuum, created by 
this absence of positive law inputs and regulation, steps the film-maker’s 
insurer.   
Insurers increasingly play the traditional governmental roles of 
risk-spreading and loss prevention.332  Just as in the private regulatory 
universe of tort law generally, liability insurance has the capacity to 
translate the specific tort of copyright infringement’s incentives into prices, 
and more importantly, directives.333  In the fair use context, in theory 
regulation by insurance is facilitative, in that the E & O insurer spreads the 
cost of losses arising from infringement actions, and thus permits film-
makers, investors, exhibitors, and distributors to proceed in their activities, 
rather than be inhibited by the possibility a risk may become a loss.334   
When an insurer elects to cover a documentarian’s exercise of fair 
use, insurance abates the potential cost of copyright infringement in a 
world where new creative works build upon and transform older creative 
works.335  The fair-use friendly insurer thus enables and facilitates the 
creation of new documentaries.  Conversely, in the more likely scenario 
that the insurer denies coverage to a documentarian invoking fair use, the 
owner-friendly licensing market is reified and enabled by the denial, and 
the insurer has successfully, if inadvertently, policed the content industry’s 
copyright, without recourse to courts, legislators, regulation.336  
Copyright regulation by insurance inheres in the insurer’s power to 
refuse the risk of fair use, which creates leverage over the insured film-
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maker.337  And if the insurer accepts the fair use risk, this gives the insurer 
incentive to manage the risk both before and after it matures into a loss.338  
Leverage and incentive translates into several broad categories of 
regulation by insurance: gate keeping, loss prevention, selective exclusion, 
management of loss costs, and education.339    
The insurer’s gate keeping role is elementary in the documentary 
context: a film-maker’s contracts with distributors and exhibitors mandates 
E & O coverage to protect those third parties, by covering losses they 
might be exposed to in an infringement action.340 In the copyright context, 
to get through that gate, documentarians are either compelled to drop any 
un-cleared footage as soon as it has been disclosed to the insurer, or have 
the film vetted by an attorney, who then furnishes an opinion letter for the 
underwriter to either accept or reject.341  In both of these scenarios, the 
film-maker must meet the insurer’s standards if she wants to pass through. 
The insurer chooses whether to permissively regulate fair use by assessing 
whether the risk comports with existing law, deny coverage if its risk 
analysis does not jibe with the opinion letter, or affirmatively regulate an 
owner-friendly copyright regime by a per se exclusion of un-cleared 
footage.342  
These last two choices fall under another quasi-regulatory 
category, selective exclusion, wherein an insurer denies the use of un-
cleared footage because the underwriter has deemed the potential loss too 
uncertain, given the instability of judicial readings of the four factors. (Pre-
2007, this was AIG’s policy.)343  Selective exclusion of uncleared footage 
effectively eliminates the liability altogether. 
                                                                                                                 
337 See Baker & Farrish, supra note 332, at 294-95.   
 
338 See id. at 295. 
 
339 See id. at 294-99. 
 
340 See id. at 294. 
 
341 See Interview with Kenn Goldstein, supra note 294. 
 
342 See id. 
 
343 Telephone interview with Debra Kozee, supra note 289; however, often 
when an insurer would offer indemnification and defense for all elements of a 
documentary except the un-cleared footage; the film-maker, exercising 
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An insurer practices loss prevention to prevent harm, once it has 
assumed responsibility for any consequences for a given harm.344  In the 
context of fair use, this translates into underwriting procedures that make 
loss prevention activities a condition of obtaining insurance, such as the 
film-maker’s jettisoning of any un-cleared materials, or else an attorney’s 
opinion letter vouching for fair use; risked-based pricing, such as Chubb’s 
increase in premium costs proportional to the heightened degree of risk 
once it had accepted a film-maker’s fair use assertion; and engaging in loss 
prevention-oriented monitoring in the course of the entire insurance 
relationship, typified by First Media’s recommendation at the outset that 
the film-maker acquire copyright counsel to vet the film at every step, 
followed as well by Media Pro and Chubb.345 
Finally, the insurer can influence the behavior of the 
documentarian through education.346  Insurers who deal with film-makers’ 
copyright issues have the benefit of years of experience weighing fair and 
unfair uses, and accordingly formulate basic principles for the film-maker 
before the relationship even formally begins. This will direct the film-
maker’s decision-making so that it is harmonious with the insurer’s 
requirements.347  Media Pro, First Media, Chubb, and the brokerage C & S 
all issue press releases and print articles on their websites providing over-
views of  fair use and its attendant case-law, typically stressing the 
importance of competent counsel and  advising cautious behavior by 
prospective film-maker/insureds.348  In addition, insurers attend seminars 
                                                                                                                          
considerable nerves,  might then roll the dice by accepting the exclusion, and 
retaining the footage. Id.    
 
344 Baker & Farrish, supra note 332, at 295. 
 
345 Interview with Michelle Tilton  supra note 294; Interview with Leid Dodell 
supra note 282; Interview with Kenn Goldstein, supra note 294; Interview with 
Paul Paray, supra note 294; For  See generally Baker & Farrish, supra note 332, at 
295 (providing additional background on insurer loss prevention activities).  
 
346 See generally Baker & Farrish, supra note 332,at 297-98. 
 
347 See Gibson, supra note 116, 893-94. 
 
348 Media/Professional Insurance, Documentary Filmmakers Find Freedom 
from ‘Clearance’ Hurdles Thanks to Initiative by Media/Professional Insurance 
and Leading Lawyers, http://www.mediaprof.com/documents/Fair 
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and workshops at documentary organizations’ events, and maintain a press 
profile, furnishing quotes in trade journals on the rights and responsibilities 
of film-makers and insurers alike with respect to fair use.349 In this way, the 
insurers can advertise their products, while providing film-makers working 
their way through the permissions maze with ex ante advice drawn from 
expertise and experience. 
 
C. THE ATROPHIED FAIR USE MUSCLE AND A SHOT ACROSS THE 
BOW 
 
By 2004, Michael Moore’s Fareneheit 911 raised documentary 
films profile by achieving record box office grosses for the genre and 
raised the genre’s profile to a summit.350 However, the consensus among 
film-makers, their copyright counsel, and academic commentators was that, 
as far as documentaries were concerned, “fair use was broken.”351  
Documentarians who had experienced clearance hassles and whose efforts 
at invoking fair use had not passed muster with insurers commented: “Fair 
use has never been my friend…and my advice to would be to cover your 
                                                                                                                          
%20Use%20News%20Release.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2004);  Blake Keating, 
The Uncertain Applicability of “Fair Use,” http://www.firstmediainc.com/insights 
/ip101_iss4.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2004); Chubb Group of Insurance 
Companies, Errors and Omissions Liability Insurance for Video and Film 
Producers, http://www.chubb.com/businesses/csi/chubb9538.pdf; C&S 
International Insurance Brokers, Producer's E & O, 
http://www.csins.com/prodins/eando.shtml (last visited Apr. 28, 2004). 
 
349 See, e.g., Jason Fahmy and Kevin Violette, Playing Fair: The Basics of Fair 
Use (Chubb generated article posted at non-theatrical filmakers' online journal 
CINE newsletter), http://www.cine.org/newsletter/newsletter.php#4 (last visited 
6/27/09);  Dave McNary, "Insurance for Documentary Fair Use," Variety online, 
2/22/07 (Leib Dodell of Media/Pro quoted in show business trade organ), 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117960027.html?categoryid=18&cs=1 (last 
visited 6/27/09). 
 
350 See BRET TOPLIN, MICHAEL MOORE’S ‘FAHRENHEIT 9/11: HOW ONE FILM 
DIVIDED A NATION (University of Kansas Press 2007).  
 
351 Telephone interview with Anthony Falzone, supra note 315. 
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tracks.”352  “If you’re doing a feature DVD or for theaters, you can’t invoke 
fair use . . . You can say whatever you want, but at the end of the day you 
can’t sell your film.”353  “Fair use is a defense. If someone is suing you, 
you’re already in the situation where you would have had to have the 
money to hire a lawyer . . . which is already out of the range of most film-
makers.”354 
Veteran copyright attorney and general counsel to the International 
Documentary Association Michael Donaldson stated that he won many fair 
use negotiations with insurers, but it was challenging.355  Winning fair use 
negotiations for Donaldson was always a fight.  It was a cumbersome, 
lengthy process, made doubly painful because it occurred so late in the life 
of a film, shortly before release, but after the documentarian had spent 
years in production.356  Any fair use victories with insurers were generally 
kept secret, so no precedent could be built upon them, and the wheel was 
reinvented in an ad hoc fashion with each fair use assertion.357  Donaldson 
said that he was aware of some documentarians who had felt so thwarted 
by the clearance process and subsequent denials of fair use by insurers that 
they often abandoned projects at their inception.358  One insurer said that 
her client Michael Moore, the most commercially successful and well-
capitalized figure in the field, has described insurance as his biggest 
production headache.359 
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Copyright scholars in legal academia seized upon the problems of 
documentarians and their insurers as evidence that even the most 
sympathetic users, whose work so often falls under the § 107 enumerated 
purposes of criticism, comment, research, scholarship and news, were 
blocked from availing themselves of effective fair use.360  James Gibson 
termed the fair use logjam “doctrinal feedback.”361  Doctrinal feedback 
occurs when copyright’s entitlement swallows up fair use, not within the 
realm of positive law, but through an accretion of unrelated industry 
customs and practices which inadvertently reinforce the necessity of 
seeking licenses even where the use is fair.362   
Gibson’s thesis laid out the preconditions of doctrinal feedback: 
risk aversion of documentarians, their insurers, and their distributors, faced 
with the legal uncertainties of fair use, breeding overly conservative 
permission-seeking.363  The shadow the fourth fair use factor, effect on the 
market, casts on any ex ante decision-making, because of the inherent 
circularity where any appropriation can be found unfair if permission had 
ever been sought in the past by anyone, or even could potentially be 
sought.364 Owner’s rent-seeking propensities, via unreasonably high 
clearance fees, reinforced by the practice of major corporate entities to 
license everything at the maximum price;365 and documentarians own 
ambivalent respect for a pro-licensing norm, given that their own work can 
be subject to similar appropriation.366  Gibson concluded that even if all of 
these motivations are rational and innocent, the solicitude shown by all 
                                                                                                                 
360 Aufderheide, supra note 139; Gold, supra note 110; HEINZ & BECKLES, 
supra note 106, at 6, 18; Jaszi, supra note 136, at 717; LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, 
supra note 4, at 95-99; Marques, supra note 124; Rothman, supra note 119, at 
1972-74. 
 
361 See generally Gibson, supra note 116. 
 
362 See id. at 887-903. 
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364 Id. at 896. 
 
365 Id. at 902. 
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parties to owner’s self-aggrandizing strategic licensing behavior ultimately 
subverted the constitutional knowledge-creation purpose of the Copyright 
Act, while acting entirely outside the realm of positive law.367 
If, as Gibson implied, documentarians’ fair use impasse arose from 
custom and practice, and was a collective action problem, then, perhaps, 
only a collective action solution could break it.  As one documentarian put 
it, “[fair use is] like a muscle. You have to use it.”368 Beginning in 2004, 
film-makers, assisted by lawyers and academics, began to flex that muscle. 
That year, the Center for Social Media at American University produced a 
study entitled “Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights 
Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers,” authored by academic 
and copyright lawyer Peter Jaszi and communications scholar and center 
director Pat Aufderheide.369  
“Untold Stories” was the product of interviews with 45 
documentarians about their clearance difficulties and the inadequacy of fair 
use as a cure.370  The authors concluded that the inaccessibility of licenses, 
due to either exorbitant costs or rights-holders’ reluctance to part with the 
material, had resulted in films whose message was diluted, and sometimes 
in films not being made at all.371  These “untold stories” were prima facie 
evidence of a shrinking public domain and the need for a stronger, more 
effective fair use.372  The study also concluded that many film-makers—as 
well as lawyers, distributers, and broadcasters—lacked a full understanding 
of the doctrine, and called for greater educational efforts so that such 
misunderstandings would not continue to be a hindrance to the application 
of fair use.373  Finally, the study identified insurers as “the chokepoint of 
rights,” a gatekeeper who, if swayed, could break the fair use impasse.374 
                                                                                                                 
367 See generally Gibson supra note 116, at 903-906. 
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VI.   THE DOCUMENTARY FAIR USE SEA-CHANGE 
 
A. BEST PRACTICES 
 
Among the recommendations in “Untold Stories” was a call for 
film-makers to craft a including: encouraging documentarians to rely on 
fair use whenever reasonable; persuading gatekeepers, including insurers, 
to accept well-founded assertions of fair use; discouraging copyright 
owners from threatening or bringing infringement suits against 
documentarians when the use comported with best practices;375 and, should 
such a suit be brought, providing film-makers with an evidentiary basis for 
a fair use defense, if their use complied with best practices.376 
“Untold Stories’” co-author Peter Jaszi noted that the fair use case-
law, particularly the  nonfiction film cases, used the four § 107 factors as a 
covert means of determining whether the film-maker appropriated 
copyrighted material for a legitimate documentary purpose, or for mere free 
riding, commercial exploitation, or creation of market substitute.377  The 
fair use inquiry thus compares the defendant’s actual practice and the norm 
or pattern of use with which that defendant seeks to affiliate: documentary 
knowledge-creation, or mere piracy.378 Therefore, if film-makers could, as 
a group, articulate fair use custom and practice, then courts, as well as 
gatekeepers, would be on firmer ground when weighing a fair use 
assertion.379    
                                                                                                                          
 
374 See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 9. 
  
375  See id. at 31. 
 
376 See id. at 30-31.  
 
377 Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 1 UTAH L. REV. 715, 
720 (2007). 
 
378 Id. at 731. Such a reading of the cases makes the harshest judicial denial of 
fair use, Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Passport Video, seem less harsh, if a 
documentarian were to use the case as a boundary-marker for 
“transformativeness,” as well as a caution not to actually advertise her film based 
on the copyrighted material included. See Aufderheide, supra note 139, at 29.   
 
379 Id. at 732. 
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In a series of thirteen meetings, Jaszi and Aufderheide worked with 
members of five filmmaker organizations380 to articulate principles of fair 
use and limitations on those principals; the findings were then vetted by a 
legal advisory board, and the results, The Documentary Filmakers’ 
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use (“the Statement”), was issued on 
November 18, 2005.381  
The Statement lists four situations where documentarians may 
reasonably assert fair use, and for each situation articulates a fair use 
principle, each with an attendant limitation.382  While the situations came 
from the experiences of participating film-makers, the principles were 
synthesized from extant documentary fair-use case law, with particular 
attention paid to the requisite transformative inquiry.383  In addition, the 
Statement folds the first “purpose and character of the use” into the third 
“amount and substantiality” factor to ask whether the amount taken was 
appropriate in light of the nature of the copyrighted work and the purpose 
of the use.384  The situations where documentarians may assert fair use 
include: 
 
1) Employing copyrighted material as the object of 
social, political, or cultural critique; the underlying 
principle here reflects the enumerated fair use purposes in 
the act. The Statement notes that so long as the film-maker 
analyses or comments on the copyrighted material, and 
uses it only as extensively as her point is made, then the 
use is fair.  The limitation flows from the last point, in that 
the appropriated work cannot be used so much that the use 
becomes a substitute for the original.  
                                                                                                                 
380 PAT AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 1 (2005), available at 
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2) Quoting copyrighted works of popular culture to 
illustrate an argument or point; an example given is the use 
of a film clip to depict changing attitudes towards race.  
The illustrative power of such a use, subordinated to the 
intellectual or artistic purpose of the documentary, renders 
any entertainment value inherent in the original work 
irrelevant, because the original is being transformed for a 
new purpose, rather than free-riding.  The limitations 
include: Proper attribution; drawing from a range of 
sources as much as possible; using no more than necessary 
to make the point; and not employing the quoted material 
in order to avoid shooting equivalent footage. 
3) Capturing copyrighted material in the process of 
filming something else.  Here, tampering with reality by 
removing the captured work would be in violation of 
documentary practice.  The limitations include: not 
requesting or directing that the media content be in the 
scene, a manipulation of reality unacceptable to 
documentarians anyway; the captured material must in 
some way be integral to the scene; it must be attributed; the 
captured content should not be there purely to be exploited 
by being the scene’s sole point of interest; and if what is 
captured is music, it must not functionally be used as a 
synchronized soundtrack, that is, the scene must not be 
edited to the rhythm of the music, or it cannot carry over 
into another scene. 
4) Using copyrighted material in a historical 
sequence.  Acknowledging that the best way to create 
historical context may be the use of words, images or 
music connoting the period; often this material is available 
on reasonable licensing terms, but sometimes the cost is 
exorbitant, or the owner otherwise refuses permission. The 
principle stated is that due to the importance of historical 
matter, in some instances fair use should apply. But here 
the limitations are more stringent: the film must not be 
designed around the material used; the film does not 
disproportionally rely upon a single source; the material 
must serve a critical illustrative point; no suitable 
substitute for the copyrighted material can exist; no more 
should be taken than to make the point; no license is 
available, or the licensing fee is excessive in proportion to 
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the documentary’s budget; and the material must be 
properly attributed.385 
 
Remarkably, almost before the ink was dry on the Statement, it had an 
almost immediate impact upon the gatekeepers. 
          
B. THE BELLWEATHER FILMS AND THE INSURERS 
 
Eight weeks after the Statement’s release, three documentarians 
successfully invoked its principles to justify their reliance upon fair use 
when all three premiered films at the Sundance Festival.386  “This Film Is 
Not Yet Rated,” which examined the arbitrary and capricious standards of 
the Motion Picture Association of America’s (“MPAA”) film rating board, 
used 143 film clips from Hollywood movies to illustrate that the ratings 
system discriminated against independent films.387  The film-makers 
quickly realized that given the critical posture the film took towards both 
Hollywoods’s depiction of sex and violence and the MPAA rating practice, 
it would be impossible to secure licenses.388  Primarily because through 
criticism of the film quoted, “This Films’…” violated standard form 
language in studio licensing agreements389 thus fair use was the only 
feasible means of producing the film.390 
The second Sundance film debut invoking fair use was “The Trials 
of Darryl Hunt,” recounting the vindication of a wrongfully accused man 
facing life in prison for rape and murder after a racially-charged trial.391  A 
local broadcast outlet had permitted the use of news footage, but when the 
licensor decided it wanted to make its own documentary on the subject, 
permission was withdrawn; the film-makers stood their ground, asserted 
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fair use, and used the footage anyway.392 The final Sundance film screened 
under the Statement’s aegis was “Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes;” 
this film quoted substantially from songs and music videos to critique rap 
music’s celebrations of misogyny and violence.393  Taking on the music 
industry, the most proprietary of content-owners, “Hip-Hop’s” makers 
relied on fair use and the Statement, as their film was unquestionably 
quoting in the service of criticism and commentary.394 Releasing a film 
employing uncleared material through festivals is one thing, as festival 
rights clearance is a pro forma affair.  However, all three films went on to 
either theatrical or broadcast distribution, and eventual DVD release.395  
Additionally, the broadcast outlets that aired the films, including ITVS, 
PBS, HBO and the Independent Film Channel, accepted the three film-
maker’s fair use assertions based on the Statement.396  This was only 
possible because insurers had first accepted fair use.397 Subsequently, key 
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insurers went further than the usual ad hoc fair use acceptance which bore 
no precedential impact.398 Within a year, two insurers would announce 
formal fair use endorsements. Two others, while continuing their pre-
Statement ad hoc fair use underwriting, would align themselves publicly 
with the two furnishing endorsements.399 
 
C. THE FAIR USE ENDORESEMENT 
 
Of the seven insurers who handle the E & O needs of 
documentarians, four of them: AIG, Media/Professional, Chubb and First 
Media represent the bulk of the market.400  In early 2007 both AIG and 
Media/Pro came out with endorsements affirmatively providing coverage 
for fair use.401  AIG’s acceptance of fair use was particularly noteworthy, 
because hitherto it had per se excluded uncleared footage.402  The 
endorsements came about through a convergence of several discrete parties 
operating independently, all of whom had been motivated towards the same 
goal by momentum generated by the Statement.403 
 
1. AIG’s Fair Use Doctrine 
 
AIG’s turnabout was precipitated by Debra Kozee, President of C 
& S Insurance Brokers, and Peter Jaszi.404  Kozee had been acting as an 
insurance intermediary for several years, and had both a business and 
personal commitment to documentarians405.  In January of 2007, she was 
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involved in procuring insurance for “Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and 
Rhymes.”406  Jaszi, working as copyright counsel for the film-makers, had 
flagged “Hip-Hop” as a test case for insurers acceptance of fair use, largely 
because of the film’s use of music and music videos met head-on with the 
thorniest copyright arena and the most proprietary and litigious class of 
owners.407  Jaszi wrote an opinion letter asserting fair use, and letter in 
hand, Kozee went out with the film to underwriters for bids.408  
Paul Paray, an underwriter at AIG, was impressed with the opinion 
letter.409  He believed he discovered a clue on how fair use could be 
responsibly used by film-makers, due to the fact that expert copyright 
counsel vetted the film and adequately applied the four factors analysis.410  
Furthermore, Paray concluded that though not dispositive, the factors 
Statement was a “key” factors in the creation of the endorsement.411  He 
believed that there was great care used in the creation of the 
standards412and that the Statements represent a good-faith pledge of due 
diligence.413 
Shortly afterwards, Paray went to a highly attended film-maker 
conference on fair use 414 that affirmed the documentarians’ desire to 
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follow the Statement’s guidelines.415  Paray concluded that he would rather 
have a fair use endorsement than not,416  thus AIG accepted “Hip-Hop’s” 
fair use assertion and created a formal endorsement scheme.417  The 
endorsement was predicated upon an attorney’s opinion letter that agreed 
with the underwriter’s analysis of the film under the § 107 factors. 
(footnote 320).418 
Paray describes AIG’s fair use endorsement as helping all parties: 
film-makers, because they are permitted greater freedom and creativity; 
insurers, because the decision of underwriters compels documentarians to 
rely on counsel creating clarity from a claims perspective; and the public, 
because it gets the benefit of viewing the documentary as the film-maker 
intended it.419  He is careful to note that the endorsement is not a substitute 
for the film-maker’s due diligence with respect to acquiring clearance; but 
because of the opinion letter requirement, the film-maker cannot say, 
“insurance will cover it, so I’ll just take.”420 
Paray credited Jaszi’s advocacy and momentum in the 
documentary community generated by the Statement as the reason why 
AIG reversed itself on fair use.421  The Statement had fostered film-maker’s 
recognition of the benefits of the involvement of counsel, and this in turn 
created the template for AIG’s endorsement.422  Finally, commerce played 
a part.  Paray believes that public perception of the failure of the 
mainstream news media in representing the world has significantly raised 
documentary film’s audience profile in the last two decades.423  The 
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attendant explosion in documentary production and outlets revealed that a 
market existed.424 Paradoxically, given the fear of copyright litigation kept 
fair use from being accepted by insurers, Paray notes that “these policies 
are profitable from our perspective, because in fact there is very little 
litigation.”425 
 
2.  Media Professional’s Fair Use Endorsement  
 
Media/Professional’s endorsement was the result of a two-front 
initiative.426  The first approach was made by veteran copyright attorney 
Michael Donaldson.427 Donaldson worked with documentarians for years 
and was very hands on with his clients.  He often observed his client’s 
work in the editing rooms, guiding them through adherence to legally 
sound fair use.428  He also served as general counsel to the Independent 
Feature Project and the International Documentary Association,429 and 
worked with Jaszi as legal advisor on the Statement.  Through workshops 
and seminars, Donaldson wanted to educate film-makers and industry 
representatives on the importance of responsible fair use.430 Donaldson has 
written thousands of opinion letters, and the fact that his clients have never 
been subject to a fair use cease-and-desist order has made him very 
comfortable in predicting fair use outcomes.431   
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In the fall of 2006 he began negotiations anew with 
Media/Professional.432 By February of 2007, Media/Pro had hammered out 
an endorsement which stated that if one of seven pre-approved attorneys 
furnished an opinion letter saying a use was fair, the insurer would cover 
the film.433 
Simultaneously, Media/Professional was working out a different 
type of deal with Anthony Falzone, an intellectual property litigator and 
executive director of the Stanford Center for Internet and Society School 
Fair Use Project.434  Falzone offered to Media/Professional a pro bono 
defense promise for any covered documentary threatened with an 
infringement suit.435  Like Donaldson, Falzone would work closely with the 
film-maker in advance to ensure it comported with responsible fair use.436  
Media Pro accepted the offer.437  
Falzone, for his part, recognized that when the time comes that the 
pro bono defense is called in, that scanty documentary fair use case law 
may be expanded by any litigation that ensues.438 While cautioning that he 
doesn’t want to see any of his clients sued for infringement, he believes 
that more decisions in the reporters can only help bolster predictability in 
an uncertain arena.439  Moreover, cease-and-desist letters from owners will 
                                                                                                                          
factor test: “Do I need it to tell the story?  Is it only sufficient time-wise to make its 
point? Is it clear why the use makes the point, and does the film itself explain the 
use? If it doesn’t meet this test, I’ll tell the film-maker to leave it out.” Telephone 
Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73. 
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now be getting rapid legal responses from hitherto impecunious film-
makers.440  Film-makers would gain in confidence knowing someone is 
standing behind them, while litigious owners will find their bullying 
ineffective if it looks like the law is on the documentarians side.441 
Media/Professional president Leib Dodell expressed his pleasure 
because Falzone and his crew of activist attorneys had taken the weight of 
litigation off of the insurer through shouldering the cost of defending film-
makers who adhered to the Statement.442  While the “Donaldson Way,” the 
use of transactional attorneys to ascertain cut-and-dried fair use assertions, 
was a formalization of Media/Professional’s prior policy, the “Falzone 
Way” represented something truly novel.443  Dodell said it was ultimately 
the key element in solidifying his company’s posture towards fair use.444  
The cost of litigation, a significant barrier to covering even the fairest of 
uses, evaporated in a heart-beat.445  In addition, Dodell acknowledged that 
the thorough vetting of the films by either the seven approved lawyers or 
Falzone reduced underwriting costs.446 
Dodell still believes fair use case law in the documentary context is 
unsettled, but because of the pro bono promise is now more comfortable 
with Donaldson’s rejoinder that “it’s absolutely settled.”447  Dodell was 
aware of the historical inconsistency between insurers who were reluctant 
to accept fair use and attorneys, who were more comfortable arguing the 
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doctrinal boundaries in a defendant’s favor.448  The insurer was formerly 
viewed as the policeman or regulator of the fair use system.  However 
Dodell said “the lawyers have taken on the policeman role, they vet 
everything now.”449  Since the endorsement was created, Dodell reports (as 
do Chubb and First National), the fair use litigation front has been calm.  
Film-makers are happy, no-one has been sued, and financing has opened 
up.450 
 
3.  The Bandwagon 
 
While the AIG turnabout quietly occurred a month before 
Media/Professional’s fair use endorsement, the latter managed to generate a 
publicity coup, Hollywood style, that landed the arcane doctrine of fair use 
on the front page of both The Hollywood Reporter and Variety the very 
next morning.451  In February, 2007, Media/Professional’s endorsement 
was announced by the president of the International Documentary 
Association, Diane Vicari, at the Los Angeles gala party for the 
announcement of the Academy Award’s Best Documentary nomination.452  
She brought representatives of each company on state, where the elite of 
the documentary community greeted them with a thunderous standing 
ovation.453 
The next day, the announcement made the trade paper headlines, 
and Donaldson received a phone call from a major insurer, outraged that 
they had not been included in the festivities, or, more to the point, 
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approached with a similar endorsement proposal.454 He then fielded similar 
phone calls from Lloyd’s and AIG.455  As the story gained traction in the 
trades, blogs, and more specialized insurance and film-making news 
organizations, First Media and Chubb, who had always accepted fair use 
with an opinion letter, chimed in to align themselves with what now 
appeared to be an irresistible tide of insurer capitulation to documentarians’ 
fair use assertions.456 
Donaldson speculated as to why the other two joined in, and why 
AIG was sure to raise its profile: They wanted to bask in industry applause 
and retrieve any stolen thunder; exploit a growing demand for a new 
insurance product; they had been quietly granting fair use already, but a 
more openly permissive underwriting attitude, and a foregrounding of film-
makers’ copyright counsel’s role, would cut through the ad hoc struggles 
such assertions bred.457  Finally, the opinion letter process ultimately saved 
them money, if not to the degree Falzone’s pro-bono lawyers would on 
litigation, at least on the underwriting side.458  Or, as Debra Kozee more 
pithily put it, “monkey see, monkey do.”459 
Peter Jaszi has written that the most powerful evidence of the 
Statement’s impact on industry custom and practice, its most stunning 
success, was the fact that it took a mere eighteen months for the majority of 
insurers providing E & O coverage to documentarians to cover fair use.460  
“At least where documentary films are concerned, the vicious circle has 
become a virtuous circle.”461  While the respective stories of AIG’s and 
Media/Professional’s arrival at fair use endorsements are dramatic, with 
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many forces coalescing into a happy ending, the response by the other 
primary insurers, Chubb and First Media, offers a slightly different angle 
on the virtuous circle.462 
 
4.  Marketing v. Substance: Chubb and First Media 
 
First Media and Chubb historically accepted documentarians’ fair 
use assertions, if accompanied by copyright counsel’s opinion letter, and 
continue to do so.463  Representatives of both companies aver that AIG’s 
and Media/Professional’s fair use endorsements are merely cosmetic 
changes in the underwriting process.464  
Ken Goldstein of Chubb described the endorsements as “a 
marketing change, not a substantive change.”465  He stated that 
Media/Professional demands an opinion letter identical to what was 
required prior to February 2007, and gives that letter the same underwriting 
scrutiny as before, with the same consequences if it finds that the film-
maker has failed to satisfy the four factors: denial of coverage.466 
When asked if Chubb would consider Media/Professional’s 
acceptance of Falzone’s pro bono defense promise as a valid option, he 
unequivocally said no.467  This is because Chubb’s E & O policy is 
structured around the documentarian/insured’s participation in settlement 
decisions.  Goldstein stated that he wants the film-maker to have “skin in 
the game,” and a pro bono defense promise would both let documentarians 
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off the hook of making hard choices, and encourage them to avoid asking 
for a license from a copyright owner at the outset.468 
Michelle Tillton of First Media called the fair use endorsements 
“spin,” and stated that any characterization of a “before and after” scenario 
regarding the four insurers’ handling of fair use was “not valid.”469  She 
believes commerce, and not a particular solicitude for documentarians’ 
clearance troubles, motivated the endorsements, pointing that the insurance 
market has been a soft one for well over a year.470  Explaining that 
documentarians E&O policies are “non-reoccurring premium business,” 
that is, one-year policies without renewal, Tilton believes that 
Media/Professional’s and AIG’s new products are merely a quick and 
inexpensive means of collecting new insured s in a soft market, through 
writing these policies on an ad hoc, one-off basis.471 
However, both Goldstein and Tillton saw some value in the 
endorsements, not because of innovative underwriting practices, but 
because of better conduct by documentarians.472 
Goldstein believes that insurers are not any more fair use friendly 
than pre-Statement, but instead that film-makers are more responsible.473  
Because the new endorsements require film-makers to have an experienced 
copyright lawyer thoroughly vet their films, tell them what they can and 
cannot do, and these decisions are the basis for the opinion letter, then 
documentarians are being educated in the law.474  Film-makers, as a 
consequence of this education, have shown a good-faith effort to exercise 
fair use in compliance with the law.  This good faith, engendered by the 
Statement and validated by the availability of the endorsements, will 
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certainly lead insurers to be more receptive to fair use claims, regardless of 
whether an endorsement is offered or not.  
 
VII.  THE FUTURE 
 
While insurers, film-makers, academics, and attorneys have all 
expressed optimism for the future of fair use in the documentary field, 
especially since the insurers have become a more permissive gatekeeper, 
they also concur that it is too soon to foretell the degree to which 
documentarian’s invocations of fair use will resolve their clearance 
issues.475  However, the players have flagged several key areas of 
uncertainty, and in some instances have been comfortable with making 
predictions.476  These areas of uncertainty include the response of copyright 
holders, the thorny areas of music clearance and archival footage clearance, 
the receptivity of third parties, such as distributors and broadcasters, to fair 
use assertions already vouched for by insurers and copyright counsel, and 
the potential for moral hazard when copying is protected by insurance.477 
 
A. THE RESPONSE FROM COPYRIGHT OWNERS 
 
A year after the insurer fair use was announced, copyright holders 
have remained silent litigation-wise with respect to fair use and 
documentaries.478   Anthony Falzone suggested that the silence may owe 
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something to publicity and momentum, specifically with respect to 
documentarians new-found boldness in asserting fair use, and the speed 
with which insurers stepped up to support them.479  As Falzone explains, 
“Owners’ counsel’s attention has been attracted to this assertion of a strong 
positive law basis for fair use, and sense they can no longer bully a film-
maker with cease and desist letters as easily.”480  Michael Donaldson 
believes that after twenty years of education and experience, rights holders, 
movie studios in particular, “get it now,” and have come to understand fair 
use in the documentary context knowing when they can sue for 
infringement.481  Moreover, now that insurers are visibly on the film-
makers side, in the wake of the probability of being met with a strong 
defense, owners are gun-shy of losing.482   
Ken Goldstein of Chubb took the sympathetic view of copyright 
holders in a fair use scenario.483  Goldstein pointed out that they perceive 
the use as the loss of a valuable revenue stream, but he agreed that an 
owner, faced with a legitimate fair use assertion, if furnished with an 
authoritative explanation of why the law would favor the use, might be 
relieved to be spared the burden of litigation.484  Leib Dodell of 
Media/Professional, who like the other insurers represents owners as well 
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as users, stated that he has conveyed to owners that the fair use 
endorsement will ultimately benefit them as well, by sparing them needless 
litigation headaches.485  Pat Aufderheide believes that the Statement can be 
a litigation tool for owners in infringement suits, as they can point to a 
defendant’s departure from its dictates as prima facie evidence that the use 
was unfair.486 
Michelle Tillton of First Media elaborated on this point.487  
Because the four factors cut both ways, potential owner/plaintiffs now have 
a heightened awareness of litigation costs and the possibility of a court 
defeat.488  She agreed that since an adverse fair use court decision could 
create precedent that hurts owners in future litigation, that they will choose 
their legal battles carefully rather than reflexively firing off cease-and-
desist letters.489  Tillton also opined that the zeitgeist and box-office success 
of Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 911" have made owners, as aware as the 
public at large, of the social value of documentaries.490  Finally, she 
believes that policing copyright violations on the internet has kept the 
content industry sufficiently preoccupied so as to make documentarians fair 
use assertions a lesser concern.491 
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B. MUSIC 
 
Music presents a more difficult fair use analysis than film clips or 
incidental captured material because it is harder to distinguish between 
transformative use and mere use as soundtrack.492  While fair use assertion 
by the producers of “Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes” went 
unchallenged by music rights holders, one documentarian called music “the 
next [fair use] frontier (clips being a settled issue).”493  Michelle Tillton of 
First Media stated pithily, “music always sucks.”494 
Donaldson and Falzone are comfortable in asserting that a film-
maker who comports with the Statement’s music guidelines are exercising 
a legitimate use.495  Falzone, noting that there have been no challenges to 
documentarians’ fair use of music recently, says that since the same four-
factor analysis in cases involving clips controls, then provided the film-
maker is properly guided by counsel through the editing process, he would 
have no hesitation about defending a music-based fair use assertion.496  
Michael Donaldson seconded this statement, saying “music appropriation is 
now settled.”497  He qualified this belief by stating that what he calls “third-
party music,” or music not composed for the original film appearing in a 
film-clip that has been otherwise properly licensed is still unsettled, and an 
area where he would like to see some cases create certainty.498 
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C. ARCHIVE FOOTAGE 
 
Michael Donaldson is wary of one fair use arena that is archival 
footage.499  This is an area where film-makers have had considerable 
difficulties in securing affordable licenses, and often crucial to the purpose 
of a historical documentary.500  He characterized the depiction of archive 
houses as monopolistic in “Untold Stories” as greedy as unfair, pointing 
out that acquisition, digitization, cataloging, preservation, and storage of 
this often fragile film is extremely expensive, and moreover, is often 
licensed by the archive owner as well.501  His advice to film-makers is if 
they cannot afford a license for archival film, get a suitable substitute 
elsewhere rather than taking it under fair use, as the Statement provides.502  
On the other hand, Pat Aufderheide believes that archive houses have 
responded positively to the Statement on account of its clarity, and that the 
houses’ litigation posture has diminished since its appearance.503 
 
D. THE RESPONSE OF DOWNSTREAM DISTRIBUTORS 
 
An insurer signing off on a documentary’s fair use of copyrighted 
material does not guarantee that a distributor will follow.504  Because the 
big commercial players, studios, cable and broadcast networks will 
continue to unthinkingly pay top dollar for clearance, this precedent of 
industry custom and practice will always be available for a litigation-shy 
distributor to point to when it acquires a documentary.505  The president of 
one documentary production company, whose work is largely aired on 
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cable, believes that the only arena the post-Statement activity has created a 
fair use safe harbor for are clip-driven films about cultural artifacts.506  For 
anything less on point, distributors may still balk at a fair use assertion 
despite available coverage.507  She explained that in work-for-hire 
situations, especially in cable or broadcast television, while immediate 
supervisors may be happy with vetted fair use assertions, corporate 
resistance at the top still exists.508  This resistance will clearly need to be 
eroded on a company-by-company basis over time, as fair use assertions 
become more frequent and gain credibility.509 
 
E. MORAL HAZARD 
 
The doctrine of moral hazard posits that the presence of insurance 
creates disincentives on the part of the insured to avoid risk, knowing the 
insurer is there to pay the bill.510  Insurers and attorneys all acknowledged 
the potential for moral hazard where fair use is covered, in that film-makers 
at the very least might not go the extra mile to acquire a license, or would 
just take copyrighted material without thinking.511  However, all of them 
qualified this concern as well.512  
Paul Paray, formerly of AIG,  was conscious of a moral hazard 
problem and indeed his company had been hit with bad claims once on an 
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independent film when a film-maker/insured relied on insurance while 
surreptitiously not clearing some footage.513  Paray said this case did not 
involve a documentarian, and that he believed non-fiction film-makers 
operate in good faith and only opt for fair use when they have no other 
choice.514  Calling them consistently responsible actors, he made it 
understood that moral hazard and malicious usage only surfaced in 
commercial fiction feature films.515  Michelle Tillton of First Media’s 
worst-case moral hazard scenario is that a documentarian will represent on 
her application that she received all permissions, a policy will be issued, 
and then it turns out no permission existed.516  This scenario remains 
hypothetical, and given First Media’s directive to their insured on having 
counsel vet the film, it will likely remain unrealized.517  She also expressed 
that the danger of loss of the film to injunction would keep film-makers 
honest, and only extraordinary ignorance and a complete lack of guidance 
by counsel and insurer could ever allow this to happen.518 
 
VIII.   CONCLUSION: A NEW TYPE OF REGULATORY INSURER,  
OR A BETTER INSURED? 
 
Before the appearance of the Statement and insurers’subsequent 
embrace of documentarians’ fair use assertions, insurers filled a regulatory 
vacuum operating on behalf of an owner-friendly copyright regime.519  As 
gatekeeper, E & O insurers could deny documentarians from coverage for 
un-cleared footage, and thus prevent a film from being seen.520  Even where 
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no per se bar existed, as at AIG, the fair use underwriting process was 
lengthy, cumbersome, ad hoc, and uncertain.521  From the film-makers 
perspective, all of these factors were aggravated by the process’ proximity 
to the film’s acquisition of a distributor, and its potential to delay a films 
release.522   
Since the appearance of the endorsements and public embrace of 
fair use by the insurers who do not affirmatively endorse fair use, the E & 
O insurer still fulfills a regulatory function, but of a different kind.523  All 
four insurers require a documentarian asserting fair use to have the film 
vetted by competent copyright counsel, with an opinion letter stating that 
the use satisfies the four § 107 factors.524  The insurers may have been 
persuaded of the validity of fair use,525 but perhaps more importantly, the 
documentarian/insureds have been compelled by their insurers to use un-
cleared material in compliance with the doctrine.526  While this comes with 
the added expense of retaining counsel to vet the film, the reward comes 
not merely in the form of a more efficient underwriting process and greater 
certainty of coverage.527  With each opinion letter, each subsequent grant of 
coverage, and each film released exercising responsible fair use, the 
doctrine may gradually be incorporated into industry custom and practice.  
Since, as some theorists argue, custom and practice – “what is reasonable”- 
lies beneath the often mechanical deployment of the four factors in the 
courts, an expansion over time of customary fair use in documentary film 
                                                                                                                 
521 Interview with Debra Kozee, supra note 289.      
 
522 Donaldson, supra n 188 at 198. 
 
523 Pat Aufderheide at IFP Summit, Panel Disccusion, supra note 503. 
 
524 Interview with Paray, supra note 294.  
 
525 AIG, in dropping its per se exlusion certainly was; Chubb and First Media 
maintain they have needed no such persuasion; and Media/Pro, in adopting the pro 
bono defense promise offered by Stanford Law School litigators,  have armed 
themselves with a weapon that relaxes the need to be a policeman considerably.  
Interview with Lieb Dodell, supra note 282.  
 
526 See Interview with Michelle Tillton, supra note 294.   
 
527 See telephone interview with Leib Dodell, supra n. 283. 
 
2009] FAIR IS FOUL 493 
 
 
may be dispositive, should the day comes that a case gets litigated.  The 
insurer as “good cop” regulator, granting the “carrot” of coverage of un-
cleared material by steering his insured towards responsible fair use with 
the “stick” of retaining counsel is a vicarious educator.  Through the 
demand for an opinion letter, he guarantees that the film-maker will learn 
the law during the post-production process. Both Michael Donaldson and 
Anthony Falzone sit over the shoulder of their clients, and make sure that 
the material taken makes its point, makes it with only as much taking as 
necessary, and makes it in such a way that it explains itself contextually 
(not just to the audience, but to a prospective judge as well).528   
The insurer and copyright attorney schooling the film-maker are 
but part of a team of teachers, indeed only the last ones in a line.  The 
events of February 2007 were the results of collective action by the 
documentary community to solve a collective action problem, and 
insurance was only a piece of it, even if it was the key piece.529  “Untold 
Stories” established that film-makers were ignorant of fair use, or, if they 
knew something about it, were too discouraged by resistance by 
gatekeepers to exercise it.  Since then, an active support system has sprung 
up, to educate film-makers in their rights and responsibilities with respect 
to fair use.   
Conferences and seminars at documentary events, such as festivals, 
are a regular occurrence.530 A network of linked electronic resources for 
film-makers abound, where film-makers, attorneys, and activists can share 
their knowledge and experience of fair use.531  Duke University’s Center 
for the Study of the Public Domain even offers a fair use comic book, 
explaining the doctrine and best practices.532  Under the aegis of the Center 
                                                                                                                 
528 Interview with Anthony Falzone, supra note 313; Telephone Interview with 
Michael Donaldson, supra note 73. 
 
529 See Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.   
 
530 See, e.g., Center for Social Media at American University, 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).   
 
531 Id.  
 
532 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, DUKE UNIVERSITY, 
TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: BOUND BY LAW? (2006), available at 
www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/digital.php.   
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for Social Media, film students can enter their documentary projects for a 
“Best Fair Use” award.533 All of this fosters a better, more responsible 
insured.  Michael Donaldson, when called “the hero of the story” because 
of his victory after decades in the trenches of fair use wars, replied , “No. 
The film-makers are the heroes.”534  Their progress, from fighting and 
usually losing isolated battles on the clearance front, to becoming a unified 
group dedicated to learning the law and then putting it into practice, is what 
changed the game.535  Insurers, whether they smelled money, good public 
relations, or always had a genuine sympathy for their insureds, provided the 
key that un-locked the gate, but it was in large part because of the 
momentum built by the community. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
533 April 2008 Newsletter, CENTER FOR SOC. MEDIA (Am. Univ. Sch. of 
Commc’ns), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/ 
newsletter/entry/2008april/.   
 
534 Conversation with Michael Donaldson, IFP Fair use Summit, supra note 
73.  
535 THIS FOOTNOTE HAS NO TEXT. 
 
 
 
CROP INSURANCE IN THE  
AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY:  
SHOULD FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE  
ENDORSE BIOTECHNOLOGY?  
 
Steve Cooper* 
 
*** 
This casenote discusses whether biotechnology should be endorsed by 
federal crop insurance.  It reviews the history and the goals of the Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation, as well as the role that it plays in the 
American agricultural system.   Genetically modified crops are becoming 
more prominent in U.S. agriculture, yet they have not been addressed by 
federal crop insurance.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture recently 
established the pilot program Biotech Yield Endorsement, whose goal is to 
bring together the federal crop insurance system with the growing industry 
and market for genetically modified seeds.  Agricultural policymaking is 
also reviewed and categorized as economically inefficient.  This note 
argues that a permanent biotechnology endorsement program should not 
be implemented until it has been proven that the environmental and 
economic consequences do not make lower crop insurance premiums 
inadvisable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the wealth of biological and genetic knowledge has improved 
over the past century, the ability to study and modify the genome of an 
organism has revolutionized many industries.   Agriculture in the U.S. has 
seen as many changes as any other industry.  Over the past several decades, 
biotechnology has played an increasingly prevalent role in the agriculture 
industry.  For example, in 2001, 26% of corn grown in the United States 
was genetically engineered.1  Since then, that number has more than tripled 
to 80%.2  This technology has become so widespread because the ability to 
engineer a plant resistant to certain pests or weeds allows farmers to 
increase their yield and profits. 
Along with subsidies, the federal crop insurance program has 
played a major role in allowing the federal government to aid farmers and 
stabilize the nation’s agriculture industry.3  Although the federal crop 
insurance program has been in place for the past eighty years, it has not 
been without its shortcomings.4  One aspect of agriculture that federal crop 
insurance has not addressed, despite its prevalence in the 21st century, is 
genetically modified crops.  If a farmer plants seeds that are genetically 
engineered to reduce the risk of crop loss, then logically, crop insurance 
premiums should be adjusted according to this reduction of risk.  For this 
reason, in 2007 the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and Risk 
Management Agency (RMA), both part of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), devised the Biotech Yield Endorsement pilot 
program, which for the first time would lower the premiums paid by 
farmers who planted specific hybrid seeds created by biotech companies.5 
                                                                                                                 
1 Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Factsheet: Genetically Modified 
Crops in the United States (Sept. 2004), http://trusts.orgpewagbiotech/news_ 
room_detail.aspx?id=17950. 
 
2 Nat’l Agric. Statistical. Serv., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Acreage 24 (2008). 
 
3 Joseph W. Glauber, Crop Insurance Reconsidered, 86 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 
1179, 1179  (2004). 
 
4 Id. 
 
5 U.S. Dept. Agric., Pilot Biotech Yield Endorsement Insurance Standards 
Handbook 2008 and Succeeding Crop Years 1-2 (2007), available at 
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Despite the apparent merits of encompassing a biotechnology 
endorsement in the federal crop insurance system, it is uncertain if the 
endorsement can solve many of the old and lingering problems facing the 
federal crop insurance program, or if it may in fact create new problems.  
There are several economic and environmental concerns that are presented 
by a biotechnology endorsement, rendering the promise and potential of the 
new policies ambiguous. 
Part I of this paper details the history of the federal crop insurance 
program in the U.S. and examines the goals of this program.  Part II 
explains the recent biotechnology endorsements that have been instituted 
by the USDA that have reduced crop insurance premiums for farmers who 
plant seeds generated by biotechnology.  Part III examines whether these 
biotechnology endorsements will have a positive economic impact on the 
federal crop insurance program.  This includes whether the endorsements 
could result in increased participation in the federal crop insurance 
program.  Part IV, however, discusses how, despite the promise of a 
biotechnology endorsement, it could be, as similar agricultural legislation 
has been, problematic both economically and environmentally.  Lastly, Part 
V explains why the specific pilot programs implemented by the USDA and 
biotechnology endorsements could be generally beneficial as they safely 
shift federal crop insurance into an age dominated by genetically modified 
organisms and how these pilot programs can avoid certain pitfalls over the 
course of their implementation. 
 
I. THE HISTORY AND GOALS OF THE FEDERAL CROP 
INSURANCE PROGRAM 
 
In order to evaluate the efficacy and potential problems presented 
by a federal endorsement of biotechnology and hybrid seeds through crop 
insurance, it is important to examine the role that crop insurance plays in 
the U.S. agricultural system.  This section discusses the purpose and 
establishment of the federal crop insurance program, how federal crop 
insurance is administered, and what is necessary for the program to 
succeed.  
  
 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.rma.usda.gov/handbooks/20000/2008/08_20070.pdf) [hereinafter BYE 
Handbook]. 
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A. THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT 
 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act (“The Act”) establishes an 
insurance and reinsurance program whereby the holder of an insurance plan 
is covered against “losses of the insured commodity... due to drought, 
flood, or other natural disaster.”6  Through the USDA, the federal crop 
insurance program is administered by the FCIC, a group that is also 
established by the Act.7  For much of the history of federal crop insurance, 
it was entirely administered by the FCIC, which acted as the primary 
insurer.8  In recent years, however, there has been a shift towards a new 
system, whereby federal crop insurance is not administered directly by the 
FCIC.  Instead, the FCIC acts as a reinsurer for private insurance 
providers.9  Under this system, the eligibility of private insurance providers 
and the terms of federal crop insurance policies are subject to approval by 
the FCIC.10 
The Act was passed in 1938 as part of the New Deal in an attempt 
to help rejuvenate the state of American agriculture following the Great 
Depression.11  The stated purpose of the Act is “to promote the national 
welfare by improving the economic stability of agriculture through a sound 
system of crop insurance and providing the means for the research and 
experience helpful in devising and establishing such insurance.” 12  The 
                                                                                                                 
6 7 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (2008). 
 
7 7 U.S.C. § 1503 (2008). 
 
8 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Crop Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Reduce 
Government Costs for Private-Sector Delivery 18-19 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter U.S. 
GAO Report]. 
 
9 Christopher R. Kelley, The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000: 
Federal Crop Insurance, The Non-Insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program, and 
the Domestic Commodity and Other Farm Programs, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 
143 (2001). 
 
10 Id. 
 
11 Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal 
Crop Insurance Act, 185 A.L.R. Fed 419 (2003). 
 
12 7 U.S.C.A. § 1502(a) (2008). 
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Act, however, was unable to establish the prescribed “sound system of crop 
insurance” as originally stated, resulting in several amendments to the Act 
in the past century.13   
A major problem with the originally-devised federal crop insurance 
scheme was that incomplete and therefore ineffective coverage resulted.  
Initially, wheat was the only crop insured under the Act and coverage was 
geographically limited, thus, certain areas of the country were ineligible for 
coverage.14  Thus, the program, as it was initially devised, created an 
insurance system that was more costly than legislators and taxpayers 
intended.  Low participation led to an increase in premiums for the 
participants and an increase in taxpayer contribution to the program.15  To 
remedy the problem, numerous amendments were made to the program in 
the following decades in order to increase coverage both in terms of 
included crops and geographical scope.16  The hope was that these changes 
would result in a more cost effective insurance program. 
 
B. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
TO INCREASE PARTICIPATION 
 
Despite recognition that the success of federal crop insurance was 
dependent upon high participation rates, by 1980, following the attempts to 
improve the program, crop insurance was still only offered for thirty crops 
in only one-half of the counties in the United States, and only 10% of the 
eligible area was insured.17  Thus, it is not surprising that the USDA was 
forced to pay out hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency loans during 
the 1970s.18  In another attempt to improve federal crop insurance, the 
                                                                                                                 
13 David F. Rendahl, Comment, Federal Crop Insurance: Friend or Foe?, 4 
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 185, 186 (1994). 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 Id. 
 
16 Id. (stating that subsequent amendments to the Federal Crop Insurance Act 
were enacted four times from 1949 to 1968). 
 
17 Steffen N. Johnson, A Regulatory ‘Wasteland’: Defining a Justified Federal 
Role in Crop Insurance, 72 N.D. L. REV. 505, 513. 
 
18 Id. 
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Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Act of 1980 introduced more 
government subsidies in order to promote the purchasing of insurance.19  
Congress believed that if premiums were at least partially subsidized, 
farmers would be more willing to participate in the program.20   
While these changes did result in an expansion of the availability 
and participation in the federal crop insurance program, the improvements 
still resulted in only 25% participation within eligible acreage by 1988, 
much lower than the 50% participation rate expected by Congress.21  Due 
to the low participation, the federal government was again forced to pass 
supplemental legislation to account for crop losses occurring from 
disasters, which reached almost $5 billion for the years 1988-1989.22  In an 
effort to continue to reduce these ex post payments, Congress passed the 
Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 to further increase subsidization.23  In 
fact, one way the 1994 revisions attempted to avoid making ad hoc 
payments to uninsured farmers was by trying to remove the legal authority 
to make such payments for a crop that is covered by the insurance.24 
One of the most significant developments resulting from this 
period of changes was the inclusion of private insurers in the insurance 
program and an expansion of their role in the system.25  Rather than 
administer insurance policies directly to producers, the USDA reinsures 
private groups through the FCIC and the RMA.  For the administration of 
crop insurance policies, private companies that participate in the program 
                                                                                                                 
19 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179. 
 
20 Johnson, supra note 17, at 514. 
 
21 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179-1180.  Coinciding with the increase in 
participation was an increase in availability of federal crop insurance, as by the end 
of the 1980s, some form of federal crop insurance could be obtained in all 50 states 
and the number of insurable commodities increased by 70%.  Johnson, supra note 
17, at 515. 
 
22 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179. 
 
23 Id. 
 
24 Johnson, supra note 17, at 519. 
 
25 U.S. GAO, supra note 8, at 19. 
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are paid a fee by the RMA.26  Furthermore, the private company and FCIC 
share the underwriting gains, as well as the underwriting losses.27  Thus, 
acting as a reinsurer can be greatly beneficial for the government, as they 
can share the risks and potential losses of the crop insurance system and 
avoid much of the responsibility for selling crop insurance programs 
directly to farmers.  As noted, however, by the United States General 
Accounting Office, the relationship between the federal government and 
private insurance companies has been an imperfect one, with the federal 
government remaining responsible for significant losses.28 
 
C. THE AGRICULTURAL RISK PROTECTION ACT OF 2000 
 
Despite a large increase in the number of insured acres in the wake 
of the 1994 amendments, from 83.7 million in 1993 to 220.5 million in 
1995, further legislation was passed in 2000 to address the reductions in 
participation and additional ex post payments were still required to cover 
losses, which occurred throughout the later years of the decade.29  The 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (“A.R.P.A.”) was passed in order 
to further increase the subsidization of producers, as well as to implement 
several other new practices.30  Two notable measures were adopted to 
increase the ability and flexibility of the FCIC to adopt future measures 
improving federal crop insurance. 
                                                                                                                 
26 Id. 
 
27 Id. 
 
28 See id. at 24, 29 (The GAO report details several examples of how the 
federal government as a reinsurer is still taking on significant financial losses.  
Between the years of 1990 and 1996, the federal government administered 
$2,168,000,000 in reimbursements to private insurers, significantly higher than the 
$528,000,000 earned by those private insurers in underwriting gains.  Furthermore, 
the administrative reimbursements made by the government to insurers is often in 
excess of the administrative expenses of those insurers, thereby leaving the 
government spending far more money than necessary.  The GAO reports this 
amount to be $38 million for the years of 1994 and 1995). 
 
29 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179-1181. 
 
30 Kelley, supra note 9, at 142-143. 
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First, the A.R.P.A. provides for increased research and 
development of new risk management tools.31  The FCIC was given the 
authority to enter into contracts with private or public entities to advance 
research and development targeting participation levels in federal crop 
insurance.32  Additional objectives of the new provisions of the A.R.P.A. 
were to “to allow producers to take preventative actions to increase end 
product profitability and marketability and to reduce the possibility of crop 
insurance claims,” “to develop a multifaceted approach to pest 
management and fertilization to decrease inputs, decrease environmental 
expose and increase applications efficiency,” and “to develop other risk 
management tools to further increase economic and production stability.”33 
A second significant inclusion in the A.R.P.A. is the authorization 
of the FCIC to implement pilot programs.34  The FCIC can develop and 
conduct pilot programs “to evaluate whether a proposal or new risk 
management tool tested by the pilot program is suitable for the marketplace 
and addresses the needs of producers of agricultural commodities.”35  The 
types of issues that may be addressed through pilot programs vary greatly, 
ranging from destruction of bees due to the use of pesticides to risks 
associated with fruits, nuts, vegetables and specialty crops.36  Further, the 
FCIC may implement programs that provide producers with reduced 
premiums for using whole farm units or single crop units of insurance.37  
The A.R.P.A. specifically prescribes a pilot program whereby approved 
insurance providers may propose policies with reduced premium rates for 
one or more agricultural commodities within a limited geographic area.38 
                                                                                                                 
31 7 U.S.C. §1522 (2008). 
 
32 7 U.S.C. §1522(c)-(d) (2008). 
 
33 7 U.S.C. §1522(d) (2008). 
 
34 7 U.S.C. §1523 (2008). 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 Id. 
 
37 Id. 
 
38 Id. 
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Despite all of these attempts at improving federal crop insurance, 
however, many of the problems that have plagued the program still persist.  
In 2002, the costs of the program had tripled from the costs of 15 years 
earlier.39  In the same year, Congress was still making supplemental 
payments in order to recoup losses suffered during that year.40  Thus, even 
though many changes have been made to the federal crop insurance 
program improving some of the program’s shortcomings, there still is a 
need for more improvements to the program to reduce the cost to taxpayers. 
 
D. WHY DO FARMERS IN THE UNITED STATES NEED FEDERAL 
CROP INSURANCE? 
 
As evidenced by the effort put into the significant number of 
amendments and the attempted improvements to federal crop insurance 
over the past eighty years, and despite persistent problems, there are many 
justifications for the government creating a successful crop insurance 
program.  A primary reason for a federal crop insurance program is the 
importance of preventing American farmers from suffering substantial 
losses that occur due to natural causes, such as weather, and unnatural 
causes, such as market forces determining crop prices.41  Prevention of 
these significant losses is necessary because they could threaten the 
stability of a part of the American economy as well as of a significant food 
source.42  Government programs, such as federal crop insurance, allow 
farmers to reduce the cost of production, which subsequently has a positive 
impact on all Americans, helping to lower the price of food.43 
A second justification for federal crop insurance is the inability of 
the private market to foster such a program.44  Insuring crops involves a 
                                                                                                                 
39 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1180. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41Rendahl, supra note 13, at 186. 
 
42 Id. 
 
43 Galen E. Boerema, Comment, Turning Straw Into Gold: Federal 
Securitization of Agricultural Commodities, 83 N.C. L. REV. 692-93 (2005). 
 
44 U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 18-19. 
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high degree of risk due to the unpredictability and high frequency of the 
types of events that trigger crop losses.45  Severe weather, for example, 
cannot be easily predicted or protected against by farmers and is a factor 
that will affect a large number of producers.  Due to the unpredictable 
nature of losses insured against, such a program requires a substantial level 
of participation in order to effectively spread the risk and consequently, the 
costs.46  This feature can be much better addressed with a large, federal 
system of crop insurance, rather than with a system of individual private 
companies, each with separate and low participation rates.  A further 
consequence of the unpredictability of the risks involved with crop 
insurance is the difficulty it creates when deciding on the cost of premiums.  
In the lead up to the Federal Crop Insurance Act, the inability to determine 
appropriate premium costs was cited as a significant failure of the 
privatization of crop insurance and as reason for putting the system under 
government control.47 
Finally, as seen in the above discussion of the history of the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act, because agriculture plays such a large role in 
stability around the world, major losses will not go uncompensated.  Thus, 
without a high level of participation in some form of crop insurance there 
will be a persistent need to administer ad hoc payments to farmers to 
recover for losses that occur due to disasters.48  As pointed out by Steffen 
Johnson, in the 1980s the federal government spent $19 billion on 
emergency loans and disaster relief for farmers, more than tripling the 
expense of federal crop insurance over that same period of time.49  Despite 
                                                                                                                 
45 Johnson, supra note 17, at 526. 
 
46 Id. 
 
47 Rendahl, supra note 13, at 187.  The specific reasons given to President 
Roosevelt that private companies could not administer crop insurance included: 
“(1) The insurance was only offered in limited areas that did not sufficiently spread 
the risk if there was a major crop failure; (2) The private companies tried to cover 
losses from price declines, as well as crop failures, (3) The companies did not have 
the capability to properly determine the degree of risk, so premiums were not 
matched with the risk involved.”  Id. 
 
48 Johnson, supra note 17, at 507. 
 
49 Id at 515-16. 
 
2009]    CROP INSURANCE IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 505 
 
 
the increase in participation in crop insurance, however, these expenditures 
are still prevalent, as in 2002 $2.1 billion was still spent in disaster 
assistance to producers.50 
 
II. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS 
 
A. THE BIOTECH YIELD ENDORSEMENT 
 
Beginning in the 2008 crop year, the USDA decided to make an 
additional attempt at solving the lingering problems of federal crop 
insurance by taking advantage of many of the mechanisms that were 
established by earlier legislation, when it began the Biotech Yield 
Endorsement (BYE).  The BYE is a pilot program incorporating a 
relationship with private industry groups.  The program sought to bring 
together the federal crop insurance system with the growing industry and 
market for genetically modified seeds.  Not an independent creation by the 
USDA, the BYE came to fruition with the assistance of a prominent force 
in the industry of genetically modified crops, the Monsanto Company.   
Following two years of research, Monsanto presented the RMA with their 
proposal and supporting data.51  The rationale supporting the program that 
was presented by Monsanto, and accepted by the USDA, was that if a 
farmer is planting a biotech hybrid, the farmer is doing so to reduce the risk 
of crop loss and to increase yield amounts, so it is logical that the crop 
insurance program should account for this risk-reducing practice.52  Thus, 
for the first time, American farmers in the eligible states of Iowa, Indiana, 
Illinois and Minnesota benefited, through the federal crop insurance 
system, for planting seeds containing specific traits developed by the 
biotechnology industry.53 
Since the BYE is a pilot program, which by its nature will be 
restricted in several ways through the Federal Crop Insurance Act, it is also 
                                                                                                                 
50 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1183. 
 
51 Peter Shinn, USDA Approves Unique Biotech Corn Insurance Policy, 
BROWNFIELD AG NEWS, Sept. 27, 2007. 
 
52 Id. 
 
53 BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 1. 
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limited in several other regards.  First, the program did not apply to all 
agricultural commodities, only non-irrigated corn for grain.54  Further, in 
the unit of corn acreage which is to be insured, it is required that 75 percent 
of the acreage planted be non-irrigated corn of a qualifying hybrid.55   
Second, the producer seeking to take advantage of the BYE must 
also have a certain type of crop insurance policy.  In general, there are two 
categories of coverage that are administered: yield-based and revenue-
based.56  In yield-based insurance programs, the insurance policy and losses 
are framed around the amount or value of a producers’ total expected 
yield.57  In revenue-based insurance programs, producers insure an amount 
of expected revenue, rather than yield.  Under the BYE, three specific 
policies are eligible for the program: Actual Production History (APH), 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Revenue Assistance (RA) plans of 
insurance.58   
In order to understand how these specific plans function, it is 
helpful to understand the general model by which federal crop insurance 
operates.  A participant in the program selects an amount of yield or 
revenue to be guaranteed.59  If the production at the end of the harvest 
results in less than the guaranteed amount, then the insured participant is 
indemnified for the difference between the production and guarantee, 
which is calculated in a form dependent upon the insurance plan.60 
APH policies are yield-based and apply to losses in yield due to the 
causes permitted by the FCIA.61  Thus, the indemnity given in the event of 
                                                                                                                 
54 Id. at 4. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Kelley, supra note 9, at 144. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at Exhibit 2. 
 
59 Rendahl, supra note 13, at 188-89. 
 
60 Id.  For an example of how a payment is calculated for federal crop 
insurance.  See id. 
 
61 U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., Crop Policies http://www/rma.usda.gov/policies/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2008).  
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loss is based on the selected amount of average yield insured and the price 
at which the crop is insured, wherein the average yield can be determined 
by examining at the insured’s historical yield productions.62  In contrast, 
CRC and RA plans are both revenue-based plans.  CRC insures revenue by 
compensating for losses below the guaranteed average gross farm revenue, 
which is based on the higher of an early season price or harvest price.63  In 
RA plans, the producer is covered for a pre-selected target revenue 
typically between 65 and 75 percent of the total expected revenue.64 
A third limitation in the BYE is that the qualifying hybrids are 
restricted to those containing combinations of specific traits.  As a result of 
the Monsanto Company’s role in developing the BYE, all of the traits that 
qualify farmers for the premium reduction, YieldGard® Rootworm, 
YieldGard® Corn Borer, and Roundup Ready® Corn 2, are produced by 
the company.65  YieldGard® Rootworm is designed to protect corn roots 
from various species of rootworm.66  The touted benefits of this feature are 
increased nutrient uptake from the soil and decreased need for sprayed 
insecticide.67  The second trait, YieldGard® Corn Borer, targets the corn 
borer insect, which attacks the corn stalk.68  It carries with it many of the 
potential benefits also possessed by YieldGard® Rootworm.  The final 
trait, Roundup Ready, unlike the previous two products, is an herbicide, 
intended to provide protection from weeds throughout the growing 
                                                                                                                 
62 Id. 
 
63 Id.; see also Kelley, supra note 9, at 144. 
 
64 U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., supra note 61. 
 
65 BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at Exhibit 2. 
 
66 Monsanto Company, YieldGard Rootworm,  http://www.monsanto.com 
/monsanto/ag_products/input_traits/products/yieldgard_rootworm.asp#features 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2008). 
 
67 Id.  
 
68 Monsanto Company, YieldGard Corn Borer,  http://www.monsanto.com/ 
monsanto/ag_products/input_traits/products/yieldgard_corn_borer.asp (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2008). 
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season.69  In order to be eligible for the BYE premium reduction, the hybrid 
seeds planted by the producer must include one of the aforementioned 
traits, or a combination thereof.  Although they use different mechanisms to 
achieve their goal, the traits are all designed to increase crop yields. 
 
B. THE PILOT BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENT 
 
In August of 2008, however, it was announced that the BYE 
program would be modified in order to expand the geographic scope of the 
program, the eligible seed hybrids, and to include specific insurance 
providers.70  Renamed the “Pilot Biotechnology Endorsement”, premium 
reductions were made available to farmers in Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Nebraska, in addition the original 
four states.71  The number of participating seed producers also increased, as 
hybrid seeds produced by Pioneer/Dow AgroSciences, LLC, and Sygenta 
Seeds, Inc., will also be eligible to those traits manufactured by 
Monsanto.72  Depending on the state and the seed variety, the program also 
expands coverage for both irrigated and non-irrigated corn.73  Thus, the 
program that started as a four-year pilot program in only four states will 
soon see a great expansion as the USDA’s support for biotech hybrid seeds 
in agriculture continues to grow.  
 
                                                                                                                 
69 Monsanto Company, Roundup Ready Corn 2 available at 
http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/ag_products/input_traits/products/roundup_r
eady_corn_2.asp. 
 
70 U.S. DEPT. AGRIC, FCIC BOARD EXTENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY PILOT 
COVERAGE AREAS AND QUALIFYING HYBRIDS, (Aug. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.rma.usda.gov/news/2008/08/fcicbiotech.html. 
 
71 U.S. Dept. Agric., Pilot Biotechnology Endorsement Insurance Standards 
Handbook 2009 and Succeeding Crop Years 1 (2008) (available at 
http://www/rma.usda.gov/ handbooks/20000/2009/20110.pdf) [hereinafter Pilot 
BE Handbook]. 
 
72 Id. 
 
73 Id. 
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III. HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS CAN IMPACT 
DECISION-MAKING IN AGRICULTURE 
 
In order to determine the likely impact on U.S. agriculture of a 
crop insurance policy that endorses biotechnology based farming, one must 
first examine whether a program of this nature will effectively alter the 
habits of American farmers.  One way in which the biotechnology 
endorsements could have an impact is by attempting to increase 
participation rates in the federal crop insurance program.  An additional 
possible effect of biotechnology endorsements is a shift in seed selection by 
farmers towards those that carry lower insurance premiums, which in turn 
could lead to higher crop yields. 
As discussed above, it has long been a goal of federal crop 
insurance reform to increase participation in the program.74  Lower 
participation in the crop insurance program has resulted in increasing 
program costs.75  Thus, one manner in which the success of the 
biotechnology endorsements can be measured is by the increasing number 
of farmers who purchase crop insurance associated with the BYE premium 
reductions. 
There is a potential market share of uninsured crop growers who 
could be influenced by a biotechnology specific insurance plan.  As of 
2003, federal crop insurance had an eighty percent participation rate, thus 
leaving one-fifth of farmers uninsured.76  In comparison, according to the 
National Agricultural Statistics Survey in 2008 eighty percent of the corn 
planted in the United States was of a biotech variety.77  Therefore, given 
the fact that an overwhelming majority of farms are planting biotech crops, 
it is likely that there is an overlap of these farmers with the 20% of farmers 
who have not yet purchased insurance.  The probability that many of the 
uninsured farmers in the U.S. are planting genetically modified seeds is 
high. This group, already utilizing biotechnology generated seeds, may be 
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induced to buy crop insurance centered around biotechnology premium 
reductions. 
Several factors influence the decision to purchase crop insurance 
policies.  One particular study by Makki and Somwaru found that the most 
important factors influencing the decision included premium rate, the level 
of risk, the availability of new revenue insurance products, the level of 
subsidy, and the design of the contract.78  Additional studies have also 
found many of these factors to be pertinent to the decision to purchase 
federal crop insurance, in addition to other factors.79 
The biotechnology endorsements incorporate many of these 
factors.  Most notably, the endorsements will address premium rates. The 
primary element of the endorsements is to reduce premiums based on the 
use of the specified products.  This directly impacts the cost of federal crop 
insurance for farmers.  By decreasing the premium rate, defined as the total 
premium cost by total liability, the program positively influences a farmers’ 
decision to participate in federal crop insurance.80  Furthermore, given the 
prominence of biotechnology in agriculture in the U.S., an overwhelming 
majority of farmers could immediately benefit from this premium 
reduction. 
Additionally, when considering the relationship between the cost of 
a farmer’s premium and the farmer’s corresponding risk of loss, the 
endorsements address a general inequity facing farmers in making their 
crop insurance decisions.  Generally, farmers who are low risk pay higher 
insurance premiums relative to higher risk insureds.81  This is because 
premium prices are determined by the average risk of the entire insurance 
                                                                                                                 
78 Shiva S. Makki & Agapi Somwaru, Farmers’ Participation in Crop 
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pool, and not targeted to the specific level of risk that farmer carries.82  By 
incorporating both high and low risks into an insurance pool and requiring 
an average premium, insurance companies are effectively spreading risk 
and the cost of insuring those risks.  Naturally, this creates an entry barrier 
for low or lower risk farmers to the insurance pool and thus to federal crop 
insurance programs.83  A solution to that problem is a crop insurance policy 
that lowers the premium cost on the basis of the nature of the crop.  While 
it may not properly take into account all of the risks that differ between the 
use of genetically modified crops and non-genetically modified crops, the 
type of premium rate allocation seen in the endorsements does, to some 
extent, encourage low-risk farmers to purchase crop insurance. 
Despite the fact that the endorsements present several reasons that 
would seem to increase participation in federal crop insurance, there are 
other indicators that suggest the opposite could occur, or that no change in 
participation would result.  A second of the factors found relevant by 
Makki and Somwaru that is addressed by the biotech endorsements is the 
level of risk.84  Biotech crops are designed to increase yield.  Accordingly, 
because of the genetically enhanced traits, there is less risk of loss and 
consequently, it is less likely that a farmer needs indemnification.   
In a study by Sherrick et alia, the attributes of those who do and do 
not own crop insurance were examined.85  The study compared owners of 
crop insurance policies to those without crop insurance.  It found that those 
without policies believed they would not need indemnity payments for loss 
in crop yields.86  Based on this study, farmers who use biotech crops, and 
who therefore perceive themselves as low risk, are less inclined to possess, 
or purchase, crop insurance precisely because of their use of the genetically 
enhanced crops. The biotech farmer probably has greater confidence that 
the harvest is less susceptible to external stresses that could potentially 
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diminish yields.  Consequently, by using biotech seeds as a way to reduce 
the risk of losses, a producer may find it unnecessary to insure against 
losses.87  It has been found that where producers use mechanisms other 
than crop insurance to reduce the risks of loss, it leads to a reduction in 
participation in the federal crop insurance program.88   
On the other hand, this particular finding may also suggest that 
those who use biotech crops subject to premium reductions will be included 
among those who are not currently participating in the program.  This is 
because non-participants are less likely to believe they will suffer losses 
requiring payment; and presumably, biotech crop growers are also less 
likely than those who do not grow biotech crops to believe they will suffer 
losses, given the trait enhancements in biotech crops.  If it is a goal of the 
biotechnology endorsements to increase participation in the federal crop 
insurance program, it is possible that the premium reductions are well-
targeted towards a group in need of additional incentives to purchase 
insurance.  Ultimately, whether a non-participant is induced to purchase 
crop insurance will come down to deciding if the cost of the premium is 
less than the amount of indemnities that can be expected; therefore, it is 
logical to lower the premium for a group targeted for potential participation 
increases.89   
Furthermore, the Sherrick et alia. study found that those who 
participated in the federal crop insurance program had higher expected 
yields than those who did not participate.90  One of the general principles 
supporting the use of genetically modified crops is that it will lead to higher 
yields because of their crops increased resistance to natural stresses, such 
as insects, weeds, and weather.  Therefore, this seems to indicate that those 
farmers using biotech crops are more likely to own crop insurance and are 
thus less likely to be among the non-participants that can be induced by a 
biotechnology endorsement to purchase federal crop insurance.; 
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With respect to the remaining factors effecting crop insurance 
purchasing decisions cited by Makki and Somwaru, the endorsements have 
a less significant impact on incentives for purchasing crop insurance.  The 
endorsements apply to Actual APH, CRC, or RA plans of insurance.91  
None of these three insurance products are completely subsidized, a factor 
for which consumers of crop insurance have a preference.92  However, the 
availability of revenue-based insurance, as opposed to yield-based 
insurance, was one of the most prominent factors cited.93   
As evidenced by the inquiries into which factors have an impact on 
a farmers’ decision to purchase federal crop insurance, the potential impact 
a biotechnology endorsement could have on increasing participation is not 
clear.  By lowering the cost of a crop insurance policy, it is likely that the 
biotechnology endorsements will persuade some to participate in the 
federal crop insurance program.  However, as the studies show, it is not at 
all clear how many of the twenty percent of uninsured producers will be 
effected by this decision. 
Regardless of the ability of the biotechnology endorsements to 
persuade non-participants to join the federal crop insurance program, there 
is another way in which this program could directly impact the affordability 
of the program.  It has been suggested that a farmers’ decision of what crop 
to grow is related to crop insurance policies.94  If a crop insurance policy is 
far more favorable with respect to one crop versus another, the farmer is 
more likely to plant the crop with the more favorable insurance policy.95  If 
this were to occur as a result of biotechnology endorsements, there could be 
an increase in the use of genetically modified seeds.  The most obvious 
economic consequence of using genetically modified seeds is increased 
yields due to decreased crop loss.  Accordingly, there would be a 
diminished need for indemnifications or supplemental payments to be 
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given for crop losses.96  Thus, by creating a shift to biotech varieties of 
certain crops, the biotechnology endorsements could reduce the cost of 
administering the federal crop insurance by reducing the amount of crops 
that are lost as a result of weather, pests and other factors mitigated by 
genetically enhanced crops. 
 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
ENDORSEMENTS IN CROP INSURANCE AND RECENT 
SHORTCOMINGS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICYMAKING 
 
Although its success has been deemed necessary by both 
lawmakers and farmers in the U.S., agricultural policymaking is generally 
deficient in several regards.  Many of the policies that are instituted are 
economically inefficient.  In addition, promoting agriculture has often 
meant that environmental concerns are ignored.  This section addresses 
these issues and how the biotechnology endorsements could follow similar 
patterns. 
 
A. COMPARING THE BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS WITH THE 
ECONOMIC SHORTCOMINGS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
MAKING 
 
In examining the impact of the biotechnology endorsements, it is 
worth examining the nature of the relationship between large agricultural 
corporations, such as those producing the genetically modified seeds at 
issue, and the farmers who use those products.  There has been a shift in 
U.S. agriculture policy that favors corporate agriculture rather than the 
contributions of rural farmers.97  The cause of this shift lies in several 
harmful effects from subsidization.   
First, corporations receive more funds from the farm bills than 
smaller farmers.98  Subsidization payments, such as those implemented 
                                                                                                                 
96 Shiva S. Makki et al., Biotechnology in Agriculture: Implications for Farm-
Level Risk Management, 19 J. AGRIBUSINESS 51, 56-7 (2001). 
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under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, are typically 
tied to the amount and type of commodity produced.99  Because of this 
method of distribution, statistics like those from 1997 illustrate that the 
largest six percent of farms in the U.S. received 43% percent of the money 
available for farm support.100  Furthermore, as Boerema discusses, more 
profitable farmers receive a greater benefit from subsidization than less 
profitable farmers who have a greater need for it.101  While profitable 
farmers are able to keep or spend their subsidies, less profitable farmers are 
forced to use their subsidies to repay loans, which as a result of poor credit 
and low profitability carry a much higher interest rate than those for the 
profitable farmer.102  As a result, “a federal subsidy can actually accelerate 
the demise of the very farmers it is intended to protect.”103 
Second, the use of subsidies has also become an inefficient and 
ineffective way to improve the status of rural farmers and stabilize 
agricultural production.104  Subsidies are administered for specific crop 
types, which ultimately renders the subsidy ineffective.  This is because the 
subsidized crops lead to immense and unnecessary surpluses of those 
crops.105  Rather than help the farmers, farmers have to sell these 
oversupplied crops at lower prices, which in turn leads to a further need for 
subsidies and the continuation of this cycle.106  Thus, even though it is 
asserted that subsidizing agriculture is necessary in order for U.S. farmers 
to compete on a global scale, the subsidies have resulted in inefficiencies 
and have benefited large farmers disproportionately to others.107 
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Although offering a lower crop insurance premium is by no means 
equivalent to a subsidy, biotechnology endorsements are in some ways 
similar to these unsuccessful agricultural policies.  In fact, one of the ways 
Congress attempted to increase participation in the federal crop insurance 
program during the 1990s was by subsidizing premium payments.108  Even 
though this type of subsidization is more beneficial than typical subsidies, 
it also is a likely contributor to the fact that the cost of federal crop 
insurance program grew during that decade.109 Another similarity is that if 
the crop premium reductions are given for only a few seed varieties and 
those seed varieties increase in prevalence, it could lead to similar 
overproduction that arose from subsidization.  As stated earlier, crop 
insurance policies that are far more favorable to one crop in comparison to 
other crops have been shown to lead farmers towards production of the 
specified crop.110  Furthermore, the biotechnology endorsements favor one 
group of farmers over another, as only those who plant biotech varieties 
will be able to receive the benefits of the programs. 
Additionally, if the crop insurance program favors only a few seed 
varieties from a few producers, it could lead to a similar shift of corporate 
favoritism.  In the first year of the BYE, some farmers were unhappy with 
the apparent favoritism the program shown toward Monsanto.  When the 
program was announced, the National Farmers Union came out with a 
special order of business that stated: 
 
WHEREAS, the purpose of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program is to provide appropriate and affordable 
crop insurance to all producers, regardless of size, 
equipment of technology, THEREFORE, BE IT 
RESOLVED, National Farmers Union opposes RMA’s 
approval of the pilot program which allows discounts 
based upon the use of specific crop genetics. The approval 
of the BYE pilot program is an endorsement by RMA of 
Monsanto’s triple-stack genetically traited corn and it does 
not take into effect other technologies or Best Management 
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Practices. THESEFORE, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, 
National Farmers Union calls for an immediate 
congressional oversight hearings to investigate the 
continuation of the BYE pilot program and future RMA 
partnerships with specific companies on crop genetics for 
federal crop insurance premium discounts.111 
 
Thus, there is a tension amongst farmers regarding whether the 
crop insurance premium reductions are actually intended to favor them or 
the biotech seed companies.  Although the second year of the program will 
involve seed manufacturers other than Monsanto, and some of the National 
Farmers Unions fears of lack of competition may be alleviated, the 
potential for disparately impacting farmers and seed manufacturers, or at 
least the appearance of such a disparate impact, is a factor that must be 
taken into account when establishing this type of federal crop insurance 
program. 
 
B. COMPARING THE BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS WITH THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL SHORTCOMINGS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
MAKING 
 
As genetically modified agricultural products have gained 
prominence around the world, they have presented a number of 
environmental concerns.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that these 
crops will cause unforeseen harms to other species in the ecosystem in 
which they are used.112  For example, it was suggested that a genetically 
modified crop, such as those covered by the BYE and Pilot Biotechnology 
Endorsement, that was engineered to protect against crop destroying pests 
increased mortality in monarch butterfly larvae in comparison to those 
larvae eating non-modified crops.113  However, these specific findings have 
been challenged, and several studies have in fact found the genetically 
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induced toxin was not more toxic to the monarch butterflies.114  Several 
other environmental consequences have been noted.  It has been suggested 
that these crops will damage soil ecosystems and increase the use of 
chemicals such as pesticides, which in turn has harmful environmental and 
health effects.115  An additional problem that could arise from the use of 
pest and weed resistant varieties of biotech crops, such as those involved in 
the current biotechnology endorsement, is an increase in resistance by pests 
and weeds.116  The use of certain biotech crops, over the long-term, has 
been found to induce resistance in the pests it seeks to prevent from 
destroying the crops. 117   Similar results have been found with certain 
chemicals created by crops genetically modified for increased resistance 
against weeds.118  However, accompanying all of these potential 
environmental threats is an element of doubt as to their probability.119 
Another environmental problem is the threat of gene flow from 
genetically modified crops to wild plants in the surrounding ecosystem.  
Gene flow occurs when the genetic material from one organism or group of 
organisms is transferred and incorporated into the genetic material of 
another group of organisms.120  Gene flow is a natural process and is 
difficult to prevent in plants, as seeds or pollen can travel by many different 
mechanisms to other plant varieties.121  If this were to occur with 
genetically modified plants, it could have severe consequences for the 
surrounding ecosystems.  Wild plants could take on the genetically 
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enhanced traits, making certain plants much weedier or more resistant to 
natural threats, also reducing biodiversity.122  While it is uncertain whether 
the genetically modified traits, which are specifically designed for 
agriculture, will persist in wild plant species, gene flow between 
genetically modified and wild plant species is one of the most significant 
environmental threats posed by genetically modified crops.123  Not only 
could this potentially harm the environment by reducing biodiversity and 
giving normal plants the genetically modified traits, but it also creates a 
potential liability problem for the farmers originally using the genetically 
modified crops.  If the genetic material were to escape into neighboring 
farms, it could ruin others crops, leaving the user of the genetically 
modified crop liable for damages.124 
 The way that the U.S. has addressed these environmental concerns 
has different greatly from the regulatory approach of other countries.  The 
U.S. has taken an approach that views the risks of genetically modified 
organisms with less caution.  When the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development met in Brazil in 1992, it created the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, a set of principles that 
would guide future international environmental regimes.125  Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration sets forth the precautionary approach as the guiding 
principle in assessing environmental risks, stating that “[i]n order to protect 
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”126  Thus, even if the potential harms presented by genetically 
modified organisms (GMO) are not proven with scientific certainty, steps 
can be taken to prevent those potential harms.  The precautionary principle 
has been incorporated in the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, both of which govern much of the 
international use of GMOs.127   
In contrast to the approach of the international community, the U.S. 
has taken a much different approach to assessing the environmental impact 
of GMOs.128  U.S. regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the USDA, strive for scientific certainty before 
taking regulatory action regarding GMOs.129  This approach allows for 
fewer restrictions on GMOs in the absence of hard scientific evidence that 
they cause environmental harms.  As the USDA has taken this approach 
over the years, it has provided for a lesser regulatory burden on biotech 
crops and some have theorized that this relaxed approach to regulation is 
inadequate in ensuring products are environmentally safe before they enter 
the market.130  According to some, as a result of the standards exercised by 
the U.S. in crafting agricultural policy, the environmental concerns 
presented by farming have not been adequately addressed.131  The USDA 
itself admitted the failure of their agricultural procedures, as it released a 
report in 2005 stating that they had failed to monitor whether biotech crops 
                                                                                                                 
127 The Preamble of the Convention of Biological Diversity states: “Noting 
also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological 
diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.”  Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 1762 31 I.L.M. 822.  In the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety there are two inclusions of the precautionary principle.  The preamble 
reaffirms “the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration.”  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027..  Annex III states, “Lack of scientific 
knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as 
indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk.”  Id. 
at annex III. 
 
128 Jessica McDonald, Note, Precautionary Pioneer Evades Biotech Giant? 
Beyond the Cartagena Protocol: The EU Offers the World a Model, 8 OR. REV. 
INT’L L. 157, 164-171. 
 
129 Id. at 167. 
 
130 Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically 
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 767-776 (2003). 
 
131 Morrow, supra note 97, at 362. 
 
2009]    CROP INSURANCE IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 521 
 
 
were segregated, that during field tests they failed to test for contamination 
in the surrounding environment, and that they failed to meet shipping, 
storage, and disposal standards designed to prevent crops that were not 
approved from being dispersed.132  Although the precautionary approach 
taken by the international community may be considered overly cautious, 
the U.S. regulatory response to genetically modified organisms has been 
one in which the potential environmental harms of the organisms are 
underestimated relative to the international approach.133  But considering 
the fact the USDA has decided to use federal crop insurance as a way of 
promoting the use of biotech agriculture, it does not appear that they are 
easing support of GMOs. 
However, others argue that genetically modified crops may 
actually benefit the environment.  The majority of scientists believe that the 
use of genetically modified agriculture has resulted in a decrease in 
pesticide use and a shift towards less toxic herbicides.134  In turn, this could 
lead to less water contamination, improved health for farmers, and 
improved biodiversity.135 
A different environmental problem would arise from the 
biotechnology endorsements if they were to result in overproduction of 
certain biotech crops.  As mentioned earlier, subsidies have led to 
overproduction of certain crops in the past.136  Not only is this practice 
harmful economically, but it also reduces biodiversity and increases 
chemical use.137  Although biotech crops seek to reduce chemical use, 
biodiversity is an important environmental contributor to agriculture.138  
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However, as subsidization has shown, when only a few different crops are 
grown, it will have harmful environmental consequences.139  This practice 
reduces crop variety and biodiversity, which ultimately makes crops more 
susceptible to harms such as those posed by pests.140  Further, production of 
a select number of crops can also lead to poor usage of land and 
dependence on certain chemicals.141 
 
V. HOW TO ADVANCE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE IN THE 
AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
A. THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM SHOULD OFFER 
LOWER PREMIUMS FOR FARMER WHO USE BIOTECH CROPS 
 
There are several significant points to take from the discussion of 
the federal crop insurance program and the biotechnology endorsements.  
First, it is an important goal of the federal crop insurance program to 
increase participation in the program, which in turn should make it more 
cost effective.142  Second, although premiums will be reduced for farmers 
who plant certain crops generated by biotechnology, which are widespread, 
it is uncertain if a biotechnology endorsement could induce additional 
participation in the federal crop insurance program.143  Finally, in addition 
to the simple notion that genetically modified crops increase crop yield, 
there are numerous economic and environmental mistakes that have been 
made by agriculture policymakers in the past that should be avoided when 
the biotechnology endorsements are implemented.144 
In light of all of those considerations, the biotechnology 
endorsement still appears to be a necessary step in beginning the movement 
towards tailoring crop insurance to biotech crop growers.  It does not make 
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sense that two individuals, one carrying less risk of loss than another, 
should contribute the same amount in premiums for federal crop 
insurance.145  As is the case with other types of insurance, if one individual 
is more likely to need an indemnity payment than another person is, then he 
or she typically should have to pay a higher premium.146  A biotechnology 
endorsement could be a step towards shifting the disparate payment scheme 
of the federal crop insurance program, whereby the farmers with higher 
risk pay relatively lower premiums compared to those with lower risk.147  
Even if these endorsements are insufficient to lead to a significant increase 
in participation in the federal crop insurance program, the biotechnology 
endorsements will at least make crop insurance policies more affordable for 
eighty percent of U.S. farmers.148 
 
B. THE CONCERNS TO BE MONITORED IN ADMINISTERING A 
BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENT 
 
Despite the potential for lower premium costs, there are a number 
of concerns that are brought up by the biotechnology endorsements that can 
be monitored while carrying out this pilot program in order to avoid these 
problems in the future.  The most notable problem that the new 
biotechnology endorsements will present is that of adverse selection.  As a 
result of the numerous insurance options and a lack of actuarial 
information, farmers are able to “adversely select the option that maximizes 
their net return.”149  In contrast to more typical forms of insurance, crop 
insurance needs to have an extensive period of data collection that it can 
rely on to establish an economically sound program.150  Because the 
biotechnology endorsement is a new program, there are not going to be 
very much actuarial data initially, thus making it more difficult to 
                                                                                                                 
145 Makki and Somwaru, supra note 78, at 666. 
 
146 Id. 
 
147 Id. 
 
148 See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 
149 Glauber, supra note 3, at 1184. 
 
150 Id. at 1185. 
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accurately project yields and proper premium payments in advance.  
Considering that the FCIC still has difficulty finding proper ways to 
calculate risks and yields for the non-biotech crops that have always been 
covered by the federal crop insurance program, it is reasonable to believe 
that there will be difficulties insuring a commodity for the first time.151 
The problem of actuarial soundness and adverse selection becomes 
more difficult to asses when also considering how widespread the use of 
biotech crops is and the differences in yield that occur in different regions.  
The assertion that the use of a biotech crop results in higher yields is not 
always true, because yields vary from location to location.152  In some 
locations, a certain pest may not be a factor in reducing yields.153  Thus, a 
crop that is genetically modified to express one trait may greatly increase 
survival in one area of the country, but may have little impact in another.154  
All of this information would have to be taken into consideration before 
applying blanket premium reductions to those who use GMOs, including 
the ability of each of the many GMOs that can be used.  Otherwise, there 
would still be some producers who are paying a higher premium than those 
taking on higher risks. 
 An additional problem posed by biotechnology endorsements that 
should be examined given the effects of some U.S. agricultural policies is 
whether or not the lowering of premiums will benefit all farmers, including 
rural farmers and farmers who do not plant genetically modified seeds.  As 
stated earlier, U.S. agricultural policies have a history of not spreading 
benefits equally among agriculturalists.155  On its face, the biotechnology 
endorsements only help the farmers who plant qualifying biotech seed 
varieties and the companies who produce those seeds.  If this is the case, 
then small farmers who do not plant these seeds could continue to be 
marginalized by U.S. agricultural policies.156   
                                                                                                                 
151 Id. at 1184-85. 
 
152 Makki et al., supra note 96, at 56. 
 
153 Id. at 57. 
 
154 Id. at 56. 
 
155 See discussion infra supra Part IV.A. 
 
156 Morrow, supra note 97, at 357-360. 
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Solving this problem could be difficult, given that the typical 
solution to aiding struggling farmers is through subsidies, which create 
problems in their own right.157  A theoretical worst case scenario that is 
derived from insurance programs such as the biotechnology endorsements 
is that non-biotech farmers are over time less competitive with biotech 
farmers, and are either placed out of business or are forced to join the 
biotech farmers and buy seeds from biotech companies.  While there could 
be a market of consumers who prefer non-biotech crops to those that have 
been genetically engineered, the lack of a requirement in the U.S. that 
goods be labeled as biotech or not makes this difficult.158 
Many of the other risks and increased costs biotech crops bring 
could be borne by those who do not even use the biotech crops.  Makki et 
alia suggest that in order for growers to maintain their crops status as “non-
biotech,” it will require increased management and segregation costs in an 
agricultural world that becomes more dominated by biotech varieties.159  
These segregation costs are incurred in both transporting and storing the 
seeds.160  How federal crop insurance will address this factor, or if it will be 
able to adequately contemplate this factor, is uncertain. 
Another problem that could be created by a biotechnology 
endorsement is that it could pose a threat to biodiversity.  While this 
problem is hardly new to the field of agriculture, the biotechnology 
endorsement certainly does not help solve the problem.161  Many of the 
qualifying hybrids for the program have the same general traits, and in 
some cases combine the traits into a single hybrid.162  The consequences of 
this homogeneity could be severe if the worst case scenario for pest or 
weed resistance were to occur.   
Furthermore, despite the probability that biotech crops would 
increase crop yields, there are a number of additional economic risks that 
                                                                                                                 
157 Id. 
 
158 Marden, supra note 130, at 735. 
 
159 Makki et al., supra note 96, at 57-8. 
 
160 Id. 
 
161 Morrow, supra note 97, at 362. 
 
162 See supra text accompany notes 65-69. 
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they present.  First, although yields may increase and overall profits may 
see a corresponding increase, there are a number of additional costs that go 
into using genetically-modified crops.  Biotech seeds are generally more 
expensive than natural seeds because of the research and development costs 
that seed companies seek to make back.163  It is also unclear whether or not 
in certain situations a farmer using a biotech crop variety will need to 
purchase more chemicals.164  Although one would think fewer chemicals 
should be used if the crop is engineered to protect against the same threats, 
this has not been entirely the case, as many seed companies require a 
treatment regimen to go with the use of their seeds, which in many cases 
has increased the use of herbicides.165  Use of genetically-modified crops 
also requires farmers to keep a certain percentage of their crops a non-
biotech variety, for reasons which will be explained in the next section.166  
This in turn imposes a number of additional costs on farmers, such as the 
costs of keeping seeds and crops segregated so that the two crop varieties 
do not mix.167 
If crop insurance is to be revised for biotech crops, the 
consequences of contaminating neighboring non-biotech crops should also 
be taken into account.  However, this becomes problematic when 
attempting to accurately project how often this would occur and what the 
damages of such an occurrence would be.  There is little evidence that 
conclusively indicates the likelihood of such an event, making it difficult to 
factor into a crop insurance policy.  However, if this possibility is not taken 
into account, farmers who do not use biotech crops could be the ones who 
suffer, instead of those who do use the biotechnology. 
Another complicated factor that would have to be taken into 
consideration when attempting to establish insurance premiums for biotech 
                                                                                                                 
163 Makki et al., supra note 96 at 55.  The authors state that for certain biotech 
corn crops in 1999, the cost of biotech seeds were 35-50% greater than non-biotech 
seeds.  Id. 
 
164 Hunter, et al. supra note 116, at 1061-62. 
 
165 Id.  But see Makki et al. supra note 96, at 56 (stating that increased use of 
herbicide-tolerant soybeans has led to a decrease in use of herbicides). 
 
166 Makki et al., supra note 96, at 57. 
 
167 Id. at 58. 
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crops is how to account for those who switch from biotech varieties to non-
biotech varieties, or vice versa.168  As explained above, one of the main 
factors in establishing insurance premiums for some types of insurance, 
including those included in the BYE and Pilot Biotechnology Endorsement, 
base the amount of coverage on the farmer’s yield history.169  This creates 
an inherent problem when a farmer who formerly used a non-biotech seed 
variety begins using biotech varieties, as such farmers would be offered 
yield contracts which guarantee payments for yield levels based on 
previous non-biotech variety yields.  In this case, farmers may find the 
expected value of such a contract to be lower than their willingness to pay 
for the contracts.  Furthermore, the increased yield differentials can alter 
farms’ risk classification, which increases the cost of insurance to biotech 
crop producers.170 
If the problem in this case is caused by a wide differential between 
annual yields, it can then be inferred that this problem could arise not only 
when shifting from non-biotech to biotech varieties, but also when there is 
a switch from one biotech variety to another that is more effective at 
increasing yield. 
The final element that makes the biotechnology endorsements 
difficult to administer is the problem of moral hazard.  Moral hazard “is the 
susceptibility of actual yields to the influence of producer actions...or 
inactions,” making it difficult to determine the reason for a farmers yield 
reduction.171  Seed producers often have a variety of additional instructions 
that must be followed when planting biotech crops.172  The increase in 
procedures also present increased options for a farmer to not follow the 
procedures, leading to crop losses from a cause that crop insurance is not 
intended to cover.  Therefore, in order to avoid making payments for crop 
losses that are “voluntary,” there would have to be increased supervision of 
                                                                                                                 
168 Id. at 61-62. 
 
169 See supra text accompany notes 56-58. 
 
170 Makki et al., supra note 96, at 62. 
 
171 Johnson, supra note 17, at 529. 
 
172 See supra  text accompanying note 164. 
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the practices of the farmers who are participating in the biotechnology 
endorsements.173 
Therefore, while the biotechnology endorsement is a beneficial 
model for the federal crop insurance program with respect to improving the 
insurance premiums of the farmers who plant genetically modified seeds, it 
is not a perfect model.  Because of the number of different factors that 
could play into the implementation of such a crop insurance program, it is 
crucial that the biotechnology endorsements serve as tools for monitoring 
the pros and cons of lowering crop insurance premiums for biotech crops.  
If this program, and future programs established by the FCIC are created 
for the primary benefit of corporate agriculture without an eye to the 
impact on rural farmers and the environment, then the consequences will be 
severe enough to outweigh the insurance premium savings. 
 
C. THE BENEFITS OF USDA PILOT PROGRAMS SERVING AS A 
MODEL FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS 
 
The current pilot program system implemented by the USDA 
should serve as a beneficial way of phasing in lower premiums for biotech 
crops for several reasons.  The first attribute of the current biotechnology 
endorsements that makes it a good model for beginning to phase biotech 
crops into the federal crop insurance program is its status as a pilot 
program.  This is beneficial in several regards.  First, it is not a permanent 
program, but it only will last until 2011, pursuant to statutory prohibitions 
on a pilot program lasting more than four years.174  Because the program is 
unprecedented and because there are a number of questions and doubts 
about some of the impacts of the program, it is important that a permanent 
program is not established prior to obtaining more knowledge about the 
impact of such a program.  If it is proven that after a period of time, the 
environmental consequences of increased use in biotech crops or the 
economic consequences of endorsing specific agricultural products make 
lower crop insurance premiums for biotech crops inadvisable, the program 
                                                                                                                 
173 Johnson, supra note 17, at 529. 
 
174 BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 1; 7 U.S.C.A. § 1523(a)(4)(B) (2008).  
However, the program can be extended beyond that date or cancelled earlier than 
that date by the FCIC.  7 U.S.C. § 1523(a)(4)(C) (2008). 
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can be cancelled and the previous federal crop insurance programs can be 
reinstated.   
Additionally, as can be seen by the transition from the 2008 to 
2009 growing seasons, the current structure of the biotechnology 
endorsements has allowed for reviewing of the program in order to 
determine how it can be improved.  For example, one of the weaknesses of 
the first year of the program was that only a few seed varieties produced by 
Monsanto were covered.   Although the reason for only including these 
seeds could be justified (as Monsanto was the only company that had 
contributed data that their seeds would increase yield,) by only 
incorporating this one company in the process, it presents the appearance of 
favoritism and, if the program were to be successful in influencing farmers’ 
choices in seed selection, would give Monsanto a huge advantage over 
their competitors.  However, because the program is constantly reviewed 
and closely scrutinized by the USDA, after the first year, this deficiency 
could be improved by covering the seeds of other companies.  It is in this 
fashion that similar improvements can be made from year to year based on 
the problems that are observed.  Because the program includes a great deal 
of monitoring of the farmers who participate, there is great potential to find 
weaknesses in the coverage or consequences of using the biotech crops that 
can be taken into account with future crop insurance policy decisions.175 
Although the future of the federal crop insurance program is far 
from clear, what does appear to be certain is that crops generated by 
biotechnology have become a significant part of U.S. agriculture and will 
continue to grow.  In order for the federal crop insurance program to 
remain relevant and actuarially sound, it will have to accommodate these 
changes in farming practices coinciding with changes in technologies.  By 
implementing pilot programs that exercise caution as premiums begin to be 
reduced for biotech crops, the USDA has established a system where they 
can monitor the impacts of the new policies and hopefully avoid the pitfalls 
of previous crop insurance regimes and agricultural policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
175 See BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 27-37 for a discussion of spot-
checks of randomly selected policies. 
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RACE BASED UNDERWRITING AND THE  
DEATH OF BURIAL INSURANCE 
 
J. Gabriel McGlamery* 
 
 
*** 
This casenote explores the reasons why industrial life insurance, and 
the use of racial discrimination, died.  The history, as well as the 
problems presented by industrial life insurance, including 
discriminatory practices, is reviewed.  The 2005 case, Guidry v. 
Pellerin Life Insurance Company, although a minor suit, is the only 
industrial life insurance case to offer a holding in regard to the use 
of race in industrial life insurance.  Although the Guidry court held 
that no rule, law, or statute prevents a life insurance company from 
using race as a criterion in underwriting life insurance, it can be 
described as a provocative artifact since industrial life insurance has 
effectively died.  The theories examined include the adoption of 
legislation that bars the use of race in underwriting life insurance 
premiums, social pressure to stop using race as a tool in 
underwriting, and other theories, including the closing of the racial 
mortality gap, and the success of group life insurance.  This note 
concludes that not one theory on its own is satisfactory, but taken 
together as a whole they provide some understanding of why 
industrial life insurance died. 
*** 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, a Louisiana federal district court came to the remarkable 
conclusion that there was no rule, law, or statute that prevents a life 
                                                                                                                 
* J. Gabriel McGlamery is a graduate of the University of Connecticut School 
of Law, class of 2009, and is the current Editor-in-Chief of the Connecticut 
Insurance Law Journal. 
532 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
insurance company from using race as a criterion in underwriting life 
insurance.1  The case, Guidry v. Pellerin Life Insurance Company,2 was a 
minor case that came at the tail end of a wave of class action litigation 
against life insurance companies that had offered industrial life insurance to 
African-Americans.3  Guidry was remarkable only because it actually 
reached the merits rather than settling or failing on statute of limitation and 
class certification issues.4 
The reason why this little case did not cause more than a ripple in 
the insurance world was because industrial life insurance effectively died 
almost thirty years ago.5  So, the case is more relevant as a provocative 
artifact than as an influential decision.  But, as a provocative opinion it 
raises questions.  First, was the Guidry holding correct?  Briefly, yes it was.  
The way the law looks today, in the state of Louisiana, nothing stopped the 
insurer from doing what it was doing.6  It becomes more complex if you 
widen the holding of Guidry to other states and jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                 
1 Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (W.D. La. 2005). 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 E.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006); In 
re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004); Moore v. Liberty Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Nat’l Sec. Ins. Co., 237 
F.R.D. 685 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Servs., Inc., 422 F. 
Supp. 2d 346 (D. Conn. 2006); Hunter v. Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 384 F. 
Supp. 2d 888 (D.S.C. 2005); Carnegie v. Mut. Savs. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. CV-
99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004); Brown v. Am. 
Capital Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 01-2079, 2004 WL 2375796 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2004); 
Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 
4 See infra pp. 14-18. 
 
5 See appendix for a chart showing the decline in industrial life insurance.  All 
charts in the appendix are taken from information in the Life Insurance Fact 
Books.  INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 30 (eds. 
1954-99).  As of 2006, industrial life insurance premiums accounted for less than 
0.1% of the life insurance market with $239.6 million in premiums written.  
Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics: The Life/Health Insurance 
Industry, www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/life/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 
6 See Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 592. 
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Second, if, according to Guidry,7 the industrial life insurance 
industry did not stop using race as a factor in pricing because of legislation, 
why did they stop?  Industrial life insurance was inexorably linked to racial 
discrimination, to cut off the availability of racial discrimination as a tool 
for underwriting crippled the product.  In this paper I will look at a mix of 
theories as to why industrial life insurance, and the use of racial 
discrimination, died when it did.  The theories I examine are (1) legislative 
and judicial influence, (2) social pressure, and (3) other forces, such as 
competition from non-discriminatory insurance products and the drop in 
the mortality gap between African-American and white policyholders. 
In the first section of my paper, I will briefly describe industrial life 
insurance, its history and the discriminatory practices that came to light in 
the recent litigation.  In the second part I will examine the legislative 
action, or lack thereof, that may have lead to the death of industrial life 
insurance.  The third part of my paper will discuss the theory that social 
pressure changed the way the insurance industry used race in underwriting 
life insurance.  The fourth part of my paper will discuss the influence of the 
decline in the mortality gap between African-American and white 
policyholders, and the rise of group life insurance.  Finally, in the 
conclusion I will discuss how all of these factors drove the cost of 
industrial life insurance, and the use of race in underwriting up, past the 
point where it could survive on the market. 
 
II.  A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
 
A. WHAT IS INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE? 
 
Originally named after the industrial workers to whom it was 
marketed,8 it is distinguished by its small premiums, the small face value of 
its policies,9 and the fact that it was usually collected by hand. 10 An agent 
                                                                                                                 
7 Id. 
8 David A. Ivry, Historical Development of Some Basic Life Insurance 
Terminology, 28 J. INS., Sept. 1961, at 65, 67-68.  At the time, the insurance was 
provided to industrial workers.  Id. 
 
9 The cost and coverage of industrial life insurance has varied from $25 when 
it was first offered in America to around $2,000 toward the end of its existence.  
MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 75 
(The Viking Press 1947) (Metropolitan first offered industrial life insurance with 
benefits from $25 to $1,000); Note, Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life 
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of the insurance company would travel door-to-door along a weekly or 
monthly route, sometimes called a “debt,” to collect the premiums from the 
policyholders.11 The logic behind the product was that the working poor 
that needed inexpensive insurance would not be able to budget effectively 
enough to pay on the quarterly basis, or afford the minimum level of 
benefits that ordinary life insurance demands.12  Personal collection was 
used because mailing was not cost effective and, theoretically, the 
policyholder did not have the time or motivation to deliver their payments 
themselves.13 
However, because of the high overhead costs, the ratio of 
premiums to the policy’s face value was horrible for all industrial life 
insurance,14 and it got much worse if the policyholder was a high risk. 15 
Industrial life insurance was sometimes referred to as “debt 
insurance” after the route the agents would take to collect their premiums.16  
                                                                                                                          
Insurance, 61 YALE L.J. 46, 46 (1952) ($300); INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE 
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 30 (1962) ($1,000);  INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE 
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 30 (1979);  In re Monumental, 365 F.3d 408, 412 n.3 (less 
than $2,000). 
 
10 Monumental, 365 F.3d at 412. 
  
11 Id.  See Alan Gurganus’s story, Blessed Assurance, in his collection, WHITE 
PEOPLE (1991) for a personal story of a former premium collector. 
 
12 ALEXA BENSON HENDERSON, ATLANTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY: 
GUARDIAN OF BLACK ECONOMIC DIGNITY 15 (The University of Alabama Press 
1990). 
 
13 MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 7 
(McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1944). 
 
14 Note, supra note 9, at 49.  The cost may be attributed to the high mortality 
of the policyholders and the high operating costs.  Id. 
 
15 See Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47.  The plaintiff in Thompson spent 
10¢ a week ($5.20 per year) for 30 years for a “substandard” life insurance policy.  
By the end of the period he had paid $156 for a policy with a face value of $178.  
Id.  A “standard” policy with a face value of $178 would have cost him $112 over 
the same period, while an ordinary (not industrial) life insurance policy would have 
cost $81.80.  Id. 
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It was also referred to as “burial insurance” when it was marketed as a way 
for poor people to afford a large funeral.17  It would pay its small sum soon 
after the death of the policyholder, sometimes arranging the funeral for the 
decedent.18 
 
1. What Was Wrong With Industrial Life Insurance 
 
Industrial life insurance has been criticized since its inception 
because of its deceptively low value, its high overhead, its incredibly high 
lapse rate, its possible connection to infanticide, and even whether such 
arrangements benefited the working class at all.19  Official inquiries have 
been made into the fairness of industrial life insurance on these grounds 
throughout its existence.20  However, the evil this note, and the recent wave 
                                                                                                                          
16 The agent collecting the premiums was assigned a fixed area that was 
referred to as a “debit.”  DAVIS, supra note 13, at 7.  The agents were paid roughly 
15% of the premiums they collected on their route.  EARL CHAPLIN MAY & WILL 
OURSLER, THE PRUDENTIAL 81-82 (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1950).  See also 1 U.S. 
Comm’n on Civil Rights, Discussion by Gayle Lewis-Carter, Special Assistant to 
the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS AND HEALTH LIFE AND DISABILITY 
INSURANCE, 197, 199 (1978) [hereinafter DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES]. 
 
17 MAY & OURSLER, supra note 16, at 32-33. 
 
18 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:42 (3d ed. 
2007); DISCUSSION BY ELEANOR LEWIS, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF 
INSURANCE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, 
supra note 16, at 193.  See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 189 for a description of the 
prompt payment, low levels of investigation in industrial life insurance, and 
marketing the insurance based on the consumer’s need to pay for their funeral. 
 
19 See generally, DERMOT MORRAH, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE 
ASSURANCE, 172 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1955). 
 
20 See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 9, at 332-33.  In 1936 the New York department 
of insurance examined Metropolitan’s sale of industrial life insurance and found 
that the high cost of the insurance was justified, but the lapse rate was too high, 
and the volume of insurance being written on children was questionable.  Id.  See 
also DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 194-200 
(mentioning the poor rate of return on industrial life insurance policies, their unfair 
claims practices, and mentioning that no insurance at all may be a better option for 
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of litigation focuses on is industrial life’s connection and reliance on racial 
discrimination.21 
Because of the need to keep the premiums low despite high 
overhead costs, the policyholders were rarely given the full medical 
examination that an ordinary life insurance policy would merit.22 Instead 
the industrial policies would be issued on the soliciting agents observations 
and recommendations as well as the applicant’s own statements about their 
health.23  Because these proxies were used in place of medical 
examinations, African-American customers were either steered into low 
paying industrial life insurance policies rather than ordinary policies (the 
“dual-plan” practice), or the mortality tables were racially segregated 
(“dual-rate” policies). 
Not to condone the practices of the industrial insurers, but it is 
important to note that the actual mortality rate of African-American 
policyholders at the time was disturbingly high, and may correspond to the 
                                                                                                                          
industrial life insurance policyholders).  The assistant to the commissioner of 
insurance in Pennsylvania mentions attempts to deal with industrial life insurance 
while it was still a problem by using the unfair trade practices act.  Id. at 199-200.  
Their efforts were frustrated by policyholder’s distrust of government bureaucracy 
and their fear of testifying.  Id. at 199.  The industry also tends to write a check and 
settle the problems of anyone who is vocal enough to cause a problem.  Id.  In 
1978, an article in Consumer Reports was often cited in the modern cases as 
evidence of mainstream society’s awareness of some of the problems with 
industrial life insurance.  Insurance that Preys on the Poor, CONSUMER REPORTS, 
Nov. 1978, at 661 (calling for a ban of industrial life insurance).  See generally 
MAURICE TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE (1934). 
 
21 DAVIS, supra note 13, at 107 (“The race of the applicant also has an 
important bearing on prospective longevity.  Nonwhite races have been found to 
have a much higher mortality than white persons, which should be considered in 
underwriting.”). 
 
22 Note, supra note 9, at 47.  “Medical examination of applicants was at best a 
hasty look-over by a physician who received fifty cents a head for his services.”  
JAMES, supra note 9, at 86. 
 
23 Id.   If the policyholder died within a year or two their death would be 
looked into and the “sound health” clause may be used to contest their claim.  Id. at 
58. 
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high rates charged by the insurers.24  The actions on the part of the insurers 
seem to be, at least from the record, motivated by a legitimate fear of the 
high correlation of risk and race in the first half of the twentieth century, 25 
rather than out of racial animosity.26 
                                                                                                                 
24 An investigation into the mortality rates of African-Americans in 1942 by 
the insurance commissioner of New York found that the mortality rate for African-
Americans with ordinary policies was 50% higher than white policyholders.  
DAVIS, supra note 10, at 112.  For African-Americans with industrial life insurance 
policies, owing to different age distributions and different socioeconomic status the 
rate was 83% higher than white policyholders.  Id.  See also the Appendix for 
charts showing the mortality gap between white and non-white Americans.  The 
charts used the INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK (eds. 
1954-99). 
 
25 See JAMES, supra note 9, at 86-87.  In the 1870’s the mortality gap between 
white and African-American policyholders first became an issue.  Major 
companies entering the industrial market such as Prudential and Metropolitan first 
offered industrial life insurance without using race as an underwriting 
characteristic.  Id.  By 1881 both companies realized the significance in the 
mortality difference between the two groups and raised their premiums.  Id. When 
states made laws prohibiting discriminatory premiums Prudential stopped selling 
any insurance to African-Americans in those states while Metropolitan heightened 
the requirements for African-American applicants.  Id.  In 1907 new industrial life 
table were produced that showed the considerable difference in mortality.  Id. at 
551.  Both companies reacted by instituting dual-rates and dual-plan practices 
discussed infra pp. 6-9.  See also Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d 38 at 46-47.  
 
Many studies have been made with respect to the mortality 
among negroes and all have shown that, class for class, their 
mortality is higher than that of white persons.  It is not true, of 
course, that all Negroes have higher mortality than any white 
persons because Negro physicians would undoubtedly show up 
better than white underground miners.  The important fact that 
needs to be emphasized is that Negroes have higher mortality 
than white persons of the corresponding class.   
Id. 
 
26 See WILLIAMSON & SMALLY, NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE: A CENTURY 
OF TRUSTEESHIP, IN DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 550.   
 
From time to time Northwestern insured the lives of Negroes.  In 
1885 the problem of getting a full medical history on Negro 
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While the largest sellers of industrial life insurance were some of 
the largest insurance companies in the market, it would be a mistake to see 
industrial life insurance as only a dynamic of large white businesses against 
poor African-American policyholders.  Industrial insurance laid the 
groundwork that allowed several African-American owned and controlled 
insurance companies to enter the insurance market.27  Oddly enough, the 
desegregation of life insurance, both in its sales practices and in its hiring, 
lead to increased competition with large “white” life insurance companies 
and the death of industrial life insurance was actually the nail in the coffin 
of some of the African-American owned companies.28 
 
a.   Dual-Rates 
 
“Dual-rate” is the term used for charging African-Americans 
higher rates for the same benefits as white policyholders.29  Insurance 
underwriters used to use two separate tables to predict mortality, one for 
white policyholders, and another for “non-white” policyholders.30  The 
                                                                                                                          
applicants raised the question as to the advisability of continuing 
this practice.  Kimball made it clear, however, that “we have no 
prejudice against insuring colored men growing out of mere fact 
of color.”  
Id. 
 
27 See ROBERT E. WEEMS, JR., BLACK BUSINESS IN THE BLACK METROPOLIS 1-
26, 29 (Indiana University Press 1996); HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 15-19; 
WALTER B. WEARE, BLACK BUSINESS IN THE NEW SOUTH 14-15 (University of 
Illinois Press 1973). 
 
28 WEEMS, supra note 27, at 115-18.  In the early eighties, following criticism 
of industrial life insurance and after the large “white” insurance companies had 
already stopped offering industrial life insurance, many of the African-American 
owned companies attempted to follow suit.  Id.  Of the six largest African-
American insurance companies, only three, North Carolina Mutual, Atlanta Life, 
and Golden State Mutual, survived.  Id. at 115-22. 
 
29 In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 331, 336. (5th Cir. 2003). 
 
30 Id. (“Liberty national employed the term ‘standard rates’ to refer to 
insurance rates applicable to African-Americans and the term ‘premium 
rates’ to refer to insurance rates available only to white individuals.”). 
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insurance agent would be asked to mark the race of the policyholder, and 
their premiums would be adjusted accordingly.31 
Following the industry’s abandonment of dual-rates, companies 
merged the two rate tables,32 or changed the title of the rate tables, but little 
else.33 Companies that had an African-American market suffered the most 
from their inability to separate rates by race.34 
 
b.   Dual-Plans 
 
“Dual-plan” practices refer to the various means insurance 
companies used to steer African-American applicants into discriminatory 
plans.35  This tactic was often adopted when states or insurance 
commissioners banned or pressured insurance companies into using race-
neutral rate tables. 36  Generally, the insurer would offer two tiers of 
                                                                                                                 
31 DAVIS, supra note 13, at 107; In re Monumental, 365 F.3d at 412 n.4.  The 
actual difference in the rate structure varies radically amongst plans, but a variety 
of discriminatory plans were apparent in the cases.  For example, in Monumental 
an ANICO rate book from 1962 with an industrial policy for a twenty year old with 
a face value of $500 had a weekly premium of $0.41 while a white policyholder 
would pay $0.32.  Id. 
 
32 E.g., Thorn., 445 F.3d 311, 315. 
 
33 See infra pp. 9-11. 
 
34 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 590-91. While 
companies with a predominantly white market could shift their merged rates 
toward their white rates, companies with a primarily African-American market had 
to shift their rates toward the higher mortality of their “non-white” rates or face 
insolvency.  Id. at 591.  This rate was non-competitive so these companies 
continued to be restricted to African-American markets.  Id.  Unfortunately, many 
of the companies that had focused on the African-American market were also 
African-American owned, and suffered from competition for both applicants as 
well as personnel.  HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 191-95. 
 
35 See text accompanying note 3. 
 
36 Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(“Since the laws of several states do not permit us to take race into account in 
appraising an applicant for insurance, we have had to adopt other means of 
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industrial life insurance, sometimes referred to as standard plans and sub-
standard plans.37  This is where the term “dual-plan” originates.  While the 
plans would be facially race neutral and their rate tables would be approved 
or created by the insurance commission, there would be an understanding 
that the tables were made from data specifically gathered from African-
Americans and would reflect their particular mortality rates.38 
 The insurance companies used direct and indirect methods of 
steering African-Americans into the sub-standard policies. A common 
practice was to pay agents no commission,39 or only partial commissions40 
                                                                                                                          
avoiding unfair discrimination against white policyholders in the cost of their 
insurance.”).  
 
37 See id. at 46-47 (using standard and substandard tables); Carnegie v. Mut. 
Savs. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. CV-99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446, at *1 (N.D. 
Ala. Nov. 23, 2004).  Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company divided their 
policies into “colored cash,” “white cash,” “colored burial,” and “white burial” 
where the only underwriting factor differentiating between the “white” and 
“colored” policies was race, as determined by the agent.  Carnegie, 2004 WL 
3715446, at *1.  In the 1960’s they stopped calling the bad policies “colored,” but 
the tables were not changed, with the same S for standard, and R for substandard 
policies using occupational proxies for race.  Id. at *2. 
 
38 See Brown v. Am. Capital Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 01-2079, 2004 WL 
2375796, *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2004), explaining that in New York there was no 
specified standard mortality table for “substandard” policies, and the tables that the 
insurance commissioner approved did not explicitly segregate by race.  It was 
“commonly accepted that the [Commissioners Standard Industrial Mortality Table] 
was created using ‘the experience of white risks’ and the [Commissioners 
Substandard Industrial Mortality Table] was ‘created using African-American 
risks.’”  Id. 
 
39 Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Servs., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 346, 349 (D. 
Conn. 2006).  The plaintiffs were described as “white” on the application so that 
the agent could collect his entire commission for selling them standard, rather than 
substandard policies.  Norflet v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 3:04cv1099 
(JBA), 2007 WL 2668936, *2 (D. Conn., Sept. 6, 2007).  On a subsequent 
application John Hancock corrected this.  Memoranda within John Hancock 
discussed the use of the no-commission policy, excepting sales in New York to 
avoid anti-discrimination laws.  Id. 
 
40 Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (80% reduction in commissions to offset 
the mortality risk); Brown, 2004 WL 2375796, at *2 n.7 (MetLife only paid their 
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if they sold standard policies African-Americans, but they allowed full 
commissions if they sold substandard policies to minorities.41  Driving 
down the incentive to sell reasonably priced policies was used as a crude 
underwriting technique.42 
Some insurance companies created a system to steer African-
Americans towards substandard policies based on their occupations.43  
Under this point system, certain jobs had a greater number of points then 
others.44  The jobs that were selected were manual labor jobs, commonly 
held by African-Americans in the pre-civil rights era south.45 
Like the discriminatory use of redlining in homeowners insurance, 
some insurers would map out the racial ratios of neighborhoods in order to 
                                                                                                                          
agents when African-Americans bought substandard insurance); Norflet, 2007 WL 
2668936, at *2 (a memo altered John Hancock’s “no-commission” policy for 
African-American policyholders in New York in order to conform to New York 
laws.  They justified their discriminatory steering and commissions because they 
had a “unitary rate” for their policies and did not use racially based rate tables.). 
 
41 Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 43.  
 
42 Id.  
 
43 E.g., Brown, 2004 WL 2375796, at *2 n.7. 
 
44 Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 
45 Friedman Decl. Ex. M, Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 44.  From a 1945 
memo, “Re: Underwriting Negro Lives”:  
 
Lowering the underwriting limit for standard Industrial insurance 
from 200% to 150% of standard Ordinary mortality.  Since a 
materially higher proportion of negro lives would be in 
occupations rates more than +50 and since a higher proportion of 
negro lives would also be rated more than +50 for reasons other 
than occupation, the effect of drawing the limit for standard 
Industrial insurance at 150% would result in considerably more 
negro lives than white lives being assigned to the substandard 
Industrial classification. 
 
Id. 
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determine the risk associated with that area.46  In some cases, different 
applications would be used in those neighborhoods.47  These applications, 
and the agents providing them, would ask questions about the morals, 
environment, and habits of the policyholder that were considered “too 
detailed and otherwise unsuitable” for the standard applications.48  The 
                                                                                                                 
46 Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270-71 (N.D. Ala. 
2000) (“Liberty National, after ceasing to make explicit, race-based distinctions 
among individuals in setting policy rates, nonetheless continued to sell racially-
discriminatory policies by including in the calculation of policy rates factors often 
directly correlated with race, such as employment in certain occupations or 
residence in ‘undesirable’ neighborhoods.”); Brown, 2004 WL 2375796, at *2 n.7.  
 
47 Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 45. 
 
48 Friedman Decl. Ex. R., Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 44.  The “Special 
Questions Report” issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance stated: 
 
In connection with the proposal now under consideration for the 
insuring of colored lives, it was agreed ... (ii) to use special 
questions designed to bring out poor environmental, moral 
hazards, or bad habits, either as part of the regular application or 
perhaps in the form of a special application to be completed in 
districts where a substantial proportion of the applications are on 
low grade risks. 
 
Id.  The report also included some suggested questions about the applicant’s home 
and habits: 
 
(a) Number of rooms in the home? 
(b) Number of persons living in home, including lodgers? 
(c) Does home contain toilet facilities? 
(d) Does home contain running water? 
(e) Is home in good repair? 
(f) Is home clean? … 
(a) Does applicant or premium-payer associate with criminals or 
gamblers such as those in the policy number game? 
(b) Does the applicant or the premium-payer get into fights? 
(c) Have the applicant's or the premium-payer's drinking habits 
been criticized? 
(d) Is there any other criticism of the applicant's or premium-
payer's habits or reputation? 
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answers would be used to determine or justify the underwriting risk of the 
policyholder.49 
 
II.  THE PRESENT LITIGATION 
 
The present wave of litigation against industrial life insurers began 
with a widely publicized settlement.  Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill 
Nelson filed an order stating that American General continued to collect 
premiums on racially discriminatory industrial life insurance policies sold 
by insurance companies it had purchased years ago.50  Two months after 
receiving the order, American General settled for $206 million.51  A 
                                                                                                                          
Id.  The report stated that the questions were “too detailed and otherwise 
unsuitable” for the standard application and only suitable for a “special 
application” that would give the insurer grounds for refusing the applicant. 
 
A special application which asks a fairly large number of plain 
spoken definite questions regarding poor home environment and 
questionable morals or habits is more likely to elicit an answer 
on the basis of which the case may be declined, than would a few 
question, necessarily somewhat generalized, on the regular 
application. Furthermore, the intent of questions of the type 
suggested for the special application should soon become 
obvious to the agent. 
Id. 
 
49 Id. 
 
50 Mark Hollis, Company Cited for Overcharging Poor Blacks for Burial, Life 
Policies, SUN-SENTINEL, June 22, 2000, at A1.  Senator Nelson, at the time 
running for office, stated that he became interested in burial insurance after he saw 
a program where a television crew followed an insurance salesman door to door 
collecting premiums from low-income residencies, “even prying money out of a 
family piggy bank with a coat hanger.”  Id.  It is likely that the program dealt with 
ordinary home life insurance, a different product that also involves door-to-door 
collection of premiums.  Ordinary home life insurance is a topic beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 
51 Id.  For a detailed description of the negotiations between the Florida 
Commissioner and American General see American General Life & Accident 
Insurance Company, Nationwide Settlement, Florida Department of Insurance – 
Primary Negotiator (unpublished manuscript, on file with Florida State 
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number of suits and settlements followed in order to correct the racially 
discriminatory premiums throughout the insurance industry.52 
 
1. Guidry v. Pellerin Life Insurance Company 
 
Guidry v. Pellerin Life Insurance Co.53 was a minor suit compared 
to In re Monumental54 or Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life 55 (both of which 
were class-actions), but it was the only industrial life insurance case to 
offer a holding in regard to the use of race in industrial life insurance.56  
After a brief preamble about his awareness and the continued presence of 
discrimination the judge acknowledges that, like many of the other 
industrial life insurance cases, the defendant “did charge African-
Americans as a class, higher premiums than it did Caucasians as a class, for 
the same life insurance coverage.”57  This is followed by the conclusion, 
and admittedly counterintuitive notion that: 
[D]efendant’s differential in the pricing of premiums for life 
insurance between African-American and Caucasians was based on risk, 
not race.  In that regard, the known risk assumed by defendant for a sum 
                                                                                                                          
University), available at http://consensus.fsu.edu/academic_directory/casestudies 
2001/Crowell_AmGenIns.pdf. 
 
52 See text accompanying note 3. 
 
53 364 F. Supp. 2d 592. (W.D. La. 2005). 
 
54 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 
55 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 
56 The Corpus Juris Secundum cites to Monumental and Williams as cases 
holding that insurers cannot discriminate based on race; however, both cases were 
settled without reaching the issue of race.  44 C.J.S. INSURANCE § 43 (2007).  See 
In re Monumental, 365 F.3d 408; Williams, 237 F.R.D. 685.  Monumental was 
settled after the 5th circuit addressed issues of class and statute of limitations.  365 
F.3d at 413, 420.  Williams was a certification of a settlement and only stated that 
after five years, taking the case to trial would cost a small fortune and possibly 
bankrupt the National Security Insurance Company before a judgment was 
reached.  237 F.R.D. at 695. 
 
57 Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 593. 
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certain as it related to insuring the lives of African-Americans and 
Caucasians was akin to an insurer charging a lower premium to a female 
than to a male and a higher premium to a smoker than a non-smoker.58 
The facts of Guidry are almost the same as all of the major 
industrial life insurance cases; the plaintiffs represented a class of African-
American and minority policyholders who purchased policies from Pellerin 
Life Insurance Company.59  Pellerin used dual-rate tables until they 
switched to a dual-plan practice, pushing African-Americans into “higher-
priced, inferior policies.”60  Pellerin continued to charge their policyholders 
at the same discriminatory rates.61  The plaintiffs addressed this problem by 
bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.62 
In applying the facts to the framework of §§ 1981, 198263 the court 
found that actuarial tables to determine risk were a legitimate, non-
                                                                                                                 
58 Id. at 594. 
 
59 Id. at 594-95. 
 
60 Id. at 594. 
 
61 Id. 
 
62 Id. at 597. 
 
63 Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97.   
 
To establish an inference of discrimination under §1981, 
consistent with McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs must allege facts 
in support of the following elements: (1) the plaintiffs are 
members of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the 
basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination 
concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute. 
 
Id. at 596 (citing Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 
In order to bring an action under § 1982, a plaintiff must allege 
with specificity facts sufficient to show or raise a plausible 
inference of the following: (1) the defendant’s racial animus; (2) 
intentional discrimination; and (3) that the defendant deprived 
plaintiff of his rights because of race. 
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discriminatory reason for Pellerin’s use of dual-plans, and rates.64 The 
plaintiffs attempt to use a decision by the Louisiana insurance 
commissioner that states that race is considered “unfair discrimination” and 
violated La. Rev. Stat. 22:1214(7).65   
La. Rev. Stat. 22:1214(7) was based on the NAIC’s Model Unfair 
Trade Practices Act.66  This act was not meant as a form of protection 
against any vulnerable class, rather it owes its origin to a practice among 
insurance agents where they would offer a rebate in certain customers to 
encourage business.67  Other applicants would not know if they were 
paying the same price as the other individuals who contributed to the same 
pool, so the NAIC offered this model statute to prevent “unfair” 
discrimination.68 It was quickly adopted, in some form, by all 50 states.69  
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 597 (citing Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616-17 
(1987)). 
 
64 Id. at 597. 
 
65 Id. at 597-98 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1214(7)(a) (2007)): 
 
(7) Unfair discrimination. (a) Making or permitting any unfair 
discrimination between individuals of the same class and equal 
expectation of life in the rates charged for any contract of life 
insurance or of life annuity or in the dividends or other benefits 
payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions of 
such contract, provided that, in determining the class, 
consideration may be given to the nature of the risk, plan of 
insurance, the actual or expected expense of conducting the 
business or any other relevant factor… 
 
66 UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES MODEL ACT § 4(G) (NAIC 2007) (defining 
unfair discrimination as an unfair trade practice “[m]aking or permitting any unfair 
discrimination between individuals of the same class” and similarly situated for 
rates charged in life insurance policies). 
 
67 Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s 
Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1656-57 (1995). 
 
68 Id. 
 
69 Herman T. Bailey et al., The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance 
Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 782 n.17 (1976). 
 
2009]  RACE BASED UNDERWRITING AND BURIAL INSURANCE 547 
 
 
However, the judge held that Pellerin did not discriminate 
“between individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life.”70 The 
Louisiana Code § 65271 specifically states that “fair” was not meant to be 
interpreted in the usual social context, but in an “efficient” view of fairness, 
barring practices where the classification of an individual had no relation to 
their risk, like the rebates La. R.S. 22:1214(7)(a) was supposed to 
remedy.72 
The second challenge the plaintiffs offered was a comparison to a 
similar favorable case that passed summery judgment, Brown v. American 
Capital Insurance Company.73  Brown shared the fact pattern of Guidry,74 
but in Brown there was a question of whether the mortality tables were out 
                                                                                                                 
70 Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98.  In a later affidavit the insurance 
commissioner stated that there was no evidence that Pellerin priced its policies on 
anything other than life expectancy, and that “after the passage of [LA. REV. STAT. 
§] 22:652 an insurer charging ‘different groups of people different premium 
amounts because of differing risk determined by life expectancy, would not violate 
rule and/or regulations of the Louisiana Department of Insurance or Louisiana 
statutory law.”  Id. at 599. 
 
71 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:54 (2008): 
 
No insurer shall make or permit any unfair discrimination in 
favor of particular individuals or persons, or between insureds or 
subjects of insurance having substantially like insuring risk, and 
exposure factors, or expense elements, in the terms or conditions 
of any insurance contract, or in the rate or amount of premium 
charged therefor, or in the benefits payable or in any other rights 
or privileges accruing thereunder.   This provision shall not 
prohibit fair discrimination by a life insurer as between 
individuals having unequal life expectancies.  (italics in Guidry, 
364 F. Supp. 2d at 599 n.1). 
 
72 Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
 
73 Brown v. Amer. Corp. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 01-2079, 2004 WL 2375796 
(E.D. La. 2004). 
 
74 Id. at *1-2.  See also Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (“…as the facts and the 
expert testimony in the instant action are almost identical to the facts and expert 
testimony in Brown.”). 
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of proportion to the actual mortality risk of African-American 
policyholders and to the amount of reserves kept by the insurance 
company.75  The possibility that the rate tables themselves were 
discriminatory and did not correlate to the risk of the policyholders created 
a matter of evidence that was not present in Guidry.76  Brown was fought 
over the issue of whether those tables were “fair” discrimination, rather 
than Guidry, where there was no evidence of insufficient reserves, biased 
tables, or anything that would show that the higher premiums were based 
on racial animus rather than realistic approximations of risk.77  So despite 
the explicit use of race, Pellerin did not actually use race to price the 
policies, they only used race to gauge the life expectancy of the 
policyholders which was used to price the premiums.78 
                                                                                                                 
75 Brown, 2004 WL 2375796 at *2.  “[A] pivotal dispute in this case is 
whether historically the 41 SSI table reflected underwriting practices, supported by 
objective factors, which placed the mortality rate for African Americans 
significantly higher than whites; or whether these socioeconomic underwriting 
factors were deployed as a ‘mask’ for racial discrimination.”  Id.  The issue was 
complicated by the fact that the New York Insurance Commissioner actually made 
the tables, and set the necessary reserves.  Id.  
 
76 Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 598 (“While the expert testimony related to the 
evidence adduced in Brown created a genuine issue of material fact, plaintiffs in 
this case have failed to introduce any evidence that suggests that the basis of dual-
pricing (dual-rate and dual plan practice) was based on anything other than life 
expectancy.”) (italics in original).  The defendant’s expert, which the court agreed 
with, showed the correlation of race and mortality by presenting Society of 
Actuaries papers from 1952, and 1965 as well as 1961-98 U.S. census data.  Id. 
 
77 Id. at 599 (“[P]laintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment is devoid of even 
a supeon of evidence that the subject insurance policies Pellerin issued were priced 
in a racially discriminatory manner or that any of Pellerin’s actions were racially 
motivated.”) (italics in original). 
 
78 Id. at 598. 
 
Frank Pellerin testified that race was not used in setting an 
insured’s premium, but rather was used only to determine risk.  
Because that risk was reflected in the premium paid under some 
Pellerin policies, African Americans paid a higher premium than 
Caucasians for the same coverage under those policies.  Id. 
(internal citation omitted). 
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II.    WHAT KILLED BURIAL INSURANCE? 
 
Industrial life insurance, and the racial discrimination that 
accompanied it, died out during the 1960s and 1970s,79 but the exact reason 
why they died is not clear.80  Several possible theories are that legislation 
either stopped racial discrimination in underwriting, or affected industrial 
life insurance directly.  Another theory is that the social climate changed 
and social pressure pushed the insurance industry to abandon the use of 
racial discrimination in underwriting and the sale of industrial life 
insurance.  A third theory is that market forces and chances in population 
demographics drove industrial life insurance from the open market.   In this 
section I will examine each of these theories and see if there is any 
evidence of their validity.  None of these three theories are mutually 
exclusive, but there is an assumption that needs to be clarified.  Industrial 
life insurance is directly linked to, and relied on racial discrimination.  
Industrial life’s inefficiency and reliance on racial discrimination is 
shown in three different ways.  First, it was an expensive product, which 
makes it very vulnerable to any competition that could fill its niche market.  
                                                                                                                 
79 See e.g., Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Life, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 n.5 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (Liberty National’s counsel admitted in the June 20th 2000 hearing that 
the debit route collection system was dismantled in 1995-96); Thorn v. Jefferson-
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (Jefferson stopped issuing 
policies in 1973, but continued to collect dual rate policies.  In 1988 they adjusted 
the dual rate policies to merging the tables but they still left a difference between 
the merged tables and the white tables. In 2000 at the time of filing Jefferson 
declared all dual-rate policies “paid up”.) In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 
408, 412 (5th Cir. 2004) (Monumental and the companies it acquired had not sold 
dual-rate policies since the 1970’s.  As early as 1988 some insurers voluntarily 
adjusted premiums and/or death benefits to equalize coverage.); Williams v. Nat’l 
Sec. Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 685, 687 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2006) (National Security 
stopped using dual rates on December 1st, 1980); Carnegie v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
No. CV-99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446 at *3 n.18 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004) 
(While Mutual stopped calling the bad policies “colored” in the 1960s the tables 
were not changed, with the same S for standard policies, and R for substandard 
policies, except they used occupational proxies for race); see also LIFE INSURANCE 
FACT BOOK, supra note 5, (eds. 1953-97). 
 
80 Robert Randall, Risk Classification and Actuarial Tables as They Affect 
Insurance Pricing for Women and Minorities, in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 590-91. 
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Desegregation allowed greater competition which industrial life insurance 
was not able to handle. 
Second, it relied on crude underwriting, particularly assumptions 
about the mortality of African-Americans.  If it was forced to use 
characteristics that were more costly than an agent’s personal assessment it 
would become too costly, even by its own standards.   
Finally, and most compelling, there is the evidence of the timing.  
There is plenty of evidence of dual rate and dual plan practices and their 
close connection to the sale of industrial life insurance.  The times that 
insurance companies gave for their discontinuing their discriminatory 
practices coincide with their abandonment of industrial life insurance as a 
whole.  It looks like if they gave up one, they gave up both.  The remaining 
question is why did industrial life insurance or race based underwriting die 
at all. 
 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE THEORY 
 
Surprisingly, while a number of states enacted laws that dealt with 
the use of race in insurance,81 very few of them prohibited the use of race in 
underwriting,82 and none of them could stop the use of dual-plan 
discrimination.   Guidry is interesting because it is evidence that in at least 
one state there was a surprising lack of legislative action.83  Guidry is not 
proof of this, but it does open up the possibility that race based 
                                                                                                                 
81 See supra, p.17 and note 71.  See also DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
MINORITIES, supra note 13, at 195-209.  In interviews with various state insurance 
commissioners, they were not able to tell congress about any negative rights 
against discrimination in life insurance, and they commented on the difficulty of 
passing informational laws to prevent abusive practices in the sale of industrial life 
insurance.  Id. 
 
82 Randall, supra note 16, at 195-209.  Various insurance commissioners 
testified to their efforts to reduce discrimination, but the only laws concerning 
industrial life insurance dealt with disclosure, and that law exempted industrial life 
insurance.  Id. at 199. 
 
83 See Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (W.D. La. 
2005). 
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underwriting is more legal that we assume.  Under our present laws, 
Guidry’s holding could apply to roughly 34 states.84 
As far as state adoption of legislation that bars the use of race in 
underwriting life insurance premiums, only thirteen states have adopted 
statutes specifically prohibiting racial discrimination in life insurance 
premiums.85  Three of those states, Texas, Maryland, and New York, only 
passed their laws after industrial life insurance was on its last legs in 2009, 
1998, and 1984 respectively.86  Three other states bar insurers from using 
race, but only in conjunction with credit scores, and have only done so 
recently.87  Five more states bar the use of race in relation to purchasing, 
canceling, or limiting the amount of life insurance an applicant can 
purchase, but do not prohibit racially discriminatory premiums or 
                                                                                                                 
84 See infra note 85 and accompanying text.  
 
85 California (CAL. INS. CODE §§ 679.71, 679.72, 10141, 10140 (West 2008)); 
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-447 (West 2008)); Delaware (DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304 (West 2008)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-4 (West 
2008)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085 (West 2008)); Maryland 
(MD CODE ANN., INS., § 27-501 (West 2008) (prohibits discriminatory 
cancellations, or refusing to offer insurance, and prohibits inquiring about race on 
applications)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 151B § 4(3A) (West 2008) 
(prohibiting insurers and bondsmen from inquiring about the race of the 
applicant)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.12 (West)); New York (N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 2606 (McKinney 2008)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
3-25 (West 2008)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.16 (West 2008)); Texas 
(TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 560.002 (Vernon 2008)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 625.12 
(2008)).  New Jersey’s statute (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:29B-4(7)(c), 17B:30-12(a) 
(West 2008)) was repealed insofar as it applies to life insurers.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
17:36B-3. 
 
86 MD CODE, INS., § 27-501 (West 2008) (prohibits discriminatory 
cancellations, or refusing to offer insurance, and prohibits inquiring about race on 
applications); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606 (McKinney 2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 
560.002 (Vernon 2008). 
 
87 Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.103 (West 2008) (insurers cannot use credit 
scores that are based on race)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5104 (2008) 
(insurers cannot use credit scores that are based on race)); New Mexico (N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 59A-17A-4(A) (West 2008) (insurer can’t use credit scores based on 
race)).  None of these statutes was enacted prior to 2003. 
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underwriting.88  So only 10 states have statutory prohibitions against race 
based underwriting that could have had an impact on the sale of industrial 
life insurance.89  In the 1950s, when industrial life insurance sales began 
their long decline, only three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Ohio 
had enacted laws barring race based underwriting.90  
On the whole, states that passed laws barring race based 
underwriting saw a decline in the sale of industrial life insurance in 
proportion to the national market, with the only exception being 
Wisconsin.91  When the sale of industrial life insurance in states barring 
racial discrimination is compared to states that passed no laws, it is not 
clear whether the laws were the only factor.92  Almost all states saw a drop 
in the late 1970s, even if they did not pass a law.93  Seven states lost more 
than one percent of their share of the national industrial life insurance 
market between 1954 and 1984, but only four of those states passed laws 
                                                                                                                 
88 Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 500.2027 (West 2008) (cannot 
refuse to insure, cancel insurance or limit the insurance because of race)); Missouri 
(MO. ANN. STAT. § 375.007 (West 2008) (cannot refuse to insure, cancel insurance 
or limit the insurance because of race)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
417:4 (2008) (cannot refuse to insure or cancel insurance because of race)); 
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.2 (2008) (prohibits cancellation based on 
race)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.178 (2008) (cannot refuse to insure 
or cancel insurance because of race)). 
 
89 See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
 
90 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-447 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
151B § 4(3A) (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.16 (West 2008). 
 
91 Wisconsin dropped 0.12% after passing its anti-discrimination law in 1969, 
but by 1984 its market share grew 0.13%.  See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT 
BOOK, supra note 5 (showing life insurance market share changes over time); see 
also author charts on file with the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal.  To make 
Chart VI, in the appendix, I found the yearly change in the face value of insurance 
for each year.  The chart shows the average change in face value for all states with 
laws affecting the underwriting of minorities purchasing industrial life insurance 
and for states without these laws. 
 
92 See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5.   
 
93 See chart 5, infra app. 5. 
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during that time that might have influenced the sale of industrial life 
insurance.94 
However, the theory that legislation destroyed the industrial life 
insurance market is not quite compelling because as some states passed 
laws barring discrimination, the laws were either ineffective, or the 
industry shifted to the many other states where it was still legal.  Of the ten 
states that sold the most industrial life insurance in 1954,95 four passed 
laws.96  Thirty years later, three out of those four states, as well as New 
York and Michigan, fell from the top ten.97  However, of the twenty-one 
states that had more than two percent of the national market at any point 
between 1954 and 1984, seven passed laws.98  However, passing laws 
never led to a state dropping below two percent of the national market.99 
On the whole, laws barring racial discrimination had an impact on 
the sale of industrial life insurance in those states, however the impact does 
not seem to be significant, and the laws only seem to have impacted a small 
section of the market.  What is interesting is the sudden drop-off in the late 
1970s.  Four states passed laws in the 1970s, and some of those states had a 
                                                                                                                 
94 Illinois fell 1.06%, Massachusetts 2.92%, New Jersey 1.47%, New York 
5.57%, Ohio 1.59%, Pennsylvania 2.24%, Connecticut 1.19%.  New Jersey 
repealed their law for the benefit of life insurers in 1974.  Massachusetts, Ohio, and 
Connecticut also passed laws.  Ohio was still one of the top ten states in terms of 
market share in 1984 despite passing a law barring discriminatory premiums 
roughly thirty years before. See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 
5 (showing life insurance market share); see also author charts on file with the 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal.  See also Chart VI in the appendix and note 
91, supra. 
 
95 Pennsylvania, 10.2%; New York, 9.3%; Ohio, 6.8%; Illinois, 6.3%; New 
Jersey 4.8%; California, 4.4%; Texas, 4.3%; Massachusetts 4.2%; Michigan 3.8%; 
Florida, 3.0%.  Id. 
 
96 Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, and Ohio.  See discussion supra 
note 85 and accompanying text. 
 
97 See discussion infra Section IV, Part 3. 
 
98 See author charts on file with the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal. 
 
99 See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5, in eds. 1954-
1994. 
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significant share of the national market.100  Still, the theory that legislation 
kills industrial life single-handedly has the critical flaw that at the end of its 
impact on the market, only 10 states passed laws barring the sale of 
industrial life insurance.101 
Another factor that might hurt the legislative theory is the absence 
of legislation that regulates the industrial life insurance market in 
particular.  All of the statutes mentioned above concerned racially 
discriminatory premiums.  It is not clear whether these statutes were 
effective in stopping dual-plan practices, and there were no cases litigated 
during the decline of industrial life insurance to show what impact the few 
statutes that were passed would have had. 
Federal laws, specifically §§ 1981-83102 may have applied to race 
based underwriting, but, again, without any litigation or other evidence, 
nothing supports the theory that the possible application of these federal 
laws deterred the sale of industrial life insurance to the point where it was 
driven from the market. 
 
B.  THE THEORY OF “SOCIAL REPUGNANCE”  
 
In academic articles, “repugnance” is given as the reason that the 
industry abandoned racial discrimination.103 The insurance industry claims 
it abandoned dual-rates and dual-plan practices because the differences in 
                                                                                                                 
100 California, Georgia, North Carolina, and Kentucky.  All of these states had 
a significant, greater than 2%, share of the market at the time they passed their 
laws.  See generally id. 
 
101 See discussion supra, note 95 and accompanying text. 
 
102 Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 594-97. 
 
103 Robert Jerry, II, Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another Perspective, 34 AM. 
U.L. REV. 329, 348 (1985).  What is curious about this article is that while it uses 
society’s rejection of race as a factor in insurance to argue for unisex insurance, it 
cannot point to any law, case, or event that pushed the life insurance industry to 
reject racial underwriting.  Jerry presumes that the change occurred “when insurers 
realized that the torrent of federal legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in 
various aspects of society could reach insurance practices if the industry did not 
take steps to eliminate such discrimination.  Id. at 367 n.139.  
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mortality, “were felt to be socioeconomic and hence reflecting them was 
felt to not be socially acceptable.”104 
There was some public outcry in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
that add some credibility to this theory.  However, some of the recent 
industrial life class action suits actually turn on the public knowledge of 
industrial life insurance’s discriminatory dealings.105  The defendants in 
those cases referred to negative publicity that industrial life insurance 
received at the time and argued that the plaintiffs should have been aware 
of the racially discriminatory practices of industrial life insurers.106  Among 
some of the minor news articles were some rather well circulated reports 
such as an interview on 60 Minutes,107 and the hearing before the United 
                                                                                                                 
104 RANDALL, supra note 80 at 527.  See also DOUGLAS CADDY, LEGISLATIVE 
TRENDS IN INSURANCE REGULATION, 105 (1986) (the insurance industry bases the 
high mortality of African-Americans on poverty rather than race itself). 
 
105 See, e.g., Carnegie v. Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 99-S-3292-NE, 2002 
WL 32989594, *6 (Nov. 1, 2002, N.D. Ala. 2002); Thompson v. Metro, Life Ins. 
Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D. Conn. 2006).  The issue was relevant because various 
state and federal statute of limitations toll when the plaintiff, using ordinary care, 
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment.  Carnegie, 2002 WL 3715446 
at *6 (citing Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273 (N.D. 
Ala. 2000)). 
 
106 Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing Derek T. Dingle, Insurance 
Schemes Still Plague Poor, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, June 18, 1980, at A1; Albert 
Edward Wiggam, Let's Explore Your Mind, THE DETROIT NEWS, September 26, 
1936 at 10 (“It is arithmetic not race prejudice that makes life insurance higher for 
Negroes.”)); Winfred Bryson, Insurance Companies: An Overview, BLACK 
ENTERPRISE, June 1977, at 121-122; Paul M. Barrett, Delaware Settles Insurance 
Complaints on Blacks' Policies With Five Firms, WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 
26, 1988.  In total, the defendants in Thompson submitted 24 articles over a 60-
year span.  Id.; See also Carnegie, 2002 WL at *6 (the defendants submitted 50 
articles). 
 
107 60 Minutes: Soak the Poor (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28, 1979).  Mike 
Wallace only briefly mentioned the racially discriminatory aspect of industrial life 
insurance; much of the program primarily focused on the impact of industrial life 
insurance on poor Americans in general. 
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States Commission on Civil Rights.108  While this shows there was at least 
some media attention, there was not enough attention to convince the court 
that the public knew about the issue.109 
There was some official criticism of industrial life insurance during 
this period as well.  The Federal Trade Commission issued a report on 
industrial life insurance, but it focused on the fact that industrial life 
insurance was overpriced and inefficient.110  This report led to a widely 
circulated Consumer Reports article,111 which in turn led to an investigation 
by the NAIC.112  Their conclusion was that despite its faults, it served a 
useful social function.113   
The trouble with the evidence supporting the theory of social 
repugnance is that industrial life insurance has always had extremely vocal 
critics.114  These critics provoked inquiries and the inquiries lead to the 
same conclusions, that industrial life insurance is inefficient but it fills a 
niche.115  Few of the major criticisms focused on the racial aspect of 
                                                                                                                 
108 Supra note 16.  However, like the Sixty Minutes piece, the commission 
touched on industrial life insurance briefly, most of its focus was on gender and it 
was assured that the use of race based underwriting had already been abandoned.  
Id.; RANDALL, supra note 80. 
 
109 The court in Thompson only found that there was a material issue of fact as 
to whether the plaintiffs were even aware of the issue.  Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d 
at 52.  In Carnegie, the court was unconvinced that there was enough media 
attention to the issue of racial discrimination to alert industrial life insurance 
policyholders.  Carnegie, 2002 WL 3715446 at *6. 
 
110 Joan Koonce Lewis, Home Service Distribution System: A Method of 
Marketing Life Insurance to the Poor, 9(1); FINANCIAL COUNSELING & PLANNING 
35, 36 (1998). 
 
111 Insurance that Preys on the Poor, 43 CONSUMER REPORTS 658, 661, Nov. 
1978.  
 
112 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Home Service Life 
Insurance: A Commentary 93, Dec. 1982.  
 
113 Id. 
 
114 See supra, pp. 5-6 notes 16-18. 
 
115 Id. 
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industrial life insurance, rather they focused on the way it preys on the 
poor.116  None of these other past attacks succeeded, so while the presence 
of criticism certainly contributed to industrial life insurance’s decline, it 
does not explain it. 
It would be wonderful to believe that social acceptability guides 
the insurance industry.  However, other practices with a disparate impact 
on race, such as redlining117 and the use of credit scores,118 as well as the 
differing treatment of men and women, show that the insurance industry 
can be strongly attached to unethical practices as long as they are efficient 
and actuarially sound.   
This is not to say that the insurance industry and the people in it are 
unethical, but that ethical changes may only be possible if the social 
pressure is stronger than they countervailing economic incentive.119  In this 
case some of the economic incentives for using race as a tool in 
underwriting disappeared over time while other insurance products, 
particularly group life insurance, took away industrial life insurance’s 
comfortable monopoly on the working poor. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
116 See e.g., Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 52.  Quoting the interview with 
Mike Wallice, the court calls attention to the fact that the only mention of 
discrimination was the fact that the majority of consumers of industrial life 
insurance are African-American.  Id. 
 
117 See generally GREGORY D. SQUIRES, INSURANCE REDLINING: 
DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (1997). 
 
118 Credit-scoring is an example of an accurate predictor of risk that had no 
causal connection to that risk.  There were many objections to the use of credit 
scores and some litigation over them. The social outcry against insurance 
companies using credit scoring has had more success in the legislator than in the 
courts.  See generally Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).  
After years of protest, forty-eight states passed some kind of law controlling the 
use of credit scores.  See National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, 
State Laws Governing Insurance Scoring Practices, 
http://www.namic.org/reports/credithistory/credithistory.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 
2008) (an index of the state laws and their treatment of credit scoring). 
 
119 See Jerry, supra note 93. at 330. 
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C. OTHER POSSIBLE THEORIES  
 
Two factors that do seem to align with the fall of industrial life 
insurance are the closing of the racial mortality gap, and the success of 
group life insurance.  The mortality gap between white and African-
American policyholders dropped by more than half in the period between 
the introduction of industrial life insurance in America and its 
abandonment.120  This would have reduced the economic impact of race-
blind insurance sales.  Group life insurance took off during the same 
period, offering cost efficient insurance to the same working-class market. 
 
i.   The Mortality Gap 
 
The difference in the life span and average mortality of African-
American policyholders and white policyholders is particularly relevant.  It 
represents an adverse selection risk that the insurance industry would have 
to accept before they stop using racially discriminatory factors in their 
underwriting.  At the turn of the century there was approximately a 14.6 
year difference between the life span of white and non-white Americans.121  
By the 1960s the gap had halved itself and it continued to decline 
significantly until the 1980s.122.  In either case, the sale of industrial life 
insurance leveled off at the same time that the difference between “white” 
                                                                                                                 
120 See app., p.38. 
 
121 See app. for comparative charts based on figures from the INSURANCE FACT 
BOOK. 
 
122 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5 (ed. 1999) at Table 13.3.  In 
1900, the difference between the life expectancy from birth of white and “non-
white” males was 14.1, between females it was 15.2, and combined it was 14.6.  
By 1950 it fell to 7.4, 9.3, and 8.3.  In 1965 it was 6.5, 7.3, and 6.9.  By 1975 it fell 
to 5.8, 4.9, and 5.4.  The mortality continued to drop until the 1980s.  The 
mortality gap has continued to close since that point, but slower, reaching 4.5, 3.2, 
and 3.5 in 1997.  But see Robert S. Levine, MD, et al., Black-White Inequalities in 
Mortality and Life Expectancy, 1933-1999: Implications for Healthy People 2010, 
116 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 474, 480 (2001) (“We have seen no sustained 
decrease in black-white disparities in either age-adjusted mortality or overall life 
expectancy at birth at the national level since the end of World War II…”).  
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and “non-white” mortality showed its greatest improvements.123  At this 
point race was not as relevant an underwriting factor as it had been in the 
past.  
The timing of the decline in the mortality gap and the decline in the 
use of race as a criterion for underwriting is the best evidence that they are 
related; no publicly available study has mentioned it.  It is possible that this 
is just a coincidence, that the same social an political pressure that 
improved African-American living conditions and improved mortality rates 
also provided a social incentive to stop racial underwriting.  However, it 
may be useful to compare the life insurance industry’s quiet abandonment 
of race based underwriting with its fight to continue sex based 
underwriting.124  
The insurance industry has clung to sex based underwriting.125  
Since the criterion affects all of their policyholders and since the effect is 
substantial,126 the industry claims it would suffer from severe solvency 
problems if it switched to gender-neutral rate tables.127  They believe that 
men would over-consume life insurance while women abandoned it 
because their premiums do not correspond to the value of their policies.128   
The insurance industry has had mixed results in their fight.129   
                                                                                                                 
123 See app., pp. 37-42. 
124 See generally United States Commission on Civil Rights, Statement of 
Richard Minck, Vice President and Actuary, American Council of Life Insurance 
in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 224-40. 
 
125 See Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: 
What’s Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1647-49 (1994-1995), for a breakdown of the 
academic battle over the economic justification of gender discrimination and the 
arguments against it. 
 
126 See app. 
 
127 See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Statement of Richard 
Minck, Vice President and Actuary, American Council of Life Insurance in 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 224-40.  
 
128  Id. 
 
129 See Stephen R. Kaufman, Comment, Banning “Actuarially Sound” 
Discrimination: The Proposed Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, 20 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 631, 633 n.22 (1983) for an overview of failed federal legislation 
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If we compare the industry’s differing treatment of sex and race 
based underwriting from only an economic standpoint the closing racial 
mortality gap was still rising at the time when it came under fire in the 
1970s.130 
As a result of the closing mortality gap the incentive for any 
insurance product to use race based underwriting was rapidly dwindling.  
Combined with the social and legal pressure to stop racial discrimination, 
various life insurance products began to enter minority markets, competing 
with industrial life insurance. 
 
ii.   Group Life Insurance 
 
Group life insurance offered unprecedented competition to 
industrial life insurance.131  The decline of industrial life insurance during 
the 1960 and 1970s corresponds to the point where group life insurance 
took off.132  Both plans appealed to similar demographics, but considering 
the expense of industrial life insurance, compared to the administrative ease 
of group life, it is easy to see why group life insurance quickly became one 
of the strongest life insurance products.133  Contrasting its strengths with 
                                                                                                                          
banning the use of gender as a classifier in insurance. Gaulding, supra note 63, at 
1652-53. 
 
130 See app. 
 
131 See LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 18, at 34 (eds. 1973-77) 
(stating that industrial life insurance lost 10% of its market share in the decade 
between the 1960s and 1970s, and that increased availability of group life 
insurance may have been a factor). Group life insurance, as its name suggests, 
requires an employer or “central entity” in addition to the insurer and policyholder. 
RUSS, supra note 15, at § 7:1. The central entity acts as the policyholder as they 
enter into an agreement for the benefit of the employees or group members.  Id. 
 
132 See app. 
 
133 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 30 (ed. 1974) (as of 1974, 
group life was 42% of the insurance market).  A reason for the growth of industrial 
life insurance was that risk aversion, a by-product of the great depression, was a 
strong factor for many employees and unions.  After the war, when employers had 
to find new employees in a competitive market they found that group insurance 
was an attractive incentive for hiring as well as retention.  HENDERSON, supra note 
9, at 157-58.  By 1954, group insurance was the most popular benefit offered to 
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the enormous expenses involved in industrial life insurance could explain 
why industrial life insurance died when it did.134 
Group plans replace uninformed consumers with a central entity, 
such as a union, an employer, or an association.135  This reduces the 
informational imbalance between the insurer and the policyholder than 
leads to dual-plan practices.  In addition, group plans have the advantage of 
skimming a group of the healthiest risks, those who have regular 
employment, out of the life insurance pool, leaving industrial life insurance 
the high risk, unemployed, self employed, or irregularly employed 
individuals. 136  
For minority policyholders, group life insurance offers both 
statutory and structural protection from discrimination.  Structurally, the 
premiums are fixed to the characteristics of the group rather than the 
individuals.137  This means that while there might be a disparate impact 
because of racism in hiring, direct discrimination should not be a 
problem.138  Statutorily, discrimination against minorities and women 
                                                                                                                          
employees.  Id. at 157.  See also app. for charts of the growth of group life 
insurance. 
 
134 One of the advantages of group plans is the low transaction cost, in contrast 
with industrial life insurance’s poor underwriting and premium collection fees. 
RUSS, supra note 18, at § 7:1. 
 
135 Id.  The entity then contracts with the insurer, and acts as the policyholder 
for the chief contractual relationship.  Id. 
136 Id. (“[T]hey typical scenario where the insured party is a group of 
employees, because such group members are by definition healthy enough to be 
employed at the time they become insured.”). 
 
137 MCGILL’S LIFE INSURANCE 817 (Edward E. Graves ed., 3d ed. 2000).  The 
general underwriting considerations are the reason for the group’s existence, its 
stability, its persistency, the method of determining benefits, the provisions for 
determining eligibility, the source and method of premium payments, the 
administrative aspects of the group insurance plan, the prior existence of the plan, 
the size of the group, the composition of the group (which may include the general 
age and sex of the group participants), and the industry represented by the group.  
Id. at 817-22. 
 
138 See DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 589.  While 
sex and age are used to calculate the group rate, the employee or employer only 
pays the overall rate rather than their particular portion of it.  Id.  Race is not a 
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might be allowed at the state level, but additional protection is provided 
when the group plan is attached to employment and falls under the more 
expansive laws protecting individuals from discrimination in the 
workplace.139 Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart140 is an 
example of how differently the plaintiffs in Guidry would have been treated 
if they were in a group plan covered by federal employment laws.  When 
the Supreme Court in Manhart reached the same central issue that was the 
crux of Guidry, whether discrimination based on a protected characteristic 
is actually “fair” discrimination based on mortality, the court quoted Judge 
Duniway that “one cannot say that an actuarial distinction based entirely on 
sex is based on any factor other than sex. Sex is exactly what it is based 
on.”141 
Another more theoretical explanation for group life’s consumption 
of the industrial life insurance market might involve the reduction of 
adverse selection risks when the insurance is attached to a more vital 
attribute of the consumer.142  Some kinds of insurance pools require a 
                                                                                                                          
factor in their underwriting because of “its social unacceptability, but the 
proportion of our total population that is nonwhite is so small (10 percent) that the 
impact has been minimal.”  Id. 
 
139 See generally Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 708-10 (1978). 
 
140 Manhart, 435 U.S. 702.  Manhart dealt with an employer who required 
female employees to contribute 14.84% more to the employee retirement funds 
than their male coworkers to compensate for the difference in their mortality.  Id. 
at 704-05.   In Manhart the court held that Title VII focused on individuals and 
precluded their treatment as part of “a racial, religious, sexual, or national class.”  
Id. at 708 (“The statute makes it unlawful ‘to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis in Manhart)). 
 
141 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712-13 (quoting Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 
Dep’t of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1976) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 
142 The theory behind adverse is that when a high risk section of the market is 
offered insurance at the same rate as the low risk portion of the market, the high 
risks may over-consume insurance, forcing up the claims, and driving the price of 
insurance past the point where it becomes a reasonable investment for lower risk 
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common attribute from the policyholders, like church attendance,143 union 
membership, or employment.144  The purchase of insurance may be seen as 
a socially driven act of collective reasonability.  This both keeps low risks 
in an insurance pool when they may find better offers on the open market, 
and it stops high risk individuals from over insuring by preventing any 
individual from buying more than a set amount of insurance under a single 
policy, or preventing them from purchasing multiple policies.  This might 
explain the survival of mutual benefit societies into the early 20th century, 
despite their lack of underwriting.145  It also would explain how the “death 
spiral” is more apparent when the choice between two competing pools is 
not dependant on any shared social attribute of the policyholders.146 
Industrial life insurance policyholders are not unified by any social 
bond or attribute that would prevent high-risk individuals from over-
insuring themselves at the expense of low risk applicants.  Actually, 
industrial life insurance’s rudimentary underwriting techniques147 allow 
                                                                                                                          
individuals.  When low risk individuals are driven out of the insurance pool, the 
rate of claims become higher then the value of the pool and forcing the insurance 
provider into liquidation.  See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of 
Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976).  
 
143 See HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 12-13. 
 
144 Group life insurance, as its name suggests, requires an employer or “central 
entity” in addition to the insurer and policyholder.  See Russ, supra note 18, at § 
7:1.  The central entity acts as the policyholder as they enter into an agreement for 
the benefit of the employees or group members.  Id. 
145 See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: An 
exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1255 (2003-2004) (“mutual assessment 
societies” survived in Canada and America into the 1920’s). 
 
146 See generally David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection 
in Health Insurance, 1 FRONTIERS HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1 (1998).  Here, Harvard 
offered its employees a choice between an expensive PPO and an in expensive 
HMO.  When budget cuts forced the university to adjust the premiums of the plains 
to their actual cost, the younger, healthier, lower risk individuals switched to the 
cheaper plan.  When the premiums were adjusted the next year the departure of the 
low risks raised the premiums, driving more low risks out of the PPO until, within 
two years of the initial premium adjustment, it was disbanded.  Id. at 13-14. 
 
147 Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life Insurance, supra note 9, at 47.  
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high-risk individuals to hide health problems.148  It is clear why high 
mortality helped drive up the price of industrial life insurance so 
drastically.149  The only protection against this is the vigilance of the agent, 
and the low caps on each industrial life insurance policy.150 
On the other extreme, group life insurance policyholders must have 
a unifying attribute; states will not allow a group to obtain insurance if that 
is the group’s only purpose.151 This attribute may compensate for over-
consumption of insurance by high-risk individuals.  
Because of the structure of life insurance, its costs, and federal 
laws that apply to employment, group life offers many more protections 
against discrimination, while also supplying competition against industrial 
life insurance.  This competitive replacement for insurance was certainly 
part of the reason why industrial life insurance died without much social 
pressure and legislative action.  
 
                                                                                                                          
 
148 Id. at 47.  There is usually a clause allowing the insurance company to 
rescind the policy if the applicant lied about the condition of their health.  DAVIS, 
supra note 13, at 34. 
 
149 Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life Insurance, supra note 9, at 50  (“The 
mortality rate of industrial policyholders is indeed 20 per cent higher than that of 
ordinary life insurance policyholders.”). 
 
150 One argument against the risk of adverse selection is that premiums for life 
insurance fall as more insurance is purchased.  Siegelman, supra note 145, at 1280 
(citing John Cawley & Thomas Philipson, An Empirical Examination of 
Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 827, 841 (1999)).  
This is counter intuitive since high-risk individuals should be the ones over-
consuming, and reducing their rate of consumption would drive up the cost of 
insurance.  Id.  However, industrial life insurance does not offer this feature, but 
demands that applicants purchase multiple policies to reach their desired level of 
protection.  Willis v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, No. 400CV323PB, 2001 WL 
34403088, at *2 (N.D. Miss.  May 31, 2001); Justin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 
00-2208, 2000 WL 1741858, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2000).  While this does not 
conform to a prediction that rationing to avoid adverse selection would mean 
increasing the price of subsequent policies, it shows a trend toward reducing the 
risk of over consumption by high-risk individuals. 
 
151 RUSS, supra note 18, at § 7:7. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
None of these theories are entirely satisfactory, but taken together 
they form a rough understanding of what happened; An inefficient product 
was driven from the market when its costs grew and its advantages were 
lost. 
Social repugnance is certainly a cost, and while most insurance 
products were able to adapt by ending race based underwriting, industrial 
life insurance could not.  In some instances, such as the use of redlining 
and credit scores, the insurance industry has been willing to pay the social 
cost of an unpopular but profitable tool.152  In those instances the only thing 
that stopped the industry, was legislation and legal action.153  In the case of 
race based underwriting the industry may have realized that racially 
discriminatory pricing and practices were becoming less and less useful 
while their social repugnance rose.  There was no reason to wait for the 
inevitable social backlash.  When the majority of the insurance industry 
abandoned their use of race in both their products and their hiring practices 
it took away industrial life insurance’s monopoly on the African-American 
market.154  Industrial life insurance’s inefficiency was only tolerated 
because consumers had few realistic alternatives.155  Once that reason fell 
away the product did as well. 
One of the lessons that the death of industrial life insurance can 
teach is the inefficiency of racism.  When racist practices disappear we 
expect that it is the result of a social or political effort to rub out the 
offensive practice.  In this case, whatever economic advantage industrial 
life insurance had slowly dwindled without much of a concerted effort and 
died when it was confronted with more efficient products.  While there was 
some social repugnance it was similar to other inquiries and outrages that 
                                                                                                                 
152 See supra notes 117-118, at 27 and accompanying text.  The perfect 
example of this is the life insurance industry’s discrimination against the elderly.  
The elderly are certainly a vulnerable minority, but no amount of social 
repugnance could stop them from using an incredibly accurate underwriting 
criterion.    
 
153 E.g., supra note 118, at 27.  
154 The best evidence of this is the collapse of African-American owned life 
insurance companies, who primarily provided industrial life insurance, after 
desegregation.  See supra notes 28, 34, at 8-9 and accompanying text. 
 
155 See supra notes 18-20, at 5-6 and accompanying text. 
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industrial life insurance had weathered in the past.  While there was some 
legislation, its effect was limited and probably unnecessary.  The social 
changes that closed the mortality gap and increased the number of African-
Americans enrolled in group life insurance plans were probably as 
significant as any concerted effort to end industrial life insurance directly. 
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Chart IV: Face Value of the Group and Industrial Life Insurance
 In Force for the Period of 1940-60 (000,000 omitted)
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Chart III: The Number of Group and Industrial Life Insurance Policies Outstanding (000,000 Omitted)
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Chart V: Face Value of the Group and Industrial Life Insurance in Force for 
the Period of 1900-75 (000,000 omitted) 
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INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Hazel Beh* 
Amanda M. Willis ** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Association of American Law Schools Insurance Law 
Section’s 2008 meeting was devoted to an examination of insurance 
intermediaries.  Intermediaries play a critical middleman role in the 
distribution and operations of insurance.  Besides bringing insureds and 
insurers together, intermediaries also provide advice to insureds, gather 
underwriting information for insurers, and generally help facilitate the 
relationship between insured and insurers all the way through the claims 
process.  Despite the critical importance of intermediaries, judicial 
decisions considering the duties, obligations, and loyalties of intermediaries 
have left the law muddied and insureds largely unprotected.  
In 2004, the New York Attorney General launched an investigation 
into whether the common compensation schemes offered to insurance 
intermediaries by insurers had induced intermediaries to improperly steer 
their clients’ insurance business to those insurers paying the most lucrative 
commissions, without regard to their client’s interests.  New York’s 
investigation raised the question of whether the longstanding practice of 
paying brokers contingent commissions undermined broker loyalty and 
tainted the broker-insured relationship.  The investigation and its aftermath 
revealed the vulnerabilities of insureds to the undisclosed practices of 
insurers and intermediaries.  Impoverished case law on the loyalties and 
duties owed by intermediaries to insureds, together with ignorance about 
the conflicts raised by compensation and contingent commissions likely 
exacerbated the problem.  Thus, the time to look more closely at 
intermediaries was long overdue.        
                                                                                                                 
*  Hazel Glenn Beh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of 
Hawai‘i, William S. Richardson School of Law.   
 
**  Amanda M. Willis, Class of 2008, University of Hawaii, William S. 
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This article explores the role of the intermediary in the context of 
insurance in order to introduce reflections on intermediaries presented by 
Professors Jeffrey Stempel, Daniel Schwarcz, and others at the 2008 AALS 
program.  Daniel Schwarcz considers the problems of compensation 
schemes in the context of both commercial and personal lines of 
insurance.1  Jeffrey Stempel examines the relatively unexamined role of 
intermediaries employed after the formation of the insurance contract, 
including so-called independent claims adjusters and managing general 
agents.2  
Part II discusses the various methodologies employed to 
understand the legal relationship of intermediaries to insurers and insureds.  
It concludes that principles of agency law do not provide a particularly 
helpful framework to understand the legal relationships among insured, 
insurer, and their intermediary because the intermediary’s role, even in a 
single transaction, is inconstant.    
Part III discusses judicial treatment of claims against 
intermediaries.  It finds the outcomes are fact-driven and unpredictable; it 
is often difficult for courts to determine to whom an intermediary owes its 
duties.  It observes that courts frequently impose a relatively low standard 
of care toward insureds upon intermediaries.  The majority of courts apply 
a low standard of care even to those intermediaries who are deemed 
brokers working for the insured, and captive and independent agents have 
even lesser obligations.  The judicial treatment of intermediaries is out of 
step with the pro-insured treatment courts generally adopt in disputes 
between insurers and insureds.   
Part IV then briefly considers whether contingent commissions 
paid by insurers to intermediaries add further mischief to already confused 
legal relationships.  It introduces two views to be considered.   
Professor Daniel Schwarcz contends that dangers indeed exist, 
particularly the temptations of improper steering, and that disclosure of 
intermediary compensation schemes to insureds is not sufficiently 
                                                                                                                 
1  Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” 
in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 878 (forthcoming).  
 
2 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Other Intermediaries:  The Increasingly 
Anachronistic Immunity of Managing General Agents and Independent Claims 
Adjusters, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 741 (forthcoming).  
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protective.3  Schwarcz posits that even if “consumers understand their 
intermediaries face a potential conflict” they cannot on their own “police 
the quality of the advice they receive from their intermediaries or … 
calculate the expected costs of this limitation.”4  Schwarz believes that 
disclosure is insufficient even in the commercial insurance market with 
sophisticated insureds, because even equipped with that disclosure, 
insureds will lack a means to protect themselves.5  Schwarcz proposes 
methods to reduce or eliminate the conflicts raised by compensation, 
including perhaps by moving away from differential compensation in the 
consumer insurance markets altogether.6   
On the other hand, insurance insider Sean Fitzpatrick contends that 
we should not abandon the contingent commission scheme, rather that 
adding the safeguards of mandatory disclosure of compensation practices 
should suffice.7  Fitzpatrick argues that the incidents of improper steering 
and the conflicts raised by contingent commissions are exaggerated.8  
Moreover, he views contingent commission schemes as beneficial to 
consumers, because they encourage intermediaries to consider “long-term” 
performance of insurers.9 
                                                                                                                 
3  Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent 
Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 324 (2007) (concluding that 
contingent commissions should be banned in the consumer market and possibly 
banned in the commercial market as well).  
  
4  Id. at 323. 
 
5  Id. at 325-26. 
 
6  Schwarcz, Differential Compensation, supra note 1.  
 
7  Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to Market 
Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3067-71 (2006) (calling for voluntary 
disclosure of compensation mechanisms). Sean M. Fitzpatrick is employed within 
the insurance industry.  He currently holds a Senior Vice President position with 
The Chubb Corporation. 
 
8  Id. at 3061-62. 
 
9  Id. at 3061. 
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Part V briefly comments on Jeffrey Stempel’s viewpoint on 
outsourced independent adjusters and managing general agents – those 
intermediaries employed by insurers to facilitate insurance functions after 
the policy has been issued.  He notes that bottom line interests have made 
outsourcing these insurance tasks more common.  Stempel cautions that 
although these intermediaries carry out important functions associated with 
insurance, the lack of regulation and a lack of viable legal theories 
(particularly bad faith) against downstream intermediaries leaves them 
largely immunized for their own errors.  Stempel argues that expanding tort 
liability to outsourced adjusters and administrators will improve 
accountability, advance public policy, and enhance the effective operation 
of the insurance market.10 
Discussions about the legal status of intermediaries, the conflicts of 
interest they encounter, and their potential liability to insureds has been 
little explored or understood.  Their role in the marketing, processing, and 
management of insurance is vital and increasing.   
   
I. CLASSIFICATION OF INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Insurers have access to a wide “variety of marketing channels.”11  
These channels include direct marketing to buyers, through means such as 
soliciting by Internet, mail, and company employees.12   To a large extent, 
however, insurers rely on insurance intermediaries of various kinds to sell 
their products.13   
In direct writing, the insurer does not utilize an intermediary, but 
engages in mass merchandising of its own insurance products.14  Direct 
                                                                                                                 
10  Stempel, supra note 2, at 741.  
 
11  See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance 
Intermediaries, 73 J. Risk & Ins. 359, 360 (2006).  See also Background on 
Insurance Intermediaries, 2004 Ins. Info. Inst. 4 , available at 
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/774206_1_0/InsuranceIntermediaries.doc. 
 
12  See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360; Background on Insurance 
Intermediaries, supra note 11, at 4.  
 
13 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360 (stating “the vast majority 
of commercial [property and casualty] insurance sales involves an intermediary”). 
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writers are employees of the insurer, working as the insurer’s sales force 
and representing only the insurance company.  With a direct writer, there is 
often no face-to-face contact with a prospective insured, and no local agent.  
Instead, communications are through employees, and via phone, mail, fax, 
and Internet.  Direct writers are simply the insurer’s own sales force. 
Often, however, insurers use intermediaries to sell insurance, and 
to bring insurers and prospects together. These intermediaries perform an 
essential service in the insurance market that enables both the insured and 
the insurer to transact business.  Intermediaries may be labeled as “captive 
agents,” agents that principally sell the products of a single company; 
“independent agents” that typically sell for several insurers;15 and brokers, 
that are engaged by insureds to procure insurance on their behalf.  Brokers 
“tend to service larger and more complicated business insurance needs.”16  
Large brokers, with a global reach, are “highly concentrated” and “the bulk 
of commercial [property and casualty] lines for the large and international 
buyer segment of the market is placed by a small number of brokers for 
each of whom it is their biggest source of revenue.”17   
While there are numerous ways to classify intermediaries, each 
merely describes aspects of their role.  Commentator Sean Fitzpatrick 
observes, “[i]ndeed, one can hardly locate an in-depth legal analysis of the 
broker-agent distinction that does not feature words such as ‘blurry’ or 
‘cloudy.’”18  Determining what intermediaries do and for whom they work 
has not leant itself to easy answers; definitive characterizations have been 
illusive.  The intermediary’s relationship with the insurer and the insured 
must often be determined on a case-by-case basis.   
Among the ways to characterize intermediaries are a) by the 
exclusivity-independence they have established in their contractual 
relations with insureds and insurers; b) by the extent to which the insurer’s 
mode of market distribution utilizes intermediaries; and c) by principles of 
                                                                                                                          
14  Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of 
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & ECON. 637, 638, 640 (1996). 
 
15  Robert H. Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law 64 (3d ed. 2002).   
 
16  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361. 
 
17  Id. at 363, 367.  
 
18  Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3054. 
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agency law, including the nature of the agent’s authority vis-à-vis the 
insured or insurer.  However, as described below, while these classification 
exercises may help us understand the role of the intermediary, each does 
little to help us understand the legal relationship between the intermediary, 
the insurer, and the insured.  
Characterization of intermediaries by the independence or 
exclusivity they maintain is often unsatisfactory because the actual 
relationship an intermediary has with insurers and insureds may be less 
categorical.19  Many are neither strictly exclusive agents working for an 
insurer nor strictly independent agents working for an insured.  For 
example, a “captive” agent is one who purportedly sells for a single insurer 
and ought to be the most clearly an agent of the insurer.  Yet a captive 
agent may sell insurance products of other companies in some 
circumstances.20  Moreover, by conduct directed toward the insured, a 
captive agent may transform from an agent of the insurer to one for the 
insured in a particular case.21  
Just as captives may not be strictly captive, “independent” agents 
are in fact be less independent than that label implies.  Although agents are 
called “independent,” implying that they are free from ties to any particular 
insurance company, independent agents usually sell only for a handful of 
insurers with whom they have agency appointment contracts.22  
Importantly, although they have the independence to place insurance with 
                                                                                                                 
19  See, e.g., Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla. App. 1990) (whether 
an agent works for insured or insurer presented a triable issue of fact). 
 
20  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361.  Captive agents may be 
employees or independent contractors.  Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 637-
38 (1996). 
 
21 See Campbell v. Valley State Agency, 407 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Minn. App. 
1987) (“agent may undertake an affirmative duty by entering into a special 
relationship with an insured”). 
 
22  In 2000, “the average independent insurance agency … represented 7.3 
personal lines insurers, 6.7 commercial lines insurers, and 4.8 life and health 
carriers.”  JERRY, supra note 15, at 64. 
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multiple insurers, they are not necessarily agents for the insured.23  
Independent agents are vested with authority to perform certain acts for the 
insurer and are paid commissions by the insurer based upon agreements 
with particular insurers.24   
Brokers, whose name implies that they work for the insured and 
negotiate contracts on the insured’s behalf,25 are also not as independent as 
their name implies.  Brokers who purport to work for the insured also may 
“place a significant portion of their business” under agency appointment 
contracts.26  These contracts vest authority in brokers to perform certain 
services for the insurer.  This may be so even where the broker also charges 
the insured a separate fee for their services.27  Thus, brokers in fact may be 
working on behalf of both the insured and the insurer in a particular 
transaction.28   
Modes of market distribution may also help to characterize the role 
of the intermediary.  Modes of distribution tend to sort by the nature of the 
lines sold.29  Personal lines, sold to consumers, are more frequently 
distributed through direct marketing by insurance employees or through 
                                                                                                                 
23  See Watkins v. HRRW, LLC, No. 3:05-00279, 2006 WL 3327659, at *7 
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2006) (observing that independent agents may be agent of 
the insured, but also for the insurer for some functions). 
 
24  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 374-78. 
 
25  The dictionary defines a broker as “an agent middleman who for a fee or 
commission negotiates contracts of purchase and sale… between buyers and 
sellers…”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 281 (3d ed. 
1981). 
 
26  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361.  See generally Md. Cas. Co. v. 
J.M. Foster, 414 P.2d 672 (N.M. 1966) (agency agreements authorized 
independent agent to bind and place insurance with four companies). 
 
27  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 376-79 (observing that fees charged 
to insured clients are “offset by commissions”). 
 
28  See Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla. 1998) (“it is 
equally well settled that an insurance broker may act in the dual capacity of broker 
for insured and agent of the insurer”). 
 
29  See JERRY, supra note 15, at 64. 
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captive and exclusive agencies.30  Commercial lines are more often 
distributed through so-called independent agents and brokers.31 Notably, 
some insurers now market through several distribution channels, “blurring 
the boundaries that used to exist among insurers based upon distribution.”32  
Intermediaries may also be characterized by agency principles, 
particularly by the intermediary’s relationship to its principal, and the level 
of authority vested in them.  The problem here is that insurers vest varying 
degrees of authority in agents, defying classification by their title.  A 
general agent, enjoying the broadest authority on behalf of an insurer, “is 
authorized by an insurer to accept risks, to agree upon and settle the terms 
of insurance policies, to issue and renew policies, and to modify or waive 
the terms of existing policies.”33  “The powers of such an agent are 
coextensive with the business entrusted to his care, authorizing him to act 
for the principal in all matters coming within the usual and ordinary scope 
and character of such business.”34   
Insurers conduct much of their business through the use of 
intermediaries with more limited authority.  These limited authority agents 
                                                                                                                 
30  Id. (characterizing captive agents and insurance marketing through insurer 
employees directly to buyers as examples of direct marketing). 
 
31  See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 362 (noting that independent 
agencies and brokers “control 32 percent of personal lines business” and 68 
percent of commercial lines of property and casualty.); Regan & Tennyson, supra 
note 14, at 653 (observing the dominance of exclusive agencies in personal lines 
and dominance of independent agents in commercial lines).  More specifically,  
Firms which use tied sales [exclusive agents] agents sell nearly 80 percent of 
life-health insurance but hold only a 45 percent market share in property-liability 
insurance; the remainder of each of these markets is sold by firms using 
independent sales agents. The distribution of market shares by organizational form 
is also systematic within more narrow classes of insurance: for example, 
independent agency firms sell only 35 percent of private passenger auto insurance 
but control 65 percent of the commercial auto insurance market.   
Id. at 638. 
 
32  JERRY, supra note 15, at 65. 
 
33  Douglas Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL 
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 3 (2004). 
 
34  Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 491 So. 2d 872, 874 (Ala. 1985).  
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are “authorized to act for the principal only in a particular transaction or in 
a particular way.”35  Agents with limited authority to bind insurers are 
characterized as “special agents,” and include “soliciting agents,” who are 
not authorized to bind the insurer, but are authorized only “to solicit 
insurance, to take applications for insurance and forward them to the 
company or its general agent, to deliver policies once issued by the insurer, 
and to collect premiums.”36  Although agents with limited authority cannot 
bind the principal beyond the scope of that authority, the principal may still 
be liable for the agent’s conduct, for example, when the agent commits 
fraud under ‘respondeat superior’ principles.37    
Characterizing the loyalties and duties of intermediaries by 
examining the agent-principal relationship is imperfect at best, because 
whether the insured or the insurer serves as the principal can depend on the 
actual tasks performed.  Intermediaries, both independent and exclusive, 
perform valuable services that are desired and beneficial to both 
prospective insureds and insurers.38  Thus, “[a]lthough an independent 
agent or broker is normally an agent for the insured, for some purposes he 
may be an agent for the insurer as well.”39  Determining for whom the 
                                                                                                                 
35  Id.  
 
36  Richmond, supra note 33, at 4. 
 
37  Washington, 491 So. 2d at 874-75. 
 
38  Intermediaries can be characterized as “two-sided firms.”  Cummins & 
Doherty, supra note 11, at 361 n.3.   
Three conditions must be present in a two-sided market: (1) two distinct 
groups of customers; (2) the value obtained by one group increases with the size of 
the other; and (3) an intermediary connects the two. Coordination of two-sided 
markets requires that this intermediary or "middleman" create a platform for the 
groups to interact. The intermediary must ensure the existence of a critical mass on 
both sides.  
Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)application of the 
Economics of Two-sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, at 517.  As a 
result, each side of the market intermediaries bring together may to some extent 
subsidize the other.  Id. 
 
39 Washington, 491 So. 2d at 875.  See also Young v. Allstate, 812 N.E.2d 
741, 752 (Ill. App. 2004) (“An independent broker may act as agent of the insurer 
and insured in certain circumstances.”). 
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intermediary works in any given transaction at any point in time involves a 
complicated factual inquiry.40  Determining for whom an intermediary 
works may also require a factual analysis of how the intermediary was 
engaged in this particular transaction.41     
Insurers utilize intermediaries not only to sell their products, but 
also to gather information utilized during the underwriting process, and to 
provide services on behalf of the insurer to insureds during the coverage 
period.42  As Regan and Tennyson observe, to ensure profitability, 
“insurer[s] must devise an effective method of classifying applicants.”43  
Generally, when underwriting requires gathering more sophisticated or 
complex risk information, insurers utilize the services of independent 
agents rather than captive agents.44  
                                                                                                                 
40 See Richmond, supra note 33, at 7-9.  Richmond comments that brokers 
“may be an agent of the insured for purposes of obtaining coverage” but an agent 
of the insurer for purposes such as “issuing policies, issuing certificates of 
insurance, collecting premiums, and the like.”  Id. at 7-8. 
 
41 See Young, 812 N.E.2d at 752 (quoting Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Gitelson, 801 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (identifying four factors to 
determine to whom a broker owes a duty as “1) who first set the agent in motion; 
2) who controlled the agent’s action; 3) who paid the agent; and 4) whose interests 
the agent was protecting”).) 
 
42 Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 638-39.  As Regan & Tennyson 
explain the agent’s value in underwriting: 
 
Although insurance sales agents do not typically participate in the 
formal underwriting process, they frequently play an important role in 
applicant risk assessment. The agent is the first contact the insurer has 
with a potential policyholder and may be able to obtain information 
about the consumer which would be difficult or costly for the firm to 
verify. It is widely acknowledged that agents often employ subjective 
criteria in evaluating insurance applicants. The agent's information may 
then be used by the insurer in the decision regarding whether to insure, 
or under what conditions to insure, an applicant. 
Id. at 639. 
 
43 Id. at 638. 
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Prospective insureds also benefit from the expertise and labors of 
intermediaries.  A buyer, whether sophisticated or not, would be hard 
pressed to intelligently compare characteristics of insurance products 
beyond the premium charged without the expertise of an intermediary.  For 
example, nuances in policy language, insurer solvency, claims practices, 
and reputation of the insurer are matters for which even sophisticated 
insureds need the counsel of intermediaries. “[T]he buyer of insurance 
faces the daunting task of first deciding what sort of insurance protection is 
needed given the risks faced, and then comparing policies offering 
alternative coverage at different prices from several insurers with different 
levels of credit risk and reputations for claims settlement and policyholder 
services.”45  Buyers, thus, turn to intermediaries to “match buyers with 
insurers who have the skill, capacity, risk appetite, and financial strength to 
underwrite the risk, and then help the client select from competing 
offers.”46   
Despite their vital functions in the insurance market, the 
inconstancy and vagueness of their legally prescribed allegiances is 
problematic.  In any given intermediary relationship, the intermediary, the 
insured, and the insurer cannot be certain for whom the intermediary is 
working.  Each time, ad hoc, and without definitiveness, courts must ask if 
the intermediary was working in their own self-interest, the interest of the 
insured, or the interest of the insurer.   
 
II. TREATMENT OF INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES IN THE 
COURTS 
 
A. THE INTERMEDIARY’S STANDARD OF CARE  
 
Although the relationships between insurer, intermediary, and 
insured are complex and not easily categorized, cases have frequently 
                                                                                                                          
44 Id. at 663.  The authors explain that the advantage of utilizing independent 
agents “arises because the independent agent’s multiple placement opportunities 
and ownership of policy expirations reinforce his incentives to participate in risk 
assessment, thereby lowering the insurer’s marginal cost of obtaining agent 
information.”  Id. 
 
45 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 359-60. 
 
46 Id. at 360. 
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adopted a relatively simplistic approach in disputes between insureds and 
intermediaries.  In litigation between intermediaries and their insureds, 
little judicial attention is paid to the peculiar vulnerabilities of insureds, 
even though these same courts have developed special protective rules to 
protect insureds in the context of suits between insureds and insurers.   
 Professor James Fischer, explaining why insurance contracts 
traditionally have been judged contractually by special rules, explains that 
insurers enjoy such a uniquely superior position in the relationship that it is 
proper to treat the insurer-insured contract differently than any other.47  
There are a variety of justifications for special rules.  To name a few, 
insurers are repeat players with greater knowledge and sophistication about 
insurance than consumers.  Insurers understand more about risk and about 
the nuances and complexities of coverage and non-coverage in the context 
of endless factual uncertainties that may arise.  Insurance contracts are 
super-adhesionary; insurers have unilaterally and carefully drafted the 
insurance policy, and are unwilling to negotiate the language of the 
document.  Most importantly, Fischer explains, insurers hold substantially 
more information than insureds about nearly every aspect of insurance, and 
can use this asymmetric possession of information to their advantage.48  
Reasonable expectations, contra proferentum, estoppel, and most notably 
the tort of bad faith are all judicial inventions aimed at leveling the playing 
field for insureds.49  Likewise, for the other important intermediary in the 
third-party insurance context, the defense attorney, courts have created 
extraordinary safeguards to protect insureds.50    
                                                                                                                 
47  See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special 
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1049-50 
(1992).  
 
48  Id. at 1050-51. 
 
49  See Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 85, 85-86 (2004) (discussing justifications for pro-
insured canons of contract interpretation, “including the adhesive quality of the 
insurance product, the parties’ relative bargaining power, the relation of trust, the 
parties’ asymmetric access to information, the unique nature of insurance, and the 
quasi-public nature of the insurance industry”).  
 
50   See, e.g., San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 
208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing insured separate and 
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The imbalance of knowledge, power, and sophistication that exists 
between insureds and insurers is apparent between intermediaries and 
insureds as well.  Intermediaries are more like insurers than insureds:  they 
are repeat players in the insurance industry; they are equipped with 
expertise, experience and a sophisticated knowledge of insurance; they 
market products that insureds do not understand; they can exploit this 
asymmetric possession of information to their advantage.  Simply put, 
insureds have no more savvy, knowledge, or power in the relationship with 
their intermediary than they do with their insurer.  
Despite the imbalances in the relationship between insureds and 
intermediaries, case law often does not impose a particularly high standard 
of care upon insurance intermediaries.  Usually, courts do not regard these 
intermediaries as fiduciaries and they are merely held liable under a 
negligence theory.  For some courts, it is the insured who bears most of the 
risks associated with imperfect communications or failure to purchase 
appropriate coverage.  “[T]he majority of courts have placed the burden on 
the client to know potential coverages and ask for a particular coverage” 
rather than “requiring the agent to clarify the request and educate the 
client.”51 
A few courts have flirted with the notion that intermediaries, 
particularly independent brokers, may be fiduciaries, on compelling facts52 
                                                                                                                          
independent counsel at insurer’s expense in instances of conflict).  Even 
jurisdictions that do not require so-called “Cumis counsel” establish enhanced 
obligations to govern both the attorney hired by the insurer and the insurer itself.  
See Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1156-57 (Haw. 1998); see also Tank 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986).  
 
51  Daniel Gregory Sakall, Note, Can the Public Really Count on Insurance 
Agents to Advise Them?  A Critique of the “Special Circumstances” Test, 42 
ARIZ. L. REV. 991, 1002 (2000). 
 
52  See, e.g., Watkins v. HRRW, LLC, No. 3:05-00279, 2006 WL 3327659 at 
*8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2006)  (a broker may be a fiduciary “if Plaintiff 
establishes that: 1) that the transaction was not an ordinary arm’s length, business 
transaction; and 2) that the particular facts establish a confidential relationship had 
been established” and that to establish a confidential relationship the plaintiff  must 
have “reposed confidence in the agent who exercised dominion and influence to 
act for the plaintiff’s benefit”). 
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or for particular tasks.53  Only a handful of jurisdictions have characterized 
the broker relationship generally as fiduciary.54  Arizona has adopted a 
professional standard of care, that requires brokers to “exercise reasonable 
care, skill and diligence in carrying out the agent’s duties . . . .”55  
In spite of a handful of notable attempts to classify insurance 
intermediaries as either professionals or fiduciaries, in most cases absent a 
so-called “special relationship,” the only duty the intermediary actually 
                                                                                                                 
53  See, e.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. PRG Brokerage, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2272 
(GHB), 2004 WL 35439 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2004) (noting that in New York, a 
broker is a fiduciary in narrow circumstances, specifically collecting and receiving 
premiums); see also Philips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 325, 
327 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (insurance agent is a fiduciary for the insured “with 
respect to procuring insurance, correctly naming the insured in the policy, and 
correctly advising the insured about the nature and extent of his coverage” but has 
no fiduciary duty to advise insured in the absence of a request). 
 
54  Illinois courts view the insured-broker relationship as fiduciary.  However, 
legislation limits broker liability.  See DOD Tech. v. Mesirow Ins. Serv., 887 
N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008) (insured stated a cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty for alleged misappropriation of premiums, an exception to statutory 
immunity).  In New Jersey, a broker’s duties have been characterized as fiduciary:   
Further, as a result of the special nature of their relationship, an insurance 
broker owes a fiduciary duty towards its principal: 
 
Any individual seeking insurance should be able to rely on the expertise of the 
agent, regardless of the prior contract between the parties.  The fiduciary nature of 
such a relationship should not depend solely upon the length of the relationship.  
Because of the increasing complexity of the insurance industry and the specialized 
knowledge required to understand all of intricacies, the relationship between an 
insurance agent and a client is often a fiduciary one. 
  
In re Payroll Exp. Corp., Bankruptcy No. 92-B-43150 (CB), 2005 WL 
2438444 at *17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005) (summarizing New Jersey law 
and quoting Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.). 
 
55 Sw. Auto. Painting and Body Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 P.2d 1268, 1271 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).  See Shane Ham, Arizona Case Note, Webb v. Gittlen: 
Assignability of Professional Negligence Claims Against Insurance Agents, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 650-51 (2008) (observing that Arizona is in a minority of 
jurisdictions elevating agents to a professional standard of care). 
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owes the insured is to act reasonably to procure the specific policy the 
insured requests.56  It has proven difficult for insureds to establish that a 
special relationship in fact existed.  “A special relationship in the context of 
insurance requires more than the ordinary insurer-insured relationship.”57  
The agent must take some affirmative step to elevate the relationship, such 
as “hold[ing] himself or herself out as a highly skilled insurance expert, and 
the insured relies to his detriment on that expertise.”58  It may “also be 
demonstrated by a long term relationship of confidence, in which the agent 
or broker assumes the duty to render advice, or has been asked to provide 
advice, and the advisor is compensated accordingly, above and beyond the 
premiums customarily earned.”59 
 Lewis-Williamson v. Grange Mutual Insurance Co.60 illustrates 
judicial reticence to find a special relationship.  There, the plaintiff, a 78-
year-old homeowner, had insured her home through Grange Mutual since 
1981.61  Beginning in 1991, plaintiff purchased her insurance through 
Clute, an agent who wrote “property insurance exclusively for Grange 
Insurance unless Grange Insurance d[id] not offer the requested insurance, 
in which case Clute [wa]s authorized to seek coverage from another 
insurance company.”62  In 1996, when plaintiff’s policy limits were 
$200,000, she attended a Grange Hall meeting63 and discussed her 
                                                                                                                 
56  Michael Childress et al., A Matter of Trust, 2005 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 30, 
32; Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability:  Crossing 
the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 242 (2002); Richmond, supra note 
33, at 16. 
 
57  Sadler v. Loomis Co., 776 A.2d 25, 35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
 
58  Id. 
 
59  Id. 
 
60 39 P.3d 947 (Or. App. 2000). 
 
61 Id. at 948. 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Grange Hall is a national social and community centered association for 
farmers with local affiliates in rural communities.  Importantly, Grange Mutual is 
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insurance with Clute after the meeting.  According to the court, Grange 
Insurance was only available to Grange members and Clute discussed 
insurance needs with members after the Grange meetings.   
Plaintiff asked Clute to increase her insurance “to at least double” 
and that she wanted “replacement cost.”64  Focusing on the “casual nature 
of the relationship,” the court observed that Clute told plaintiff he would 
“stop by,” but did not make a formal appointment with her.65  Thereafter, 
Clute did stop by when she was not there, and examined only the exterior 
of her home.  Intimidated by a large dog, Clute did not fully inspect the 
home.66  Nevertheless, Clute did provide the plaintiff with advice.  “Based 
on his exterior inspection and a telephone conversation with plaintiff, Clute 
recommended to plaintiff that she increase her coverage on the residence to 
$510,000.”67  Plaintiff followed his recommendation.   
In 1998, plaintiff’s residence was completely destroyed and 
replacement costs were estimated at $700,000, well in excess of the insured 
value.68  Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Clute, and against 
Grange on vicarious liability.  The court granted summary judgment in 
favor of both defendants, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.69   
The court explained that, absent a special relationship, “an 
insurance agent acting as an agent for the insured owes a general duty to 
exercise reasonable skill and care in providing the requested insurance.”70  
                                                                                                                          
an insurer that focuses on the insurance needs of rural and farm communities.  
HOOVER’S BASIC CO. REC., GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY (2009); see 
also Malcolm Trupp, Locally, Granges Thriving, THE REGISTER GUARD, May 20, 
2008, at A7. 
 
64 Lewis-Williamson, 39 P.3d at 950. 
 
65 Id.  
 
66 Id. at 948. 
 
67  Id. 
 
68  Id. at 949. 
 
69  Id. at 948-49. 
 
70  Lewis-Williamson, 39 P.3d at 949. 
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The court acknowledged that plaintiff placed trust in Clute to advise her, 
but distinguished between the factual trust plaintiff placed in Clute and 
trust establishing a legal obligation to act in her interest.  “The fact that she 
trusted him and deferred to his judgment does not make him her agent or 
show that he was acting on her behalf.”71  The court continued, “[a]lthough 
plaintiff trusted Clute to take care of her insurance needs, there is no 
evidence that she had reason to expect, other than through her trusting 
nature, that he would work on her economic behalf.”72  The court noted that 
as a captive agent, Clute was Grange’s agent, not hers, and had “been 
available to her for her convenience by virtue of his presence at Grange 
Hall meetings, but that was for the economic benefit of Grange and himself 
and not plaintiff.”73  
The result is troubling.  A 78-year-old homeowner purchased an 
inadequate amount of insurance through a mutual insurer who particularly 
catered to rural clients, whose captive agent had purposely cultivated a 
lengthy and trusted relationship, and who affirmatively offered faulty 
advice.  Yet in the court’s view the insured was not reasonable to trust 
Clute’s advice.74    
                                                                                                                 
71  Id. at 950. 
 
72  Id. 
 
73  Id. 
 
74  The plaintiff would have been better off if Clute had advised her to obtain 
an appraisal of the cost of replacement, rather than to suggest an amount.  Had he 
not wanted her to follow his advice, he could have easily warned her that it was 
merely his own personal opinion or better yet, not rendered any advice at all. 
Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency, 583 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003), is equally disturbing.  Canales, a customer of independent agent Wilson for 
several years, sought automobile insurance to cover his vehicle in both the United 
States and Mexico.  Canales did not speak English, and brought an interpreter with 
him to the insurance agency.  After the insured vehicle was destroyed in Mexico, 
the insurer denied the claim because driving in Mexico was excluded from 
coverage.  Canales filed suit against Wilson claiming Wilson did not procure the 
proper insurance for Canales.  At summary judgment, the fact of whether Wilson 
expressly said the automobile policy would cover trips to Mexico was hotly 
contested.  Both the interpreter and Canales claimed Canales requested Mexico 
coverage and that Wilson said the policy would cover driving in Mexico, while 
Wilson denied the alleged statements.  Id. at 204.  On the other hand, it was 
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B. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE 
PRODUCT AND CURRENT STANDARDS FOR INTERMEDIARY 
LIABILITY  
 
Lewis-Williamson illustrates the majority rule that, absent “special 
circumstances,” little is owed by an insurance intermediary to the insured.  
It further illustrates judicial reluctance to find that special relationship, even 
on quite compelling facts.  This approach does not appropriately account 
for the level of trust commonly placed in intermediaries or the lack of 
sophistication and expertise common to insureds.75  Insurance 
intermediaries are generally viewed as a sales force for insurers and 
“something less than professionals”76 by the courts,77 despite the 
importance and complexity of the product they sell.78  While courts may 
                                                                                                                          
undisputed that Canales, who did not read English, did not read the policy issued 
nor have his interpreter read it to him.  Canales also claimed that he relied on 
Wilson to obtain appropriate insurance, that he trusted Wilson to advise him, 
particularly because of their prior dealings and because Canales was 
unsophisticated in matters of insurance.  Id. at 204-205.  Despite the contested 
facts regarding what was said, Wilson obtained summary judgment, because the 
language of the policy issued was clear and Canales had a duty to read the policy 
or have someone read it to him.  Id.  The court observed, just because “two 
people…have come to repose trust and confidence in each other as a result of such 
dealings is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant a finding that a confidential 
relationship exists between them.”  Id. at 205 (quotation marks omitted).   
  
75 The special circumstances exception that many jurisdictions adhere to 
requires the plaintiff insured to establish something more than an ordinary broker-
insured relationship, i.e., a factual basis for a heightened standard of care imposed 
on the intermediary.  See Richmond, supra note 33, at 27-28 (describing instances 
where courts have found a special relationship).  Yet, even when confronted with 
special circumstances, courts seem reluctant to find the exception applies.  As 
Richmond observes, “special relationships are not lightly created.” Id. at 27.    
 
76  Sakall, supra note 51, at 1004. 
 
77  Id. at 993. 
 
78  Sakall, surveying approaches adopted by courts observed that the standard 
of care set by courts is inappropriately low, and the special circumstances test 
unwieldy.  He argued that an Arizona approach is preferable.  Under Arizona 
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not regard intermediaries as professionals, intermediaries commonly 
market themselves as professionals with expert knowledge that consumers 
can trust.79     
Paradoxically, courts frequently have imposed unrealistically high 
expectations on insureds in these transactions:  to read and understand an 
insurance policy, and to understand and communicate precisely their own 
insurance needs.80  Insureds, both commercial and individual, are expected 
to carefully research the purchase of insurance as they would the purchase 
of any commodity, including checking with multiple sources and 
comparing prices and benefits.81  Caveat emptor applies to the procurement 
                                                                                                                          
caselaw, Sakall explains that the duty of agents may include a duty to advise.  He 
writes: 
The Arizona approach is preferable to the majority’s “special circumstances” 
test for a number of reasons. First, agents’ duties do not turn on whether they are 
company agents or brokers. All insurance agents are held to a general professional 
duty. Second, an agent’s liability turns not upon some dictate by the court but, 
rather, upon the conduct of the agent’s colleagues and a jury’s determination. If 
both their colleagues and a jury believe it reasonable for an agent not to have 
advised a client, the agent will not be found liable. Third, agents gain some 
certainty in knowing that they must keep up with industry customs rather than 
hoping that a judge does not create some new type of “special circumstance.” 
Fourth, courts are open to clients who truly entrust their insurance concerns to their 
agents and seek their agents’ advice. Fifth, the Arizona approach does not decrease 
judicial efficiency, as the “special circumstances” rule still requires a jury trial 
before the judge can determine whether a duty exists. Finally, if a client's damages 
are limited to the policy limits of a policy that should have been recommended, 
there is no danger of subverting the fundamental purpose of insurance in allocating 
risk.  
Sakall, supra note 51, at 1013. 
 
79  Id. at 1011. 
 
80  In this regard, both sophisticated commercial insureds and unsophisticated 
consumer insureds fare similarly.  See, e.g., Wilmering v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 
S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no duty of insured’s broker to 
advise or explain “watchman” warranty to an insured corporate owners of a river 
vessel purchasing marine insurance).  In my view, Richmond also has 
unrealistically heightened expectations of insureds.  See Richmond, supra note 33, 
at 33 (“[c]ommerical insureds are keenly attuned to deductible amounts and 
issues”). 
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of insurance.82   Notably, the brokerage houses involved in the Spitzer 
investigation dealt with large commercial insureds.  Yet even these highly 
sophisticated insureds were unable to discern whether they were obtaining 
the services they needed at a fair price.  It begs the question, if even 
business savvy commercial insureds are unable to protect their interests, 
how can we expect personal insurance consumers to guard against their 
agents’ undisclosed financial motives without safeguards?     
Judicial reluctance to impose a professional standard of care on 
intermediaries ignores the realities that insurance products are so complex, 
the customers so unsophisticated, and the bargaining aspects so one-sided 
that insureds deserve special advantages to level the field.  The market for 
intermediaries exists because of the complexity and incomprehensibility of 
insurance policies.  Even sophisticated insureds must seek the counsel and 
advice of an intermediary to understand what they are purchasing.83  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that courts understand the vulnerabilities of 
the insured and protect them in other aspects of the insurance transaction, 
they neglect a principled approach of imposing a professional standard of 
care on intermediaries.  A heightened standard of care better protects 
insureds and acknowledges the trust intermediaries nurture, expertise they 
possess, and the advice they provide.   
 
III. INSURANCE INTERMEDIARY COMPENSATION 
 
On October 14, 2004, then New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer filed a complaint against one of the world’s largest insurance 
brokers, Marsh and McLennan, alleging that the compensation scheme 
between it and certain insurance companies constituted fraudulent business 
practices.84  The suit alleged that Marsh improperly steered its customer 
                                                                                                                          
81  Richmond, supra note 33, at 12, (citing Weisblatt v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1998)). 
 
82  Id.  
 
83  Beh, supra note 49, at 94, 97-98.   
 
84 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3041 (recounting events and 
repercussions of the New York lawsuits and investigations).   See also In re Marsh 
ERISA Litigation, No. 04 Civ. 8157(SWK), 2006 WL 370169 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 
2006).  Insurers were also targeted in the Spitzer investigation.  For example, Aon 
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business to insurers in order to take advantage of Marsh’s commission 
structure with these insurers.  The suit alleged that the compensation 
agreements Marsh had developed with key insurers created an incentive for 
Marsh to steer business to insurers that paid maximum contingent 
commissions, regardless of whether those insurers offered the most 
competitive rates to Marsh’s clients.  The suit raised the question of 
whether the compensation scheme between insurers and intermediaries 
created insurmountable conflicts of interest between insureds, insurers, and 
their intermediaries.85   
 
A. CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS 
 
Independent agents and exclusive agents both typically earn 
compensation through commissions paid by insurers.86  Brokers, who are 
selected by insureds to provide broader risk management assessment than 
simply placing insurance, earn commissions for the insurance they place, 
even while charging fees to insureds for other services.87    
It has been “a familiar and public feature of the insurance market”88  
to also pay “contingent commissions”89 to intermediaries, and it is these 
                                                                                                                          
Corporation eventually settled with the State of New York, apologized for 
participating in contingent commission steering schemes, and established a fund 
for insured claimants.  See Piven v. Ryan, No. 05 CV 4619, 2006 WL 756043, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2006). 
 
85  While attention was largely directed at large commercial brokers, such as 
Marsh and Willis, in fact contingent commissions were common compensation 
schemes with brokers of all sizes.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3045, 3056-57.   
 
86  See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379.  Cummins and Doherty 
also observe that “[s]ome intermediaries also receive noncash compensation from 
insurers” to reward “superior performance.”  Id. at 379, n.17. 
 
87  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379. 
 
88  Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3049. 
 
89 Id. The practice of paying commissions based upon profitability is not new.  
See, e.g., Harris & Spear, Inc. v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 68 F.2d 63 
(9th Cir. 1933) (describing terms of a 1922 broker contract with an insured: “By 
the terms of the contract the said general agents or managers were allowed ‘a flat 
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types of commissions, more so than commissions based solely on 
premiums, that have drawn criticism.  Contingent commissions are 
typically earned based on the intermediary’s profitability to the insurer.90  
“Typically, contingent commissions are based on the profitability of the 
intermediary’s business placed with the insurer, the persistency rate, and/or 
on the volume of business.”91   
Contingent commission compensation structures vary from insurer 
to insurer, even between intermediaries for the same insurer, and from line 
to line.92  They may be contingent on volume sold, i.e., the intermediary 
receives a commission based on reaching certain volumes; or they may be 
profit based, i.e., the intermediary receives a commission based on factors 
such as claims filed on a policy.93 
Contingent commissions reward intermediaries for meeting profit 
aims of the insurer.  Until recently, there was no obligation or practice that 
encouraged intermediaries to disclose the manner or amount of 
compensation they earned from the insurer to the insured.94   
                                                                                                                          
commission of thirty-five per cent of the net premiums written,’ and, in addition 
thereto, ‘a contingent commission of fifteen (15) per cent of the net profits of the 
business under their charge, said profits to be computed as of the 31st day of 
December, 1923, and annually thereafter on the business of each ‘single’ year so 
long as this agreement shall continue.”).  An agreement between a broker and an 
insurer from the 1980’s described the contingent commission as based on 25% of 
the “[n]et underwriting profit” described as “the excess of income to plaintiff 
[insurance company] over outgo from plaintiff.”  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Risk Exchange, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 7461 (MJL), 1990 WL 210258 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1990). 
 
90  Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 648-50. 
 
91  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379.  See Roth v. AON Corp., 2008 
WL 65069 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2008) (“‘contingent commissions’ refers to a 
practice in which brokers such as Aon received payments from insurers based on 
the overall volume or profitability of business that brokers placed with those 
insurers.”). 
 
92  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379. 
 
93  Id. 
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The perceived problem with contingent commissions is that 
intermediaries earned additional and different commissions based upon 
where they placed an insured’s business.95  Some assert that these 
commissions create an irreconcilable conflict between the intermediary and 
the insured because the intermediary’s self interest in compensation may 
not be aligned with the insured’s interest in obtaining the best insurance for 
their needs at the best price.96  The variability in compensation between 
insurers and the availability of contingent commissions tend to pit the 
insured’s interests against the intermediary’s own financial interests, while 
the lack of disclosure makes it unlikely that insureds would be able to 
protect themselves.     
Contingent commissions may force the intermediary to choose 
between their own desire to enhance their income and their responsibility to 
place the insured with the insurer and policy most ideally suited to meet the 
insured’s needs.  This type of commission creates the risk of “steering,” 
where the insured is placed with the insurer that provides the best 
commission rather than the best policy for the insured.97  Contingent 
                                                                                                                          
94  Douglas Richmond argues that intermediaries do not have any duty to 
disclose their compensation to insureds.  Richmond, supra note 33, at 35-36.  He 
argues that the competitive marketplace and other market forces, state regulation, 
impracticalities, and its attenuated effect on premiums favor a no duty to disclose 
compensation rule.  Id. 
 
95  The intermediary’s value to the insurer is the fact that they own their client 
lists.  “Agent ownership of policy expirations means that the insurance provider 
has no legal right to solicit an independent agent’s clients directly or to replace the 
agent and assign his customers to another agent.”  Regan & Tennyson, supra note 
14, at 640.   When a policy is first placed or later renewed, an agent earns a 
“premium based commission.”  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 375.  This 
is “a commission which is a proportion of premium volume.”  Regan & Tennyson, 
supra note 14, at 648.  Some insurers only pay premium-based commissions.  
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 375. 
  
96  Schwarcz, supra note 3. 
 
97 Id. at 297.  See Jeffrey Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common 
Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial Lines Insurance (U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group, Working Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), 
available at http://irm.wharton.upenn.edu/S02-Wilder.pdf.  The study found that 
contingency fees affect where brokers place their customers in several ways.  
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commissions may also serve to limit the intermediary’s drive to search for 
low prices and bargains.98  If the intermediary chooses to prioritize “their 
receipt of contingent commissions over their market-matching role,” their 
customers may receive suboptimal insurance, or a much more expensive 
policy than their needs dictate.99     
 
B. REPONSES TO CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS 
 
Different schools of thought exist regarding the best way to 
counteract the harmful effects of contingent commissions.  Some are 
convinced that contingent commissions are efficient and do not harm 
insureds.100  For those who view contingent commissions as benign, a 
solution to calm fears is to permit contingent commissions but require 
                                                                                                                          
Brokers receiving contingency fees are more likely to place new customers with 
insurers offering contingency fees, they are less likely to move renewing insureds 
to non-contingency fee paying insurers, and they are less likely to place customers 
with insurers “for which contingency fee contracts have been ‘swamped’ by past 
losses and are unlikely to pay contingency fees in the current year.”  Id. 
 
98 Victor P. Goldberg & Richard A. Epstein, Introductory Remarks: Some 
Reflections on Two-Sided Markets and Pricing, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 509, 
512 (2005). 
 
99 Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 878.  Recently, an Illinois Appellate Court 
recognized that an allegation that the broker’s undisclosed contingent commissions 
“led [the broker] to place certain policies for the customer’s needs” could state a 
claim for misappropriation of premiums.  DOD Tech. v. Mesirow Ins. Servs., Inc., 
887 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ill. App. 3d 2008).  On the other hand, Richmond takes the view 
that intermediaries have no duty to disclose and that no cause of action for failure 
to disclose contingent commissions is viable.  Richmond, supra note 33, at 33.  
Richmond contends that claims based on a failure to disclose commissions are ill-
conceived.  Id.  He writes, “[b]oth agents and brokers are entitled to what the 
insurance industry considers to be reasonable compensation for their services, even 
if cost-conscious insureds think otherwise.”  Id. at 36.  However, in our view, 
Richmond does not adequately consider the allegation of self-motivated steering.  . 
 
100 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360 (“Although contingent 
commissions, like most business practices, can be misused by the unscrupulous, in 
general such compensation plans play an important role in aligning incentives 
between buyers and insurers and thus facilitate the efficient operation of insurance 
markets.”) 
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disclosure of the compensation scheme by which they are earned.  
Proponents of contingent commissions view disclosure as a compromise 
that would enable insurance customers to make informed decisions.101   
Opponents of contingent commission argue that disclosure alone 
cannot correct the fundamental unfairness in the marketplace that 
contingent commissions exacerbate.  For them, nothing short of banning 
contingent commissions altogether will suffice.102  Notably, New York’s 
investigation involved extremely sophisticated insureds, employing and 
paying for the services of one of the largest brokerage firms in the world.  
Yet they were unaware of potential conflict posed by contingent 
commissions or the steering that might or did occur at their expense.103  
Full disclosure might have helped them to negotiate a clearer deal with 
their brokers, but only if they had true choices.  Arguably, in a concentrated 
broker market they may not have had choices.  Disclosure cannot protect 
insureds in the consumer or smaller markets, where there is little ability to 
negotiate a different arrangement.  Thus, Schwarcz’s position is 
particularly compelling in the personal lines market. 
 
IV. OTHER INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Insureds at least know that an intermediary is brokering the 
procurement of insurance; however Professor Stempel writes about 
intermediaries of whom insureds know far less.104  These intermediaries are 
employed by insurers after the contract has been formed and do work on 
behalf of the insurer.  Many of the functions undertaken by these 
                                                                                                                 
101 Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3067-71 (citing “transparency” as the key to 
the problem posed by contingent commissions).  
 
102  Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 878. 
 
103 Joseph B. Treaster, Connecticut Suit Says Marsh and Insurer Misled State, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/business/22insure.html (“Clients paid Marsh 
a fee or commission for unbiased recommendations and, according to the lawsuit, 
were often unaware of the incentive payments”).  
104  Stempel, supra note 2, at 741. 
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intermediaries are those that have traditionally been in-house operational 
functions, such as underwriting, adjusting, and claim-handling.105  
The issue concerning these intermediaries is not for whom they 
work or where their loyalties lie.  We know that downstream intermediaries 
work for the insurer.  The issue here is whether it better protects insureds 
and serves the public good to subject these intermediaries to tort liability 
when their actions harm insureds.  If they act as agents for the insurer, is it 
sufficient that the insured can pursue a claim against that insurer, or would 
it be advantageous to allow an independent claim against the intermediary 
as well? 
Lack of privity between the insured and these intermediaries 
generally has made them untouchable, under either tort or third party 
beneficiary theories.  Stempel notes that the prevailing view is that there is 
not a pressing need to create a cause of action because the insured can 
adequately vindicate claims by suing the insurer, who should be liable as 
the principal.106  He complains that it is unfair to use the barrier of privity 
to preclude tort liability.107  After all, in these instances the intermediary 
usually deals directly with the insured, and even if they are not in privity, 
the insured is obviously a foreseeable plaintiff.  Insulating a tortfeasor for 
its own conduct toward a foreseeable plaintiff, simply on the grounds of 
privity, undermines basic tort principles. 
Stempel argues that these intermediaries should be subject to 
potential liability.108  Among other reasons, he observes that potential 
                                                                                                                 
105  Independent adjusters are independent contractors who work for insurers 
and self-insurers to investigate and adjust claims.  Public adjusters, on the other 
hand, work for insureds to help them present their claim.  See, e.g., Hammill v. 
Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226, 232 (Vt. 2005) (explaining that 
independent adjusters works “in behalf of the insurer” and public adjuster works 
“in behalf of insured”); Benjamin v. Thomas Howell Group, No. Civ.1996-071, 
2002 WL 31573004, at *2 (D.Virgin Islands Apr. 22, 2002) (explaining that a 
public adjuster works on behalf of the insured, while an independent adjuster 
“represent[s] the interests of the insurer”).  See also NY Adjusters: Who We Are, 
http://www.nyadjusters.org/Who_we_are/who_we_are.html.   
 
106  Stempel, supra note 2, at 547.   
 
107 Id. 
 
108 See id. 
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liability to insureds will make intermediaries more directly accountable for 
their wrongdoing, and that in and of itself advances societal interests.  He 
also notes we cannot count on insurers to always have the ability or 
incentive to police the conduct of intermediaries who are authorized to act 
on their behalf, because these intermediaries often function in capacities 
beyond the tight control of the insurer, operating with some independence 
and autonomy.109   The public policy interests that legitimate claims be 
promptly investigated and paid, and that unfounded claims be denied are 
better served by holding those who impede those interests to account. Each 
cog that carries out the functions that facilitate the proper administration of 
insurance should bear the attendant liability.  Finally, insureds here are just 
as peculiarly vulnerable as they are in all other aspects of insurance 
transactions.  Downstream intermediaries stand between insureds and the 
insurer who owes a duty to investigate, process, and pay claims honestly 
and expeditiously.  The insured has little power to leverage here, except 
what power judicially constructed protections can provide. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Several dominant themes emerge in the examination of insurance 
intermediaries that lead to a single conclusion.  First, the public knows little 
about the intermediary who sells them a product or processes or 
investigates their claims on behalf of insurers.  In the case of intermediaries 
brokering insurance, fundamental questions include:  Who does he work 
for?  To whom does he owe his allegiance?  Who is paying him?  Is he a 
professional or a salesperson?  What recourse is there if he fails to carry out 
his duties?  In the case of downstream intermediaries, similar questions 
arise, such as: What independent responsibilities and liabilities to the 
insured does he shoulder for his negligence?  That these basic questions are 
so difficult to answer should compel us to re-think how we regard the 
intermediary. 
The second theme is how relatively low the standard of care is for 
intermediaries considering the important work they do to facilitate the 
insured-insurer relationship.  The law has established special contract and 
tort principles to judge the conduct of insurers.  It has done so because it 
recognizes the peculiar vulnerabilities of insureds and strengths of insurers.  
The insured is just as vulnerable in dealings with intermediaries, and 
intermediaries share similar strengths with insurers.  Intermediaries also 
                                                                                                                 
109  Stempel, supra note 2, at 547. 
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operate in a complex world where insurers and insureds do not share a 
common language.  Intermediaries know a lot about insurance and have an 
important role in the interface between insureds and insurers but they also 
have competing interests that are unknown to insureds.   
Courts have been champions of insureds when it comes to policing 
the relationship between insurers and insureds.  Courts often favor insureds 
in the interpretation of insurance contracts; courts construct contractual and 
tort claims to restrain overbearing conduct, and courts place heightened 
duties on attorneys who represent insureds at the behest of insurers.    
Curiously, courts have paid scant attention to the important role of 
intermediaries in the insurance transaction, and have barely considered 
whether this to is an area that needs judicial vigilance.  It is therefore an 
opportune time for all of us to examine more closely these important and 
mysterious middlemen and develop a more principled approach.    
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This article addresses the “other” intermediaries involved in the 
administration of insurance policies, specifically “downstream” 
intermediaries, who are engaged in the administration of insurance 
claims.  The focus is on managing general agents, third-party 
administrators and independent contractor claims adjusters, who perform 
the nuts-and-bolts tasks of the insurance industry, and are generally less 
well compensated than commercial insurance brokers.  Since these “other” 
intermediaries are immune from judicial claims by policyholders, they are 
also less incentivized to perform their duties well.  The article argues that, 
in order to improve the claims process, the “other” intermediaries should 
be held accountable for their misconduct, at least in tort, or even for “bad 
faith” in the manner of an insurer.  It reviews the benefits of accountability 
and suggests a workable standard for intermediary liability where an 
intermediary is potentially liable when a policyholder has alleged 
negligence or some greater wrongdoing. 
 
*** 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
٭ Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of 
Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.  Thanks to Hazel Beh, Sean Fitzpatrick and 
Dan Schwarcz for their work on the 2008 AALS Section Program and Symposium 
on Insurance Intermediaries.  Thanks also to David Herr, Randy Maniloff, Ann 
McGinley, and Jay Mootz for helpful insights on the issue.  Special thanks to Clay 
Crawford, Esq. (I think) for introducing me to the occasionally strange manner in 
which these issues play out in practice.  Comments regarding his (and my) 
interesting brush with intermediary error and its consequences, including criticism 
of the court and some parties to the dispute (see text and accompanying notes 
(“TAN”) 161-76 , infra), are mine alone.  ©  Copyright 2009, Jeffrey W. Stempel. 
 
600 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a result of headline-grabbing investigations regarding 
commissions, the role and conduct of major insurance brokers has received 
prominent attention in the news1 and also in the academy.2  In this 
Symposium, Professor Daniel Schwarcz continues his scholarly inquiry on 
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Ian McDonald, Marsh, Spitzer Settle with $850 Million, An 
Apology to Clients, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2005, at C1; Monica Langley & Ian 
McDonald, Marsh Averts Criminal Case with New CEO – Resignation and Shift 
On Business Model Reflect Pressure of Spitzer Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, 
at A1; Monica Langley & Theo Francis, Policy Matters: Marsh Probe May Be Tip 
of U.S. Insurance Scandal – As Spitzer Broadens Inquiry Into Bid-Rigging, Rivals 
Like Aon are Felling Heat, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct 18, 2004, at A1; Theo Francis, 
Spitzer Charges Bid Rigging in Insurance - Top Broker, Major Firms Named in 
Legal Actions;`Trust Me: This Is Day One’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2004, at A1.  
See also Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against 
Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study 
of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111 (2004-
2005) (concluding that Spitzer’s use of the media, although questionable on 
fairness grounds, violated no rules of attorney professional conduct); Stacy 
Anderson, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2004, 24 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 1, 94 (2005) (“New York Goes After the Insurance Industry”).  
Former Attorney General and Governor Spitzer’s assessment of the practice of 
undisclosed contingent commissions is reflected in the title of a press release.  See 
Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
Investigation reveals Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 14, 2004), 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/oct/oct14a_04.html.  
Ironically, Spitzer later would resign the governorship in disgrace after an 
embarrassing tryst with a very expensive prostitute that raised the prospect, later 
dropped, of criminal prosecution.  See Tom Precious, No Charges for Spitzer in 
Probe of Prostitution; Federal Prosecutors Conclude Investigation, BUFF. NEWS, 
Nov. 7, 2008, at A1; Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns as N.Y. Governor; 
Fierce Enforcer of Ethics is Brought Down by Sex Scandal, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Mar. 13, 2008, at 1. 
 
2 See, e.g., Sean Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to 
Insurance Market Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2006); J. David Cummins 
& Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 
359 (2006).  For a pre-Spitzer scholarly examination of the issue, see Laureen 
Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance 
Marketing System, 39 J.L. & ECON. 637 (1996). 
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this topic,3continuing to make common sense regarding the limits of 
permissible broker compensation and the wisdom of regulation of broker 
commissions.  His suggestion in this symposium, that hidden or contingent 
commissions are more of a problem for consumer insurance than for 
commercial insurance, seems to me unassailable.4  As Schwarcz argues 
persuasively, the problems presented by undisclosed contingent 
commissions in the world of commercial insurance brokerage are 
magnified in the context of consumer insurance purchases.  Defenders of 
commercial brokerage contingent commissions have generally had the 
weaker of the argument in general.  Applied to consumer insurance 
purchases, the defenses-cum-apologies for traditional contingent 
commissions seem even more wanting.   
Reviewing the law of insurance intermediary liability, Professor 
Hazel Beh concludes “that courts frequently impose a relatively low 
standard of care toward insureds upon intermediaries.”5  She also finds that 
“traditional principles of agency law do not provide a particularly helpful 
framework to understand the legal relationships among insured, insurer, 
and their intermediaries because the intermediary’s role is inconstant.”6  
The insurance intermediary is a different type of agent, one that not only is 
the assigned arm of a primary principal but also has duties to another party 
to the transaction and is subject to public interest considerations generally 
surrounding the insurance industry.    
Rather than echoing Professor Schwarcz’s compelling critique of 
the pitfalls of traditional broker compensation or Professor Beh’s insight 
regarding the limits of traditional agency law as applied to insurance 
intermediaries, this article addresses the seemingly overlooked “other” 
intermediaries involved in the administration of insurance policies.  Rather 
than focusing on the “upstream” intermediaries involved in the sale of 
insurance policies, this article concentrates on “downstream” 
intermediaries involved in the administration of insurance claims.  In 
                                                                                                                 
3 See Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent 
Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2007). 
 
4 See Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the 
Bottom” in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009). 
  
5 See Hazel Beh, Insurance Intermediaries, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 
2009). 
 
6  See id.  
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particular, it addresses the question of whether “downstream” insurance 
intermediaries should be responsible to policyholders and third parties for 
errors in claims handling.   The primary focus is upon managing general 
agents (“MGAs”), third-party administrators (“TPAs”) and independent 
contractor claims adjusters, rather than the legal and medical professionals 
that could also be characterized as downstream intermediaries in the 
relationship between policyholders and insurers.  This article also touches 
upon the law’s treatment of other actors commonly involved in the claims 
process as a useful guide to determining the proper legal governance and 
liability exposure of MGAs, TPAs and adjusters. 
As compared to MGAs, TPAs and independent claims adjusters, 
commercial insurance brokers, the primary focus of recent scholarship on 
intermediaries, are the “sexy,” “Hollywood” intermediaries of the 
insurance business.  Figuratively, at least, they eat at the Four Seasons and 
are fixtures at the industry’s golf outings in Bermuda or other resort 
destinations, as they schmooze with clients and insurers in search of policy 
sales.  For their efforts, brokers, like Marsh and Aon, are well 
compensated, often paid six figures in annual base pay for representing a 
policyholder in search of insurance, as well as typically receiving long-
standing (but now occasionally controversial) commissions based on the 
insurance products they procure for their large, wealthy, prestigious 
business clients. 
In contrast, MGAs, TPAs and independent adjusters are saddled 
with the decidedly less festive task of underwriting (sometimes), billing, 
record-keeping, and claims processing:  ensuring that the insurance policies 
for which the brokers have already been well paid are properly 
administered.  In return for shouldering these nuts-and-bolts tasks and 
potentially alienating policyholders through claims denial or mishandling, 
these other intermediaries are generally less well compensated, particularly 
as respects claims adjusting.  They are more likely to be wolfing down a 
Big Mac in the office or on the way to an appointment then lunching in the 
finer restaurants of a major city. 
The comparatively low-budget drudgery of these other 
intermediaries unfairly masks their importance to the insurance system.  
Many insurers have “outsourced” substantial parts of their operations, 
making MGAs, TPAs and independent adjusters de facto insurers, at least 
for purposes of these key tasks related to policy administration and claims 
handling.  Despite their increasing importance, these intermediaries have 
historically been immune from claims by disgruntled policyholders (or 
others, including claimants) so long as the insurer for whom they work is 
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known to the policyholder or there is no formal written contract between 
the downstream intermediary and the policyholder or other third party.  
As a result, these intermediaries have been effectively beyond the 
reach of judicial regulation while being simultaneously under-regulated by 
executive branch insurance departments.  Faced with reduced incentive to 
discharge their duties well, the other intermediaries frequently act 
negligently, recklessly, or even in bad faith, needlessly creating claims 
imbroglios that could be avoided, minimized, or streamlined.   
In the past, legal reluctance to hold these other intermediaries 
responsible for errors may have been tolerable or even efficient.  Today, 
however, the greater near-autonomous role now shouldered by MGAs, 
TPAs and independent adjusters demands that they be treated under the law 
on a par with the insurers they represent.  Instead of essentially being 
immunized from the consequences of their errors, these intermediaries 
should be held accountable, at least in tort for misconduct even if not for 
“bad faith” in the manner of an insurer.7  Holding these intermediaries 
more accountable holds at least some promise for improvement of the 
claims process.   
 
                                                                                                                 
7  See Largest MGAs/underwriting managers, BUS. INS., Sept. 8, 2008, at 20 
(ranking of MGAs shows ten largest to have 2007 premium volume of more than 
$5 billion, reflecting the degree to which these intermediaries have become big 
business.)  This article does not address questions of the duties and liabilities owed 
by “front end” insurance intermediaries generally but instead addressed the “back 
end” or “downstream” (my preferred term) intermediaries involved in policy 
administration and claims.  See id.  As noted above, the issue of the degree to 
which brokers or sales agents may be liable to insurers, policyholders, or others 
and the standard of care applicable to these “upstream” intermediaries lies beyond 
the scope of this article.  Id.  In general, both brokers and agents may be 
independently liable to insurance applicants and policyholders for negligence or 
misconduct in the performance of their duties even when their actions are not 
binding on their principals.  See, e.g., Terrain Tamers Chip Hauling, Inc. v. Ins. 
Mktg. Corp. of Oregon, 152 P.3d 915, 918 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (settlement with 
insurer does not extinguish policyholder’s claim against agent).  But see Bentley v. 
North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 705, 712-713 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) 
(policyholder cannot bring bad faith claim against insurance sales agent because of 
lack of privity of contract).  See also Londo v. McLaughlin, 587 A.2d 744, 748 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (by statute, brokers owe duty of good faith to policyholder 
clients).  
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II. THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF INTERMEDIARY 
IMMUNITY 
 
Just as insurance law is a subset of contract law, the law of 
insurance intermediary liability is a subset of agency law.  The principal is 
the insurer that hires a downstream agent (the intermediary) to represent it 
in the administration of the policies it has sold.  The agent in turn interacts 
with the principal’s “customers” or policyholders and also represents the 
insurer in dealing with third parties who make liability claims against the 
policyholder.  A “hornbook” rule of agency law, most authoritatively stated 
in § 320 of the American Law Institute’s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY and continued in § 6.01 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY, is that an agent for a “disclosed” principal is not itself liable for 
any acts of the principal.8   
The law of insurance intermediaries, like insurance itself, is also a 
subset of contract law.  To enjoy contract rights, one must normally have 
entered into a contract with the entity from which one seeks contract rights.  
Unless one was in “privity” of contract with the party from which relief is 
sought, the claimant would ordinarily be barred from relief by the historical 
                                                                                                                 
8  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958) (“Unless otherwise 
agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for 
a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006) (“When an agent acting with actual or apparent 
authority makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, (1) the principal and 
the third party are parties to the contract; and (2) the agent is not a party to the 
contract unless the agent and third party agree otherwise.”).  See also 3 C.J.S. 
Agency § 485 (2008) (Ordinarily where the agency is disclosed, a plaintiff entitled 
to recover is entitled to recover against the principal but not the agent); 2A C.J.S. 
Agency § 365 (2008) (An agent who contracts on behalf of a disclosed principal 
and within the scope of his authority, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, or other circumstances showing that he has expressly or impliedly 
incurred or intended to incur personal responsibility, is not personally liable to the 
other contracting party, although he may execute the contract in a manner which 
would otherwise bind him personally, and he need not expressly negate his 
liability); 12-88 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 88.5 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2008).  
Because the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) is so recent, the limited case law invoking 
agency principles to shield insurance intermediaries has been based on the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND).  At this juncture, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6.01 has been 
cited by only a handful of courts, with none of the decisions involving liability of 
insurance intermediaries. 
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“citadel” of privity of contract, which held that an entity not in contractual 
privity owed no contract-based duties to an aggrieved party and generally 
owed no socially imposed tort duties as well.9   Although recovery could be 
premised on a theory that the claimant was a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract between agent and principal, courts were historically reluctant to 
give contract rights to any third-party beneficiary not specifically so 
identified in a written instrument.10 
These hornbook rules became established during the 19th Century 
as Anglo-American law grappled with the question of the apt extent of 
liability in a growing, increasingly industrial society.  The courts largely 
accepted, at least implicitly, the proposition that unduly broad imposition 
of liability would throw too much sand in the metaphorical gears of 
progress and exact too high a tax on commercial activity.  Where a 
                                                                                                                 
9   See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 353 (2000); William S. Prosser, 
Hornbook of the Law of Torts §§ 93, 96-104 (4th ed. 1971).   See also Lee R. Russ 
with Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 208:10 (3d ed. & Supp. 2008): 
 
Although there are exceptions, investigators and adjusters 
working under contract for the insurer are, for the most part, not 
considered to have sufficient privity with or duty to the insured 
to be directly and personally liable to the insured.   Insureds have 
a better chance of surviving preliminary dismissal motions by 
framing their actions as breaches of duty owed to the public at 
large---torts of various types.  Of these, the most likely sources 
of an actionable duty involve the investigator or adjuster acting 
in a way that “interferes” with the insured’s relationship with the 
insurer, or with some other legally protected right of the insured. 
 
For more discussion of basic tort law as a ground for holding claim intermediaries 
liable to policyholders or claimants, see infra text accompanying notes 177-221. 
 
10   See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.2 (3rd ed. 1999) 
(historically, third parties generally did not enjoy rights under contract unless 
contract text expressly indicates that third party was intended beneficiary of 
contract).  See, e.g., Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 263 A.2d 668, 672 (Pa. 
1970) (“Without such a [contractual] relationship, it is impossible for the 
[independent claims] adjusters to be liable for breach of contract to the insureds.”). 
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commercial actor was linked to another by contract, this created certain 
rights.  But absent such links, law was reluctant to impose liability.11   
In addition, immunity for the agents of disclosed principals could 
be defended on the ground that an aggrieved party nonetheless had 
substantial legal rights as against the principal.  Imposing liability on the 
agent of the disclosed principal thus seemed unnecessary.  Under a rough 
cost-benefit analysis, the tacit notion appears to be that although agent 
liability would provide an additional source of compensation for the 
injured, it brought with it a greater burden of discouraging socially useful 
agency activity and encouraging needless expansion of disputes.12 
Applied to the typical commercial transactions of the era, the 
traditional rules of privity and agency immunity made sense, at least 
initially.  Consider a sale of goods by Merchant Marley through Agent 
Cratchett to Consumer Dickens.  If it is clear that Cratchett is selling on 
behalf of Marley, Dickens knows with whom he deals:  a ruthless 
businessman not above cutting corners (who would have an ethical 
epiphany only after death) and not the fair, guileless agent.13  After the sale, 
if Dickens finds the goods to be substandard, he may sue Marley for relief 
but generally could not also sue Cratchett, an agent for a disclosed principal 
who has no contractual privity with Dickens.    
Because Cratchett appears not to have had any fault or to have 
much in the way of autonomy, assets, or insurance (the liability insurance 
                                                                                                                 
11   See sources cited supra note 9.  See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 
152 Eng. Rep. 402.  Accord National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203 
(1879).  But as Prosser also noted, the “citadel” of privity protecting manufacturers 
and wholesalers not in direct contract with consumers fell during the first half of 
the 20th Century as courts permitted product liability claims in cases where a 
product caused physical injury to its ultimate user.  See PROSSER, supra note 9, § 
97.  By contrast, the privity prerequisite to liability has retained considerable force 
regarding agency issues outside the context of product liability. 
 
12   See infra text accompanying notes 15-22, 122-149 (discussing this 
rationale in modern cases rejecting liability claims against insurance 
intermediaries). 
 
13  Although Dickens presumably did not know ex ante that Marley would 
have a posthumous epiphany (in time to save his partner Scrooge), Dickens 
famously acquired ex post knowledge.  See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS 
CAROL (Atlantic Monthly Press) (1843). 
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industry did not really emerge until after the industrial revolution and was 
not well-established until the 20th Century)14 there is not a particularly 
strong case for permitting him to be sued by Dickens or other dissatisfied 
customers.  Marley is the one responsible for the substandard goods and he 
should be the one responsible for rectifying things for Dickens.  One could 
argue that making Cratchett liable as well will induce greater care by 
Cratchett, but this could manifest itself in socially wasteful activity such as 
Cratchett inspecting the Marley products or standing over the shoulder of 
Marley’s operations.    
Further, as a practical matter, agents like Cratchett with little 
autonomy are not expected to do much more than be conduits for making a 
sale and to take orders accordingly.  He probably would not be permitted to 
attempt to provide some quality control to Marley’s operation but would be 
summarily fired by Marley for his temerity.   As this aspect of the 
hypothetical illustrates, Cratchett in this case is more like an insurance 
sales or soliciting agent and quite removed in scope of authority from the 
modern MGA or adjuster, who may have quite a bit of either express or 
practical authority about the manner in which a claim is resolved.   
If instead of being the sales agent, Cratchett were the Complaint 
Department at Scrooge & Marley, his situation would be closer to that 
found in modern insurance, at least if Marley had delegated significant 
authority to Cratchett.  In addition, law has subsequently moved 
substantially in the direction of holding front-end intermediaries such as 
insurance agents liable under some circumstances, such as when the agent 
knows of a particular customer’s coverage needs and then procures an 
inappropriate policy or fails to follow through on a promised purchase.15  
                                                                                                                 
14  See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC:  CRIPPLED 
WORKMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004) 
(describing the rise of accident and liability insurance in reaction to increase in 
injuries associated with industrial revolution); John Fabian Witt, The 
Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 
YALE L.J. 1467 (1997-1998) (also describing the rise of accident and liability 
insurance in reaction to increase in injuries associated with industrial revolution). 
 
15 See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 35 (3d ed. 
2002); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.5 (1988).  See, 
e.g., President v. Jenkins, 853 A.2d 247 (N.J. 2004) (no duty to advise applicant 
doctor about gap in coverage where doctor did not advise broker about lapse of 
prior policy); Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency, 583 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003) (no duty to advise policyholder that auto policy provided no coverage 
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Consequently, the historical immunity of agents for disclosed principles 
has begun to look outdated. 
When Dickens makes the purchase, there is of course the danger 
that Marley, a notoriously mean character, will only make good on the 
contract if sued to judgment or that he might seek to avoid his lawful debts.  
But Dickens knew he was dealing with Marley and historically was 
constructively charged with knowing these things about his infamous 
vender.  In addition, the law of debt relief was considerably less favorable 
to the Marleys of the world at the time that the general rule was crafted.  
Rather than risk debtor’s prison, Marley was likely to pay a court judgment 
obtained by Dickens.  Secreting assets was more difficult as well in a world 
predating electronic funds transfer, sophisticated corporate shells, and 
cooperative tropical havens for capital.16 
Under the traditional rules protecting agents, if an insurance 
policyholder or third party claimant knows that the MGA, TPA, or adjuster 
is working for the insurer, the MGA, TPA or independent contractor 
adjuster is generally not itself liable for any misconduct that injures the 
policyholder or the claimant.  The identity of the insurer as principal is 
almost always disclosed in that the policyholder of course knows that it has 
insurance with a particular company/principal and the claimant is usually 
made aware of this by the MGA/adjuster.  As a result, under the traditional 
agency law analysis, MGAs, TPAs and independent adjusters were not held 
                                                                                                                          
outside U.S. and Canada).  The broker’s limited exposure is something of a two-
way street.  See, e.g., DeHayes Group v. Pretzels, Inc., 786 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2003) (insurer lacked special relationship with broker sufficient to require 
broker to advise insurer that policyholder sprinkler system was inadequate to 
suppress fire).  The agent’s potential liability exposure often hinges on the specific 
facts of a case.  See, e.g. Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2006) (agent not 
liable for failing to procure policy where evidence shows that possibility of 
additional insurance was discussed but policyholder never directed agent to 
procure insurance); Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1997) (insufficient 
“special relationship” between agent and customer to make agent liable for alleged 
failure to advise customer regarding “possible additional insurance coverage 
needs.”).  Where an agent sells or distributes a merchant’s dangerous products, the 
law long ago removed the shield of contractual privity as a defense to product 
liability claims.  See infra text accompanying notes 43-46. 
 
16  See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996-
1997). 
 
2009] THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES 609 
 
 
liable for mishandling of claims, even when their misconduct amounted to 
bad faith toward a policyholder.17 
Case law concerning this issue is almost uniformly favorable to 
insurance intermediaries until the late 20th Century.  Where an independent 
claims adjuster or administrator is accused of mistreating a policyholder or 
otherwise causing injury, the comparatively few reported cases find the 
intermediary immunized as a matter of law so long as its representation of 
the insurer was adequately disclosed.18  That the cases are so few in number 
suggest that most aggrieved policyholders or claimants may not have even 
considered a claim against the intermediary or that such claims were 
quickly dismissed at the trial level and never challenged on appeal. 
Ironically, comparatively few of these cases specifically cite 
Agency Restatement § 320.19  More commonly, decision is based on the 
absence of contractual privity between the intermediary and the 
policyholder or claimant,20 although agency concepts are also occasionally 
                                                                                                                 
17   See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979); 
Larkin v. First of Georgia Underwriters, 466 So.2d 655 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 
18   See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973) 
(defendants other than insurers not liable for alleged bad faith conduct toward 
policyholder, resulting in dismissal of investigative service hired by insurers, 
claims adjuster employed by service, law firm representing insurers in claims 
adjustment, and individual lawyer in firm).  “Obviously, the non-insurer 
defendants were not parties to the agreements for insurance; therefore, they are not, 
as such, subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.”  Id. at 576.  
 
19  An October 2008 search of the LexisNexis federal and state court database 
yields fewer than 40 cases citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 
(1958) in cases even tangentially involving insurers.  Fewer than 15 cases 
expressly cited § 320 and address the issue of the liability of an intermediary, 
including both “upstream” sales intermediaries and “downstream” policy 
administration intermediaries. 
 
20   See, e.g., Wolverton v. Bullock, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (auto 
policyholder cannot sue independent claims adjuster because “in the absence of a 
contract between Sentry [adjuster]  and Bullock [policyholder], there can be no 
implied duty of good faith that Sentry would have owed Bullock.  This holding is 
consistent with approaches taken in other jurisdictions.”) (citing cases from  
Alabama, California, Louisiana,  Nevada, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and 
Pennsylvania as well as Kansas); Wathor v. Mut. Assur. Adm’rs, 87 P.3d 559, 562 
(Okla. 2004) (TPA owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing to policyholders 
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invoked,21 sometimes without a specific citation to § 320.22   Little 
consideration is given to the issue of whether the overall context of the 
                                                                                                                          
and facts of the case do not permit policyholders to recover against TPA as third-
party beneficiaries of contracts between TPA and an insurer); Natividad v. Alexsis, 
Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 1994) (holding no adjuster duty of good faith and 
fair dealing and no special relationship with policyholder absent contract); Amica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957-58 (Utah 1989) (holding there is no 
adjuster duty of good faith and fair dealing and no special relationship with a 
policy holder absent a contract); Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 48, 50-51 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (“Although Connecticut recognizes a common law duty of 
an insurer to act in good faith in the settlement of the claims of its insured, a cause 
of action for breach of that duty may be asserted only against an insurers.  An 
action for bad faith, therefore, does not lie against a person who is not a party to 
the contract of insurance, including an attorney.”) (citations omitted); Larkin v. 
First of Georgia Underwriters, 466 So.2d 655, 657 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding a 
homeowner/policyholder alleging breach of contract and bad faith cannot sue 
independent claims adjuster because no privity of contract between homeowner 
and adjuster).     
In occasional twists of irony, the traditional approach may on occasion prevent 
insurers from obtaining relief against intermediaries.  For example, in Farmers 
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. N.M. 2006), an insurer 
facing a presumably questionable claim when fire destroyed a furniture store hired 
an investigator and independent engineer to conduct a cause-and-origin 
examination of the fire.  When these individuals allegedly failed to preserve 
evidence useful to the insurer’s defense (presumably one based on arson), the 
insurer sought to hold each personally liable.  The individual investigator sought 
dismissal on the ground that the insurer’s contract was with his employer, an 
investigation company, and that the insurer had no claim against him.  The court 
agreed, even though the company was a company he had founded and controlled.    
See 452 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76 (citing RESTATEMENT § 320, as well as noting 
absence of direct contract between individual investigator and insurer).  See also 
First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. NovaPro Risk Solutions, Inc., 468 F. Supp.2d 1321, 
1343 (D.Kan. 2007), see infra notes 161-176 and accompanying text. 
 
21   See, e.g., LaFontaine v. Mass. Cas. Co., No. C05-5059FDB, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27137 at *7 (W.D. Wash., April 27, 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
on other grounds, No. 06-35434, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26392 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 
2007) (independent claims adjuster for disability insurer initially sued by insured, 
but dropped from the case by mutual consent when defendant adjuster and insurer 
argued that adjuster was “a disclosed agent of Massachusetts Casualty Insurance 
Company [because] Washington follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 320 (1958)”) (citing Hopkins v. Anderson, 766, 502 P.2d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1972)); Am. Ins. Co. v Material Transit, Inc., 446 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Del. Sup. Ct., 
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1982) (holding an agent processing insurance premium payments that erroneously 
misapplied funds resulting in wrongful cancellation of policy not itself liable 
because it acted as agent for disclosed principal and had no contractual relationship 
with policyholder). 
[I]n making these payment arrangements [payment processor] Montgomery 
was not acting for itself but was solely acting as the agent of American Insurance.  
It is established law that an agent for a disclosed principal is not a party to a 
contract and is not liable for its nonperformance.  Restatement (Second) Agency §§ 
320, 328; 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 8832 at 459 (1968).  Thus, 
the only parties to this allegedly breached payment contract are American 
Insurance [insurer] and Material Transit [policyholder].  Montgomery, acting as 
agent on behalf of a disclosed principal, American Insurance, is not personally 
liable to third-party, Material Transit, for acts performed within the scope of its 
authority. 
 
Id. at 1104-105. 
 
See also WESTRM-West Risk Markets, Ltd. v. XL Reinsurance America, 
Inc., 02 Civ. 7344 (MGC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48769, at *17-*18 (S.D.N.Y., 
July 19, 2006) (dismissing claim against issuing agent on contract and agency 
grounds); Seigworth v. State, 539 P.2d 464, 466 (Nev. 1975) (holding an 
individual agent for bail bond company is not liable for bond forfeiture when 
criminal accused fails to show up for court date).  Of course, the agency at issue in 
Seigworth is one of upstream sales agency rather than insurance policy (and a bail 
bond is an insurance policy or surety arrangement and thus falls outside the scope 
of this article).  However, the short-and-sweet resolution of the question provides a 
good example of the traditional rule in action. 
[W]e now turn to the question, is a bail agent, as attorney-in-fact for the 
purpose of binding the insurer, himself a surety for the appearance bond? 
Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract 
with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the 
contract.  Restatement, Second, Agency § 320.   See also, Restatement § 4(1), 
Restatement § 4, Comment (a) and Restatement §328. 
[In this case,] Resolute Insurance Company is a disclosed principal; Drendel, 
dba Mac’s Bail Bonds is an agent.  Drendel cannot be liable for the bond forfeiture. 
 
Id. at 466. 
 
In WEST-RM, another case technically involving more of an upstream agency 
problem than one of policy administration, the federal district court was almost as 
succinct in applying the traditional rule but held out some ground for possible 
liability in the future depending on agent activity. 
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situation creates a relationship for which the law should apply tort law 
duties of reasonable care. 
In addition to fighting this general rule of agent immunity, third 
party claimants had the additional barrier of the legal rule that an insurer’s 
misconduct in claims administration generally does not create a direct 
cause of action for the claimant due to the absence of privity of contract 
and a public policy reluctance to allow such direct actions because of the 
nature of liability claims in which the insurer is usually charged with 
                                                                                                                          
[T]he settled rule in New York is that “when an agent makes a contract for a 
disclosed principal, it becomes neither a party to the contract nor liable for the 
performance of the contract.  Accordingly, it is not liable if the contract is 
breached.”  Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher, 761 F.2d 855, 850 (2d 
Cir. 1985)(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 320, 328).  Although an 
agent might be held liable on a contract if he acted outside the scope of his agency 
in executing the contract, [there is no evidence that this occurred and no evidence 
that the intermediary was subject to the indemnity provisions of the surety bonds in 
question]. 
 
WESTRM-West Risk Markets, Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48769 at *17-*18 
(emphasis in original). 
 
22   See, e.g., Gorab v. Equity Gen. Agents, Inc., 661 P.2d 1196 (Colo. App. 
1983), in which the Court affirmed a dismissal of a claim against an independent 
insurance sales agent, but found that its principal, California Union Insurance, 
could be sued for negligent failure to settle. 
 
Central to the plaintiff’s right to recover on these [negligence and breach of 
contract] claims is the contractual relationship arising from the Cal Union errors 
and omissions policy.  [citation omitted]  Since Equity General is the agent of Cal 
Union, and is not a party to the contract of insurance, it is not bound by duties 
created under the contract.  Accordingly, liability for breach of those duties, 
whether the breach be contractual or tortuous in nature, cannot be visited upon the 
agent. 
 
Id. at 1198 (citing Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Inc., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979) and 
Iversen v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).  The Colorado 
Supreme Court subsequently rejected this approach and made adjusters potentially 
liable for negligent failure to settle in Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins., 68 P.3d 
462 (Colo. 2003).  During the intervening 20 years, Colorado caselaw had been 
edging away from the pure historical rule of agent and intermediary liability set 
forth in Gorab. 
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defending the policyholder and questioning as necessary the merits of the 
claim.23 
Bad faith scholar Stephen Ashley adds an additional historical 
perspective on the manner in which the requirement of contractual privity 
has insulated insurance intermediaries.  In his view, part of the problem is 
that basing the existence of a bad faith cause of action on a contract’s 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which was the fulcrum of 
the modern spurt in first-party bad faith law emerging from California 
Supreme Court caselaw of the 1970s, resulted in obsessive judicial focus 
on a formal contractual relationship and privity of contract between the 
party seeking relief and the actor alleged to have committed misconduct.24
 In particular, Ashley views the source of the problem as Gruenberg 
v. Aetna Ins. Co.,25 which he describes as “the landmark case” recognizing 
“a cause of action for bad faith in first-party cases.”26  Gruenberg found 
that a first-party policyholder (in this case one involving life/health 
insurance) had bad faith rights vis-à-vis the insurer, which was at the time a 
novel view, even though bad faith rights of third party liability insurance 
policyholders had been recognized for several decades.27   However, the 
                                                                                                                 
23   See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. 
1988).   
 
24   See Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions:  Liability and Damages §§ 6:09, 
6:15 (2d ed. 1997).  
 
25  510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 
26  ASHLEY, supra note 24, at 6:15.  California also launched the modern era of 
bad faith in the third-party liability context with cases like Comunale v. Traders & 
Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958) and Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 
173, 176 (Cal. 1967).  But the widespread emergence of bad faith actions in the 
first party insurance context did not occur until the 1970s and 1980s.  See also Seth 
William Goren, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places:  Problems in Applying 
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 257, 268 
(2002)(referring to Comunale as a “benchmark case”). 
 
27   See, e.g., Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 258-59 (Wis. 1930); 
reaff’d on reh’g, Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1931); Douglas 
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 127 A. 708, 709 (1924).   See generally JEFFREY W. 
STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS Ch. 10 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 
2009).   
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The ability of a liability policyholder to sue for bad faith was recognized much 
earlier than any similar right for first-party policyholders largely because courts 
viewed the liability policyholder as considerably more vulnerable and dependent 
upon the insurer since the insurer was controlling the defense of any third-party 
claims against the policyholder.  In particular, courts have seen the insurer and 
policyholder as part of a defense “team” involving mutual obligations of protection 
and cooperation, while viewing first-party insurance as something closer to a pure 
arms-length commercial contract where either party is free to take advantage of the 
other (although this odd view has fortunately eroded over the past 30 years).   
Further, liability claims have the potential to greatly exceed the amount of 
available insurance if settlement of the claim is not reached and expose the 
policyholder to potentially bankrupting liability.  By contrast, first-part insurance 
is, at least in theory, supposed to be available in amounts sufficient to provide 
adequate indemnity once any bad faith wrongs of the insurer have been righted.  
For example, a homeowner’s policy is likely to be more in sync with property 
value than may be the case when comparing auto liability policy limits and a 
serious auto injury claim. 
However, the path to modern bad faith law was not necessarily linear or 
smooth.  Hilker, cited above, is often viewed as the seminal case of what might be 
called the early modern era in which liability insurers charged with defending 
claims against policyholders were held to reasonably rigorous standards of conduct 
toward policyholders.  Prior to Hilker, many cases had stated generally that an 
insurer may not act in bad faith, but, when examined closely, these cases tended to 
define bad faith as an actual, specific intent to harm the policyholder or outright 
fraud.  This is a more constrained view of bad faith than found in modern cases, 
which find bad faith where an insurer’s conduct has been non-malicious but 
unreasonable, insufficiently solicitous of the policyholder’s interests (as opposed to 
the insurer’s interests) or otherwise deprived the policyholder of the benefit of the 
bargain embodied by the insurance policy.   
For example, in Best Bldg. Co., v. Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp., 160 N.E. 
911 (N.Y. 1928), the court observed:   
 
[t]hat the insurance company in the handling of the litigation or in failing to 
settle is liable for its fraud or bad faith is conceded and has been repeatedly 
stated in all the cases bearing on the subject.  So also it has been held by this 
court that the company is not liable on its contract for a failure to settle; a 
contract imposes upon it no such duty. 
[T]here is no implied obligation in the insurance policy in this case that the 
company must or will settle according to the offer made.  *  *   *  The 
insurance company, in refusing to settle the actions, did what it had the legal 
right to do under the terms of the policy.” 
 
Id. at 912.    
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In other words, on the eve of the Hilker decision, the bad faith law of New 
York and most other jurisdictions were relatively toothless in that it did not include 
the now familiar “duty to settle,” which is not literally a duty to settle under any 
circumstances and throw money at even frivolous claims, but instead requires that 
an insurer accept a reasonable settlement offer at or below the available policy 
limits in cases where there is a substantial risk of an excess verdict that would put 
the policyholder’s own assets at risk.   A significant exception is Texas, which 
established a duty to settle in G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 
S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).  Today, the duty to settle in Texas 
is still routinely labeled the insurer’s “Stowers duty.” 
The facts of Best Bldg. v. Employers’ Liab. created a situation ripe for 
declaring the existence of a duty to settle, but the New York Court of Appeals 
showed no interest.  An employee was injured and made a claim.  The liability 
insurer, which had a $10,000 policy limit, defended the claim.  The plaintiff 
offered to settle for $8,500; the insurer counter-offered at $6,500 and did not 
inform the policyholder of the offer or counter-offer.  Trial resulted in a judgment 
of $16,000 for the injured plaintiff, leaving the employer policyholder 
understandably upset that it faced $6,000 of its own liability.  Further, the 
policyholder alleged that it was willing to contribute up to $2,000 of its own funds 
to resolve the matter and therefore could have worked with the insurer to effect a 
settlement had it merely been informed of the offer and counter-offer.   
Despite these sympathetic facts, the Court was unmoved, viewing the insurer 
as having unfettered contract rights to settle or try the case as it saw fit regardless 
of the consequences to the policyholder.  The Court dismissed the bad faith claim 
as a matter of law.  It was not even willing to permit fact-finding and trial 
regarding the circumstances of the insurer’s seemingly obvious error in failing to 
resolve a case that resulted in a 160% excess verdict.  As long as the failure to 
settle resulted from mere negligence rather than intent to disserve the policyholder, 
the insurer was unregulated in this regard, a situation quite different than the norms 
of modern insurance bad faith law. 
By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hilker found the negligently 
unreasonable behavior by the insurer could support bad faith failure to settle 
claims.  The insurer had rejected the injured plaintiff’s settlement offer and 
responded only with a low offer.   
The adjuster for the company exhibited an indifferent and hostile attitude, 
refusing to meet and discuss settlement in the offices of the attorneys representing 
the [plaintiff] girl and her father. 
[The adjuster and defense counsel] must have known that the testimony of 
these eye-witnesses of the accident tended to establish actionable negligence on the 
part of the [defendant and] that the injury was one for which a verdict might be 
rendered for a sum much in excess of the coverage of the policy.  They knew that 
they had absolute control of the litigation and of its adjustment.  They also knew 
that plaintiff would be liable for all sums in excess of $5,000 which might be 
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Gruenberg Court refused to recognize any bad faith cause of action against 
the independent adjuster involved in the case or the law firm representing 
the insurer. 
 
Obviously, the non-insurer defendants were not 
parties to the agreements for insurance; therefore, they are 
not, as such, subject to an implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.  Moreover, as agents and employees of the 
                                                                                                                          
recovered in these actions.  Under such circumstances the failure to make some 
more effective effort to adjust the cases does present evidence which sustains the 
finding that the defendant acted in bad faith toward the plaintiff in handling these 
claims and conducting this litigation. Hilker, 231 N.W. at 260.  
As the quotation above might suggest, the first Hilker decision left some 
uncertainty as to whether the insurer’s errors amounting to bad faith were negligent 
or intentional, leading counsel to seek rehearing to clarify the legal standard to be 
derived from the case.  After rehearing and decision a year later, the Court made 
clear that the insurer’s settlement failures need not be willfully intended to injure 
the policyholder in order to be actionable as bad faith.   
[Although it] is the right of the insurer to exercise its own judgment upon the 
question of whether the claim should be settled or contested . . . the decision 
should be an honest and intelligent one. . . . . In order to be honest and intelligent it 
must be based upon a knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which 
liability is predicated upon a knowledge of the nature and extent of the injuries so 
far as they reasonably can be ascertained. 
This requires the insurance company to make a diligent effort to ascertain the 
facts upon which only an intelligent and good-faith judgment may be predicated.  *  
*   *  [I]t should exercise reasonable diligence in this behalf, which means such 
diligence as the great majority of persons use in the same or similar circumstances.  
This is ordinary care.  Hilker II, 235 N.W. at 414-15. 
The modern era had arrived regarding duty-to-settle/failure-to-settle bad duties 
imposed upon liability insurers and it in essence required insurers not to be 
negligent in their investigation, defense, and settlement conduct regarding a claim 
against the policyholder.  Over the ensuing four decades, third-party bad faith law 
became more favorable to policyholders in that it generally came to hold that the 
insurer failing to settle was automatically responsible for the amount of the excess 
verdict, and also permitted policyholders to seek punitive damages where the 
insurer’s failure to settle went beyond negligence and exhibited willful indifference 
to policyholder rights.  See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra, § 10.06.  
However, it was not until the 1970s that there was significant recognition of a bad 
faith cause of action for first-party policyholders faced with unreasonable insurer 
claims adjustment. 
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defendant insurers, they cannot be held accountable on a 
theory of conspiracy.28   
 
To Ashley, the focus on contract as the source of rights to demand 
reasonable insurer behavior was something of a wrong turn in the law, even 
though California (in Gruenberg and other decisions) and most other states 
treat breach of the covenant of good faith as a tort, which can subject at 
least the insurer to a range of compensatory damages as well as punitive 
damages, at least if it is the policyholder or its proper assignee that is suing 
the insurer.  As Ashley points out, claimants injured by the policyholder 
seldom have a direct right of action against the insurer that acts in bad faith, 
a limitation in the law he regards as related to limits on the policyholder’s 
ability to bring bad faith claims against independent adjusters and MGAs.29 
My own view is in some disagreement with Ashley in that I see 
nothing wrong with the basic analysis that has led to the modern 
establishment of the tort of insurance bad faith in actions by policyholders 
against insurers.  These parties have a contract.  The insurance policy 
contract, like all contracts, carries with it an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  But unlike most consumer and commercial contracts, the 
insurance arrangement and the relationship of insurer and policyholder 
establish a context in which the meaning of good faith changes (from mere 
“honesty in fact” to a requirement of reasonable behavior giving equal 
consideration to the interests of the policyholder) and the covenant of good 
faith creates tort duties imposed by law on the insurer.  The breach of the 
covenant and those duties correspondingly subjects the insurer that acts in 
bad faith to tort law damages, including punitive damages if the 
                                                                                                                 
28 510 P.2d at 1039 (quoted in ASHLEY, supra note 24, § 6:15). 
 
29 See ASHLEY, supra note 24, § 6:15 (Gruenberg approach of “reliance on the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the foundation for the tort of bad 
faith has posed problems for the California courts in determining which persons 
harmed by an insurer’s unreasonable rejection of a claim may sue the insurer for 
bad faith.  The same problems have plagued the courts’ efforts to determine which 
persons responsible for the insurer’s unreasonable conduct may be sued for bad 
faith.”).  See also Francis J. Mootz, III, The Sounds of Silence:  Waiting for Courts 
to Acknowledge That Public Policy Justifies Awarding Damages to Third-Party 
Claimants When Liability Insurers Deal With Them in Bad Faith, 2 NEV. L.J. 443, 
443 (2002) (arguing in favor of third-party claimant standing to bring bad faith 
actions against insurer that breaches duty to policyholder to defend/settle claim). 
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unreasonable behavior is accompanied by a willful indifference to the 
rights of the policyholder. 
This is not a bad syllogism or analysis and provides a sound basis 
for holding both liability insurers and first-party insurers (property, life, 
health, disability) liable to policyholders for bad faith breach.  Ashley, 
however, seems to suggest it is an imperfect or even defective analysis 
because it does not automatically establish standing to sue for bad faith for 
the third-party complainants themselves or for actions against the 
downstream intermediaries that administer insurance policies.   
From my perspective, Ashley’s lament is only partially well-taken.  
Requiring a sufficiently significant, not-too-attenuated contract connection 
as prerequisite for bad faith liability makes sense.  Failing to do that 
arguably expands bad faith liability in ways that may prove inefficient and 
unwise in situations where the claimant is not nearly so vulnerable as the 
average policyholder suffering a loss or facing a claim.   
The failure of the traditional jurisprudence, in my view, is not its 
presumptive insistence on contract privity or its respect for the disclosed 
principal rule of agency.  The historical approach has become problematic, 
not because of the contract underpinnings of the bad faith tort, but because 
too many courts and litigants have seen adjuster liability as an all-or-
nothing proposition.  Either the adjuster is liable in bad faith, or the adjuster 
is immune.  There is an intermediate position.  The adjuster should 
ordinarily be protected from imputed liability due to an insurer’s 
misconduct, but the adjuster should be liable for negligence (or certainly 
for more egregious misconduct such as gross negligence or recklessness) 
based on basic tort principles and overarching agency axioms that 
overcome the protection provided by the disclosed principle rule.   
As discussed below, one need not be in a contract relationship to 
owe tort duties to third parties and Agency Restatement (Second) §320 is 
really only a rule protecting agents for disclosed principals from being held 
to the contracts made by the principals through the agent.30  It is not a 
general tort immunity statute for agents, and courts have erred to the extent 
they have expanded the Section to have this effect.  Picking up on Ashley’s 
critique, I agree that adjusters owe to policyholders the same duty of good 
faith owed by insurers as principals.  Where insurance intermediaries have, 
in essence, 1) assumed the functions of the insurer (which seems to take 
place in many MGA and TPA operations, or where adjusters have 
                                                                                                                 
30 See infra notes 177-221 and accompanying text, proposing and defending 
tort liability for downstream intermediaries. 
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substantial discretion in evaluating claims), 2) are in a position of special 
relationship to a policyholder or other party, or 3) are in a “joint venture” 
with the insurer, intermediaries should be held to account as if they were 
the insurer, including facing bad faith exposure.   
These downstream intermediaries may or may not owe good faith 
duties to claimants, depending on whether applicable state law permits 
claimants to make bad faith claims against a defendant’s insurer.  But these 
downstream intermediaries logically still owe at least tort duties to the 
claimant, even where the adjuster has more limited discretion.  The nature 
of the intermediary-claimant relationship is one that should impose at least 
modest duties on the intermediary.  Where the intermediary is negligent or 
reckless and causes injury, the claimant should not be barred from pursuing 
recompense through tort law.        
Currently, because claimants initially and often have styled their 
claims against adjusters, TPAs, or MGAs as bad faith litigation, the field 
was shaped by cases like Gruenberg that found insufficient contractual 
connection to impose insurer-like obligations on the intermediaries.  So 
bent, the branch of intermediary liability law grew from simply ruling that 
intermediaries were not liable to the extent of insurers, to assuming (and 
least in the seeming majority view) that intermediaries were not liable at all 
to third parties.  But the latter legal rule does not follow even if one 
strongly accepts the former premise that bad faith liability for downstream 
intermediaries might be overkill. 
In addition, the issue of adjuster or MGA liability has been unduly 
commingled with the question of whether a third party, such as an accident 
claimant, can sue an alleged tortfeaser/defendant/policyholder’s insurer for 
bad faith in claims handling.  The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
have refused to permit such claims, reasoning that they induce undue 
complications and conflicts into the liability claims adjustment process, 
which requires the liability insurer to defend the policyholder and thus 
focus its loyalty on protecting the policyholder/defendant rather than 
pleasing the third party who is suing the policyholder.31    
For a ten-year period, California permitted such claims per the 
famous Royal Globe32  case, but reversed field in its 1988 Moradi-Shalal33 
                                                                                                                 
31  See STEMPEL, supra note 27, § 10.05. 
 
32  See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1979).  
 
33 See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 60 (Cal. 1988).  
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decision.  Although neither the California legislature nor the California 
Supreme Court shows any sign of returning to the Royal Globe regime, the 
intellectual argument on the issue continues.  Like many observers, I 
continue to be relatively ambivalent about any perceived need to give tort 
plaintiffs and other claimants a direct bad faith right of action against 
liability insurers.  Although scholars have made strong arguments in favor 
of this extension of the law and advocate Royal Globe as the preferred 
approach,34 courts continue to adhere to the view that bad faith claims 
against the insurer belong to policyholders and not to tort claimants.35   
Judicial opinions on the topic rely not only on maintaining some 
vestige of the historic citadel of privity but also upon the public policy view 
that providing third parties with an action for bad faith against insurers 
would introduce too much mischief into the claims settlement process, 
likely increasing the costs of the tort system and putting unwise additional 
demands on the legal system.36  Although these arguments may well be 
overstated or even wrong,37 they are not merely crabbed, formalistic 
                                                                                                                 
34 See, e.g., Francis J. Mootz, III, The Sounds of Silence, supra note 29; 
Francis J. Mootz III, Holding Liability Insurers Accountable for Bad Faith 
Litigation Tactics With the Tort of Abuse of Process, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 467, 507 
(2002); Michael Cohen, Note, No Faith in Bad Faith, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 225 
(1989).   
 
35 See generally STEMPEL, supra note 27, Ch. 10. 
 
36 See generally Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 
1988).  
 
37 In California, for example, there was a nearly 10-year period in which Royal 
Globe was the law and third-party claimants could directly sue liability insurers for 
bad faith failure to settle claims against the insurer’s policyholders.  Needless to 
say, the world did not end during the ten years in which Royal Globe held sway.  
But see ANGELA HAWKEN ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE 
EFFECTS OF THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH DOCTRINE ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 52-53 (2001), available at 
www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1199.pdf (concluding that the 
Royal Globe rule permitting third party claimants to sue defendants’ insurers for 
bad faith resulted in auto insurance premium increases of more than 10 percent).  
What cannot be assessed from the Hawken study, however, is the degree to which 
any increase in premiums may have also purchased more responsible liability 
insurer/intermediary conduct that both better served claimants and policyholders 
and reduced costs imposed on the justice system and the taxpaying public.   
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West Virginia has for many years permitted modified Royal Globe-style 
actions.  See Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 254  (1981) 
(permitting a third-party claim against an insurer but requiring that underlying suit 
against policyholder be resolved first); see also Thomas C. Cady, et. al., The Law 
of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct in West Virginia, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 
70 (1988-1999).  But this does not appear to be linked to any insurance or 
economic woes in that state.  Further, some states, most prominently Wisconsin, 
have a direct action statute that permits claimants to sue for statutory rights similar 
to those available in a common law bad faith action.  See Wis. Stat. § 632.24 
(2007); see also Wis. Stat. § 632.34 (2007); see also Wis. Stat. § 803.04 (2007).  
Wisconsin’s insurance situation does not appear to be any more problematic than 
that of California in the post-Moradi-Shalal era or that of other states barring 
claimant suits against insurers. See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (2008); see 
also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:983 (2008) (direct action statute); R.I. Gen. Laws § 
27-7-1 (2008); see also R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2 (2008) (direct action statute). Jerry 
and Richmond observed: 
 
a few states and territories – Wisconsin, Louisiana, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico, 
and Guam – have  “direct action statutes.”  The specific provisions of these 
statutes vary considerably, but their common characteristics are making the 
insurer directly liable to the injured party and permitting liability to be 
established in a single action against the insured and insurer jointly, or in an 
action against the insurer alone. 
 
See Jerry & Richmond, supra note 15, at 628 (footnotes omitted).  See also Viqar 
M. Shariff, Recent Developments, Grubbs v. Gulf International Marine Co.: The 
Louisiana Supreme Court Declares the Direct Action Statute Applicable to Marine 
P & I Insurance, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1653, 1653-54, 1662 (1994). 
Other states, through judicial decision or statute, appear to permit claimant 
actions for bad faith even in the absence of a classic direct action statute such as 
Wisconsin’s.  See, e.g., Macola v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 451, 452 
(Fla. 2006) (claimant may bring action directly against defendant’s insurer where 
there is verdict in excess of policy limits); see also Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 89 
P.3d 69, 71 (N.M. 2004) (recognizing Royal Globe-type action for auto liability 
only); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117-18 (Ky. 
1988) (interpreting Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.070 to permit such actions); Mont. 
Code. Ann. § 33-18-242 (2005) (making Royal Globe-style action available to 
claimants for failure to attempt good faith settlement after liability has become 
reasonably clear).  The availability in these states of this additional right accorded 
third-party plaintiffs appears not to have resulted in substantial economic or 
insurance mischief. 
Under these circumstances, critics of the status quo such as Professor Mootz 
can legitimately argue that the existence of third-party standing to sue for bad faith 
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assessments dependent upon only the privity of contract notion.  It remains 
difficult (at least for me) to say with certainty whether the traditional view 
of generally limiting standing to sue for bad faith to insurance 
policyholders is clearly incorrect or misguided.   
In addition, this seems to be an area where the legislative process 
has produced some positive reaction to a perceived insufficiency of 
common law judicial remedies for claimants aggrieved by insurer behavior.  
Nearly all states have some form of Unfair Claims Practices Act and nearly 
20 permit third party claimants to sue insurers directly for violations of the 
relevant state Act.38  In addition, a number of states permit third party 
claimants to sue insurers directly regarding policy coverage.39   
Consequently, limiting common bad faith actions directly against 
insurers by third-party claimants due to absence of contract privity appears 
not to be a major defect of modern insurance jurisprudence (although 
neither does it seem essential to the effective operation of insurance).  
Some of the same arguments can of course be marshaled in favor of 
intermediary immunity.  But properly assessed, the immunity of 
                                                                                                                          
would encourage better behavior by insurers with relatively little negative external 
costs.  But conversely, neither does it appear that the absence of these third-party 
rights has prevented policyholders and their proxies from enforcing good faith 
obligations upon insurers.  Most commonly, where insurer bad faith occurs in 
significant degree, the policyholder assigns its potential rights of relief to the 
claimant and the action is pursued.  Although insurers with less vigilant 
policyholders may “get away” with some bad faith conduct as a result of the status 
quo, this does not appear to be a gaping hole in the fabric of justice.  More 
potentially troublesome is the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent punitive damages 
jurisprudence, which as a matter of law has constitutionalized limits on punitive 
damages that may be imposed upon insurers even for intentional, serious, 
widespread, and long-standing bad faith conduct.  See State Farm Mutual Auto. 
Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003); see generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
LITIGATION ROAD:  THE STORY OF CAMPBELL v. STATE FARM Chs. 17, 22-23 (2008) 
(despite considerable evidence of record of insurer’s recalcitrant insistence on 
treating liability policyholders in bad faith, presumptive maximum punitive 
damages limited to nine times amount of substantial compensatory awards). 
 
38 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 
(Ky. 1989) (interpreting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.070 to permit such actions); 
see also MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-18-242 (2005); supra note 37.    
    
39 See, e.g., supra note 37. 
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intermediaries is another matter, both in terms of public policy and law.  
Unfortunately, courts have tended to overly equate the concept of a direct 
tort victim action against the policyholder’s insurer and a policyholder’s 
action against the independent adjuster hired by its insurer. 
For example, during the brief reign of Royal Globe, California 
courts appeared to accept the proposition that the state’s Unfair Claims 
Practices Act applied to independent adjusters (and by inference other 
downstream intermediaries) because these adjusters were in the insurance 
business within the meaning and purpose of the statute.40  However, since 
Moradi-Shalal deposed Royal Globe, several California courts have 
disapproved of these holdings, reasoning that if a third party cannot sue an 
insurer directly for bad faith, persons without a contract with an adjuster 
cannot sue the adjuster for bad faith.41  The California Supreme Court has 
never resolved the issue and it remains a technically open one in the state, 
although most observers would probably conclude that the current 
California Supreme Court is unlikely to permit bad faith suits against 
                                                                                                                 
40 See, e.g., Bodenhamer v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488-89 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986) (noting that it would “be odd to construe the [Unfair Claims Act] as 
prohibiting unfair settlement practices by employees of an insurance company but 
as not prohibiting identical acts when perpetrated by an independent adjuster 
working for an insurance company” and observing that licensing and regulation of 
adjusters fell under the auspices of the state insurance commissioner); see also 
Davis v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 224 Cal. Rptr. 66 (Cal. App. 1986); see also James I. 
Devitt & Robert C. Hastie, Note, Independent Insurance Adjusters Liable for Bad 
Faith:  Fair or Farce?, 64 W. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 233, 235 (1986-1987) 
(approving Bodenhamer and Davis results). 
 
41 See, e.g., Stone v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714. 730-31 n.26 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (”the Davis and Bodenhamer cases, which extended statutory 
bad faith liability to independent adjusters, were decided prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Moradi-Shalal and are now of doubtful validity”) (citation 
omitted); see also Henry v. Assoc. Indem. Corp., 266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 585 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990).  Even prior to  Moradi-Shalal, some California decisions resisted 
holding independent adjusters accountable under the Unfair Claims Practices Act.  
See, e.g., Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 684 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1985); see also Richardson v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1984). 
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downstream intermediaries by parties not in privity of contract with the 
intermediary.42 
Nothwithstanding the conventional wisdom, the assessment that 
adjuster statutory liability was erased by Moradi-Shalal is in my view 
incorrect, at least if the “third party” suing the adjuster is a policyholder of 
the insurer that retained the adjuster.  Under these circumstances, it is quite 
clear to the adjuster that it is the representative of an insurer with fiduciary-
like duties of good faith to the policyholder and that the policyholder is 
dependent upon the adjuster’s actions just as it is dependent on the 
insurer’s actions at a time of substantial vulnerability.  A harder question is 
whether anyone other than the policyholder can lay claim to a statutory 
cause of action against the adjuster.  But in between the extremes of no 
liability and bad faith exposure to a bevy of third parties, lies the 
reasonable common law compromise of permitting tort actions in 
negligence (or perhaps only for greater misconduct) against downstream 
intermediaries. 
As a matter of legal realism, Ashley’s lament that courts have 
focused too formalistically on privity of contract holds considerable force.  
Although MGAs and independent adjusters may not have formal contract 
relations with policyholders or others involved in the transaction, these 
intermediaries in essence assume the role of the insurer in addressing loss 
claims.  Under these circumstances, courts have been too slow to realize 
that intermediaries playing this role have also in essence stepped into the 
shoes of the insurer for these claims and thus logically should be held to the 
same legal standards governing the insurer.  In these cases, both 
policyholders and other reasonably foreseeable third party claimants should 
be able to bring claims if injured by the misconduct of the 
intermediary/insurer. 
The problem is not that courts initially focused on the insurance 
contract and the covenant of good faith in articulating the existence of a 
bad faith cause of action against insurers.  The problem is that courts have 
been too slow to realize an absence of contract rights hardly answers the 
question of whether one social actor owes duties to another.  An obvious 
example is simply driving.  We have no contract relations with other 
                                                                                                                 
42 For example, Stone v. New England Insurance, discussed in the previous 
footnote, was authored by Judge Walter Croskey, who is also co-author of the 
California Practice Guide on Insurance Litigation and an acknowledged authority 
on the topic.  See generally 214 Cal. Rptr. 679; see also WALTER CROSKEY & REX 
HEESEMAN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:  INSURANCE LITIGATION (2005). 
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motorists on the road, pedestrians, or bicyclists.  But this is not any 
defense, much less an absolute defense, to our tort liability should we 
negligently injure any of these persons.  The very nature of our activity in 
relation to these third parties creates duties of reasonable care.   
The mistake of courts insisting on independent intermediary 
immunity is that they have wrongly assumed that the absence of a contract 
with policyholders not only fails to create contract rights but also erects a 
shield exempting the intermediary from the ordinary application of tort law.  
Under accepted tort law principles, claims intermediaries stand in a close 
relation to policyholders, are in a position to inflict considerable harm on 
vulnerable policyholders, and are well aware of their substantial power to 
inflict this harm.  Injury to policyholders from wrongful behavior by 
adjusters is readily foreseeable.  Courts have also been too reluctant to 
recognize that intermediaries assuming the functions of the insurer are a de 
facto part of that same contract and same covenant that protects 
policyholders by imposing legal duties on the insurer.   
After decades of resisting recognition, courts like Gruenberg were 
finally recognizing what in retrospect seems obvious.  A first-party 
insurance policy creates a special relationship between policyholder and 
insurer just as does a third-party insurance policy.  Further, the first-party 
policyholder looking to an insurer to pay a property, life, health or 
disability claim is often just as vulnerable and dependent upon the insurer 
as is the third-party liability policyholder facing a lawsuit.  But having just 
come to this realization, courts were understandably reluctant to 
immediately begin making this new action for first-party bad faith available 
against intermediaries as well as insurers. 
Regardless of the issue of contract privity, there still remains the 
separate issue of whether the intermediary as a disclosed insurer’s agent 
should be immune from tort-based claims for compensation by parties 
injured from the intermediary’s activity.  As discussed above, courts have 
traditionally taken this view but such cases are far less frequent than cases 
immunizing intermediaries on privity of contract grounds.  Infrequent or 
not, however, this rationale remains one that must be addressed.  Further, 
the agency rationale arguably has a sounder public policy grounding than 
the lack-of-privity defense to intermediary liability.  One can argue with 
some force that intermediary liability is unnecessary so long as the insurer 
is itself held accountable for misconduct toward the policyholder.  But 
ultimately the agency immunity rationale, like the lack-of-privity rationale, 
founders for the reasons set forth in the next section.     
 
 
626 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
A. PROBLEMS OF THE NOW DATED TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
 
Like the citadel of privity itself, the privity defense to agent 
immunity began to look shopworn over time and out of sync with modern 
commerce, as did the traditional rule of immunity for the agents of 
disclosed principals.  The story of the fall of the citadel of privity in 
product liability tort law has been well chronicled in the near-century since 
the walls began to crumble.43  Although retailers and manufacturers are not 
strictly in a principal-agent relationship, there are enough similarities to 
make this development of product liability law analogous to the eroding 
rationale for insurance intermediary immunity.   
In the product liability context, society found retailers selling 
products that, if defective, could exact substantial injuries on consumers 
and the public generally.  If Marley’s products are adulterated and Dickens 
consumes them after purchase at Cratchett’s corner store, an odd variant of 
the earlier hypothetical illustration occurred.  Dickens was injured 
(physically as well as economically).  If he had purchased knowing that 
Cratchett was but an agent for Marley, he would have a cause of action 
against the deeper-pocketed Marley.  But because the Dickens contract is 
with Cratchett, traditional contract warranty law and tort law gave Dickens 
a legal claim only against the more modestly heeled Cratchett.   
In a world prior to the widespread sale of commercial general 
liability insurance, this potentially left Dickens with little hope for 
significant compensation, unless he was willing to force a sale of 
Cratchett’s assets and potentially remove a well-liked merchant and store 
from the neighborhood.  The real culprit is Marley, purveyor of adulterated 
products, but under the traditional privity of contract rule, he lay beyond 
the reach of tort or contract law in any claim by Dickens. 
The situation soon proved untenable from a public policy 
perspective.  Once New York Court of Appeals Judge Benjamin Cardozo 
broke through the formalist barriers to a saner approach in MacPherson v. 
                                                                                                                 
43 See Dobbs, supra note 9, § 353; M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 1.2 (2d ed. 1988); see generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1965-1966); William L. 
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE 
L.J. 1099 (1959-1960).  
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Buick, the walls of the citadel of privity began to crumble rapidly.44  By the 
middle of the 20th Century, courts were permitting the Dickens plaintiffs of 
the world to successfully sue the Marley defendants under a theory of 
consumer product warranty or tort law product liability or both.  
Manufacturers and wholesalers could no longer hide behind contractual 
privity.  Not only injured customers but often other third parties whose 
injuries were foreseeable could vindicate their legal rights.45 
Similarly, retailers like Cratchett were unable to hide behind 
agency immunity.  In operating retail establishments and making sales of 
products, they were in direct contractual relationships with consumers.  
They may have been agents of sorts for manufacturers but they were not 
pure agents acting only as conduits for the principal.  They were free-
standing contracting parties in their own right.  As a result, consumers and 
the public had available to them a relatively broad scope of potential legal 
relief against multiple culpable defendants in cases of product liability.  
Although some may argue that the rights of injured product users are too 
broad and impose too great a burden on commerce, this legal regime enjoys 
general acceptance.46 
                                                                                                                 
44 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see also 
Prosser, supra note 9, § 96; Dobbs, supra note 9, § 353 (2000); see generally 
Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 43, at 793. 
 
45 See Prosser, supra note 9, § 100.  
 
46 See Prosser, supra note 9, § 100. Dobbs, like other modern product liability 
scholars, also notes the degree to which perceived problems with the breadth of the 
mid-20th Century product liability regime resulted in some revision and arguable 
contraction in the scope of strict liability.  Dobbs observes that the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (1998): 
 
[D]rops all references to strict products liability.  Its view is that courts have 
mostly come to apply negligence standards in determining design and warning 
defects, even when they maintained the language of strict liability.  The effect, 
although not the language of the Products Restatement is that strict liability is 
retained when it comes to product flaws, but negligence or something very much 
like it, is the test of liability when it comes to design and warning defects.  
 
Dobbs, supra note 9, § 353 (footnotes omitted).   
 
Although the Dobbs analysis is correct as to the substantive law of torts, the 
pro-defendant product liability trends of the past 20 years have not in any 
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But the arguable flip side of the fall of the citadel of privity has yet 
to take place regarding insurance intermediaries – at least not completely -- 
even though the insurance industry arguably has changed in ways 
paralleling product sales and distribution.  Cases today are divided 
regarding the liability of downstream intermediaries, with the majority 
clinging to the general rules protecting these intermediaries: privity of 
contract and disclosed principal grounds. 
Until the mid-20th Century, insurers tended to themselves 
administer the policies they sold.  The policyholder was billed for 
premiums by an insurance company employee.  Documentary records were 
maintained by an insurer employee.  When there was a claim (either first-
party or third-party), the claim was handled by an insurer employee.  This 
began to change significantly after mid-century as insurers increasingly 
outsourced policy administration and claims adjustment functions to 
independent contractors.  By the 1980s, even the underwriting and policy 
placement functions had been outsourced by some insurers.  Instead of 
compartmentalized outsourcing of billing, record-keeping, or claims 
adjustment, insurers increasingly made use of MGAs, who not only 
combined these functions but also in essence did the underwriting 
traditionally performed by insurers.   
Some of the wave of solvency problems affecting insurers during 
the 1980s and early 1990s were blamed on the lax underwriting standards 
of MGAs, who had an economic incentive to write lots of business (and 
earn higher fees) while having comparatively less motivation to make sure 
that the policies were issued to good risks.  When the figurative chickens 
came home to their metaphorical roost, there were a number of prominent 
insurance insolvencies.  Although the solvency problems facing Lloyds of 
London were primarily rooted in long-tail asbestos and environmental 
coverage obligations, some of these problems – which led to the form of 
Equitas in 199647 were also ascribed to overly aggressive underwriting by 
                                                                                                                          
appreciable way restricted a potential plaintiff’s array of potential target 
defendants.  Manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and installers are 
all subject to suit by foreseeable product users while the “disclosed principal” and 
“lack of privity” defenses have generally not been available to defendants. 
 
47 See Lloyd’s v. Jaffray, (1999) Q.B. (Colman, J) (describing background of 
Lloyd’s crisis of early 1990s and formation of Equitas Re); see generally 
ELISABETH LEUSSENHOP & MARTIN MAYER, RISKY BUSINESS:  AN INSIDER’S 
ACCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT LLOYD’S OF LONDON (1995); see also Richard J. 
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MGAs for American insurers reinsured by Lloyd’s or involved in risk 
placement for which Lloyds’ syndicates provided excess or umbrella 
insurance.  
My concern in this article is not whether independent contractors 
like MGAs and independent adjusters are better or worse at their jobs than 
insurer employees or their respective contribution to problematic insurance 
practices.  My point and contention is much narrower and simpler.  For 
better or worse, these intermediaries have assumed many of the traditional 
functions of an insurer to a sufficient degree that for most practical 
purposes, the actions of the intermediary are the actions of the insurer.   
Under these circumstances, the traditional citadel of contract 
privity now seems as outmoded in this situation as it does in the context of 
product liability.  In addition, these intermediaries have morphed from 
mere agents into the alter ego replacements of insurers, as least as respects 
their dealings with policyholders and the public.  Consequently, a rule of 
law immunizing them from the consequences of their conduct toward these 
groups appears increasingly outdated, unfair, and insufficiently deterrent of 
negligent or wrongful behavior by these intermediaries.  
Some of the problem may result from the relative youth of the bad 
faith cause of action, particularly in first-party cases.  Liability insurers 
have been subject to bad faith faith claims for as long as 75 years in some 
jurisdictions. But many states did not solidify this potential exposure until 
the 1960s or later.  First-party bad faith came later, essentially being 
birthed in the 1970s or later.48  When confronted with these relatively new 
causes of action against insurers, courts were understandably reluctant to 
expand bad faith liability to entities other than the insurer.  Until courts 
better understood the relatively new tort of insurance bad faith, they were 
inclined to apply traditional agency and privity of contract rules as a means 
of regulating the spread of bad faith claims. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
Astor, Lloyd’s of London: The Curious Case of Equitas Re, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 32 (2004). 
 
48 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 27, Ch. 10; see also, 
supra notes 24-29. 
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B. THE HALTING MODERN EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIARY 
LIABILITY 
 
As the use of intermediaries increased in the claims process, there 
was of course a corresponding increase in complaints about the manner in 
which they performed this function.  When denied insurance coverage or 
victimized by claims handling misconduct, aggrieved policyholders and 
claimants brought suit against the intermediaries as well as the insurers 
involved.  Although the intermediaries often avoided liability under the 
traditional immunizing doctrines of lack-of-privity and agent-for-a-
disclosed-principal, an increasing number of courts recognized that the 
nature of the intermediaries’ role made it inappropriate to apply the 
traditional rules. 
The first prominent case to expressly impose duties to the 
policyholder upon an independent adjuster was Continental Insurance v. 
Bayless and Roberts, Inc.49  In Bayless, the policyholder was sued due to 
explosion of a “paint pot” it owned that was used by the victim in painting 
aircraft.  The insurer, using an independent adjuster, accused the 
policyholder of failure to cooperate and threatened to cease defense of the 
claim unless the policyholder agreed to a reservation of rights.  The 
policyholder “refused to accept such a conditioned defense” and the insurer 
“withdrew from the case.”  Left in the lurch,  
 
B&R settled the tort action, agreed to entry of a 
consent judgment for $618,000, and then sued [insurer] 
Continental and its chief adjuster to recover the amount of 
the judgment as well as punitive damages.  The case went 
to trial and resulted in an award of $622,000 in damages to 
B&R, based on the jury’s finding that Continental and its 
adjuster, Arthur Stanford, had negligently conducted 
B&R’s defense, and that the insurance company had 
breached its duty to defend its insured.50 
 
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the trial court 
that under these circumstances, the policyholder was entitled to make a bad 
                                                                                                                 
49 608 P.2d 281, 288 (Alaska 1980). 
 
50 See id., at 283-84. 
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faith claim against the adjuster, affirming the verdict as reasonable.  The 
unfortunate adjuster found liable (Arthur Stanford) was branch manager of 
Underwriters Adjusting Company, an Anchorage-based “subsidiary of 
Continental Corporation” that functioned “as the claims department of 
Continental Insurance,” which was also a subsidiary of Continental 
Corporation.  Notwithstanding Stanford’s perhaps incestuous relationship 
with the Continental family, it appears he qualified as an independent 
adjuster and was not sued in the capacity as an arguable individual 
employee of the insurer. 
The policyholder had successfully accused Stanford of failing to 
adequately investigate the claim against it as well as failing to inform the 
policyholder regarding the case, all in breach of an asserted fiduciary duty 
that demonstrated “gross and wanton disregard” for the interests of the 
policyholder.  Evidence presented at trial suggested that adjuster Stanford 
had failed to inform defense counsel of problematic facts and had failed to 
disclose to counsel that the insurer had authorized up to $10,000 to settle 
the case.   
Relying on Gruenberg51 and Iversen,52 adjuster Stanford argued 
that he could not be sued because of his absence of a contractual 
relationship with the policyholder.  Even though Iverson had, like 
Gruenberg, generally been viewed as a case tending to immunize 
intermediaries, the Alaska Court noted that even under Iverson a claim for 
relief could lie, describing Iverson as a case in which “[t]he court held that 
the agent’s liability would depend upon the plaintiff’s theory of recovery.”  
If the plaintiff was asserting only contractual claims, California law per 
Gruenberg and Iverson barred the claims on lack-of-privity grounds and 
“Stanford could not be held liable for a breach of the fiduciary duty of good 
faith arising out of the insurance contract . . . .”  However, intermediaries 
like Stanford “could be held liable for negligence arising out of a breach of 
the general tort duty of ordinary care.”53 
The Bayless Court’s interpretation of California law is open to 
more than a little debate and appears to have been refuted by the latter 
state’s continued practice of largely immunizing intermediaries during the 
                                                                                                                 
51 See generally Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (1973). 
 
52 Iversen v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 49, 50-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
 
53 See 608 P.2d, at 287. 
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ensuing 17 years.54  But regardless of whether Bayless correctly interpreted 
California law, it nonetheless provided a beachhead in opposition to the 
historical view that contract privity and disclosed agency protected TPAs 
and adjusters.  The Bayless Court also saw its decision as a natural 
extension of Alaska law holding that an insurance agent could be liable for 
negligent failure to provide requested insurance even if the agent was 
working for an insurance company that was a disclosed principal.55 
Bayless broke away from the traditional formal rule of adjuster 
immunity but hardly produced an avalanche of case law rejecting the rule.  
It would be six years before another state supreme court followed suit.  In 
Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos.56, New Hampshire took a similar approach.  
The home of the policyholders was destroyed by fire and they sought 
coverage from their property insurer, which retained an independent 
investigator to perform a cause-and-origin analysis of the fire.57  The 
investigator subsequently assessed the fire as suspicious, leading to claim 
                                                                                                                 
54   See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc.,  84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
799, 802-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (policyholder may not bring claim for injury 
based on independent adjuster’s negligence). 
 
55   See Cont’l Ins., 608 P.2d at 287-88 (citing Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 498 
P.2d 702, 704 (Alaska 1972)).  Bayless & Roberts remains good law in Alaska but 
there has not been any particular flood of litigation against adjusters, who appear to 
remain peripheral to much insurance coverage litigation.  See, e.g., Gibson v. 
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 312, 316-17 (Alaska 2007) (affirming trial court 
decision to prohibit discovery directed at independent adjusters in policyholder’s 
underinsured motorist claim made against her insurer). Oddly, the policyholder 
claimed only that she was owed additional UIM benefits from the insurer after 
having received $50,000 policy limits “plus $12,747.50 in add-ons” under the 
tortfeasor’s coverage and did not allege bad faith against the insurer, which 
presumably would have opened the door to discovery from adjusters. Id. at 314. 
The policyholder prevailed at trial, but only to the tune of a few thousand dollars. 
Id. at 315-16. The opinion has an air of trying to put the case to bed and some 
annoyance with the policyholder (or counsel’s) insistence on prosecuting a case of 
such limited magnitude.  
 
56  506 A.2d 333 (N.H. 1986). 
 
57 Id. at 333. 
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denial by the insurer.58  The policyholders sued the investigator as well as 
the insurer, alleging negligence in the conduct of the investigation.59   
The trial court accepted the investigator’s defense of lack-of-privity 
and dismissed the claim.60  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that an 
investigative agent of an insurer conducting a claim investigation owed a 
duty of good faith to the policyholder “arising out of the [insurance] 
company’s duty of good faith and fair dealing.”61  The Court bolstered its 
determination by noting that investigators were required to be licensed and 
were subject to a “general duty to use due care” in the performance of their 
work.62   
In addition, the Court noted that existing precedent had held a bank 
responsible to a beneficiary with which it had no contract for failing to 
establish a survivorship account requested by the bank’s customer.63  A 
contractual tie was not necessary to create duties in that case because the 
bank was aware that the beneficiary would be harmed from negligent 
discharge of the bank’s contractual duties.64  Although the investigative 
agency and the individual investigator were not in privity with the 
plaintiffs, 
 
[T]hey were fully aware that the plaintiffs could be 
harmed financially if they performed their investigation in 
a negligent manner and rendered a report to [the insurer] 
that would cause the company to refuse payment to the 
plaintiffs.  [They] were also aware that there was a mutual 
duty of fair dealing between [the insurer] and the plaintiffs.  
                                                                                                                 
58 Id. at 334. 
 
59 Id. 
 
60 Id. 
 
61 Id. 
 
62 Morvay, 506 A.2d at 334. 
 
63 Id. at 334-35. 
 
64 Id. (citing Robinson v. Colebrook Guar. Sav. Bank, 254 A.2d 837, 839 
(N.H. 1969)). 
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Under these circumstances, we hold that the plaintiffs have 
stated a cause of action in negligence [against the 
investigator and the employee.] . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
. . .  Although . . . the investigators may give 
reports only to the insurer, the insured is a foreseeably 
affected third party. . . . Both the insured and the insurer 
have a stake in the outcome of the investigation.  Thus, we 
hold that the investigators owe a duty to the insured as well 
as to the insurer to conduct a fair and reasonable 
investigation of an insurance claim and that the motion to 
dismiss should not have been granted.65 
 
The Morvay Court also analogized the liability of the investigator 
to that of accountants, who “are liable in an action sounding in negligence 
to that group of persons who foreseeably may rely on the accountants’ 
work.”66  Consequently, “accountants may be held liable to persons with 
whom they are not in privity if they perform their work negligently and the 
plaintiffs are within the class of persons who could have reasonably relied 
on the accountants’ work product.”67  Without actually articulating the 
connection, the Court had implicitly put the relatively new wine of claims 
intermediary liability in the old skin of liability for misconduct that causes 
foreseeable injury to a known person or class of persons, something that 
had been part of the majority rule regarding public accountant liability for 
more than 50 years68 and was also part of the accepted approach to the 
                                                                                                                 
65 Id. at 335 (citing Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 
287-88 (Alaska 1980)). 
 
66 Id. 
 
67 Id. (citing Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308, 1312 
(N.H. 1982)). 
 
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 552 (1977) (auditor liable to 
foreseeable users of audit for negligence).  See, e.g., Nevada Nat’l Bank v. Gold 
Star Meat Co., Inc., 514 P.2d 651, 654 (Nev. 1973); M. Miller Co. v. Central 
Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).  But see, 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444-45 (N.Y. 1931) (limiting auditor 
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liability of attorneys preparing instruments upon which non-clients would 
rely.69 
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court was potentially 
casting a very broad net of liability that included not only the entity 
involved in claims processing, but also individual employees working on a 
matter, it placed some practical theoretical limits on its expansion of 
intermediary liability. 
 
[T]he scope of the investigators’ duty must be 
determined in the light of their contract with the insurer.  
The investigator who contracts to perform a $200 
investigation is not obligated to expend the same effort that 
might be reasonable for a fee of $2,000, nor is an 
investigator obligated to continue an inquiry when the 
insurer instructs him to stop.  The investigator’s obligation 
is to exercise reasonable care in performing the work 
within the limits set by the insurer and to advise the insurer 
in the event that the investigator has reason to believe that 
the investigation is too limited to form the basis for a 
reliable conclusion.70 
 
In essence, the Morvay Court was making the common sense 
conclusion that where a claims intermediary was acting as a surrogate or 
alter ego of the insurer, liability was likely to follow.  But where the 
intermediary’s role and authority were limited, the traditional defenses of 
lack of contractual privity and disclosed agency would likely continue to 
have force in apt cases. 
After Morvay, it would be another five years before another state 
supreme court spoke in favor of the potentially emerging modern rule.  
Then, in Bass v. California Life Insurance Co., Mississippi affirmed the 
general rule that the policyholder could not sue an independent adjuster for 
                                                                                                                          
liability for negligence to situations where auditor is not in contractual privity to 
injured party). 
 
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000); 
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois 
law). 
 
70 Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335. 
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simple negligence, but then broke ranks with the historical norm by also 
holding that a cause of action would lie if the independent adjuster had 
acted with gross negligence, malice, or reckless disregard for the rights of 
the policyholder.71  However, the adjuster must have sufficient independent 
authority to make it more than simply an appendage of the insurer.  If the 
adjuster lacks authority to rule on claims without insurer approval, the 
traditional rule of no intermediary liability still obtains.72 
Additional support for the modern approach accelerated during the 
1990s.  Courts in New Jersey,73 Georgia,74 and Nevada75 as well as some 
federal decisions76 endorsed the view that intermediaries with substantial 
insurer-like duties and autonomy could be liable for bad faith or other 
misconduct toward the policyholder.  In the 21st Century, Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
71  581 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted). 
 
72 See, e.g., Ironworks Unlimited v. Purvis, 798 F. Supp. 1261, 1265-66 (S.D. 
Miss. 1992) (acknowledging that Bass is controlling state law but distinguishing 
the instant case because the independent contractor adjuster lacked autonomy of 
adjuster in Bass).  In a tangentially related development indicating relaxation of 
historical doctrine favorable to intermediaries, Pennsylvania held that brokers owe 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing rather than merely a duty of reasonable care.  
See Londo v. McLaughlin, 587 A.2d 744, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
 
73 See Miglicio v. HCM Claim Mgmt. Corp., 672 A.2d 266, 273 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1995).  Regarding the rather complex web of bad faith and related 
liability in Pennsylvania, see Goren, supra note 26, at 276-81. 
 
74 See Gardner & White Consulting Servs., Inc. v. Ray, 474 S.E.2d 663, 665 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
 
75  See Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 969 P.2d 949, 960 (Nev. 1998). 
 
76 See, e.g., Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 797-98 (10th Cir. 
1995) (applying Oklahoma law) (finding a requisite special relationship existed 
between the medical plan beneficiary and the plan administrator where the 
administrator performed many of the tasks of insurer).  Wolf not only correctly 
predicted the path of Oklahoma law but influenced it in that subsequent state 
decisions were persuaded by the reasoning of the Wolf court. 
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adopted this approach,77 as did Colorado, specifically disapproving 
contrary precedent from the 1980s.78  Favorable New Mexico precedent 
also emerged.79  Most recently, a Rhode Island federal trial court predicted 
that the state would eventually permit bad claims against independent 
adjusters where the intermediary has sufficiently assumed the traditional 
administrative and adjusting functions of an insurer80 and an Ohio appellate 
court has also written approvingly about this “management theory” of 
liability for parties linked to insurers when sued by persons not in direct 
contract privity with the defendant.81 
 The cases permitting actions against the adjuster tend to divide, a 
bit unevenly, as to both the type of action permitted and the factual 
                                                                                                                 
77  See Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d  1080, 1100-03 (Okla. 2005); 
Wathor v. Mut. Assurance Adm’rs, Inc., 87 P.3d 559, 562-63 (Okla. 2004); Brown 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).   
 
78 See Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462, 466 (Colo. 2003) 
(overruling prior contrary line of cases, including Gorab v. Equity Gen. Agents, 
Inc., 661 P.2d 1196, 1198-99 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 
79 See, e.g., Dellaira v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 102 P.3d 111, 115 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2004) (largely following Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis in Cary v. United of 
Omaha). 
 
80 See Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Chubb Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274-275 
(D.R.I. 2007). 
 
81 See Dombrowski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 
2007).  In Dombrowski, however, the issue for decision was slightly different in 
that it focused on whether a parent company of an insurer could be held 
responsible for insurer misconduct.  Id. at 228-29.   The federal court ruled that 
corporate separateness was not a bar to liability if the facts demonstrated sufficient 
parental company control over the insurer’s coverage and claims decisions.  See id. 
at 230.  Although Dombrowski was in a narrow sense a “piercing the corporate 
veil” case, the court gave a rather ringing endorsement to what it termed the 
“management theory” of liability for parties not in contract privity with a plaintiff 
and cited approvingly Dellaira v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 102 P.3d 111 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2004), Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1979) and other cases supporting liability for claims intermediaries that in effect 
take over the insurer’s traditional claims handling and decision-making function.  
Id. at 235-39. 
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predicate required to impose liability on the claims intermediary.  One 
group of cases is willing to permit bad faith or similar actions against the 
intermediary if it is in a collaborative “joint venture” arrangement with the 
insurer or otherwise has stepped into the shoes of the insurer for purposes 
of claims administration.82  Another group permits claims against the 
adjuster based on a lower threshold of mere tort duties owed to the 
policyholder or other third party sufficient to permit a claim sounding in 
simple negligence.83  Some jurisdictions appear to recognize both grounds 
for liability.84  One court predicting state law was willing to allow a bad 
                                                                                                                 
82 See, e.g., Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 969 P.2d 949, 959 (Nev. 
1998) (bad faith claim against intermediary permitted if it is in a “joint venture” 
with insurer as evidenced by sharing of financial incentives); Farr v. Transamerica 
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 376, 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Dellaira 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 102 P.3d 111, 115 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).  See also id. at 116 
(“An insured’s expectations of good faith handling and ultimate determination of 
his or her claim for benefits by the insurer extends no less to an entity that both 
handles and determines the claim than to the insurer issuing the policy. `Absent the 
prospect of damages for bad faith breach, [the entity performing claims 
determination] has no incentive to pay in good faith[.]’”) (quoting Cary v. United 
of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462, 468-69 (Colo. 2003)). 
 
83 See, e.g., Bass v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 581 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Miss. 1991) 
(intermediary can be liable for gross negligence, recklessness, or other misconduct 
exceeding mere negligence); Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 506 A.2d 333, 335 
(N.H. 1986) (adjuster owes duty of reasonable care to policyholder and may be 
liable for negligence); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 
281, 287-88 (Alaska 1980) (same).  See also Shephard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 562, at *18 (S.D. Ohio. June 6, 2006) (predicting that Ohio will 
eventually adopt this view). 
 
84 For example, a leading Colorado case, Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. 
Co., 68 P.3d 462, 468-69 (Colo. 2003), found defendant third-party administrator 
to have performed most of the functions normally done by insurer and to have a 
substantial financial interest in denying claims because of the administrator’s 
reinsurance contract with policyholder municipality.  Therefore, it was logical to 
hold the TPA to insurer standards of conduct and liability.   See also Robertson 
Stephens, Inc. v. Chubb Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273-74 (D. R.I. 2007) 
(reading Cary as a case requiring substantial intertwinement of administrator and 
insurer similar to joint venture theory of Wohlers and Farr (See supra note 70) to 
impose bad faith liability on TPA.  I read Cary more broadly as also permitting 
negligence and other tort actions against a TPA under apt circumstances even if the 
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TPA does not rise to the level of being a surrogate insurer subject to bad faith 
liability.   
 Oklahoma is clearly a jurisdiction that operates on a two-track system of 
liability for claims intermediaries.  Two state supreme court cases have largely 
adopted the “joint venture” or “intertwinement of functions” theory of 
intermediary liability under which the claims intermediary may be sued for bad 
faith in the manner of an insurer if the facts demonstrate that the intermediary has 
largely assumed the functions of the insurer regarding policy administration, 
including wide discretion in claims decision-making, particularly if there are 
significant financial incentives for the intermediary to deny claims.  See Badillo v. 
Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080, 1101-03 (Okla. 2005) (refusing to dismiss 
bad faith claim against intermediary at pretrial stage); Wathor v. Mutual Assur. 
Adm’rs, Inc.., 87 P.3d 559 (Okla. 2004) (accepting joint venture theory of 
intermediary bad faith but dismissing instant claim as a factually insufficient as a 
matter of law).  But see 87 P.3d at 564 (Opala, V.C.J. and Watt, C.J., dissenting on 
ground that preliminary facts entitled plaintiff to discovery on intertwinement 
issues and that general agency principles could support tort liability depending on 
facts adduced at trial). 
 In addition, Oklahoma has a strong precedent supporting the existence of 
a negligence cause of action against insurance intermediaries where the facts of the 
case establish sufficient connection to the plaintiff to create a duty of reasonable 
care.  See infra text accompanying notes 151-52 (discussing the reasoning of 
Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) 
approvingly).  The state Supreme Court has never cited Brown, a particularly odd 
omission in cases like Badillo and Wathor, which dealt with the issue of 
intermediary liability.  My own theory is that the blinders counsel and courts 
occasionally put on themselves created a situation in which the Supreme Court was 
so focused on the bad faith claims as prosecuted by the plaintiffs in Badillo and 
Wathor that it did not think to address whether tort liability via negligence and the 
Brown precedent might be applicable. 
 In any event, although Brown has not had ringing endorsement from the 
state supreme court, it continues to be treated as authoritative Oklahoma law, both 
for its pronouncements on tortious interference with contract and its views on 
claims adjuster liability, the more germane part of the opinion for purposes of this 
article.  See, e.g., D & D Equip. & Supply Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s 
London, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74784, at *7-8 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2007); Ishamel 
v. Andrew, 137 P.3d 1271, 1274-75 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006).  Brown also was 
favorably cited by a federal trial court applying Ohio law in an intermediary 
liability situation.  See Shephard v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 76, at *17.  At this 
juncture, it thus appears that persons aggrieved by claims intermediaries may 
pursue either a straight-forward negligence tort for recovery or seek to sue the 
intermediary for bad faith where the adjuster has sufficiently assumed core insurer 
operations. 
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faith claim against an administrator sufficiently intertwined with an insurer 
but refused to allow a simple negligence action against the administrator.85  
As discussed in more detail below, my proposed framework for 
intermediary liability would permit both types of actions against adjusters 
based on the facts of the particular case.86 
Despite their differences at the margin, the common thread of these 
decisions is not so much a rejection of the general rule as a recognition that 
in many cases, insurance intermediaries act more like substitute insurers 
than mere agents.  Almost all of the decisions sustaining liability claims 
insisted that the intermediary engage in more than merely ministerial and 
robotic claims handling commanded by the insurer as principal to the 
intermediary’s limited agency.87  Some of these decisions went further in 
                                                                                                                 
85  See, e.g., Robertson Stephens, 473 F. Supp. 2d, at 273-78.  The Robertson 
Stephens opinion is so thorough and scholarly that one flinches from disagreeing 
with it, even in part.  However, the Court’s refusal to permit a negligence action in 
a situation it found apt for a bad faith action seems irreconcilably inconsistent, 
even if it as a practical matter does not strip the plaintiff of any serious litigation 
prerogatives.  (If the policyholder can sue for bad faith, suing for mere negligence 
is unlikely to lead to a greater recovery.)  If the claims administrator is sufficiently 
linked to the insurer to be sued as an insurer and owe a fiduciary-like duty of good 
faith to the policyholder, this same administrator must also logically owe the 
policyholder at least a basic tort duty of reasonable care.   
Robertson Stephens is a finely crafted opinion that seems to veer off track in 
this regard, although it was arguably forced to by controlling Rhode Island 
precedent, particularly the state’s general hesitance to impose on commercial 
actors liability for negligence toward third parties.  See id. at 276-81.  The Court 
noted that it was “not entirely unsympathetic to Plaintiffs’ call to augment in law 
the obligations of independent administrators . . . but Rhode Island precedents and 
the majority approach [of adjuster immunity absent a joint venture with the 
insurer] must stay the Court’s hand.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court is perfectly 
capable of pioneering new frontiers in the law of negligence on its own, and is in a 
better position to do so.”).  See id. at 280-81 (also noting that plaintiff chose 
federal forum and therefore cannot “grumble” about federal court reluctance to 
push boundaries of state law). 
 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 177-221. 
 
87 Bayless & Roberts and Morvay are arguably close to permitting liability 
even if the agency is limited.  See supra notes accompanying text 49-63.  For 
example, the Robertson Stephens court read them this way.  See Robertson Stevens, 
473 F Supp. 2d at 280.  I disagree.  In both Bayless and Morvay, the agents (an 
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requiring substantially autonomous claims administration so that the 
intermediary was in effect the decisionmaker regarding the claim and not 
merely a vessel of communication between insurer and policyholder.88  
Some also required a partnership or joint venture-like financial stake by the 
intermediary that gave it an incentive to dispute claims going beyond 
whatever natural tendency the adjuster might have to minimize payments in 
order to please the principle.89 
As the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed: 
 
In a situation where a plan administrator performs 
many of the tasks of an insurance company, has a 
compensation package that is contingent on the approval or 
denial of claims, and bears some of the financial risk of 
loss for the claims, the administrator has a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing to the insured.90     
 
If an intermediary “acted sufficiently like an insurer” to 
create a “special relationship” between policyholder and 
intermediary, the intermediary could be liable to the same extent as 
an insurer.91 
Nevada took a similar view but couched it in perhaps problematic 
language requiring that the degree of the intermediaries assumption of 
insurer functions rise to the level of a “joint venture.”  The general rule of 
insurer immunity remained operative but where an intermediary was 
engaged in a “joint venture” with the insurer, the intermediary was subject 
                                                                                                                          
investigator and an adjuster) had substantial autonomy in conducting their duties 
and substantial practical control over the outcome of the claims in question.  
 
88 Oklahoma’s Badillo and Wathor cases fall into this category, as arguably 
does Cary v. United of Omaha.  See supra notes accompanying text 78, 82-4. 
 
89 The joint venture cases, Wohlers and Farr, clearly are in this vein.  Also, 
one might argue that Badillo, Wathor, and Cary also depended on some significant 
financial incentive impinging on the claims adjuster’s ability to be fair. 
 
90 See Wathor, 87 P.3d at 563. 
 
91 See id. at 563.  However, on the facts of that particular case, the Court found 
that the intermediary did not “act sufficiently like an insurer.”  Id. at 562. 
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to the duties of an insurer and faced potential liability similar to that of an 
insurer.92  According to the Nevada Supreme Court, the instant case 
provided sufficient evidence of the requisite joint venture in that the 
intermediary  
 
[d]eveloped promotional material, issued policies, 
billed and collected premiums, adjudicated claims, and 
assisted [the insurer] in the development of [contract 
language].  Further, because [the intermediary] shared in 
[the insurer’s] profits, it had a direct pecuniary interest in 
optimizing [the insurer’s] financial condition by keeping 
claims costs down.  [The intermediary’s] administrative 
responsibilities and its special relationship with [the insurer 
are] indicative of the existence of a joint venture. . . . 
 
Due to the extent of [the intermediary’s] 
administrative responsibilities, policy management duties, 
and special relationship . . . we conclude that [the 
intermediary and the insurer] were involved in a joint 
venture to an extent sufficient to expose [the intermediary] 
to liability on all contract-based and bad faith claims.93 
 
Although the Nevada decision arguably would have been more 
doctrinally satisfying if it had simply said that MGAs or other 
intermediaries taking on insurer roles were subject to the law governing 
                                                                                                                 
92 In Wohlers, the court noted: 
 
In general, no one “is liable upon a contract except those who are parties to it.”  
County of  Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 96 Nev. 643, 548-49, 615 P.2d 939, 943 
(1980).  However, according to a well-established exception to this general 
rule, where a claims administrator is engaged in a joint venture with an 
insurer, the administrator “may be held liable for its bad faith in handling the 
insured’s claim, even though the organization is not technically a party to the 
insurance policy.”  William M. Shernoff et al., Insurance Bad Faith Litigation 
§ 2.03[1], at 2-10 (1998). 
 
Wohlers, 969 P.2d at 959 (citing County of Clark and William M. Shernoff). 
 
93 See id. at 959. 
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insurers (and dispensing with joint venture talk),94 it was not only another 
state supreme court supportive of a departure from inflexible application of 
the historical rule but also provided a striking illustration of the degree to 
which MGAs in fact often take over insurer functions.  The MGA found 
liable in Nevada’s Wohlers decision was a world away from the traditional 
limited autonomy agents the law envisioned when it adopted the historical 
rule of intermediary immunity when the agent’s principal was disclosed.95 
                                                                                                                 
94 The very terminology “joint venture,” tends to conjure up images of major, 
formal business combinations and thus subconsciously suggests that much is 
required before MGA or claims intermediary can be held liable like an insurer.  
However, all that is really necessary is relatively standard administrator or adjuster 
behavior.  When the joint venture language is peeled back, the Nevada Supreme 
Court appears to be saying that where an intermediary acting within its authority 
makes a key coverage decision in place of the insurer, the intermediary should be 
liable like an insurer, particularly if the intermediary has economic incentives 
adverse to coverage and is involved in significant administrative operations for the 
insurer. 
 In adopting the joint venture terminology and concept, the Nevada 
Supreme Court was obviously influenced by the treatise it cited authored by 
prominent California policyholders’ attorney William Shernoff.  Shernoff 
characterized pre-Wohlers case law as supporting MGA and adjuster liability if 
they were sufficiently intertwined with the insurer to constitute a joint venture.  
Although this is one valid interpretation, one could as easily looked at the case law 
assessed by Shernoff and concluded that the pre-Wohlers courts were looking not 
so much for a joint venture as for situations in which the intermediary was making 
decisions historically made by the insurer rather than one of its agents. 
95 Nevada is not alone in its attraction to the joint venture rationale as well as 
the realization that much of modern insurance is administered not by the insurer 
itself but by intermediaries.  Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. 
took a similar approach and found, much like Wohlers, that a health insurer’s 
independent claims adjuster was sufficiently economically linked to the insurer to 
be liable to the policyholder on a joint venture theory.  Farr, 699 P.2d at 386. 
 Farr’s imposition of liability upon an intermediary creates some tension 
in Arizona law because another prominent Arizona case is frequently cited in 
support of modern adherence to the traditional rule of adjuster immunity.  See 
Meineke v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 271 ( Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) 
(basing independent adjuster immunity on grounds of lack of contract privity).  See 
also Napier v. Bertram, 954 P.2d 1389, 1394-1395 (Ariz. 1998) (independent  
insurance agent had no duty to taxicab passenger to ensure that taxicab company 
has required uninsured motorist coverage; Court feared that imposition of liability 
would “impose on agents a duty to a vast number of non-clients—literally all who 
reside in or travel in this state”).  
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In Cary v. United of Omaha Life Insurance,96 Colorado set forth 
one of the most recent and forceful rejections of the traditional approach.  
The City of Arvada provided a self-funded insurance program to its 
employees, one managed by United of Omaha and Mutual of Omaha of 
Colorado (the Plan Administrators).  Thomas Cary’s 15-year-old daughter 
shot herself while attempting suicide, incurring substantial injuries that 
required extensive medical treatment, including multiple surgeries and 
hospitalization.  The Plan Administrators denied Cary’s claim for benefits 
based on an exclusion in the policy for self-inflicted injuries.  He responded 
by suing for benefits and seeking damages for bad faith against the Plan 
Administrators. 
The trial court agreed with claimant Cary that the self-inflicted 
injuries provision of the policy was ambiguous and ruled in favor of 
coverage but held that the Plan Administrators could not be sued for bad 
faith because “Cary was not in contractual privity with the Administrators.”  
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed on similar grounds. The Colorado 
Supreme Court reversed, stating that it disagreed with the court of appeals’ 
strict application of a privity of contract analysis to this case.  Here, the 
insurance administrators had primary control over benefit determinations, 
assumed some of the insurance risk of loss, undertook many of the 
obligations and risks of an insurer, and had the power, motive, and 
opportunity to act unscrupulously in the investigation and servicing of the 
insurance claims.  Under such circumstances, we hold that a special 
relationship existed between the Administrators and the insured sufficient 
to establish in the Administrators a duty to act in good faith.97 
                                                                                                                          
The cases are reconcilable in that Meineke based its holding on a view that in 
the instant case the “relationship between adjuster and insured is sufficiently 
attenuated by the insurer’s control over the adjuster to be an important factor that 
militates against imposing a further duty on the adjuster to the insured.”  Meineke, 
991 P.2d at 270.   Neither Meineke nor Napier cited Farr but Farr remains good 
law in Arizona.  Presumably, then, an Arizona court faced with adjuster-insurer 
intertwinement sufficient to make for a “joint venture” would, like the Nevada 
Supreme Court in Wohlers, refuse to immunize the intermediary. 
 
96 68 P.3d 462 (Colo. 2003). 
 
97 Id. at 465.  Under Colorado bad faith law, in order to prevail, Cary would be 
required to prove that the Plan Administrators had acted unreasonably and either 
“knew their conduct was unreasonable or acted in reckless disregard of whether 
their conduct was unreasonable.”  Id. 
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In addition to the these facts of Plan Administrator authority and 
conduct that supported permitting the claim, the Court also made a legal 
analysis differentiating cases of this type from those subject to the general 
rule of immunity from suit in the absence of privity.  First, it noted that 
“insurance contracts are not ordinary commercial contracts” and that 
breach of the insurer’s duty of good faith gives rise to a tort action.98 
 
 In the typical insurance case, only the 
insurer owes the duty of good faith to its insured; agents of 
the insurance company – even agents involved in claims 
processing – do not owe a duty, since they do not have the 
requisite special relationship with the insured.   
 
* * * 
 
In the typical case, the insured is adequately 
protected by the non-delegable duty the law imposes on the 
insurer. However, the existence of this nondelegable duty 
does not mean that a third-party claims administrator never 
has an independent duty to investigate and process the 
insured’s claim in good faith.  When the actions of a 
defendant are similar enough to those typically performed 
by an insurance company in claim administration and 
disposition, we have found the existence of a special 
relationship sufficient for imposition of a duty of good 
faith and tort liability for its breach – even when there is no 
contractual privity between the defendant and the 
plaintiff.99 
                                                                                                                 
98 Colorado had not formally recognized first-party insurance bad faith actions 
until the mid-1980s.  See Farmers Group, Inc., v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141 
(Colo. 1984). 
 
99  See Carey, 68 P.3d at 466-67.  As the Court noted, prior case law had 
already eroded the wall of immunity provided under the traditional rule.  For 
example, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, the Court held that a workers 
compensation insurer owes a duty of good faith to the employees within the scope 
of the plan and not only to the employer who purchased the policy.  706 P.2d 1258, 
1264-65 (Colo. 1985).   In Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Brighton Sch.  Dist., 
the Court ruled that sureties were subject to the bad faith regime that governed 
insurers.  27J, 940 P.2d 348, 352 (Colo. 1997).  In addition, the Court had moved 
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Consequently, “[w]hen a third-party administrator performs many 
of the tasks of an insurance company and bears some of the financial risk 
of loss for the claim, the administrator has a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing to the insured in the investigation and servicing of the insurance 
claim.”100   
Two justices dissented, viewing the majority’s expansion of 
potential liability to additional insurance activity participants as 
“unworkable” even it its social policy goal of protecting insureds “by 
providing a disincentive for wrongful behavior by agents of the insurer” as 
well as “an alternative source of recovery” was “laudable.”101  Invoking 
policy considerations of its own, the Dissent also argued that bad faith 
exposure for the Plan Administrator was inappropriate because it was 
obligated to serve the interests of the City of Arvada, which might often be 
in conflict with the interests of employees like Cary.  Whatever empathy it 
felt for the family, the City might have preferred the claim be denied in 
order to have more coverage available for other matters or to keep payment 
for the program to a minimum.102  
Even in California, often cited as the home of continuing adherence 
to the general rule that claims intermediaries as mere agents are not subject 
to suit, there is appellate court caselaw permitting such claims where the 
                                                                                                                          
away from strict privity requirements in other contexts.  See, e.g., Cosmopolitan 
Homes v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Colo. 1983) (homebuilder owed duty 
of care to subsequent purchaser even if no contract privity between builder and 
purchaser). 
 
100  See Carey, 68 P.3d at 469. 
 
101  Id. at 469 (Coats, J., dissenting, joined by Kourlis, J.). 
 
102   In Carey, the court noted that: 
 
[T]he significance of [the Administrator’s ] involvement in 
processing claims for the City is not that it is acting like an insurer 
but rather that it is acting for an insurer.  To the extent that it 
insured the City with a stop-loss or reinsurance policy, it has a 
“semi-fiduciary” relationship with the City, its insured, and owes 
the City a special duty that potentially conflicts with a similar duty 
to the City’s insured. 
 
Id. at 471 (emphasis in original). 
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intermediary has taken on the essential identity of an insurer or is 
intertwined economically with the insurer beyond a mere independent 
contracting relationship.103  There is also some authority finding rights as 
intended third party beneficiaries for persons that are not part of the 
contract between policyholder and insurer,104 although there is also much 
precedent taking a narrower view of entitlement to contract benefits.105  
                                                                                                                 
103  See, e.g., Bus. to Bus. Mkts, Inc. v. Zurich Specialties London Ltd., 37 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 299, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (surplus lines broker may owe 
duty to judgment creditor plaintiff for negligence in procuring insurance policy for 
judgment debtor policyholder that did not cover work done by policyholder in 
India); Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 740-41 (Ct. App. 
2003); Delos v. Farmers Group, Inc.,155 Cal. Rptr. 843, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) 
(“for legitimate business considerations, the [administrative intermediary] was 
formed to render management services for the [insurer] for which it received a 
percentage of premiums paid by the [insurer’s] policyholders”).  See also id. at 
653, 850 (administrative intermediary was “engaged in the business of insurance” 
and “may be held liable” under state unfair claims practices statute). Id. 
The same is true for Arizona, which is generally considered a state favoring 
the traditional rule of claims adjuster immunity on the strength of Meineke v. GAB 
Business Services, Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 268 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999), at least where the 
adjuster’s agency authority is relatively circumscribed.  But where the claim 
intermediary has substantial authority or more than a mere contract to perform 
ministerial services, Arizona courts have either permitted claims against the 
intermediary by policyholders or suggested that liability may be apt.  See, e.g., 
Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins., 821 P.2d 725, 731 (Ariz. 1991) (recognizing 
management theory as basis for holding insurer responsible for TPA misconduct); 
Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 699 P.2d 376, 386 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1984) (TPA may be liable to policyholder when there is sufficient economic 
intertwinement with insurer to constitute joint venture-like linkage between them).  
Accord, Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1137-38 (Ariz. 
1982)(approving jury instruction on joint and several liability regarding claims 
intermediary handling investigation and payment of claims, determining joint 
venturers both owed common duty of good faith toward policyholders). 
 
104 See, e.g., Delos, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 853. (“There are no public policy or 
doctrinal considerations that preclude Mr. Delos from having an independent cause 
of action against defendants.  He was a party to the insurance contract and the 
effect upon him of the improper denial of his wife’s claim was reasonably 
foreseeable”). 
 
105 See, e.g., Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 294-95 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (tenant not intended third-party beneficiary to insurance 
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Although the state’s Supreme Court has never endorsed any of these 
approaches, neither has it disapproved them in the context of claims 
intermediaries.   
In addition, the “alter ego of the insurer” and “joint venture” 
theories are arguably perfectly consistent with famous California precedent 
rejecting claims against intermediaries (Gruenberg, Egan, Iversen)106 in 
that in all of these cases, the Supreme Court considered the intermediaries 
to be engaged only in more limited, ministerial agency rather than a joint 
venture with the insurer or assumption of the insurer’s role.  Further, the 
immunity for insurance intermediaries, at least if they have substantial 
authority, would also appear to be inconsistent with state law permitting 
professionals such as an auditor or notary public to be held liable to persons 
that are not strictly part of the contract in question.107  
Going into the 21st Century, one might have reasonably predicted 
increasing erosion of the traditional rule of claims intermediary immunity 
from suit by policyholders or other claimants allegedly injured by the 
intermediary’s errors or misconduct.  However, the formal doctrines 
shielding these intermediaries have proven surprisingly resilient. 
 
C. THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE 
 
Notwithstanding the emergence of a significant number of cases 
holding that intermediaries sufficiently assuming insurer functions could be 
liable to the same extent as insurers, many courts continue to apply the 
traditional doctrine and to accord broad immunity to MGAs and 
                                                                                                                          
policy contract between lessor/policyholder and insurer).  See also id. at 1724, 295 
(“it is well settled that [California law] excludes enforcement of a contract by 
persons who are only incidentally or remotely benefited by it”) (citing Cal. Civil 
Code § 1559 and Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)).  
 
106 See Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co.,  620 P.2d 141, 154 (Cal. 1979); 
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973); Iversen v. Superior 
Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 168, 170 (Cal Ct. App. 1976). 
 
107 See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 17-19 (Cal. 1958) (notary public can 
be liable to persons reasonably expected to rely on notarization even if these 
persons were not in contractual privity with notary and person contracting to have 
signature notarized). 
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independent adjusters.108   Courts continue to hold that a claimant does not 
have standing to bring a claim directly against an independent adjuster or 
administrator.109 
                                                                                                                 
108 See, e.g., Wolverton v. Bullock, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280-81 (D. Kan. 
1998)(Kansas law does not permit policyholder to bring bad faith action against 
independent adjuster due to lack of contract privity); Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 
875 S.W.2d 695, 698-9 (Tex. 1994)(policyholder may not sue independent adjuster 
for alleged bad faith in administering claim); Koch v. Bell, Lewis & Assoc., Inc., 
627 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (2006); Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 
270-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire and Cas. Co., 656 So.2d 
1338, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Larkin v. First of Georgia Underwriters, 466 
So.2d 655, 657 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (insurance MGA not subject to bad faith claim 
by policyholder due to lack of contract privity); Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 
620 P.2d 141, 154 (Cal. 1979)(independent agents selling and servicing policies 
for disclosed insurer not subject to covenant of good faith and fair dealing with 
policyholder due to absence of contract privity); Troxel v. American States Ins. 
Co., 596 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Bentley v. N.C. Ins. Ass’n, 418 
S.E.2d 705, 707 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).  Accord Kim v. O’Sullivan, 137 P.3d 61, 62, 65 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2006)(no policyholder cause of action against insurer-provided attorney 
for legal malpractice because of lack of express contract between attorney and 
policyholder); Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 48, 51 (Conn. Super Ct. 
1994)(no claim against attorney for insurer due to lack of contract privity).  See 
also Badners v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 567 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Ala. 
1990)(no policyholder claim against bank that was supposed to debit monthly 
premium payments for life insurer due to lack of contract privity between bank and 
policyholder’s ex-spouse, who suffered injury due to missed payments and lapsed 
policy prior to policyholder’s death). 
Kim v. O’Sullivan clearly seems wrongly decided.  Although many states 
consider insurers to be “clients” of an attorney retained by the insurer to defend 
third party’s lawsuit against a policyholder, all states consider the policyholder to 
be the lawyer’s client by operation of law even in the absence of a written retainer 
agreement between counsel and the policyholder.  Consequently, it simply cannot 
be correct that the policyholder has no claim for legal malpractice against a 
malfunctioning defense lawyer retained by its insurer.  Some states even provide 
that only the policyholder is a client of the attorney and that insurers are but third 
party payers with contract rights vis-à-vis counsel. 
 
109   See, e.g., Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 586 
S.E.2d 586, 588-89 (S.C. 2003); Meineke, 991 P.2d at  270; Sanchez v. Lindsey 
Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802 (1999); King v. Nat’l Sec. 
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In some instances, legal arguments for removing intermediary 
immunity probably fall on deaf judicial ears because the facts of the case 
are not particularly compelling for the plaintiff.  For example, in Akpan v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, Inc.,110 the policyholders, owners of a convenience 
store, suffered three separate incidents of burglary and vandalism within a 
two-week period.  Although this alone does not make the claim suspicious, 
the policyholders’ post-loss behavior undoubtedly raised eyebrows as they 
backed out of submitting to an examination under oath on five separate 
occasions, ultimately refusing to answer questions about the losses.  When 
they sued the insurer and independent adjuster, the court was not very 
sympathetic in view of the case’s aroma of insurance fraud.111   
Further, the policyholder claim against the intermediary was that it 
had been slow to deliver a copy of the policy to the claimants.  Because the 
duty to cooperate and submit to examination if requested is so common in 
first-party property insurance, it is hard to take seriously the contention that 
without a copy of the policy, the insured was unsure of its basic obligations 
in this regard.  Even if the delay in furnishing a copy of the policy was 
wrongful and unreasonable, Apkan hardly presented an attractive case for 
                                                                                                                          
Fire and Cas. Co., 656 So.2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Velastequi v. Exch. 
Ins. Co., 132 Misc.2d 896, 897 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986). 
As previously discussed, the judicial immunity for adjusters facing lawsuits 
from claimants is hardly surprising in light of the general rule that third party 
claimants may not sue insurers (other than their own) directly because of the law of 
privity.  See notes 8-12, supra.  If there has been bad faith by the insurer, the claim 
is often pursued by the claimant possessing an assignment of rights from the 
policyholder.  In some states, bad faith claims are considered personal and non-
assignable.  In these states, a policyholder may agree to sue its insurer for bad faith 
and to award most of any proceeds from the suit to the third-party claimant as a 
means of settling the underlying tort litigation between the claimant and the 
policyholder. 
 
110   Akpan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc. 961 So.2d 865, 866 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2007). 
 
111   Id. at 867-71 (emphasizing importance of policyholder’s compliance with 
policy provision requiring it to submit to examination under oath if requested by 
insurer). 
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departing from the traditional rule and permitting suit against the 
independent adjuster.112 
Dear v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.113 presented similar problems for 
the cause of law reform.  Policyholder Dear was a private investigator with 
professional liability coverage.  He was sued by a former client for alleged 
overcharging and “fraudulent and negligent” investigation.  During 
mediation, the former client made a policy limits ($300,000) demand to 
resolved the case, one which the mediator had advised the insurer that it 
would be “well advised to accept [plaintiff’s] policy limits demand” and 
that the mediator “believed that a jury might find against Dear” and award 
significant damages.”114  Not surprisingly, the insurer settled, as was its 
right under the terms of the liability policy.  In a subsequent smaller case, 
Dear was sued by the former client’s mother for an allegedly intrusive 
investigation in retaliation and then was sued by two other clients for 
“improprieties while investigating their daughter’s disappearance.”115  The 
insurer settled both of these claims as well. 
Demonstrating that good deeds rarely go unpunished, Dear sued 
the insurer, the adjuster, the insurance sales agent, and the law firm that 
defended the claims.  His claim against the adjuster is that it changed its 
evaluation of the case in response to “pressure” from the defense attorney, 
conducted a poor investigation, settled a claim in spite of his objection, and  
tortiously interfered with his relationship with the insurer.  Reading the 
case, one gets the impression that the policyholder was in essence suing the 
parties for saving him from himself.  Clearly, he faced substantial claims 
                                                                                                                 
112   Nonetheless, the Apkan Court felt compelled to cite nearly all the modern 
cases on the subject, noted the majority approach, embraced the reasoning of 
majority rule cases, and rejected the analysis of cases like Bayless and Roberts and 
Morvay.  See Apkan, 961 So. 2d at 873-74. See infra text accompanying notes 49-
71 for criticism of the analyses of modern traditional rule cases such as Sanchez v. 
Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (1999) and Meineke v. 
GAB Bus. Servs., 991 P.2d at 267, both of which have been influential in shoring 
up traditional intermediary immunity in the faces of cases like Morvay and Bayless 
and Roberts.  
 
113  Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 
114  Id. at 911. 
 
115  Id. at 911-12. 
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that could have resulted in an excess verdict and his own personal exposure 
had settlement not been effected.  The claim of settlement without 
confidentiality, however, is more compelling in view of the bad publicity 
that dissemination of the lawsuit information could produce for someone in 
Dear’s line of work.   
Nonetheless, the case as a whole is not one that would likely 
prompt a court to make new law to assist a sympathetic claimant.  The 
Dear result – continued adherence to the rule of intermediary immunity, 
was also aided not only by a relatively recent state supreme court decision 
affirming adjuster immunity116 but also by substantive Texas law which 
does not impose on insurers a specific common law duty of good faith in 
the investigation and defense of claims, although it requires insurers to 
accept reasonable settlement offers within available policy limits.117   
But even where the policyholder’s plight is sympathetic, a number 
of modern cases continue to cleave strongly to the traditional rule.  In 
Troxell v. American States Insurance Co., the policyholders suffered a 
home fire.118  The insurer hired an independent investigator to perform a 
cause and origin analysis of the fire, which resulted in an adverse 
                                                                                                                 
116  See id. at 916 (citing Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 
1994)). 
 
117  See id. at 914, (citing Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., 
Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 27-29 (Tex. 1996)). 
The duty to settle in Texas is routinely labeled the “Stowers duty” but Texas 
common law has otherwise been resistant to imposing other good faith obligations 
on insurers.  However, Texas policyholders enjoy significant statutory rights and 
remedies.  See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151 (2005) (unfair and deceptive 
practices in the business of insurance); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060 (unfair 
claims settlement practices); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-17.826; 
Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 3:08-CV-0768-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 68646 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) (insurer defendant seeking to remove 
policyholder statutory claim to federal court bears heavy burden to demonstrate 
lack of any reasonable basis for recovery under Texas unfair claims practices 
statutes); South Texas Med. Clinics, P.A. v. CNA Fin. Corp., No. H-06-4041, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11460 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2008) (Chapter 542 claim requires 
that there be coverage under the policy at issue to permit unfair practices claim and 
Chapter 541 claim may be sustained on unfair claims practices independent of 
coverage determination).   
 
118  596 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
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evaluation and the policyholder being “indicted on charges of arson” with 
the investigator serving as a prosecution witness at trial.119  After the 
policyholder was acquitted, she sued the insurer and investigator.120   
The suspicions of arson may have been reasonable (depending on 
the evidence), but if they were not the investigator’s activity caused more 
than a little harm to the policyholder, harm that was readily foreseeable to 
an investigator that should at least constructively have been aware that in 
acting as an agent of an insurer it was required to proceed with good faith 
toward the policyholder.121  But the court remained unmoved by Troxell’s 
plight, at least as respects the immunity of intermediaries.  The investigator 
“was the agent of [the insurer] and had no direct [contract] relationship” 
with the policyholder and hence was immune from suit.122 
If nothing else, the sheer weight of history and precedent have 
made it difficult for reformist decisions such as Bayless & Roberts,123 
Morvay,124 or Cary125 to get traction in other jurisdictions.  For example, 
the South Carolina Supreme Court, although aware of the split in authority 
on the topic, viewed immunity for intermediaries as continuing to be the 
solidly entrenched majority rule.126  “We decline to recognized a general 
duty of due care from an independent insurance adjuster or insurance 
adjusting company to the insured, and thereby align South Carolina with 
the majority rule on this issue.”127   
                                                                                                                 
119  Id. at 922.  
 
120  Id. 
 
121  See id. at 925. 
 
122  Id. at 925, n.1. 
 
123  608 P.2d 281. 
 
124  506 A.2d 333. 
 
125  68 P.3d 462. 
 
126  See Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 586 
S.E.2d 586, 588-89 (S.C. 2003). 
 
127  Id. 
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The Court based its continued preference for immunity on the state 
precedent holding that “foreseeability of injury is an insufficient basis for 
recognizing a duty” of good faith or reasonable care.128  It also strongly 
suggested that intermediary liability was unnecessary because “a bad faith 
claim against the insurer remains available as a source of recovery for a 
[policyholder] plaintiff” [and that] “in a bad faith action against the insurer, 
the acts of the adjuster or adjusting company (agent) may be imputed to the 
insurer (principal).”129 
Despite the strong support for intermediary liability (at least when 
the intermediary steps significantly into the shoes of the insurer) expressed 
by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Morvay,130 neighboring Vermont 
took quite a different view some 20 years later.  In Hamill v. Pawtucket 
Mutual Ins. Co.131 the Vermont Supreme Court specifically rejected 
Morvay and affirmed a trial court’s summary judgment in favor of 
independent insurance adjusters, finding no legal duty owed by the 
adjusters to the policyholders – at least for solely economic damages 
claimed from alleged negligent investigation and evaluation, including 
substantial delay in processing the claim. 
In Hamill, the homeowner policyholder was away on a business 
trip during which a power outage took place, resulting in loss of heat to the 
home, frozen pipes, and subsequent pipe bursting and flooding.132  When 
the policyholder sought recovery under the policy, the insurer contracted 
with independent adjusters to handle the claim.133  The policyholder 
provided estimates of the damage ranging from $150,000 to $200,000.134  
                                                                                                                 
128 See id. at 588 (citing South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986) (foreseeability of injury alone 
does not create duty owed to foreseeably injured party)). 
 
129 See id. at 589. 
 
130 506 A.2d 333. 
 
131 892 A.2d at 228-29. 
 
132 Id. at 227. 
 
133 Id. 
 
134 Id. 
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In response, the adjuster “rejected the estimates, accused [policyholder] 
Hamill of insurance fraud, and offered to settle the matter then and there 
for $5,000.”135 
Even if these allegations were true, the Vermont Court was 
unmoved.136  Like the South Carolina Court in Dry Cleaners,137 Hamill 
found foreseeable injury alone an insufficient basis for created a duty to the 
policyholder.138  Siding with and citing cases for the majority rule, the 
Hamill Court found the adjuster protected by both the absence of a contract 
directly with the policyholder and that imposing liability would be 
“contrary to the law of agency” since the adjuster worked for a disclosed 
principal.139   
Further, the Court found public policy considerations to weigh 
against imposing liability upon claims intermediaries because “in most 
cases, imposing tort liability on independent adjusters would create a 
redundancy unjustified by the inevitable costs that eventually would be 
passed on to insureds.”140   
                                                                                                                 
135 See id. at 227.  Hamill also alleged that after he rejected the adjuster’s 
settlement offer, [adjuster] Andrulat did not get back to him for weeks, even 
though Andrulat knew or should have known that the water-damaged premises 
needed to be repaired immediately to prevent the possibility of mold growth.  
According to the complaint, [Hamill also alleged that] as a result of Andrulat’s 
failure to carefully investigate Hamill’s claims, to consider his repair estimates, 
and to make an immediate and thorough inspection of the subject premises, mold 
spread through the house, making it uninhabitable. [Had the adjustment process 
been conducted properly]…the interior of Hamill’s house would have been gutted 
and rebuilt before the mold had begun to grow.  Id. 
 
136 Hamill, 892 A.2d 226. 
 
137 586 S.E.2d 586. 
 
138 892 A.2d at 227-28. 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 See id. at 230-31 (noting that policyholder Hamill had settled bad faith and 
breach of contract claims against his insurer and that he had not produced any 
evidence that he had not been sufficiently compensated by that settlement). 
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In addition, “the insurer contractually controls the responsibilities 
of its adjuster and retains the ultimate power to deny coverage or pay a 
claim.”141  Another consideration was that  
 
to some extent, insurers can define and limit their 
risks, and set their premiums commensurate with those 
risks through conditions, limits, and exclusions in their 
insurance policies. . . . In contrast, absent any contract with 
insured, adjusters cannot circumscribe their potential risks 
and thus could face potentially open-ended liability.  This 
is particularly troublesome because of the unlikelihood that 
an action claiming negligent mishandling of a claim would 
be available against even the insurer.142 
 
The Hamill Court also rejected the argument that Vermont’s unfair 
claims practices act or other insurance regulator statutes applied to 
independent claims adjusters.143 
 
III. THE BENEFITS OF ACCOUNTABILITY:  ILLUSTRATIONS 
OF THE POTENTIAL MISCHIEF OF INTERMEDIARY 
IMMUNITY 
 
In spite of its tenacious persistence and resistance to cases like 
Bayless144 and Morvay,145 the traditional approach of intermediary 
immunity has become inappropriate to the modern world of insurance.  
Although cases like Hamill146 in Vermont and Charleston Dry Cleaners147 
                                                                                                                 
141  See id. at 231. 
 
142  See id. (citing Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 799, 801-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) and Meineke v. GAB Business Servs., 
Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)). 
143  See 892 A.2d at 231-32. 
 
144  608 P.2d 281. 
 
145  506 A.2d 333.  
 
146  829 A.2d at 230. 
 
147  586 S.E.2d 586. 
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in South Carolina make substantial public policy arguments in favor of 
intermediary immunity, they are ultimately no more persuasive than the 
dated formalism of the citadel of privity or rigid adherence to the disclosed 
principal rule of agency law.  These modern cases, like their predecessors, 
rest on a weak foundation of questionable empiricism and argument. 
Examining a leading case favoring intermediary immunity serves 
to illustrate the comparative weakness of arguments for intermediary 
immunity.  Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc.,148 is a case 
frequently cited in support of continued adherence to the traditional rule of 
intermediary immunity and is unusual in that, like the Vermont Supreme 
Court’s Hamill149 opinion (which built on Sanchez), it defends the 
traditional rule upon functional public policy grounds rather than merely 
invoking the formalism of disclosed agency and lack of contract privity, 
although those were also applied by the Sanchez Court. 
In contrast to Sanchez,150 Brown v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co.,151 like the Colorado Supreme Court’s Cary opinion discussed above, 
rejects the traditional rule of intermediary immunity on the basis of 
extensive functional analysis rather than any outright refusal to follow 
traditionally venerable privity and agency doctrine.152  Upon closer 
examination, the Sanchez153 public policy reasons for the traditional rule 
wilt while the analysis of Brown154 and Cary155 (like Morvay and Bayless & 
Roberts) is more persuasive.  However, because Sanchez and its deceptive 
policy-based assessment has been influential in shoring up the traditional 
                                                                                                                          
 
148  84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799. 
 
149  829 A.2d 226. 
 
150  84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799. 
 
151  58 P.3d 217 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002). 
 
152  See supra text accompanying note 84 (discussing Cary opinion). 
 
153  84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799. 
 
154  58 P.3d 217. 
 
155  68 P.3d 462. 
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rule of immunity in the aftermath of its rejection in states some states, some 
extensive analysis of Sanchez is required.156   
Sanchez was in the business transporting commercial machinery 
and had purchased cargo insurance from Lloyd’s of London.157  While 
moving a commercial dryer to a customer in Los Angeles, the dryer was 
damaged.158  Sanchez made a claim under the policy for repair as soon as 
possible, with apparent agreement that the damage could be repaired in 
about a week for a cost of $12,000.159  Like many policyholders, Sanchez 
wanted things taken care of as soon as possible but he had a good reason 
beyond ordinary impatience.160  The customer that was slated to receive the 
dryer was losing business every day that delivery was delayed.161  Sanchez 
informed Lloyd’s through its independent adjuster of the need for speed in 
handling the claim in order to prevent huge losses from accumulating 
(thereby at least arguably making Lloyd’s responsible for these additional 
                                                                                                                 
156  84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799. 
 
157  See 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.  More precisely, Sanchez had purchased cargo 
insurance from an underwriting syndicate at Lloyd’s.  Id.  Although perhaps the 
most famous insurer in the world, Lloyd’s is not actually an insurance company 
but is an exchange of sorts at which a number of underwriters operate as agents for 
syndicates that provide the financial backing for the operation.  Typically, a 
prospective policyholder retains a broker in the United States (or elsewhere), who 
in turn contacts a Lloyd’s broker, who arranges coverage through a Lloyd’s 
underwriter.  A similar process is followed for obtaining insurance from London 
Market insurers that might be analogized to an “off-Broadway” counterpart to 
Lloyd’s.  Consequently, where a policyholder sues for coverage, they are 
technically suing “Certain Underwriters” at Lloyd’s rather than Lloyd’s as an 
entity.  
158  Id. 
 
159  Id. 
 
160  Id. 
 
161  Id. 
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damages and a Hadley v. Baxendale162 defense unavailable, at least if the 
insurer was in breach of the policy).163   
Apparently unmoved by Sanchez’s plight, the claims adjuster took 
three months “before the claim was paid and the repairs completed.   As a 
result, the dryer’s purchaser sued and . . . obtained a judgment against 
Sanchez” for (I am not kidding) more than $1,3 million.164   Sanchez then 
sued Lloyd’s under the policy and sued the adjuster “on a negligence 
theory,” with the adjuster claiming immunity under the traditional lack-of-
privity and disclosed agency defenses165 seemingly well enshrined in 
California law.166 
                                                                                                                 
162  (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145. 
 
163  Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, a party 
breaching a contract is not liable for consequential damages unless they not only 
flow from the breach but are also within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time the contract is made.   See DAVID EPSTEIN, BRUCE MARKELL & LAWRENCE 
PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS:  CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 831-846  (2d 
ed. 2002); Farnsworth, supra note 10, § 12.14. 
As a matter of contract law, Sanchez might have been out of luck because 
most courts hold that the consequential damages in question must have been 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting rather than after the loss event.   
In addition, Lloyd’s could probably argue successfully that Sanchez should have 
come up with his own $12,000 for dryer repair and mitigated the damages rather 
than waiting for three months while Lloyd’s and its adjuster apparently diddled.  
But even if consequential damages for the breach are not available, one can make a 
strong argument that taking three months to process an emergency claim after 
being put on notice by the policyholder constitutes bad faith and entitles the 
policyholder to damages (e.g., an adverse judgment by the customer) proximately 
resulting from the bad faith, provided that Sanchez’s failure to mitigate does not 
cut off the claim. 
 
164  84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800. 
 
165 See id.  By suing the adjuster on a negligence theory, which of course 
sounds in tort, Sanchez was probably trying to avoid the problems facing him in 
prosecuting the breach of contract claim against the insurer due to the Hadley v. 
Baxendale foreseeability problem and his failure to mitigate consequential 
damages.  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145. 
 
166  See Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 824, 620 P.2d 141, 
169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 576, 510 
P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973), discussed at TAN 27-42, supra. 
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Sanchez begins as a noble effort of a busy state court to take an in-
depth look at the problem.  It even cites Cardozo’s classic work of 
sociological jurisprudence The Nature of the Judicial Process.167  But 
despite theses pretensions, Sanchez quickly dissolves into what I term 
“pseudo-policy lite.” This is the type of “analysis” that occurs when a court 
trots out non-doctrinal, seemingly prudential reasons for a ruling that are 
based primarily on assertion, illogic, poor reasoning, failure to consider 
other factors, or a misunderstanding of the manner in which either its rule 
or the rejected rule would operate.  “Pseudo-policy lite” analysis pretends 
to be applying a real world appreciation of the collateral consequences of 
its decision making when it in reality is merely invoking over-simplified or 
misleading arguments that do not in fact square with reality. 
Rather than basing its decision in favor of adjuster immunity upon 
California Supreme Court decisions pretty squarely on point (and which 
presumably controlled disposition of the case no matter how much 
commentators might criticize them),168 the Sanchez Court chose instead to 
look at a relatively recent state supreme court decision limiting the liability 
                                                                                                                 
167  See 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800-801 (“While courts do not generally make 
broad policy in the manner of legislatures, they do make policy decisions in the 
“gaps,” filling in the “open spaces” or “interstices” of the law.”  (citing CARDOZO, 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (1921))).  Courts deciding questions of 
duty are engaged in the limited “legislative” aspect of the judicial function.  From 
this promising premise, the Sanchez Court immediately slides into analogy to other 
California cases rejecting liability and a prediction of adverse consequences from 
adjuster liability that betrays lack of understanding about the operation of 
insurance intermediaries in the field.   
The Sanchez Court is right to note, as did the Cardozo Court, that courts must 
often make policy-based assessments in determining the reach of common law 
liability.  But, for reasons that I hope are apparent in this section’s discussion, it 
did a weak job of public policy analysis.  One wonders why, in view of the existing 
California Supreme Court precedent in Egan and Gruenberg, the Sanchez Court 
did not just declare adjuster immunity as a matter of settled doctrine.  If it had, it 
would have arguably better served the nation by not being a part of the 
counterattack against a possibly emerging rule of intermediary responsibility for 
misconduct. 
 
168  See supra text accompanying notes 25-29 (discussing Ashley’s criticism of 
Gruenberg and similar analyses limiting intermediary liability on privity of 
contract grounds). 
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of auditors to third parties169 and a 40-year old decision permitting a 
beneficiary’s claim for lawyer malpractice regarding a will that resulted in 
financial loss to the beneficiary.170  Sanchez analogized claims adjusters to 
auditors in making its adjuster immunity ruling and minimized the analogy 
of adjusters to attorneys in attempting to avoid a precedent imposing 
liability.171 
Rather than relying on the settled state law of adjuster immunity, 
the Sanchez Court took it upon itself to apply a set of factors generally used 
to determine the existence of a tort duty.  Although this may have made for 
a more Cardozo-like analysis for the Court, it was both unnecessary and 
misleading in that the liability of auditors, particularly if they preparing 
statements for the public or dispersal to third parties, is less problematic 
than suggested by the Sanchez Court.  Indeed, in most states auditors are 
subject to liability under these circumstances.172  Although auditor liability 
                                                                                                                 
169  See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 760 (Cal. 1992) (discussed 
at Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800-802 (holding an auditor is liable only to clients, 
and not to third parties for negligent preparation of financial statement)). 
 
170  See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal. 1958) (discussed in Sanchez, 
84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800-801 (holding a lawyer who renders a will void by 
negligently failing to have it properly witnessed owes a duty of care to the intended 
sole beneficiary)). 
 
171 After citing the Biakanj v. Irving case and acknowledging that attorneys 
enjoy less protection from third party claims than do independent insurance 
adjusters, the Sanchez Court seemed unwilling to wrestle with those implications.  
See generally Sanchez v. Lindsey Modern Claims Services Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).  As discussed below, the degree of existing attorney 
liability to third parties makes a case for at least as much insurance claims 
intermediary liability to third parties.  Lawyers stand in a significantly different 
position than do claims adjusters in terms of their role and the social interests at 
stake if they are made to compromise their traditional role of zealous fiduciary 
loyalty to the client that hires them.  This could tag attorneys for liability that 
might, in part, be characterized as merely an outgrowth of steadfast loyalty to a 
mistaken client.  In spite of this, lawyers generally, and in the insurance context in 
particular, are subject to significantly more liability exposure than independent 
claims adjusters under the Sanchez ruling, a fact that seriously calls into question 
the wisdom of the holding.  See infra text accompanying notes 198-205. 
 
172  See DOBBS, supra note 9, at § 480; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 552 
(1977) (auditor liable to third parties if third party’s reliance on auditor work was 
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may be established precedent in California, the minority status of this 
immunity is not a particularly strong public policy argument for a rule of 
auditor immunity. 
If the rule of auditor immunity is correct, one’s first reaction may 
be to apply it to adjusters as well.  But first reactions can be deceiving.  On 
one hand, Auditors are to some extent the “weights and measures” 
yardstick upon which much of the modern financial system depends.173  
The seeming failure of auditors in notorious business meltdowns of the 
early 21st Century brought on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which moved 
auditing more toward being a regulated industry than an independent, self-
regulating profession.174  Even widespread misfeasance by independent 
adjusters, TPAs and MGAs does not pose the same danger to the economy 
and is unlikely to produce the type of social upheaval or legislative 
response spurred by perceived auditor failure.175   
                                                                                                                          
reasonably foreseeable).  The contrary rule largely immunizing auditors from tort 
liability (but permitting recovery where the third party was an intended beneficiary 
of the contract between client and auditor) ironically stems from a famous Cardozo 
opinion.  See Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).  The opinion was 
subject to criticism almost immediately upon its issuance and over time most 
jurisdictions have found the Ultramares precedent to grant too much protection to 
accountants.  It arguably is an opinion in which then-Judge Cardozo erred in filling 
in the uncertain interstices of the law.  But, of course, to the extent that California 
follows the Ultramares rule, the Sanchez Court was bound to follow the 
Ultramares rule.  However, this hardly gave the Sanchez Court license to engage in 
a wide-ranging attempt to analogize auditors to accountants when there already 
existed reasonably clear adjuster precedent in California. 
 
173  Ironically, the same Judge Cardozo, who was so resistant to auditor 
liability to non-contractual parties in Ultramares, had recognized years earlier that 
a scale operation serving the public was responsible for any injury caused by 
reasonable reliance upon the supposed accuracy of its measurements.  See Glanzer 
v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
 
174  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2006).  See generally Jeffery D. Van Niel, 
Enron – The Primer, in ENRON:  CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
16-17 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); MIMI SCHWARTZ WITH 
SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF 
ENRON  94-96 (2003). 
 
175  See, e.g., BARBARA LEY TOFFLER WITH JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL 
ACCOUNTING:  AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN 219-20 
 
2009] THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES 663 
 
 
But more important is the degree of attenuation presented by 
auditor liability and adjuster liability.  An auditor may perform work for a 
client and then, without its knowledge or permission, have that work shown 
to unknown third parties who later assert claims against the auditor when 
something goes wrong.  In such cases, the auditors are truly being sued by 
complete strangers.  By contrast, a claimant or a policyholder is hardly a 
stranger to the adjuster or TPA, even if there is not a formal contract 
between the adjuster and the claimant or policyholder.  Consequently, the 
relation of auditors to potential claimants is quite distinct from that of 
claims adjusters and potentially much broader.  Consequently, it hardly 
follows that if auditors are immune, adjusters must also be immune.   
Despite these fairly dramatic differences, the Sanchez Court 
pressed the auditor analogy hard in arguing that imposing liability on 
adjusters would be a major breach of the principles of duty and tort law.  
“Like the auditors, the insurer-retained adjuster is subject to the control of 
its clients, and must make discretionary judgment call.  The insurer, not the 
adjuster, has the ultimate power to grant or deny coverage, and to pay the 
claim, delay paying it, or deny it.”176   
While this is technically true, the insurer’s final say in calling the 
shots of claims resolution hardly make the adjuster a mere functionary.  
Independent adjusters have substantial impact on claims outcomes in that 
they provide the insurer with a factual investigation and analysis of the 
claim, usually making recommendations as to denial, valuation, and 
payment of a claim.  This is a far cry from a hypothetical Cratchett of the 
19th Century simply selling the wares of Marley to customer Dickens. 
In addition, the relationship of insurer to policyholder also 
logically affects the relationship of the insurer’s agent to a claimant or 
policyholder.  Insurers stand in quite a different posture to both their 
policyholders and even to third party claimants, than do ordinary 
contracting parties.  The obligations of good faith and fair dealing that are 
often given a short shrift in much of the contract world (e.g., mere absence 
of fraud qualifies as good faith no matter how much a breaching party 
deprives the other of the benefit of the bargain) have real teeth when 
                                                                                                                          
(2003) (describing the closure of a famous accounting firm in light of criminal 
litigation and bad press stemming from its role as primary outside auditor to 
Enron). 
 
176  See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-02.   
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applied to insurance.  In some cases, an insurer may be held accountable 
for bad faith because of misconduct toward the policyholder even when it 
was not required to provide coverage.   
Although third parties have fewer rights vis-à-vis the insurer, it is 
generally acknowledged that insurance has a public interest component as 
part of a system of social policy that requires at least reasonable behavior 
toward third parties.  Although the insurer’s well-known “duty to settle” is 
designed primarily to prevent the policyholder from facing uninsured 
liability, it also has elements of encouraging rational and expeditious 
dispute resolution so as not to unduly burden the state and society through 
litigation or other means.   
The net result of all this is well-established legal doctrine that 
requires that an insurer not favor its own interests above the 
policyholder’s.177  Logically, this also requires that an independent adjuster 
or MGA may not favor the insurer’s interest at the expense of the 
policyholder, and that the adjuster fairly, accurately, and competently 
evaluate claims against a policyholder that have invoked the insurer’s duty 
to defend and settle.  Because the insurance intermediary is not an agent 
acting as a mere conduit or solicitor, the intermediary logically has duties 
of reasonable care and fair dealing approaching that of the insurer.  Further, 
those duties logically are owed to the policyholder as well as to the insurer 
since the adjuster has stepped into the shoes of an insurer that must give 
equal consideration to the rights of the policyholder in resolving claims. 
In arguing that the insurer’s final decision making authority 
excuses any intermediary responsibility to others, Sanchez failed to 
consider the nature of the intermediaries tasks and the nature of the 
insurance arrangement.  Sanchez then made the argument that:  
 
[w]hile the insurer’s potential liability is 
circumscribed by the policy limits, and the other 
conditions, limits and exclusion of the policy, the adjuster 
has no contract with the insured and would face liability 
without the chance to limit its exposure by contract.  Thus, 
the adjuster’s role in the claims process is “secondary,” yet 
imposing a duty of care could expose him to liability 
greater than faced by his principal the insurer.178 
                                                                                                                 
177 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 27, at § 10.03. 
 
178 See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.   
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This argument seems both odd and empirically incorrect in that it takes the 
absence of traditional contract privity and instead of using it as a doctrinal 
defense attempts to turn it into a policy argument in favor of intermediary 
immunity.  Although it probably should get points for creativity, it is wrong 
about the law.  Although it is true that insurer coverage liability is generally 
restricted to the policy limits of the insurance in question, it is not true that 
this provides an ironclad safe harbor against further insurer liability.   
Insurers may often be required to pay counsel fees or interest upon 
losing a coverage determination.  They of course may also be responsible 
for incidental and consequential damages for failure to properly process a 
covered claim.  Although this extra-limits liability is rare where the insurer 
has acted reasonably, volitional, unreasonable insurer conduct amounts to 
bad faith under the law of most states and makes these damages available 
to the policyholder (and often its assignees).  For example, where a liability 
insurer (in California and most states) unreasonably fails to accept a 
settlement offer, the insurer is responsible not only for paying the policy 
limits, but also any judgment amount against the policyholder in excess of 
policy limits.  Where the insurer’s bad faith or other misconduct was the 
product of willful indifference to the rights of the policyholder, the insurer 
may be held liable for punitive damages. 
In short, it simply is not true that insurers enjoy significantly more 
ability to limit their liability than do claims intermediaries.  Under these 
circumstances, it is just plain strange that a court would feel itself 
compelled to declare immunity for these intermediaries on the ground that 
the absence of formal contracting somehow makes the adjuster’s lot worse 
than that of the insurer. 
The Sanchez Court also argues that since “[a]n adjuster owes a 
duty to the insurer who engaged him,” a “new duty to the insured would 
conflict with that duty, and interfere with its faithful performance.  This is 
poor policy.”179  Actually, it is poor analysis by the court.  The claims 
                                                                                                                 
179   Id. (citing Gay v. Broder, 167 Cal Rptr. 123, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(holding a home appraiser owes no duty of care to a home loan borrower because 
this would subject the appraiser to a conflict with the duty owed to the lender 
retained by the appraiser); Felton v. Schaeffer, 279 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding a doctor hired by an employer to conduct a pre-employment 
physical owes no duty to the applicant); Keene v. Wiggins, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3, 7 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding a doctor used by a workers’ compensation insurer to 
assess the alleged disability of an employee did not owe the doctor-patient duty of 
an accurate diagnosis to the employee)). 
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adjuster represents the insurer.  By law, the insurer cannot give regard only 
to its own interests; it must not only consider the interests of the 
policyholder but give them at least “equal” consideration, a legal rule 
internalized in the custom and practice of insurance (where adjusters 
frequently describe their role as being required to “look for coverage” 
rather than “look for reasons to deny coverage”).  The adjuster, like the 
insurer, therefore already has obligations to the policyholder.  By 
immunizing the adjuster from a damages action, the Sanchez Court merely 
deprived the policyholder of a legal right that it already possessed, i.e., a 
right to have the adjuster act in the same manner as the insurer is required 
to act. 
More practically, the experience of decades of insurance claims 
adjustment in the field has already demonstrated that, despite the 
occasional glitches that produce coverage and bad faith litigation, insurers 
(and their intermediaries) generally do a reasonably good job of balancing 
the interests of policyholders against their own economic interests.  
Attorneys retained by insurers are often particularly exemplary in this 
                                                                                                                          
For what I hope are reasons obvious to the reader, if not the Sanchez Court, 
these cases are inapposite to the issue of insurance claims intermediary liability.  
Recall that the adjuster stands in for the insurer, which is obligated to give equal 
consideration or even priority to the interests of the policyholder.  By contrast, the 
home appraiser has only one interest:  making sure that the home is not overvalued 
so that the bank does not loan more money for purchasing the house than is 
justified by the fair market value of the home.    
Regarding doctors, the Felton and Keene cases, cited above, correctly state the 
historical rule but like the tradition of adjuster immunity, the tradition of doctor 
immunity is under attack and will, with luck, eventually fall.  Physicians are 
publicly licensed professionals accorded substantial privileges that historically 
have also demanded at least some commitment to the public interest.  They also 
swear a Hippocratic Oath in favor of assisting life and health when they can 
reasonably do so.  It is borderline obscene to suggest that a doctor examining a job 
applicant or a workers compensation claimant has absolutely no obligation to 
notice obvious health problems and report them to the person under examination so 
that the person may obtain appropriate follow-up care – even if the person 
examined is technically not the doctor’s “patient.”  The medical analogy to 
insurance intermediary liability is explored at infra text accompanying notes 201-
202.  See also Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709-10 (Minn. 1962) 
(vacating a settlement in a case where defense lawyer learned of plaintiff’s life-
threatening medical condition through Civil Rule 35 independent medical 
examination and failed to make disclosure). 
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regard, arguing for the best interests of the policyholder even though it is 
the insurer that is paying the bills and the insurer that the attorney hopes 
will send additional business in the future.180 
The strongest policy argument invoked by the Sanchez Court was 
the contention that “[t]he deterrent effect of imposing a duty on adjusters is 
questionable” because “[a]djusters are already deterred from neglect by 
exposure to liability to the insurer who engaged them, for breach of 
contract or indemnity.”  According to the Court, “[o]nly some modest 
additional deterrence, at most could be expected from imposing a new duty 
owed directly to insureds.”181  Although Sanchez acknowledged that 
“[i]mposing a duty also might benefit insureds by providing another source 
of recovery for injuries caused by negligent claims handling or 
investigation” the Court viewed this as “redundant” (in “most cases”) 
because the insurer would also be liable for the adjuster’s mistakes and 
“[th]hus making the adjuster directly liable to the insured would, again, 
confer only a modest additional benefit.”182 
Critical as I am of Sanchez and similar cases, I concede that this 
argument had some force even if the court’s exposition of its rationale is a 
little melodramatic.  For example, the court went on to note: 
 
      Insurance is a highly uncertain and risky 
endeavor, because it requires accurate predictions about the 
occurrence and cost of future events. Insurers are able to 
define and limit the risks, and to set premium levels 
commensurate with the risks, using complex and nuanced 
contracts (policies).  By contrast, adjusters hired by 
insurers have no contract with insureds, and thus no ability 
to define or circumscribe their potential risks or liabilities 
to insureds.  If adjusters faced negligence liability to 
insureds, market forces would tend to drive adjusting 
activities in-house, where they could be shielded with 
contractual exclusions, disclaimers, and limitations.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
180   See infra text accompanying notes 198-204 (comparing the role and 
liability of attorney intermediaries to that of claims adjusters). 
 
181  See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802. 
 
182  See id. 
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imposing a duty would reduce, perhaps severely, the 
offering of independent adjuster services.  Yet widespread 
market acceptance has shown these services to be useful 
and desirable. 
 
Those adjusters continuing to operate independently 
despite imposition of a new duty of care would attempt to 
buy insurance against this liability, or create their own cash 
reserves, adding these costs to their charges, and passing 
them on to the insurers who used the adjusters’ services.  
These insurers, in turn, would add the cost to the premium 
charged to insureds.  The insured thus would end up 
paying more for insurance without obtaining more value 
because, as noted above, adjuster liability would provide 
only a redundant source of recovery usually available from 
the insurer.183 
 
Stripped of the excessive gloom-and-doom or parade-of-horribles 
rhetoric, the Sanchez Court is merely asking the rhetorical question:  if the 
insurer ultimately is liable to the wronged policyholder, why does the 
policyholder also need a cause of action against the adjuster?  It’s a good 
rhetorical question, but not good enough to support continued adherence to 
a broad and inflexible norm of claims intermediary immunity. 
It is also important to remember that (Cardozo, sociological 
jurisprudence, and legal realism notwithstanding) courts are primarily 
supposed to be deciding cases with reference to existing doctrine and case-
by-case required modifications of doctrine rather than sweeping quasi-
legislative public policy pronouncements and predictions such as those 
quoted in the passages quoted above.  This portion of Sanchez reads like a 
legislative committee report more than a judicial opinion.  But legislative 
committee reports are generally based on at least some fact finding through 
receipt of hearing testimony, staff research, and review of public comment 
submissions (although partisanship and interest group influence of course 
play a role).  This portion of Sanchez reads as though it was taken verbatim 
from the musings of the adjuster’s brief.  It was rendered without 
supporting citation and is in part self-refuting, for the reasons discussed 
below. 
                                                                                                                 
183  See id.      
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To the extent that courts inevitably make some decisions on the 
basis of public policy rather than application of existing doctrine or the 
doctrinal refinements that result from treating like cases alike, Sanchez is 
still unsatisfying because it embraces (without benefit of electoral mandate) 
a view of public policy that is unduly protective of intermediaries for 
reasons that appear empirically incorrect.  The object of law is not simply 
to provide some avenue for recompense when wronged (a view that might 
support Sanchez’s contention that one responsible potential defendant is 
enough).  Rather, a rational legal regime should provide not just some 
incentives for good behavior but optimal incentives that accurately reflect 
the commercial and behavioral reality of the activity under scrutiny well as 
taking account economic reality. 
On the economic reality score, the “no need for additional 
deterrence or compensation sources” rationale is not nearly as strong as 
suggested by the Sanchez Court.  Although insurers do not fail with the 
seeming regularity of subprime mortgage lenders, dot.com start-ups, or 
restaurants, insurer insolvency is a real danger.  If it occurs, the 
policyholder (or its proxy) may very well not be able to obtain recompense.  
Imposing liability in apt cases upon claims intermediaries does not unfairly 
create a deeper pocket for compensation but instead provides an alternative 
pocket that provides additional protection if the insurer is unable to pay the 
claim.   
There may even be cases in which a reasonable adjudicator could 
find the claims intermediary to have liability even though the insurer does 
not.  Had it been permitted to be litigated in full, Sanchez itself might have 
been such a case.  Recall that the policyholder faced some significant 
coverage issues and arguably had failed to mitigate his contract damages.  
However, under the (admittedly rare) right set of circumstances, the 
adjuster might logically be held liable for tortuous conduct outside of the 
terms of the insurance policy, just as many jurisdictions permit recovery for 
bad faith treatment even when coverage did not exist or was doubtful. 
But the risk that insurers will escape liability through insolvency is 
not the primary problem with the Sanchez view that adjuster liability is not 
necessary for reasonable deterrence.  More problematic is that adjuster and 
insurer incentives are often misaligned in a manner that does not by any 
means ensure that in the event of policyholder mistreatment by the adjuster, 
the insurer tagged with responsibility will pursue the adjuster, thus creating 
sufficient consequences to in turn provide an adequate incentive for the 
adjuster to treat policyholders fairly. 
In real life, the insurer, even though perhaps facing liability for 
adjuster wrongdoing, may be perfectly happy to have the adjuster taking 
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sharp, unreasonable positions with the policyholder.  If the insurer itself 
behaved directly in this fashion toward the policyholder, it would be at 
substantial risk of a bad faith judgment.  Although the insurer remains 
responsible for most agent activity within the scope of the agency, juries 
might well tend to be more forgiving of the insurer in cases where the most 
egregious misconduct is committed by the independent contractor agent 
rather than the insurer itself.   
Intermediary immunity allows insurers and their claims agents to 
engage in at least occasional episodes of “good cop/bad cop” in which the 
insurer portrays itself as very concerned for the policyholder, but unaware 
of adjuster misconduct or unable to control it because of the adjuster’s 
independence and distant operations.  Even if a reviewing jury finds severe 
misconduct by the adjuster, it may be reluctant to find bad faith by the 
insurer and award substantial damages to the insurer, when the insurer has 
not been actively engaged in wrongdoing.  The adjuster agent dilutes any 
negative picture a jury might have of the insurer, but the adjuster itself 
cannot be held responsible for its active misconduct, even though jurors 
might well be diverted from focus on the insurer (either as principal or 
passive wrongdoer) because of the adjuster’s active misconduct.   
If nothing else, the buffering effect of the immune adjuster agent 
logically makes it far less likely that a jury will impose punitive damages 
on the insurer.  Although the court can painstakingly instruct the jury that 
the insurer is responsible for the bad acts of the adjuster, but this hardly has 
the same force as seeing the insurer itself act with willful indifference to 
policyholder rights.    
When Sanchez asserts that the “widespread market acceptance” of 
outsourcing the claims function demonstrates the utility and desirability of 
this delegation of insurer function, the court wrongfully forgets to ask 
whether this is good or bad for the policyholder.  Insurers might indeed 
prefer to outsource the claims function – but this can be for reasons that are 
either good (cost-savings, expertise, flexibility) or bad (cheaper because 
shoddier, insulation of the insurer, a reflection of reduced concern for fair 
claims treatment).  Insurers may find independent contractor adjusters 
“useful and desirable” but this hardly means they are good for 
policyholders.  Further, regardless of whether outsourcing the claims 
function is good or bad on the whole, each individual policyholder is 
entitled to be treated fairly by whoever adjusts the claim.   
The Sanchez Court is probably wrong in predicting that removing 
absolute immunity for independent intermediaries would drive the 
adjustment function significant more in-house for insurers.  If independent 
adjusters are a money-saver for insurers, they will be inclined to continue 
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following this business model, even if some of the savings are lost because 
of imposition of adjuster liability that will be spread and potentially passed 
on to policyholders.   
But even if this Sanchez argument is correct, it hardly follows that 
a return to in-house claims adjusting is a bad thing.  Returning more of the 
claims function to the insurer might well improve claims practices by 
creating a culture of improved incentives and concern for policyholders.  It 
is a least plausible that outsourced adjusting (particularly when coupled 
with immunity) leads to lowered standards and a more short-sighted 
attitude toward the treatment of policyholders and others.   
The independent adjuster arguably has a considerably more short 
term perspective on the process than the insurer that both must live with the 
results and wants to enjoy good public relations for customer retention, 
future marketing, and the insurer’s anticipated receipt of premium 
payments from a satisfied customer who stayed with the company, because 
the insurer treated the policyholder fairly during the claims process.   The 
very leanness and meanness of some independent adjusters that produces 
cost savings can contribute to shortcuts and slipshod claims processing.  
Adjustment by the insurer itself may cost more in initial operation but bring 
better results, both in terms of legal fairness and long-term cost savings 
stemming from reduction in disputes.   
In addition, this portion of the Sanchez public policy analysis posits 
that removing immunity for disclosed agent adjusters would impose 
substantial additional costs on the claims resolution process.  The Sanchez 
Court reasons as follows:  liability for the intermediary will raise disputing 
and liability costs; this in turn will raise adjuster fees and insurance 
premiums; and therefore intermediary liability is bad.  But this syllogism is 
far from self-evidently correct.   
In a competitive market, particularly a “soft” insurance market, 
there may be enough adjusters competing for business that they will absorb 
the relatively modest cost of liability insurance spread through the overall 
pricing of their book of business.  Alternatively, independent adjusters may 
be able to increase their fees, but insurers may not be able to pass these 
along (at least not completely or perhaps not substantially) as this risks 
losing market share to competitors. 
More importantly:  an increase in adjuster fees and insurer 
premiums is not necessarily bad if it results in better adjusting of claims 
and greater insurer supervision of adjusters and more reasonable adjuster 
and insurer behavior toward policyholders and claimants.  Although no one 
wants unaffordable or unavailable insurance, low premium insurance is of 
little or no real value if the insurer and its claims intermediaries fail to 
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accord apt treatment to policyholders and claimants.  In addition, there is 
considerable social cost if insurance error leads to economic waste, 
dislocation, or intervention (e.g., public assistance for the unfortunate 
policyholder who should have been protected by insurance that it had 
purchased).   
There is considerable wisdom in the adage that “you get what you 
pay for.”  The Sanchez Court wrongly assumes that lower costs for vendors 
is always good (irrespective of their performance and incentives) and that 
expansion of liability is always bad.  The tradition of disclosed agent 
immunity stems from the Dickensian time of Marley, but in its modern 
form bears more resemblance to Scrooge.  Essentially, the Sanchez Court is 
implicitly arguing that the simple fairness of holding adjusters accountable 
for the damage they inflict on policyholders or claimants is a burden 
victims should simply bear for the supposed greater overall good of 
hypothesized lower adjuster fees and insurance premiums. 
More important, Sanchez overlooks that the insurer’s chief duty is 
not to make insurance premiums as low as possible.  Rather, the main 
obligation of an insurer is to the policyholder suffering a potentially 
covered loss.  The insurer is required to act reasonably and give equal 
consideration to the interests of the policyholder in adjusting the loss.  If 
doing this results in premium increases or contraction of future sales, this is 
simply the price to be borne for honoring the insurer’s greater duty of care 
to the vulnerable policyholder seeking coverage and for providing a better 
insurance product.184 
By extension, this analysis requires that the independent 
intermediary employed by the insurer be subject to the same hierarchy of 
                                                                                                                 
184 In a recent advertising campaign, State Farm expressly touts its 
performance in providing coverage as of higher quality while being “about the 
same price” as other insurers.  In what may have been an unfortunate harbinger of 
the team’s 2008-2009 season, one commercial features Seattle Seahawks 
quarterback Matt Hasselbeck getting pass protection from a group of 80-pound Pop 
Warner league lineman (representing a Brand X insurer), with the predictable 
result that he is sacked.  This is contrasted with another scene in which a group of 
gigantic lineman (representing State Farm) provide Hasselbeck with sufficient 
protection to complete a pass.  The ad campaign is a fairly direct attempt by State 
Farm to sell “service-after-the-sale” (and perhaps solvency as well) in trying to 
persuade prospective buyers not to select an insurer by premium price alone.  This 
sales pitch from the nation’s largest insurer is at least in tension with the Sanchez’s 
courts “lower costs are the greatest good” contention, if not an outright refutation 
of that contention.  
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duties and set of obligations imposed on the insurer.  Refusing to impose 
substantially similar burdens on the claims intermediary undermines the 
effective operation of the insurance market.  While one can contend that 
there is sufficient adjuster discipline because the adjuster must answer to 
the insurer, this is a weak argument.  The insurer hired the adjuster for a 
reason – to outsource the job of handling claims.  Realistically, the insurer 
will rely heavily on the adjuster’s investigation and assessment (unless the 
insurer is outsourcing the function so that the adjuster can be the insurer’s 
“bad cop,” which is an even more troublesome scenario).  The adjusters’ 
good or bad conduct will have significant impact on claims decisions, all 
with relatively little supervision by the insurer.  This strongly argues for 
holding claims intermediaries to the same standards imposed on insurers.   
Further, as discussed above, the insurer is not nearly as likely to 
punish adjuster misconduct as was posited by the Sanchez Court.  One 
reason is that adjusters can run de facto interference for the insurer.  Far 
from punishing errant adjusters, insurers may enjoy the degree to which an 
aggressive anti-coverage, low-payment adjuster increases insurer profits 
while providing a useful (but immune) foil in the comparatively few cases 
that result in litigation of any sort, much less bad faith or punitive damages 
litigation. 
In addition, because insurer sales, marketing, underwriting, and 
claims departments often seem to act without much knowledge or 
coordination among themselves, there is the practical reality that even a 
pretty sloppy independent intermediary will continue to be used by the 
insurer unless something (a) goes really wrong and (b) comes to the 
attention of the proper person who can hire and fire intermediaries under 
circumstances where (c) the errant adjuster is not on the whole making 
money for the insurer.  If proposition (c) obtainshappens, the insurer is 
unlikely to seek indemnification for cases in which the adjuster’s 
misconduct toward a policyholder resulted in insurer liability.  Many 
insurers would view this as simply straining relations with a useful business 
partner and prefer to seek recompensatione through some informal 
adjustment of pricing in future claims business. 
In much the same way that a hospital may be tempted to turn a lax 
eye toward malpractice suits against a doctor who performs many 
procedures and generates considerable revenue, the insurer will most likely 
not take aggressive action against the adjuster even where the adjuster’s 
attributed misconduct results in the insurer paying a claim, particularly 
where the claim was one the insurer was required to pay in any event 
(which is usually the case).  Only in cases of where bad faith/punitive 
damages liability significantly exceeds policy limits is the insurer likely to 
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be very bothered by intermediary error.  In short, even the strongest of the 
public policy rationales of Sanchez and similar decisions is unconvincing. 
Sanchez is also awash in statements that suggest the court had an 
underappreciation of the nuances of insurance concepts and insurance in 
operation.  As noted in the extensively quoted passages above, the court 
seems to favor immunity for intermediaries because it seems them as the 
analog to mom-and-pop grocery stores under attack from supermarkets.  To 
the Sanchez court, any contraction of the business of independent adjusting 
and any movement toward adjusting by the insurer’s own employees is a 
step in the wrong direction.  But just as the supermarket is generally seen as 
an improvement over the corner grocery store (and remains a superior 
alternative to 7-Eleven and its counterparts), it might improve insurance 
adjusting if the small independents were replaced by larger, more 
professional organizations operated by the insurers themselves.   
In addition to turning the concept of privity on its head (so that the 
absence of contract not only protects the adjuster from a contract-based 
claim but also makes imposition of tort liability unfair), Sanchez also 
converts the notion of reasonable expectations from a concept generally 
favorable to policyholders to one favoring adjuster immunity because “[a] 
new rule would defeat their reasonable expectations.”185 
Further, recognition of “[a]djuster liability would be an empty 
slate, upon which the courts would have to write a whole new body of 
‘`adjuster liability’ law” without the benefit of “contracts devised by 
knowledgeable and imaginative private parties to give structure to the 
risks” resulting in years of development of law in the area.186  This part of 
Sanchez is a little shocking in that it seems to argue that courts should be 
reluctant to recognize defendant liability simply because this will increase 
the workload of the courts. 
By this rationale, one might argue for complete abolition of all 
liability irrespective of the question of individual rights and the social 
benefits of court-imposed liability and enforcement.   Or, to cite some less 
extreme examples from real life, one might note that recognition of rights 
such as anti-discrimination, desegregation, one person/one vote, arrestee 
rights and manufacturer liability for unsafe products, all required courts to 
devote subsequent judicial resources to developing these emerging bodies 
                                                                                                                 
185  See 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803. 
 
186  Id. 
 
2009] THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES 675 
 
 
of law.  But this was never seen by the judiciary as a reason to refrain from 
doing what the court otherwise viewed as the legally proper thing and 
recognizing the basic right in question. 
Similarly, the court’s desire to have “knowledgeable and 
imaginative private parties”187 provide guidance begins to make it look all 
the more as though a main underpinning of Sanchez was abdication of the 
judicial function.  Courts have for centuries developed the contours of duty 
and breach necessary to apply tort law.  They hardly need contract 
draftsman from the insurance or intermediary industries to guide them in 
fleshing out the contours of claims intermediary liability. 
In addition, there is nothing to prevent insurers, intermediaries, or 
other entities affected by any new rule of liability from doing their own 
contracting around the new legal regime through indemnity agreements or 
the like.  Sanchez wrongly assumes that the announcement of a tort law 
rule removing absolute immunity for intermediaries would forever freeze 
the operations of participants in the insurance marketplace.  On the 
contrary, a tort law rule of no adjuster immunity would be, like most legal 
rules, a default rule to which market participants could adjust (through 
contract and other means). 
Also problematic is Sanchez’s deployment of the case law on the 
question of intermediary immunity.  Predictably, Sanchez cites several 
cases illustrative of what it correctly regards as the majority rule, but it 
makes little effort to grapple with contrary precedent.  New Hamphire’s 
1986 Morvay188 decision, an opinion at loggerheads with much of the 
Sanchez pronouncements, is not even cited.  The 1980 Alaska decision of 
Continental v. Bayless and Roberts is cited but given unfairly and 
deceptively short shrift by Sanchez, which characterizes the rather 
pathbreaking Bayless case as “simply “rel[ying] on an earlier Alaska case” 
imposing liability on an agent.189 
By contrast, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals opinion in Brown v. 
State Farm,190 makes considerably more persuasive public policy 
                                                                                                                 
187  Id. 
 
188 See Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 506 A.2d 333 (N.H. 1986). 
 
189 See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803. 
 
190 See Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2002). 
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arguments in favor of at least permitting adjuster liability.  In Brown, 
plaintiffs were homeowners seeking coverage after two March 2000 fires 
damaged their property, claiming losses of more than $60,000.191  The 
insurer retained an independent investigator that “concluded, “without 
interviewing either Brown or any of the fire-fighters involved, that there 
was only one fire, and that it resulted from ‘the deliberate act of a person or 
persons’” and that some claimed damage predated the fire.192  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the investigative report was a significant factor in the 
insurer’s decision to deny the claim.193   
Brown sued both State Farm and the independent investigator, 
settling with the insurer and continuing its claim against the adjuster, 
presumably for losses that were not sufficiently compensated from the 
funds paid by the insurer in settlement.194  Thus, Brown provides an 
immediate example that, contrary to the assertions of Sanchez, it may well 
be practically useful to have liability potentially applicable to more than 
one entity involved in claim denial.  In this sense, the removal of absolute 
immunity for independent intermediaries can be an effective means of 
providing more protection, spreading risk more widely, and facilitating 
greater settlement of disputes. 
Comparing the adjuster’s situation to that of others who could be 
liable to reasonably foreseeable third parties, the Brown Court saw nothing 
jarring about removing investigator/adjuster immunity.195  Because the 
policyholder presenting a claim to the adjuster is so obviously someone 
who could be hurt by poor performance of the adjuster’s duty, the Brown 
Court had no problem finding that there was adequate foreseeability 
sufficient to create a tort law duty owed the policyholder by the adjuster. 
                                                                                                                 
191 Id. at 218. 
 
192 Id. 
 
193 Id. (case states that the decision was “based at least in part on this report”). 
 
194  Id. 
 
195 In particular, the court considered attorneys, sellers of intoxicating 
beverages, and individuals engaged in a love/lust triangle as having duties to those 
who could reasonably be injured by their conduct, citing Oklahoma case law in 
support.  See 58 P.3d at 219-22. 
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Brown was assisted in its decision by Oklahoma’s different law 
regarding immunity for auditors.  Unlike California, which follows the 
limitations of Ultramares v. Touche,196 Oklahoma had for some time 
rejected Ultramares and embraced the broader liability rule of Restatement 
§552,197 at least regarding negligently supplied information.198  According 
to the Brown Court, it “was reasonable” for the policyholder “to expect that 
State Farm, through it’s [sic] agent JJMA/Cooper, would perform a non-
negligent investigation of the fire.  Indeed, it is indisputable that ‘both the 
insured and the insurer [had] a stake in the outcome of the 
investigation.’”199 
The jurisprudence of adjuster immunity generally suffers from an 
underappreciation of the degree to which the incentives of insurer and 
adjuster are insufficiently aligned with those of the policyholder (to whom 
a duty of good faith is owed) and others to whom tort-like duties of care are 
logically owed.  As discussed above, under the current regime, the insurer 
can to some extent use the independent adjuster to “do its dirty work” with 
no liability risk to the adjuster and reduced bad faith and punitive damages 
risk to the insurer.  This potentially creates a huge practical loophole in the 
law of bad faith that is supposed to provide adequate protection to 
policyholders.  It also can create problems for other participants in 
insurance markets, as illustrated below.  Put simply, without facing liability 
                                                                                                                 
196 See 174 N.E. 441, 447 (N.Y. 1931) (accountants not liable to third parties 
for damages resulting from poor auditing, which was seen as beach of duty owed 
the client but not a basis for tort liability to third parties, even those whose reliance 
on the audit was reasonably foreseeable). 
 
197 See, e.g., Stroud v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 793-94 (Okla. 
2001). 
 
198 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977): 
 
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.   
 
199  See 58 P.3d at 222 (citing Morvay). 
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itself, the claims intermediary simply lacks sufficient incentive to engage in 
an optimal level of care toward policyholder’s and others. 
Sanchez and other modern cases defending intermediary immunity 
claim that there already exists adequate incentive for care because of the 
principal’s potential contract claims against an intermediary who errors.  
As previously discussed, this contention has problems even as a matter of 
theory.  As a matter of empirical evidence, the theory also seems infirm.  
Although the case reports are not awash in suits against intermediaries, 
they at least allege some very slipshod and wrongful conduct that should 
probably never occur if the theory of adequate policing by insurer 
principals is accurate.   
For example, in Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.,200 the 
state Department of Workforce Development retained the defendant as a 
claims manager and TPA for the state’s Uninsured Employers Fund.201  
Although the case focused primarily upon the degree to which the TPA 
might share the employer’s immunity under state workman’s compensation 
law, it is instructive in illustrating the degree to which claims 
intermediaries can engage in egregious misconduct and the utility of 
holding them accountable under such circumstances. 
Plaintiff worked as a carpenter.202  In July 1998, he fell 18 feet 
while working on a pole barn and sustained serious injury.203  His employer 
lacked worker’s compensation insurance, forcing him to make a claim with 
the Uninsured Employers Fund in January 2000 (after apparently receiving 
medical care and other benefits in the interim, the source of which is 
unclear from the opinion).204  Despite what seems a clearly work-related 
serious injury without employee misconduct, the TPA denied the claim.205  
It then required that the worker have in independent medical 
                                                                                                                 
200 729 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 2007). 
 
201 Id. at 714. 
 
202 Id. at 715. 
 
203 Id. 
 
204 Id. 
 
205 Id. 
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examination.206  The March 2000 exam, while finding lower disability 
levels than claimed by the worker, confirmed temporary and permanent 
disability and “clearly entitled the plaintiff to worker’s compensation 
benefits.”207    
But despite repeated requires, the TPA did not pay the benefits, 
even though its own vocational expert conceded up to a 10 percent loss of 
earning capacity due to the worker’s injuries.208  As of September 2001, 
benefits remained unpaid.209  The worker pursued administrative relief, 
which resulted in an administrative law judge (ALJ) order that the TPA pay 
approximately $100,000.210  But the TPA released only $4,000 from the 
state Fund and “refused to pay the remainder of the award,” forcing the 
injured worker to seek additional review.211  In May 2002, the state’s Labor 
and Industry Review Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings.212  Rather 
than pay, the TPA sought judicial review, which resulted in court 
affirmance of the administrative decision in December 2002.213  The TPA 
again refused to pay and sought further review, resulting in a September 
2003 decision in favor of the worker.214  “Only then did [the TPA] finally 
pay the balance of the plaintiff’s claim.”215 
Although finally paid, the worker was not mollified, and brought a 
bad faith action against the state Fund and the TPA, claiming (with 
                                                                                                                 
206 Aslakson,729 N.W.2d at 715-16. 
 
207 Id. at 716.   
 
208 Id. 
 
209 Id. 
 
210 Id. 
 
211 Id. 
 
212 Aslakson,729 N.W.2d at 716.. 
 
213 Id. 
 
214 Id. 
 
215 Id. 
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seemingly good reason in light of the case history) that there was never any 
reasonable basis for contesting the claimed benefits (or at least not 96% of 
them) and “that the appeals were taken merely to delay payment of 
rightfully owed benefits.”216   The Fund and TPA defended on grounds of 
immunity under the state Worker’s Compensation Act, a defense the trial 
court rejected as to the TPA.217  The intermediate appellate court reversed, 
but the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a persuasive opinion centered 
primarily on statutory construction, ruled that the state’s worker’s 
compensation law did not immunize the TPA and that plaintiff’s bad faith 
action could proceed.218   
Apparently, there was no question under Wisconsin law that, in the 
absence of statutory immunity, the claim could be brought against the TPA 
notwithstanding lack of privity of contract and the TPA’s status as a 
disclosed agent of the Fund.219  The Court viewed the claim as permissible 
(in the absence of worker’s compensation immunity) under Wis. Stat. § 
102.18(1)(b) “which provides a penalty for bad faith conduct” in worker’s 
comp claims.220   Consequently, Aslakson is not, strictly speaking, a case 
either embracing or rejecting common law immunity for claims 
intermediaries.  In spirit, however, Aslakson is more aligned with cases 
rejecting intermediary immunity than with cases following the historical 
rule. 
More important for purposes of this section, Aslakson illustrates 
the degree to which claims intermediaries can engage in pretty outrageous 
conduct and that they, in the absence of liability, have relatively little 
incentive to treat claimants fairly.  Recall that the TPA in question was 
taking the position – one rejected by an ALJ, an administrative review 
board, and a trial court – that a carpenter could fall 18 feet and suffer only 
$4,000 worth of permanent partial injury.  Although the intermediate 
appellate court mysteriously granted more leeway to the TPA, the 
                                                                                                                 
216 Id. 
 
217 Id. 
 
218 Aslakson,729 N.W.2d at 717, 728. 
 
219 See Id. at 719. 
 
220 Id. 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court overwhelmingly agreed with the assessment of 
the ALJ, review board, and trial judge. 
The bad faith claim in Aslakson centered on the TPA’s 
recalcitrance in prosecuting appeals, one can make a strong argument that 
even its initial position forcing the ALJ decision constituted bad faith.  The 
TPA’s own vocational expert concluded that Mr. Aslakson had incurred a 
10 percent decline in earning capacity because of the injuries from the fall.  
Even a lazy or bad carpenter will earn a lot more than $40,000 in what 
remains of working life but the TPA was willing to pay only $4,000 after 
the ALJ decision, and refused to pay anything prior to the ALJ order.  On 
its face, the TPA’s conduct looks unreasonable, yet the TPA was unwilling 
to give apt concern to the worker’s interest and was unwilling to re-
evaluate its hostile stance in light of mounting factors favoring payment.221 
Even if Asklakson had been a white collar worker and not suffered 
neurological impairment in the fall, the TPA’s assessment would have been 
extreme.  Applied to a claimant whose livelihood depends on his physical 
health, strength, endurance and dexterity, the TPA position seems 
ridiculous on its face.  One need not be a cynic to perceive the TPA’s 
conduct as merely running out the clock on the claimant in hopes of either 
forcing a settlement at a reduced amount or allowing the further investment 
income to the Fund.   
As discussed above, insurers are often attracted to TPAs who 
engage in such conduct because it can be profit-enhancing for the insurer 
without the carrier itself sullying its hands through directly connected bad 
faith treatment of the policyholder.  Under the traditional rule, the TPA acts 
with impunity toward the policyholder/insured/claimant, no matter how 
unreasonable or evil its conduct.   
In the context of the Aslakson case itself, the incentive structure is 
even worse because the state Fund is immune and lacks incentive to punish 
the TPA for misconduct since the Fund will not suffer any adverse conduct 
from the TPA’s wrongdoing – even though the Fund may enjoy economic 
gain because of that wrongdoing.  If the TPA is also immune, the victim is 
left without remedy.  Although the worker’s compensation or sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
221 In contrast to the TPA position, the ALJ decision seems reasonable on its 
face.  A carpenter of relatively young age could easily earn $1 million in gross 
income over his remaining working life.  Ten percent of that amount produces the 
$100,000 award.  Although a significant sum, it does not facially seem misaligned 
with the facts of the case. 
 
682 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
immunity situations give particular illustration to the problems created by 
intermediary immunity, private insurance presents much the same situation 
with only the salve that the victim will usually have at least some claim 
against the insurer as principal. 
Although the primary victims of claims intermediary error (or at 
least the victims without recompense)222 are policyholders and claimants 
seeking recovery, insurers who are not the principals of an intermediary 
may on occasion suffer harm due to the intermediary’s misconduct.  In 
such cases, the rule of intermediary immunity also needlessly shields 
intermediaries and too greatly reduces the intermediary’s incentive to take 
adequate care and to make a reasonable assessment of a claims situation.  
This imposes costs not only on the affected insurers, policyholders, and 
claimants but also can impose substantial externalized costs on the judicial 
system and society. 
A fascinating (but one hopes rare) illustration of the far-reaching 
mischief of intermediary immunity is a case that began as First Specialty 
Insurance Corporation v. Ward North American Holding, Inc.223 and ended 
as First Specialty Insurance Corporation v. Novapro Risk Solutions, LP.224   
The case started out simply enough with a barroom brawl in which one of 
the patrons was severely injured.225  Actually, it was more of an 
unprovoked attack rather than an escalating feud between patrons.226  The 
attacking group had set upon another patron earlier in the evening, 
inflicting significant but less severe injury and had not been immediately 
ejected from the premises or arrested, which is the normal accepted 
practice in such cases.  The more severely injured victim thus had a pretty 
                                                                                                                 
222  Insurers can of course be harmed by intermediary error or misconduct.  
However, as principals with contract relations with the intermediary, an injured 
insurer will have at least breach of contract remedies and perhaps other avenues of 
relief as well. 
 
223 No. 04-2359-JWL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23726 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2004). 
 
224 468 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Kan. 2007). 
 
225 Id. at 1323, 1332-33. 
 
226 Id. 
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good premises liability claim against the bar and consequently sued.  The 
bar nightclub submitted the claim to its insurance agent.227 
Simple case, right?  On its face, the matter seemed one to settle for 
some reasonably serious money fairly quickly so that the plaintiff would 
not get before a jury that could find him afflicted with seven figures worth 
of injury (his face had been crushed and had to be extensively rebuilt with 
metal plates and plaintiff, a school teacher in his thirties, had also suffered 
significant cognitive injury).228  But the actions of the first TPA took the 
case outside the realm of the simple.    
The incident and injury took place in April 2000.229  In Summer 
2000, the bar’s general liability insurer changed from a Lloyd’s group to 
First Specialty.230  Plaintiff counsel’s February 2001 notice and demand 
letter did not set forth the date of the incident.231  Suit was filed in October 
2001 and the copy passed along was not clear regarding the April date of 
the incident.232  The First Specialty TPA (Ward North American) 
incorrectly assumed that the injury took place in April 2001, during the 
First Specialty coverage period, rather than April 2000 during the Lloyd’s 
coverage period.  The First Specialty TPA (Ward, which subsequently 
became NovaPro) retained defense counsel, who represented the bar 
through arbitration, demanding trial de novo after a $175,000 award.233  
Finally, in mid-March 2003, the First Specialty TPA discovered the 
mistake and notified the apt Lloyd’s managing general agent (Mavon, 
                                                                                                                 
227 Id. at 1332-33 (“no question” plaintiff was “very seriously injured” and that 
“the $445,000 settlement ultimately reached was reasonable, that it was the result 
of good faith negotiations, and that [circumstances of the case] did not . . . result in 
an ‘over-payment’ to [plaintiff].”). 
 
228 Id. 
 
229  First Specialty Insurance Corporation, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
 
230 Id. 
 
231 Id. 
 
232 Id. at 1323-24. 
 
233 Id. at 1324. 
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which was the Lloyd’s independent contractor for claim notice purposes) 
who in turn alerted the Lloyd’s TPA, Elliston.234 
At this juncture, the situation was unfortunate on many levels.  The 
first TPA’s error had resulted in the wrong insurer expending defense costs.  
But the defense to date had been a relatively light one, without substantial 
attorney time spent fighting the arbitration or conducting discovery.235  
                                                                                                                 
234 Id. 
 
235 The minimalist nature of the defense provided by First Specialty’s chosen 
counsel became a major issue in the case in that Elliston/Lloyd’s took the position 
that not only was notice of the claim late but that they had been prejudiced by the 
late notice because the underlying tort claim was so far along and had not been 
defended with sufficient aggressiveness.  This type of late notice/prejudice 
defense, although a staple of insurance law (and a frequent favorite of insurers 
looking for reasons not to pay a claim), is a particularly hard one to make in New 
Jersey.  The state’s arguably leading case on the matter rejected the defense even 
though the insurer did not receive notice of the matter until after a default 
judgment had been obtained against the policyholder.  See Morales v. Nat’l Grange 
Mut. Ins. Co., 423 A.2d 325, 327 (1980); accord Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & 
Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 1372-73 (D.N.J. 1992) (six-year delay in notice not 
sufficient to cause actual prejudice to insurer); see also Cooper v. GEICO Ins. Co., 
237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (1968) (adopting appreciable prejudice test and notice-
prejudice rule as state law); see also Molyneaux v. Molyneaux, 553 A.2d 49, 51 
(1989) (reaffirming state law on the point). In one case rather similar to the instant 
matter where the delay resulted from a misunderstanding that had the wrong 
insurer initially defending the matter, the late notice defense of the right insurer 
was rejected due to an absence of prejudice.  See Vornado Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.  
Co., 254 A.2d 325, 328-29 (1969). 
Winning a late notice defense in New Jersey is an uphill battle even with 
compelling facts.  Only if the defense lawyer used by First Specialty had done 
horrendous work (or non-work) was this defense likely to succeed.  In reviewing 
the matter after hearing evidence at trial, the court: 
 
. . . came away from trial with the distinct impression that, at best, Ward did 
average or “C” work on the [underlying plaintiff’s] claim before suit was filed.  
The record is very thin as to whether the way in which the [plaintiff’s] claim 
was handled by Ward was materially better or worse than other claims it was 
adjusting for First Specialty and other insurers.  Nevertheless, after suit was 
filed in Ocotober 2001, the record suggests that Ward and [defense attorney 
Stephen] Wellinghorst together took reasonable actions to investigate and 
defend the [plaintiff’s] claim. 
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[T]he court formed the impression that Wellinghorst’s skills as a trial lawyer 
are generally on par to those actually exhibited by the fine lawyers who 
represented First Specialty, Lloyd’s and Ward in the instant coverage litigation. 
The court further finds that Wellinghorst used the above-described skills to do 
a reasonable and competent job in defending [the policyholder] in a case that 
presented very few, if any, viable defense opportunities on the primary issues of 
liability and damages.  The court, however, has no illusions that Wellinghorst did 
an outstanding job, let alone a “perfect” job, with his defense of [the policyholder]. 
[However,] it was Wellinghorst who discovered Ward’s mistake with regard 
to the date of loss and policy coverage issue.  He could have remained silent upon 
that discovery in an effort to avoid the instant litigation.  But instead he did the 
right thing by notifying Ward. See First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 
1329-30 (emphasis in original). 
With the exception of the statement that Ward “could have remained silent” on 
the matter, the court’s assessment seems unquestionably correct.  I was retained by 
First Specialty as an expert witness in the case (more on that below) and have 
reviewed the record in the underlying tort matter as well as the coverage dispute.  
The court’s assessment of the litigation reality of the matter is close to 
unassailable.  Attorney Wellinghorst and Ward/First Specialty did not mount a 
scorched earth defense of the barroom brawl claim but did an adequate job.  More 
important, a scorched earth defense would have only needlessly wasted resources 
and potentially exposed the policyholder to an excess verdict.  The case was a 
strong one for plaintiff, with essentially no question regarding policyholder 
liability and the essential magnitude of plaintiff’s injuries.   
The case didn’t need aggressive defense but instead required aggressive 
settlement efforts to resolve the matter at a figure that was sufficiently generous to 
eliminate the claim without overpaying plaintiff.  Wellinghorst, Ward, and First 
Specialty in my view (and the court’s) accomplished this with almost flying colors.  
A $435,000 settlement is not necessarily a bargain for the insurer, but is a more 
than reasonable amount in a case with no good liability defenses and a young 
plaintiff with substantial medical bills, a year of missed work, permanent brain 
damage, and permanent facial disfigurement.  There was also significant testimony 
putting this settlement in range of similar cases in the locality in question (Atlantic 
County and the New Jersey Shore).   One need not be a Bon Jovi devotee (the 
barroom brawl occurred in Sayreville, the singer’s home town) to realize that 
bodily injury verdicts in a relatively urbanized part of the East Coast are frequently 
substantial, often reaching seven figures.  If the case had been venued in the rural 
West, Lloyd’s might have had some ground for objecting to the size of the 
settlement but this argument was in my view unpersuasive as a matter of law in 
light of the actual trial location and the unquestioned seriousness of the injuries to 
plaintiff. 
But on the issue of attorney Wellinghorst’s obligations, the court’s assessment 
was hopefully only a rhetorical tangent rather than a serious pronouncement about 
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Now trial was scheduled for late summer 2003.  Elliston complained that it 
was now too late and that it (and more important) Lloyd’s had been 
prejudiced by the late notice and need not cover the matter even though the 
claim clearly arose during the Lloyd’s coverage period.  The argument was 
astoundingly weak in light of applicable New Jersey law236 and the 
                                                                                                                          
attorney professional responsibility.  A defense attorney retained by an insurer or 
claims intermediary owes a duty of candor to the insurer.  Although the rights of 
the policyholder defendant as primary client of the attorney are greater and take 
precedence in the event of conflict, the attorney generally has no right to remain 
silent when it discovers information that may affect the insurer’s rights as a party 
that contracted to provide legal services to the policyholder.  In this case, because 
the policyholder had insurance with Lloyd’s during the time of the brawl, there 
was no policyholder-insurer conflict sufficient to permit defense counsel to 
withhold from the insurer the important information regarding the actual date of 
loss.  If First Specialty had attempted to use the information to abandon its 
policyholder on the eve of trial, Attorney Wellinghorst would have presumably 
advised the insurer of the policyholder’s rights and a possible bad faith claim 
against the insurer.  But in my view, Wellinghorst had no discretion to withhold 
the information from Ward/First Specialty and would have been subject to breach 
of contract or legal malpractice liability (in states that consider the insurer to be a 
“client” of the defense attorney) had he done so. 
 
236  See supra note 165.  Elliston and Lloyd’s also argued, based on New 
Jersey’s “Best Practices” rules, that the time for conducting discovery had passed 
and that it was now too late to conduct discovery or other litigation activity that 
could cure the alleged inadequacies of the defense prior to their notification.  The 
“Best Practices” rules set discovery deadlines for particular types of cases but, in 
practice, appear to be as malleable as any other discovery deadlines.  Discovery in 
the barroom brawl case was “technically set to end on September 10, 2002” 
months before notification to Elliston/Lloyds but:  
 
[T]he evidence at trial was essentially uncontroverted that the parties 
continued to conduct discovery through the summer of 2003 [the eve of 
trial], including depositions of [plaintiff and three other arguably 
important witnesses].  Despite Lloyd’s speculation, there simply is no 
credible evidence in the record to support the notion that [plaintiff’s 
counsel or the New Jersey trial court] would have sought to strictly 
enforce Best Practices had Lloyd’s decided to become involved in 
[defense] in the spring and summer of 2003.  Nor is there any credible 
evidence in the record that [plaintiff counsel] or the presiding judge 
would have moved at trial to strike any discovery taken on behalf of [the 
defendant policyholder] after the Best Practices discovery deadline.”   
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practical realities of trial in every jurisdiction, where custom and practice 
as well as the discretion accorded under the rules auger in favor of granting 
additional discovery or postponement of trial where a party or counsel is 
brought into a case late in the day.   
The Elliston/Lloyd’s complaint about prejudice also appears to 
have been mere pretext in that Elliston essentially articulated the defense 
and sat on its hands rather than at least exploring the defense and settlement 
options.  Although Elliston was not in a great position, it made essentially 
no effort to salvage the situation.  It did not seek a postponement of trial.  It 
did not retain counsel or assume control of the case with existing defense 
counsel.  It did not seek to conduct additional investigation or discovery.  
Most important, Elliston made no effort to assess the liability exposure 
presented by the case or to settle the matter on reasonable terms.237   
Instead, Elliston and Lloyd’s refused to take over the case, leaving 
First Specialty holding the metaphorical bag.  If First Specialty had stopped 
defending the bar and trying to settle the case down the home stretch, it 
would have been vulnerable to serious allegations of bad faith by the 
policyholder.238  Making what it thought was the best of a bad situation, 
                                                                                                                          
See First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F.Supp.2d at 1332.   Because it is the insurer’s 
burden to show prejudice from late notice, the absence of this evidence prior to 
trial would logically have supported summary judgment for First Specialty on this 
issue.  Merely by permitting trial on this point, the court arguably did 
Elliston/Lloyd’s a favor and gave the “discovery deadline has passed” defense 
more regard than it deserved. 
 
237  See Id.  at 1335: 
 
Clearly, Lloyd’s was placed in a less than ideal position by the late 
notice of the Femia claim.  The evidence at trial, however, simply does 
not support the assertion that Lloyd’s irretrievably lost substantial 
rights as a result of late notice of the [barroom brawl] claim.  Indeed, 
the evidence strongly suggests that, had Elliston actively intervened in 
March 2003, and it definitely could have done so under a reservation of 
rights, it still would have been able to investigate, defend, and/or settle 
the [underlying] case without significant impediment.   
 
Id. 
 
238  See id. at 1339 (First Specialty “was essentially `stuck between a rock and 
a hard place’” because of duties to policyholder, even if claim did not fall within 
First Specialty policy period).  See, e.g., Griggs v. Bertram, 443 A.2d 163, 167 
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First Specialty conducted additional discovery and analysis (making up in 
significant degree for the admittedly minimalist defense it had conducted 
prior to that time) and settled the case in a range deemed appropriate by 
seasoned counsel and ultimately by the court in the ensuring litigation 
wrought by the mistakes of the two claims intermediaries (Ward and 
Elliston).239 
An old adage of the radio business is that “if you don’t have time 
to do it right the first time, you’ll never have time to fix it.”  Although not 
literally true, the saying, like the better known “stitch in time saves nine” 
nicely captures the higher remedial cost that is created by errors at the 
outset.  If Ward had correctly realized that the incident was not within the 
First Specialty coverage period, the claim would have gone to Elliston and 
Lloyd’s, who could have defended and settled (or not settled) the case as 
seen fit.  Instead, the matter went from largely simple and routine to more 
complex and unusual.  Having paid $445,000 to settle the bodily injury 
claim plus defense costs, First Specialty wanted reimbursement from the 
insurer that should have handled the claim from the outset.240 
Although Elliston’s errors as the Lloyd’s intermediary are less 
obviously fumbling than those of Ward, they were significant.  Although 
Elliston (and Lloyd’s) received notice later than desired, there was still a 
significant amount of time to take over the case and defend or settle it to its 
liking rather than whining that it was stuck with the alleged claims 
handling errors of First Specialty and defense counsel.  Instead of acting 
reasonably, Elliston postured.  For example, it claimed that further 
discovery was unavailable due to the close of the discovery period without 
even trying to obtain a reopening or an agreement with opposing counsel to 
conduct depositions, physical examinations, or the like.  As nearly every 
litigator knows, most anything can be done by agreement of counsel, which 
is not normally unreasonably withheld because courts are generally 
empowered to grant these extensions and exceptions unless the matter is 
one of the few “jurisdictional” deadlines over which courts have no 
discretion. 
                                                                                                                          
(1982) (carrier beginning defense without reservation of rights estopped from 
denying coverage).  Because of the error of its TPA, First Specialty understandably 
viewed the claim as falling clearly within its coverage and did not defend under a 
reservation of rights. 
 
239 See First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-41. 
 
240 See id. at 1323-25 (describing background of litigation). 
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Elliston’s intransigence could have been simple laziness or 
negligence.  It could also have been (and in my view was) tactical 
posturing designed to keep First Specialty “stuck” with the coverage 
obligation that rightfully belonged to Lloyd’s and for which Lloyd’s (not 
First Specialty) had received a premium.  It is more than possible that 
Elliston was not dropping the claims handling handoff because of 
incompetence or sloth but because it was doing the bidding of Lloyd’s in 
trying to paint First Specialty into a corner from which it could not escape 
through using the pretextual excuse that is was now “too late” for Elliston 
to pick up the claim and that Lloyd’s was prejudiced in its ability to defend 
and cover the matter. 
All of this brought about an additional lawsuit by First Specialty 
seeking reimbursement from Lloyd’s based on subrogation and unjust 
enrichment.  First Specialty also sued its TPA (which had blown it so badly 
on the actual date of the plaintiff’s injury at the bar) and sued Elliston as 
well as Lloyd’s.  An unfortunate but hardly remarkable barroom assault 
that probably should have resulted in no significant litigation became a 
battle royal that resulted in a second lawsuit (in addition to the injured 
patron’s bodily injury/inadequate security claim), extensive pretrial 
discovery,  retention of experts,241 four pretrial judicial opinio242 a week-
                                                                                                                 
241 See id. at 1336-37 (in which the court makes “specific credibility findings” 
about various witnesses, including expert witnesses, even though the decision was 
not, according to the court, based on any expert testimony).  As noted above, I was 
retained as an expert for First Specialty, as was former U.S. District Court Judge 
Curtis Meanor of the District of New Jersey.  Lloyd’s retained George Kenney, a 
prominent practitioner and co-author of New Jersey Insurance law.  See GEORGE 
KENNY & FRANK A. LATTEL, NEW JERSEY INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1993). 
 
242 See First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward North America Holdings, Inc., 2004 
WL 2672833, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2004) (denying Lloyd’s motion for change 
of venue to New Jersey); First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Novapro Risk Solutions, LP, 
468 F. Supp.2d 1321, 1336-37 (D. Kan. 2007) (referring to earlier pretrial ruling 
rejecting Daubert challenge to proffered expert that resulted in written opinion not 
available in LexisNexis database); see also First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward 
North America Holdings, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33250, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 
15, 2005) (denying St. Paul Travelers motion to dismiss without prejudice on 
technical grounds that submission of affidavit converted it to summary judgment 
motion that was premature); First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward North America 
Holdings, Inc., 2005 WL 3447708, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2005) (granting 
Elliston’s motion to dismiss) (all opinions by District Judge John W. Lungstrum); 
First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward North America Holdings, Inc 2006 U.S. Dist. 
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long trial and a 20-page bench opinion.243  The collective expense of the 
enterprise was hundreds of thousands spent on out-of-pocket disputing 
costs and at least tens of thousands of dollars worth of judicial resources 
(by three different judges and their staffs) shouldered by taxpayers even if 
not formally billed in itemized fashion.   
And who paid for this train wreck?  The claims indermediaries who 
caused and exacerbated it?  Hardly.  In its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, the court found that Ward (First Specialty’s administrator) could 
not be liable in negligence unless there was a finding of prejudice to either 
insurer as a result of late notice.  Finding no prejudice, the court granted 
Ward’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.244  Elliston (the Lloyd’s 
administrator) did even better in that it was dismissed from the case a year 
earlier when the court, following the traditional rule on intermediary 
liability, ruled that First Specialty had no claim against Elliston because 
there was no contract between First Specialty and Elliston.245 
                                                                                                                          
LEXIS 60219 (D. Kan., Aug. 22, 2006) (issuing protective order) (by Magistrate 
Judge Keith G. Sebelius).   There were also judicial rulings that are not generally 
available on online.   
 
243 See generally First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (discussing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by Magistrate Judge James P. O’Hara). 
 
244  See id. at 1343. 
 
245 See First Specialty v. Ward, 2005 WL 3447708, at *1-2 (Kan. Dec. 15, 
2005) (“First Specialty asserts the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
against Elliston without asserting any contractual relationship with Elliston.  The 
claim for bad faith in denying an insurance claim ‘is best understood as one that 
sounds in contract.’”) (citing Kansas precedent and Charleston Dry Cleaners & 
Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 586 S.E.2d 586, 588 (S.C. 2003) which 
was discussed supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text) (citation omitted); see 
also Wolverton v. Bullock, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280-81 (D. Kan. 1998).  The 
First Specialty Court echoed the Charleston Dry Cleaners sentiment that the “duty 
of good faith arising under the contract does not extend to a person who is not a 
party to the insurance contract.  Thus, no bad faith claim can be brought against an 
independent adjuster or independent adjusting company.”  See First Specialty v. 
Ward, 2005 LEXIS 33247 at *2, quoting Charleston Dry Cleaners.   
In addition, the court rejected the claim that there was any special relationship 
with Elliston that would support a breach of fiduciary duty claim.  See id. at *7 
(“First Specialty is not the insured in this case, and even more damaging to its 
claim, Elliston is not the insurer.  The parties are completely attenuated, and 
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At the end of this litigation day, then, two entities substantially 
responsible for a lot of wasted time, energy and money escaped liability, at 
least judicially imposed liability.  At a minimum, this seems inconsistent 
with the basic notion that a rational legal system should create sufficient 
incentives for adequate care and hold persons and entities accountable 
when their errors cause injury to others who might reasonably foreseeably 
suffer such injury.   
One response to this concern and to my criticism of intermediary 
immunity to third parties is that the parties who do have contractual 
relations with the intermediaries will have a cause of action against the 
errant intermediary, thus providing adequate deterrence and compensation 
even though the third party will not be the instrument of that deterrence and 
compensation.  But cases like First Specialty refute this contention on both 
legal and practical grounds. 
First the legal grounds.  The federal trial court ruled that Ward, the 
administrator that was too dense to realize that it had improperly saddled its 
principal with coverage responsibilities, was not liable to the principal 
because the principal was ultimately able to get reimbursed for most of the 
                                                                                                                          
accordingly, First Specialty cannot assert any breach of fiduciary duty.  Like the 
claim for good faith and fair dealing, the claim for breach of a fiduciary entirely 
turns upon a contract between the parties.”  With no contract, First Specialty has 
no claim.”) (citation omitted).  The court’s conclusion that the parties are 
“completely attenuated” is wrong.  They may not have been contractually linked, 
but there are only a couple degrees of separation between them.  Complete 
attenuation implies no logical ties whatsoever.  On the contrary, it is more than a 
little likely and foreseeable that two insurers and their intermediaries might 
become involved in a claim against their common policyholder.  For example, if 
the barroom brawl had happened at midnight on the day on which the policy 
periods changes, these parties could have been in dispute as to coverage and claims 
handling obligations even without any misfeasance by either claims administrator. 
With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, one might also chide First Specialty 
counsel for not formally making a negligence claim against Elliston, the theory 
being that although Elliston might not be a “fiduciary” to First Specialty in light of 
its greater loyalty to (and contract with) Lloyd’s, Elliston at least had basic tort-like 
duties to First Specialty and others reasonably foreseen as affected by its handling 
of the claim.  Elliston was actually and constructively aware that by failing to pick 
up the defense and handling of the barroom brawl claim it was putting First 
Specialty in a position where it had to protect the Lloyd’s policyholder even 
though the loss was not the contractual responsibility of First Specialty and that 
this would impose considerable costs on First Specialty, costs that could only be 
recouped if First Specialty assumed the burden of settlement. 
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costs by Lloyd’s once it was found that Lloyd’s was not prejudiced by the 
delay in receiving notice of the matter.  First Specialty “conceded” this 
“during trial,” which may have been good judicial politics in that it made 
the insurer look less greedy and reduced the adjudicative burden on the 
court.  But was it right under the law – and should the court have accepted 
this concession even in an adversary system where parties are largely free 
to drop claims for any reason?   
Although First Specialty essentially gave up on its negligence 
claim against Ward by taking the position that it was fully compensated if it 
could prevail against Lloyd’s, First Specialty’s legal generosity and the 
court’s summary disposition of the negligence claim is not very persuasive.  
Without doubt, Ward was negligent and negligence of this type also breach 
of contract as well as inflicting reasonably foreseeable injury upon an entity 
to which Ward owed clear duties of care and minimal competence.  Ward’s 
negligence and breach of contract entitled First Specialty to relief and 
payment of apt damages.   
Even if a successful action against Lloyd’s largely made First 
Specialty whole, there undoubtedly was lost time and productivity inflicted 
on First Specialty because of the Ward’s error.  Logically, at least some of 
this injury remained uncompensated from the judgment against Lloyd’s.  If 
nothing else, it appears from the court’s judgment that First Specialty 
shouldered all of its counsel fees in prosecuting its subrogation and unjust 
enrichment claim.  At the end of the day, then, we see a situation in which 
even the principal of an insurance intermediary is not getting relief against 
the intermediary even in a case of egregious error. 
Now, the practical grounds.  The other intermediary, Elliston, of 
course was in a contract relationship with its principal, Lloyd’s.  The errors 
of Elliston arguably inflicted injury upon Lloyd’s, unless Lloyd’s was 
calling all shots regarding the barroom brawl claim and therefore removing 
any discretion.  If Lloyd’s was calling the shots, presumably there was no 
breach of contract by Elliston.  But such a situation illustrates the 
unwisdom of the traditional rule.  If Elliston were subject to a liability 
claim by First Specialty, it logically would have made Elliston think twice 
about blinding taking orders from its principal to do nothing to salvage the 
claims handling situation when it received notice of the problem.   
An intermediary facing potential tort liability is more likely to 
exercise independent judgment that might save all concerned needless 
injury, aggravation, and litigation.  If instead the poor decision to refuse to 
take over the claim was really Elliston’s decision, it proved a costly one to 
Lloyd’s.  Under the theory underlying the majority rule protecting 
intermediaries from liability to third parties, one would expect the principal 
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to sue the errant intermediary.  However, it appears that Lloyd’s has made 
no such claim against Elliston.   
After the dust of the First Specialty litigation settled, it appears that 
neither intermediary (Ward nor Elliston) was forced to accept responsibility 
for pretty poor performance of its duties to its principals and the duties I 
argue they have to third parties.  In this case, it is hard to get too emotional 
about the result.  First Specialty is a commercial entity of some wealth that 
could have survived even it had not been able to recover against Lloyd’s.  
Having recovered, it was not greatly harmed by the errors of Ward and 
Elliston even though it in my view was far from made whole.  Likewise, 
Lloyd’s syndicates are unlikely to suffer substantial injury due to isolated 
errors in claims adjustment or litigation. 
More disturbing is the prospect that the errors of the intermediaries 
could have resulted in substantial harm to the policyholder or the claimant 
in situations like this.  For example, the late notice and Elliston’s refusal to 
accept responsibility (and the manner in which the intermediary errors 
shaped insurer positions) could have created a situation in which the 
policyholder was left without a defense or subject to a judgment in excess 
of the policy limits.  The claimant could have been put in a situation 
requiring years of litigation simply to get compensation for what were 
undeniably serious injuries resulting from pretty clear policyholder 
negligence that was subject to liability insurance coverage.  None of these 
are good possibilities.  Fortunately, the worse was averted in spite of the 
unreasonable legal deference accorded to claims intermediaries who turned 
in very defective performances of their basic tasks.   The First Specialty 
litigation, however intellectually interesting, was a huge waste of resources 
largely due to intermediary error.  This hardly provides a persuasive brief 
for clinging to the historical rule of intermediary immunity. 
Reviewing the First Specialty wreckage, one might recall the 
public policy argument made in favor of the general rule (most prominently 
in cases like Sanchez, Meineke and Hamill)246 positing that imposing 
liability on intermediaries would be bad because it would move more of the 
claims function back in house to the insurers or raise prices for basic 
adjusting services.  To that argument, I ask why this would be a problem.  
In-house claims adjusters surely could not have done worse than Ward and 
Elliston.  And if the specter of liability results in an increase in adjuster 
fees, this might be a penny well paid to reduce the pound-foolishness of 
independent contractor intermediaries who cannot even put a loss in the 
                                                                                                                 
246  See supra notes 101-141 and accompanying text.   
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right policy period and that are unable to pick up defense and settlement of 
a straight-forward assault case months before trial.  Although the cases are 
not legion and the problem is hardly law’s most pressing, one cannot help 
but wonder why the judiciary strains so hard to protect claims 
intermediaries under these circumstances. 
 
IV. THE ANALYTICAL AND PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF 
REMOVING BLANKET IMMUNITY FOR CLAIMS 
INTERMEDIARIES 
 
A. REVISITING DOCTRINE:  THE AGENT AS TORTFEASOR 
 
The privity and disclosed principals doctrines, despite their 
historical pedigree, have always rested on a relatively weak foundation.  
The notion that a contractual relationship is required to grant one rights vis-
à-vis other social actors was never as broad or absolute as its defenders 
maintained.  Even in the absence of contract, social actors have certain 
social responsibilities if placed in situations where their behavior can cause 
harm to others.  The legal system acknowledges this, of course, through a 
vast body of tort law in which actors are held to have duties toward others, 
often even total strangers.  Seen in this light, one can argue that the old-
fashioned citadel of privity, which most famously collapsed in product 
liability law,247 was always overreaching in its quest to immunize 
defendants and limit the reach of tort law.  Many of the traditional lack-of-
privity decisions tacitly but mistakenly assumed that there were no rights at 
all in the absence of formal contract rights.  These courts simply acted as if 
tort law rights were beyond realistic consideration.248  As again revealed 
most clearly in the product liability context, there were always strong 
reasons to impose tort liability upon certain conduct with a sufficiently 
close connection to foreseeable injury to certain parties once it was 
recognized that the absence of a contract was not disqualifying.   
                                                                                                                 
247  See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing MacPherson v. 
Buick and fall of the citadel of privity in product liability matters). 
 
248 See supra notes 101-141 and accompanying text (citing cases immunizing 
intermediaries on lack-of-privity grounds, expressly or implicitly finding that 
without contract-based rights, third parties had no legal liability rights against 
intermediaries). 
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In effect, courts were mixing apples and oranges by concluding 
that the mere absence of a contract precluded legal relief on other grounds.  
Often they were aided and abetted by plaintiffs’ counsel who, perhaps 
having stars in their eyes about potential punitive damages awards, bet all 
their litigation chips on seeking to make bad faith claims against 
intermediaries and overlooked the compelling logic of holding a claims 
adjuster accountable in tort, as would be a passing driver or machinery 
operator. 
Applied to claims intermediaries, the logic of tort law unfettered 
from a contract-based limitation is compelling.  The very nature of the 
claims process and the intermediaries’ role should be recognized as 
creating at least some duties of at least modest care toward claimants and 
policyholders.  Both are in a vulnerable position relative to the insurer and 
adjuster.  Failure of the adjuster to act in an honest, fair, objectively 
reasonable manner is almost certain to cause at least some harm in the 
disposition of the claim.   
In some instances, the harm will only be the relatively minor 
problem of delay or perhaps some quibbling over relatively small amounts 
of money, insistence on nit-picking documentation, or similar wrongs, that 
despite resulting from adjuster misconduct, are unlikely to result in 
litigation.  But in other instances, adjuster error can result in substantial 
delay, dramatic underpayment, or outright denial – all of which may 
impose not only ordinary breach-of-contract type harms but may also give 
rise to substantial consequential damages, perhaps even significant physical 
and mental injury to policyholders or others.  In these latter types of cases, 
there is no reason not to hold claims intermediaries accountable for their 
actions. 
In addition, the traditional agent immunity rule in disclosed 
principal cases has always been in some tension not only with basic tort 
law concepts (and jurisprudential or philosophical notions of justice, 
responsibility and accountability) but also with other aspects of agency law.  
For example, even agents for disclosed principals may be liable to those 
with whom they negotiate if they have misled the third party as to the 
agent’s authority.249  Although this traditional form of agent liability is 
premised more on contract grounds (i.e., the agent misrepresenting his 
                                                                                                                 
249  See HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 119-121 (2d edition); see, e.g., Schafer v. Fraser, 
290 P.2d 190 (1955). 
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authority has induced reasonable reliance that causes detriment to the third 
party), it nonetheless provides strong historical support for the proposition 
that where agents take volitional acts that cause injury to third parties, 
liability is appropriate.250 
In addition, notwithstanding the protection historically bestowed 
by the disclosed principal rule, “[a]n innocent agent who is responding to 
the orders of a principal may be liable without fault for torts such as 
trespass to land, conversion and defamation.”251  In addition,  
 
[f]or other torts the agent is liable only if it proved 
that he possessed the requisite state of mind.  Illustrative of 
such torts are deceit, malicious prosecution, interference 
with business and negligence.  Under no circumstances, 
except where he is acting to protect an interest of the 
principal, is the fact that the agent is acting within the 
scope of employment or the command of the principal a 
defense.  . . . [T]he liabilities of the agent may be increased 
simply because he has asserted control over the property or 
other agents of his principal or because he has presumed to 
do something which, if properly accomplished, would have 
prevented harm to others.252 
 
                                                                                                                 
250 And in misrepresentation of authority cases, the damages can be 
significant.  See id. at § 120 (damages may include net value of transaction that 
would have taken place if authority had been represented, plus counsel fees)(citing 
cases from the 1950s).  See also id. § 125 (“mere fact that an agent acts on account 
of his principal does not exonerate him of liability for misrepresentations he makes 
to a third party). 
251  See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 249, at § 124 (citations, 
including two cases from the 19th Century, omitted). 
 
252  See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 249, at § 124 (citations omitted).  
See also Leathers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 500 So. 2d 451, 453 (Miss. 
1986)(“[O]ur general rule in tort is that the agent or servant, the one whose conduct 
has rendered his principal liable, [also] has individual liability to the plaintiff.”); 
see generally WARREN SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 1 (1949); see generally 
Warren Seavey, Liability of an Agent in Tort, 1 SOUTHERN L.Q. 16 (1916). 
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Most important for purposes of assessing claims adjuster exposure, 
“[t]he fact that one acts as an agent does not absolve him from liability for 
his negligence.”253   
Particularly relevant is that “[s]ome jurisdictions will hold the 
agent liable if the agent has undertaken the sole and complete control and 
management of the principal’s premises.  In such circumstances, the 
agent’s omission is an act of misfeasance, rather than mere nonfeasance” 
although “the agent is not liable for the negligence of the principal” in the 
absence of the agent’s own negligence.254   
As noted above, in modern claims adjusting, insurers frequently 
have essentially given independent contractor adjusters and MGAs 
something quite close to “sole and complete control and management” of 
the claims process and other aspects of the insurer-policyholder 
relationship.  Applying this general maxim of agency from the Restatement 
(Second) rather than the disclosed principal immunity of Restatement 
(Second) § 320, logically would require that claims intermediaries be held 
accountable for their negligence to apt third parties without reference to 
whether the third party enjoys a contractual relationship with the 
intermediary.  Other sections of the Restatement (Second) all are quite 
supportive of agent liability under apt circumstances.255   
                                                                                                                 
253  See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 249, § 128 at 203 (citing ALI 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §348A).  The citation to § 348A seems a bit 
off here in that this section specifically addresses “Trespass to Land” rather than 
general negligence.  However, other portions of the Restatement (Second), 
particularly § 343, support this view.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§348-§348A. 
 
254  See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 179, § 128, at 203 (citing Paul v. 
Sharpe, 181 Ga. App. 443, 352 S.E.2d 626, 629 (1987) and Robinson v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 288, 290 (Ala. 1981)). 
 
255   See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 343 (1958): 
 
An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the 
fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the 
principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the principal, or a 
privilege held by him for the protection of the principal’s interests, or where 
the principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the person 
harmed. 
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 350 (1958): 
 
698 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
An agent is subject to liability if, by his acts, he creates an unreasonable risk 
of harm to the interests of others protected against negligent invasion. 
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 344 (1958): 
 
An agent is subject to liability, as he would be for his own personal conduct, 
for the consequences of another’s conduct which results from his directions if, 
with knowledge of the circumstances, he intends the conduct, or its 
consequences, except where the agent or the one acting has a privilege or 
immunity not available to the other. 
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 347 (1958): 
 
(1)  An agent does not have the immunities of his principal although acting at 
the direction of the principal. 
 
(2)  Where, because of his relation to a third person, a master owes no duty, or 
a diminished duty, of care, a servant in the performance of his master’s work 
owes no greater duty, unless there has been reliance by the master or by a third 
person upon a greater undertaking by the servant. 
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 348 (1958): 
 
An agent who fraudulently makes representations, uses duress, or knowingly 
assists in the commission of tortuous fraud or duress by his principal or by 
others is subject to liability in tort to the injured person although the fraud or 
duress occurs in a transaction on behalf of the principal. 
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 348A (1958): 
 
An agent who enters the land of another is not relieved from liability for 
trespass by the fact that he acted on account of the principal and reasonably 
believed that the principal had possession or the right to possession of the 
land, or the right to authorize the agent to enter. 
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 349 (1958): 
 
An agent who does acts which would otherwise constitute trespass to or 
conversion of a chattel is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acts on 
account of his principal and reasonably, although mistakenly, believes that the 
principal is entitled to possession of the chattels.   
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 351 (1958): 
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The Restatement (Third) continues in this vein, providing a general 
rule that 
 
[a]n agent is subject to liability to a third party 
harmed by the agent’s tortuous conduct.  Unless an 
applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains 
subject to liability although the actor acts as an agent or an 
employee, with actual or apparent authority, or within the 
scope of employment.256 
 
Although this leaves for resolution the sometimes difficult question 
of whether an agent’s conduct is “tortious” in that it negligently, recklessly, 
or intentionally violated a duty,257 the modern “hornbook rule” of the 
                                                                                                                          
An agent who directs or permits conduct of another under such circumstances 
that he should realize that there is an unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
others or to their belongings is subject to liability for harm resulting from a 
risk which his direction or permission creates. 
 
256 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.01 (2006).  Reporter’s Note 
(a) to § 7.01 specifically notes that the section “consolidates treatment of points 
made by” the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY “in several sections, including §§ 
217, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 358 and 360.”  Accord, Oriental 
Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 945 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Nebraska law 
and finding individual corporate officers personally liable for fraud and 
misrepresentation even though working for corporate entity as principal); Inter-
Connect, Inc. v. Gross, 644 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1994) (holding the president of 
the company individually liable for wrongful actions taken in individual capacity); 
T.V. Spano Bldg. Corp. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 628 A.2d 53, 62 (Del. 1993) 
(finding the corporate officer is not immune from an action seeking personal 
liability for his role in corporate pollution). 
 
257 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.02 (2006) (“agent is subject to tort 
liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct only when the agent’s 
conduct breaches a duty that the agent woes to the third party”).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.02 cmt. d at 141 (2006): 
 
Conduct by an agent that breaches a duty owed by the agent to the 
principal does not subject the agent to liability to a third party who 
suffers pure economic loss as a result unless the agent’s conduct also 
breaches a duty owed by the agent to the third party.  Most cases hold 
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Restatement is hardly one of automatic immunity for agent misconduct 
simply because the agent and the third party have not entered into a 
contract.   
 The differing strands of hornbook agency law can be reconciled by 
appreciating that the disclosed principal immunity accorded agents 
pursuant to § 320 is purely an immunity from being held liable under 
contract.  Section 320 (and its modern equivalent  § 6.01 of the Third 
Restatement) provide only that an agent for a disclosed principal “does not 
become a party to the contract” because of agent status.  By expanding this 
presumptive contract claim immunity into a general immunity from suit by 
third parties, courts immunizing claims adjusters have engaged in quite a 
bit of judicial activism in favor of this class of defendants.   
The absence of a contract and contract claim hardly ends the 
inquiry.  Actors such as claims intermediaries can still logically be liable in 
tort.  Traditional rule courts have either tended to ignore this or quickly 
leap to the conclusion that the nature of the claims management process 
does not create a tort duty of reasonable care toward the policyholder or 
liability claimant.258   
This view is wrongheaded for reasons already discussed.  The 
adjuster plays the role of an insurer.  Insurers owe a fiduciary duty to 
policyholders defending liability claims and a near-fiduciary duty to first-
party policyholders as well as having more limited duties to third party 
claimants.  By analogy, the claims intermediary ceded substantial authority 
by the insurer logically owes similar duties.259   
                                                                                                                          
that an agent does not owe a duty to a third party when the agent’s 
negligent conduct causes only pure economic loss to a third party. 
 
258 See cases cited supra note 21; see also cases cited supra notes 101-121.  
See, e.g.,  Badners v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 567 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Ala. 1999); 
Gorab v. Equity Gen. Agents, Inc., 661 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Colo. App. 1983), 
overruled by Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462 (Colo. 2003).  
 
259 At this point in the development of insurance law, insurers no longer 
contest that they owe duties of good faith to policyholders; however, they often 
argue against having a full-fledged fiduciary duty, even in liability insurance cases.  
Although most insurers and counsel are likely to also argue that claims 
intermediaries are mere agents and do not stand in the insurers’ shoes as alter egos, 
at least one commentator appears to accept the proposition that where an 
intermediary is sufficiently like an insurer or performing functions of an insurer, 
liability should attach.  See Federal Court Predicts Rhode Island Supreme Court 
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Even without putting the intermediary in the shoes of the insurer, 
the very nature of the relationship is one creating a duty of reasonable care 
and basic honesty and competence.  The intermediary is aware of the 
policyholder or third party’s dependency upon the adjuster and it is 
reasonable foreseeable that intermediary negligence or other misconduct 
could cause significant injury.   
Under these typical circumstances of claims intermediary activity 
occurring every day in the field, the standard test for imposing tort liability 
is clearly met.  Section 320’s general prohibition on imposing a contract 
relationship where the agent represents a disclosed principal hardly negates 
this basis tort analysis. 
Properly understood, then, traditional agency law does not foreclose 
liability for claims intermediaries and certainly does not grant them broad 
immunity for their negligence or greater misconduct toward policyholders 
and third parties. 
In addition, adverting again to contract law for a moment, the 
traditional contract claim immunity and lack of privity defense made by 
intermediaries arguably conflicts with the modern view of the rights of third 
party beneficiaries.  Historically, contract law was reluctant to recognize a 
claim for breach by one who was not a party to the contract breached.  
However, even in the 19th Century, third parties might have rights under a 
contract if they were sufficiently within the contemplation of the 
contracting parties or at least intended to benefit from the contract.   By the 
21st Century, this historical view has expanded somewhat, with courts more 
often characterizing a contract claimant as an “intended” beneficiary with 
rights rather than an “incidental” beneficiary with no rights.260   
                                                                                                                          
Will Permit Policyholder to Sue Independent Claims Administrators for Common 
Law Bad Faith in Limited Circumstances, INS. LITIG. REP., Feb. 15, 2007, at 149-
150 (supporting general rule in cases of mere intermediary agency but conceding 
that “[a]rguably, principles of joint venture provide a more theoretically sound 
basis for imposing liability on a claims adjuster who shares economic risk with the 
insurer and has significant control over the claims-handling process” and citing the 
“joint venture” liability cases of Wohlers v. Bartgis and Farr v. Transamerica 
Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra notes 92-97).  My proposed liability for claims 
intermediaries is only a modest extension of this concept in that it dispenses with 
the requirement that there be an economic risk partnership between insurer and 
adjuster.  Under my view, it should be sufficient if the intermediary has significant 
control over the claims process. 
260 See EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 126, at 917-18; 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, §§ 10.2- 10.3; see generally Anthony Jon Waters, 
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The insurance intermediary situation is one in which it clearly 
appears that both insurer and TPA or adjuster are aware of the position and 
rights of a policyholder or claimant and where the insurer’s contractual 
retention of an independent contractor to process a claim is intended to 
benefit the third party.  If not, the insurer hiring the intermediary would 
appear to be in at least technical bad faith in that it has failed to give the 
policyholder’s interests (in getting a fair and swift adjustment of the claim) 
as much consideration as it has given its own interests (in processing the 
claim in a swift manner the minimized payouts by the insurer). 
 
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS:  THE BENEFITS OF POTENTIAL 
LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Because lack of contract privity and agency law do not compel 
immunity for claims intermediaries, the question of intermediary liability is 
best answered through a functional analysis of the relative net benefits of 
permitting suits against such intermediaries.  In contrast to majority rule 
courts such as Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc.,261 my 
application of instrumental, public policy concerns leads to a view that 
immunity for claims intermediaries is clearly unwise and that at least in 
some instances, these intermediaries should be subject to liability. 
As outlined above in discussing Sanchez and similar cases, the 
public policy arguments mustered in defense of the traditional rule are 
weak.  The claim that insurance intermediaries should be immune from tort 
liability because they lack the protection of contractually set limits on 
liability262 is particularly bizarre.  By this reasoning, one might just as well 
conclude that there should be no tort liability for negligent driving since the 
unfortunate auto accident defendant never had the opportunity to negotiate 
with his victim about perhaps agreeing to a lower limit on liability.  
                                                                                                                          
The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). 
 
261 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (1999), see supra notes 122-149 and accompanying 
text.    
 
262 See supra notes 49-141 and accompanying text (discussing this rationale, 
as most prominently advanced in Sanchez and Hamill v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 
892 A.2d 226 (Vt. 2005)).  See also Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d 
267, 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. 656 So. 2d 
1338, 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995). 
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Similarly, if one accepts this rationale for tort immunity, one might even 
prohibit a tort claim against a mugger, unless perhaps the mugger had an 
adequate opportunity to negotiate a contractual limit on his liability for 
assault and battery. 
This simple illustration not only underscores the common sense 
absurdity of this attempted justification for claims adjuster immunity but 
also raise a question of legal doctrine.  What on earth is the consideration 
that would support a bargain in which a victim agrees to limit its right of 
recovery against (in ascending order of blameworthiness) an errant driver, a 
sloppy adjuster, or a mugger?  None comes readily to mind, suggesting that 
this attempt to turn lack of contract privity into not only a shield but a 
sword fails as anything but alchemy via ipse dixit. 
As discussed above, the notion that an insurer limits its tort liability 
by contract is itself incorrect.  The policy limits of an insurance policy are a 
contract-based limitation on a particular type of contract damages, but they 
hardly constitute the cap of an insurer’s potential liability.  As a matter of 
contract, most liability policies provide a “defense outside of limits” to the 
policyholder, which means that the insurer is responsible for paying 
reasonable counsel fees and other defense costs until policy limits are 
exhausted.  In a sufficiently involved case implicating a policy with high 
limits, defense costs can be millions or even tens of millions of dollars for 
which there is no documented cap.  The insurer’s good faith duties bar it 
from hurrying to exhaust policy limits simply as a means of lowering its 
defense expenditures.263  Beyond this, an insurer that acts in bad faith is, in 
most states, also subject to consequential contract damages that are not 
confined to the policy limits as well as being subject to tort damages, 
including noneconomic damages such as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and the possibility of punitive damages. 
Similarly, the defense of the historical rule premised on a need to 
tamp down the costs of claims adjustment and insurance premiums is 
similarly flawed, both as to fact and public policy.  We simply do not know 
whether forcing adjusters to internalize at least some of the external costs 
of their errors would inevitably lead to price increases.  Economic theory 
may predict this but countervailing theory predicts that the effect would be 
minimal or even overshadowed altogether by market conditions and the 
degree of competition for claims intermediary work or insurance sales.   
A strong case can be made that imposing liability for misconduct is 
not likely to have a great impact on insurance prices unless misconduct is 
                                                                                                                 
263  See STEMPEL, supra note 27, at § 10.03. 
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rampant.  If not, there will only be a few cases even brought, with fewer 
cases still resulting in judgments against intermediaries.  After judgment, 
the amount may or may not be enough to prompt a recouping price 
increase.  In some instances, the intermediary may not be able to increase 
prices and will simply need to absorb the loss and lower profits.  In the 
absence of compelling proof that making claims intermediaries subject to 
the tort system would bring substantial economic net costs, the judicial 
system would be wise to stick to doctrine rather than implicitly legislating 
immunity on speculative grounds.  Applying traditional doctrinal analysis, 
a claims intermediary seems at least as likely a candidate for a negligence 
action as does an errant driver, restaurant owner, or shopping center. 
In addition, the “prices will rise” rationale for limiting intermediary 
liability, whatever empirical truth it might have, lacks persuasive force as a 
public policy proposition.  It assumes without discussion that an aggregate 
increase in adjusting costs or insurance costs is bad.  That hardly follows.  
Rather, the question is whether an increase in adjusting costs is outweighed 
by the benefits of forcing adjusters to act with greater care, providing an 
alternative source of recovery for victims of bad adjusting, and the moral 
accomplishment of holding business and social actors responsible for 
wrongful conduct.   
Depending on the amount and magnitude of intermediary 
misconduct, resulting liability, and aggregate price increases, reasonable 
minds might differ over the cost-benefit analysis.  But the majority rule 
cases barely acknowledge this tension and fail to grapple with it.  A better 
approach would be to resolve doubts in favor of traditional tort law 
principles – which argue strongly for permitting actions against errant 
adjusters – and leave any construction of liability based on policy concerns 
to legislative actors. 
Commercial entities such as MGAs and independent adjusters 
generally have significantly more clout with state legislatures than do 
policyholders or consumers in general.  If there is a good cost-benefit case 
to be made against intermediary liability, it will be persuasively made by 
the intermediaries and their political allies.  Until that happens, the 
judiciary would be more consistent with overarching principles of law 
(primarily agency and tort law) by permitting liability rather than granting 
immunity to entities that are well-equipped to seek it in the political 
process. 
Particularly in the context of insurance, a field in which both 
judicial common law and executive/legislative regulation has identified a 
need to protect vulnerable consumers, it seems most odd to deny to 
consumers even the possibility of seeking recompense if they are injured by 
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the wrongful activities of a claims intermediary.  Many majority rule states 
precluding actions against claims intermediaries justify this on the ground 
that the plaintiff third party or policyholder can obtain satisfaction from the 
insurer-principal of the offending intermediary.264  However, as well put by 
the American Law Institute: 
 
It is consistent with encouraging responsible 
conduct by individuals to impose individual liability on an 
agent for the agent’s torts although the agent’s conduct 
may also subject the principal to liability.  Moreover, an 
individual agent, when liable to a third party, may be 
available as a source of recovery when the principal on 
whose behalf the agent acted is not.265 
 
The goals of accountability, fairness, and increase potential for full 
compensation are served if the claims intermediary is subject to claims in 
apt situations.  Further, it appears to be the case that in operation, the 
intermediary is effectively the insurer.  It is discordant for the law to 
impose substantial obligations and potential liability on insurers as 
principals but then to simultaneously prohibit actions against their agents, 
agents who often have independent, almost unsupervised authority over the 
claims process.266   
                                                                                                                 
264 See Hamill v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226, 230-31 (“[I]n most 
cases, imposing tort liability on independent adjusters would create a redundancy 
unjustified by the inevitable costs that eventually would be passed on to insureds”); 
see also Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1999)(“If the adjuster mishandles the claim, the insurer has the same liability to the 
insured as if an employee of the insurer had mishandled the claim.”). 
 
265  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. b (2006). 
 
266 Some of the majority rule states shrink from imposing intermediary liability 
on the ground that the applicable state law “only allows an insured to sue an 
insurer for bad faith and not simple negligence.”  King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. 
Co., 656 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).  In my view, this misunderstands 
the distinction between bad faith and “mere” negligence.  Insurers do not act in bad 
faith simply because they make mistakes.  However, where an insurer intentionally 
adopts a coverage position that is both mistaken and objectively unreasonable, bad 
faith takes place.  This type of bad faith is essentially a type of negligence that 
differs from ordinary negligence not because it is done with evil intent per se but 
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In addition, the relative immunity of claims agents seems 
incongruous when contrasted to the relatively large exposure to third party 
claims faced by sales agents, brokers, attorneys, accountants and attorneys.  
The rationale for the majority rule for claims intermediaries – that adjusters 
as agents have duties to the principal that are too inherently in conflict with 
any purported duty to third parities267 – has not prevented actions against 
other entities with substantial duties of loyalty toward a principal. 
In these other professional or semi-professional relationships, there 
often is no formal written contract between the third party and the 
intermediary (as is the case with the insurance policy, insurer, and 
policyholder) but courts have recognized a duty to the claimant because of 
the nature of the activities of the agent-defendants.  The sales agent has an 
implied contract to provide services and has tort-based duties not to 
mislead or disserve the applicant or policyholder.  The broker often has not 
only contract obligations but also obligations implied by statute or common 
law.  Accountants as agents do work for their principals that they know will 
be relied upon by others and for that reason are usually held liable if their 
negligence misleads those relying on their work.  Other actors without 
contracts may be responsible to others as a matter of tort law.268 
                                                                                                                          
because the negligence (in the form of unreasonable policy interpretation or 
conduct) takes place over an extended period of time.  It is not like the split-second 
of driving negligence that can create tort liability but it is a type of negligence 
nonetheless, even though the legal system has given it the much more sinister-
sounding name of bad faith. 
 
267 See, e.g.,  Meineke, 991 P.2d at 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); King, 656 So. 2d 
at 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995); Velastequi v. Exch. Ins. Co., 505 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986). 
 
268 See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276-77 (N.Y. 1922).  In this case, 
Judge Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals found that a merchant could be 
liable for injury caused by inaccurate weighing of goods sold.  Later, in Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 449-50 (N.Y. 1931), Cardozo and the court were 
unwilling to extend the same analysis to public accountant auditors, a result that 
has been significantly criticized and ultimately was rejected by the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).  See also Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 
247 N.Y. 160, 168 (N.Y. 1928) (finding no liability for service interruption that 
adversely affected the general public but not persons who were intended third party 
beneficiaries of a contract).  Cardozo became fonder of constricted tort liability as 
he aged.  See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), another result 
that has netted criticism and not been universally followed in other states.  See 
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In nearly all states, a policyholder victimized by poor attorney 
defense of a claim subject to liability insurance has a right to sue for 
damages even though there may not be a formal written contract between 
these entities and the policyholder.  Rather, a contract is implied in many of 
these relationships, particularly the attorney-client relationship that results 
from liability insurer defense of a third party’s claim against the 
policyholder.  In many states, the insurer may sue the attorney for 
malpractice even though the primary attorney-client relationship is between 
lawyer and policyholder (although there is clearly a contract between 
insurer and defense attorney).269  Even where counsel is adverse and where 
sensitive information is acquired through the representation of a client, an 
attorney is sometimes permitted to disclose it (over the client’s objection) 
to the opponent270 and may arguably have an obligation to do so. 
                                                                                                                          
generally JOHN T. NOONAN, SR., The Passengers of Palsgraf in PERSONS AND 
MASKS OF THE LAW  (1976). 
 
269 See generally STEMPEL, supra note 27, at § 9.03[A].  See, e.g., Paradigm 
Ins. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d. 593, 601-02 (Ariz. 2001) (finding that an 
insurer may bring a malpractice suit against an attorney it retained to represent a 
policyholder in an underlying tort litigation even though the attorney’s primary 
client is the policyholder); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 
625, 628-29 (Tex. 1998) (holding that a policyholder may not hold an insurer 
vicariously liable for an attorney’s alleged malpractice because the attorney 
represented the policyholder and was obligated to exercise independent 
professional judgment rather than robotically follow insurer’s direction).  
 
270 See Spaulding v. Zimmerman,  116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (attorney 
who learns through adverse medical exam that plaintiff suing attorney’s client has 
brain aneurysm not prohibited by lawyer confidentiality rules from disclosing 
condition to plaintiff so that plaintiff may get necessary medical attention).  
Presumably, the examining physician would also be permitted to make this 
disclosure. 
I would even argue that both the lawyer and the doctor were required to make 
the disclosures in order to protect the health and life of the plaintiff.  Even though 
the plaintiff was not a client or patient, the circumstances gave rise to a duty to at 
least tell plaintiff if they learned anything important about his medical condition 
that was relevant to future treatment.   
Whether the doctor or an insurer retaining the doctors can be held responsible 
for failing to detect an aneurysm like that in Spaulding v. Zimmerman is a different 
and more difficult question.  See, e.g., Basil v. Wolf, 935 A.2d 1154 (N.J. 2007).  
The court held that Ms. Basil, widow of a decedent worker examined by a doctor 
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for an independent medical examination as part of workers compensation claim 
adjustment, did not have claim against the insurer for the doctor’s failure to make 
timely diagnosis of decedent’s spindle cell tumor that eventually became Stage IV 
Sarcoma that killed decedent some 30 months later.   Id. at 1172.  Neither did Ms. 
Basil have a negligence claim against Dr. Wolf as medical intermediary working 
for the insurer.  Id. at 1176.  The court viewed the doctor was retained by insurer 
only for limited evaluative purposes and that the insurer was not providing medical 
treatment to Mr. Basil.  Id. at 1172.  A separate medical malpractice claim against 
Dr. Wolf individually was settled.   
Basil v. Wolf is a problematic opinion.  On one hand, Dr. Wolf was not exactly 
Dr. House (the brilliant but irascible character in the television series of the same 
name).  Dr. Wolf initially diagnosed Mr. Basil as having a “probable hematoma” 
that should be treated by physical therapy.  Basil sought an MRI or x-ray prior to 
beginning any regime of physical therapy, presumably because he wanted to make 
sure there was not a more serious problem or something that would counsel against 
therapy.  On the other hand, Dr. Wolf did in a subsequent visit recognize that the 
condition was getting worse and that an x-ray was the “logical” next step.   The x-
ray was negative and an MRI recommended.  But the x-ray did not take place for 
months and Dr. Wolf did not authorize an MRI until months after that.  Although 
Dr. Wolf, a retired orthopedic surgeon who had canceled his malpractice coverage 
upon becoming an evaluator/consultant (which suggests the Ms. Basil did not get a 
big medical malpractice settlement), can be said to have had only a limited 
assignment as an agent of the insurer, it is a little hard to square this 
characterization of his and the insurer’s role with what seems to be Dr. Wolf’s  
practical power as a gatekeeper for the insurer and the insurer’s practical power 
over the treatment Ms. Basil received.   
The slow pace of diagnosis and treatment, seemingly spurred by Ms. Basil’s 
retention of legal counsel, hardly makes a strong case for immunizing either Dr. 
Wolf or the insurer.  The case was decided on summary judgment, with the New 
Jersey courts taking the view that there were no material contested facts requiring 
trial.  This is pretty broad immunity to give an insurer or an agent of Dr. Wolf’s 
type as a matter of law in view of their important role in examining the health of a 
person in connection with a claim of this sort.  Even if this was in the context of a 
contested workers compensation claim, it still seems overly forgiving to excuse the 
insurer or the doctor as a matter of law and find that Mr. Basil was not really 
enough of a “patient” to have the protections of medical malpractice law.  
Although permitting an independent action for malpractice against the doctor may 
be enough of a correction in most cases, Basil v. Wolf appears to provide too little 
incentive for intermediaries or insurers to take seriously their reasonable 
obligations to claimants. 
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Courts have divided as to whether insurers are vicariously liable 
for the conduct of defense counsel retained and directed by an insurer271 
and have also divided as to whether a third party other than the client or 
insurer may sue insurer-provided defense counsel.  Where attorneys have 
escaped liability to third parties, this has generally been based upon the 
rationale that the attorney’s duty of fiduciary loyalty and zealous 
representation on behalf of a client (even a misguided or unreasonable 
client) makes it inappropriate to dilute this loyalty or create a 
countervailing loyalty by permitting tort actions against counsel by third 
parties.272  Although this may be a reasonable if problematic assessment 
                                                                                                                 
271   See Rose v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 599 S.E.2d 673, 682-86 (W. 
Va. Ct. App. 2004) (collecting cases finding vicarious liability and cases rejecting 
it) (also noting that some states permitting vicarious liability may require actual 
insurer knowledge of attorney misconduct while others will permit liability 
through imputed or constructive knowledge of attorney misconduct by insurer).  
See also Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 287 (Ill. 2004) (noting 
same split in jurisdictions) 
After careful consideration of this conflicting authority, we conclude that 
when, as here, an attorney acts pursuant to the exercise of independent professional 
judgment, he or she acts presumptively as an independent contractor whose 
intentional misconduct may generally not be imputed to the client, subject to 
factual exceptions.  Id. at 278. 
In reaching its holding, the Horwitz Court noted that its view conflicted with 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 253, which provides in Comment a that 
“[t]he fact that the attorney is subject to discipline by the court does not prevent the 
client from being liable for his [tortuous] conduct.”  See id. at 280.  The Court 
further noted that it disagreed 
 
with the Restatement’s discounting that attorneys are constrained by certain 
court-imposed ethical considerations that serve to distance their behavior from 
their clients.  Attorneys cannot blindly follow their clients’ directions, even if 
those directions are particular and express, if doing so would require them to 
violate their ethical obligations. 
 
See id. at 280. 
 
272 See, e.g., Horwitz,  816 N.E.2d at 277, 284.  The Horwitz Court itself was 
divided in that three judges dissented.  See id. at 284 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, 
joined by Garman, J.) (finding sufficient agency relationship to support vicarious 
liability even though attorney was independent contractor); Id. at 297 (Freeman, J. 
dissenting) (favoring application of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 253 to 
situations such as instant case). Id. 
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where attorneys are involved, it is not an apt approach for viewing the 
relation of insurer and claims intermediaries.  The claims intermediary has 
duties to the insurer as principal but they are not of the same degree and 
magnitude as those of the attorney to a client.   
More important, these divided cases focus on the issue of vicarious 
liability of the principal for the agent’s acts.  All states appear to recognize 
that the attorney can be individually liable for misconduct when 
representing the policyholder’s interests notwithstanding the attorney’s 
fiduciary responsibilities to the insurer as either client or as agent to 
principal. 
Ironically, in at least one state (Washington), a claims adjuster that 
engages in conduct too tinged with legal analysis and activity (e.g., 
document drafting) may be liable for de facto malpractice and unauthorized 
practice of law273 – but if the adjuster is merely negligent, the protections of 
the traditional lack-of-privity/disclosed principal approach would appear to 
apply.274  In other states, claims intermediaries, particularly public adjusters 
(nonlawyers who represent policyholders in advancing first party property 
claims against with insurers) are sometimes held to be engaged in 
unauthorized practice of law.275   
                                                                                                                 
273  See Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1079 (Wash. 2002).  In Jones, 
however, the adjuster found to have engaged in unauthorized legal practice appears 
to have been an Allstate employee.  Presumably, however, the court’s analysis 
would be equally applied to independent contractor adjusters. 
In addition, Jones introduces an interesting complexity to Washington law.  
Adjusters practice law if they give legal consultation or prepare legally operative 
documents such as the release at issue in Jones.  However, the court (in a 5-4 
decision) ruled that insurance companies using adjusters in this way could continue 
but that they would be liable to third parties interacting with the adjuster-cum-
lawyer if the adjusters’ activities fell below the standard of care for a lawyer in 
similar circumstances.  The adjuster in question Jones was found to have fallen 
beneath this standard. Id. at 1079.  
 
274 See Kim v. O’Sullivan, 137 P.3d 61, 64-5 (Wash. App. Ct. 2006) 
(policyholder defended by insurer-selected attorney could not assign malpractice 
claim to third party bringing suit nor could anti-assignment rule be circumvented 
by third party’s prosecution of malpractice claim; insurer-retained attorney could 
not be sued for bad faith like insurer). Id.  
 
275 See, e.g., Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 872 
(Utah 1995); Prof’l Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon,  433 N.E.2d 779, 780 (Ind. 1982). 
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But unlike actual lawyers, adjusters who avoid this pitfall, 
particularly adjusters working as insurance company employees rather than 
independent contractors, are considerably better protected from liability 
than real lawyers or adjusters drafting releases.  Further, real lawyers have 
very strong fiduciary duties to clients, sometimes multiple clients, and play 
an inherently more adversarial, judgment-laden role in the dispute 
resolution system.  Logically, attorneys should have more protection from 
liability to third parties (but not from their client-principals) than do TPAs 
and independent adjusters.  But in majority rule states, they have less.  
Something is wrong with this picture. 
Recognizing the relationship of insurance intermediaries to 
policyholders as one supporting tort liability for harm inflicted would put 
intermediary exposure on a par with that of other actors who conduct 
activities upon which a reasonably discreet and identifiable number of third 
parties are known to rely and likely to suffer injury if those activities are 
negligently performed.276  Similar results could be supported by a 
                                                                                                                 
276 For example, in the significant, now venerable case Biakanja v. Irving, 320 
P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958), the court concluded that a notary public could be held 
liable to an intended beneficiary for negligent attestation of a will.  In reaching this 
result, the court considered several factors in order to determine whether the notary 
should owe a duty to parties with whom he did not contract:  (1) the extent to 
which the transaction was intended to affect the claimant; (2) the foreseeability of 
harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury (from 
the defendant’s errors); (4) the closeness of the connection between defendant’s 
conduct and the injury; (5) the moral blame reasonably attached to defendant’s 
conduct; and (6) public policy considerations regarding incentives for preventing 
future harm. Id. at 19.  See also Bus to Bus. Mkts, Inc. v. Zurich Specialties 
London, Ltd., 135 Cal. App. 4th 165, 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005) (reaffirming state’s use of Biakanja factors for determining actor’s liability 
to third parties). 
This is not a bad set of criteria for determining the existence of duty to third 
parties in the absence of a contract.  As discussed above (see supra text 
accompanying notes 198-204), it often results in liability for accountants, 
attorneys, engineers, and others who conduct activity that they know will impact 
others in a non-attenuated way or where third parties are expected to rely on the 
activity of the professional or intermediary.   
Applied to claims intermediaries, the Biakanja factors would tend to support 
liability because (1) the entire adjusting transaction is intended to benefit the 
policyholder at least as much as the insurer (because the insurer has a non-
delegable duty to give equal consideration to the policyholder’s interests) and also 
to benefit, at least to a degree, third party claimants and society; (2) harm from 
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reasonably broad approach to the question of intended third party 
beneficiaries of contract.277 
    
C. A WORKABLE STANDARD OF INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 
 
One valid concern underlying the traditional approach protecting 
claims intermediaries from liability is the view that it is unfair to hold 
agents accountable for errors commanded by the principal.  For example, 
the adjuster denying a claim may itself have recommended payment and 
merely been the bearer of bad news when it informed a policyholder or 
claimant that coverage was denied by the insurer.  In other situations, the 
adjuster may have had only a limited investigatory role and no evaluative 
role.   
Although these are valid concerns, they do not logically support a 
blanket rule of intermediary immunity.  Rather, these cases suggest that 
claims agents should not be strictly or vicariously liable for insurer 
misconduct or error.  Intermediaries should be liable not merely because of 
an insurer’s bad conduct or decision but should instead be potentially liable 
                                                                                                                          
adjuster negligence is foreseeable; (3) harm is often certain where adjusters act 
negligently or intentionally deny or recommend denial of a claim without proper 
basis; (4) the adjuster’s conduct and an adverse outcome are often closely linked; 
(5) many adjuster failures are morally blameworthy, particularly in light of their 
status as agents for a principal that owes a fiduciary-like duty of good faith; and (6) 
public policy favors holding negligent adjuster accountable in order to discourage 
errors and their attendant harm. 
 
277 The historical rule is that a “third party should not be permitted to enforce 
covenants made not for his benefit, but rather for others [because the third party] is 
not a contracting party [and] his right to performance is predicated on the 
contracting parties’ intent to benefit him.”  See Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 33 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).  Although this may 
logically prohibit a policyholder landlord’s tenant from claiming benefits under the 
landlord’s property insurance policy, the rule should not bar a policyholder from 
being able to obtain compensation when injured by the actions of a claims adjuster 
that was retained by the insurer to vindicate the interests of the policyholder under 
the insurer’s policy.  Unlike many third parties, the policyholder clearly was 
intended to benefit from an important contract with the principal and retains rights 
under that contract even if the principal has outsourced the claims function to an 
intermediary.   
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only where a plaintiff has alleged negligence or some greater quantum of 
wrongdoing by the intermediary. 
Already, the majority rule has been relaxed enough that most states 
permit actions against claims intermediaries where the intermediary and the 
insurer can be said to have operated as something like a joint venture, 
particularly where there is some sharing of financial risk.278  Several other 
jurisdictions have moved toward permitting intermediary liability under 
what might be termed a management theory, permitting claims where the 
intermediary conducts the basic administrative functions of an insurer and 
has discretion to determine claims outcomes even if the intermediary and 
the insurer lack sufficient financial links to be deemed a joint venture.279   
From these already reasonably well established extensions of 
liability in derogation of the historical rule, it is only a relatively small step 
toward simply making intermediaries liable under basic tort principles of 
duty and negligent breach causing damages.  Although only a few states 
(perhaps only Alaska and New Hampshire) support this approach,280 it is 
the most sensible means of consistently holding intermediaries accountable 
and creating adequate incentives for intermediary care.   
This proposed approach would not create undue burden on 
downstream intermediaries or dramatically expand litigation and business 
transaction costs.  The likely additional cost of a negligence regime for 
policing the actions of claims intermediaries will probably be modest in 
relation to the gains of greater intermediary care resulting in fewer 
problems and greater settlement of claims. 
                                                                                                                 
278 See supra text and accompanying notes 77, 87-92. 
 
279 See supra text and accompanying notes 78-82, 81-93.   Although it is not 
often invoked, this principle is sufficiently established that it has in the past 
appeared to me that this was in fact the general rule:  adjusters sufficiently acting 
as the “functional equivalent” of the insurer may be liable to at least insureds and 
policyholders and perhaps to claimants under certain situations.  See Stempel on 
Insurance Contracts, supra note 27 at § 10.02[A]  p. 10-17.  Further examination 
of the issue in this article suggests I might have been overbroad in that statement 
because of the tendency of some courts not to recognize an exception to the privity 
and disclosed agency defenses even where the administrator or adjuster has 
assumed the functions of the insurer.  In general, however, it appears most 
jurisdictions will permit liability upon a sufficient showing of adjuster activity as 
an insurer, particularly if there is financial intertwinement or risk sharing. 
 
280 See supra text and accompanying notes 75-82. 
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Consistent with the general rule of § 7.01 of the current 
Restatement and its predecessors, an intermediary cannot avoid liability if 
its conduct is tortuous simply because the conduct was committed in the 
service of the insurer.  However, where an intermediary can demonstrate 
that it had no discretion in its conduct and that the conduct was completely 
controlled by the insurer/principal, adherence to the traditional majority 
rule remains appropriate. 
In practical application, this means that many, perhaps most, cases 
will result in claims against intermediaries surviving motions to dismiss as 
a matter of law.  In the modern real world of insurance law, insurers 
delegate substantial authority to claims intermediaries as independent 
contractors.  Typically, the intermediary has control over the quality and 
quantity of investigation conducted, evaluation of the claim, and 
communication with claimants and policyholders.  If the intermediary does 
not conduct these activities in an objectively reasonable manner (as would 
a hypothetically reasonable adjuster in that situation), a claim for 
negligence should lie.  But it hardly follows that adjusters who act 
reasonably will be routinely sued.  If they are, they can counterattack via 
Rule 11 motions or similar measures designed to discourage frivolous 
claims.281  At a minimum, adjusters acting reasonably, although perhaps 
forced to defend more cases because of relatively liberal notice pleading 
and Rule 12 motion practice standards,282 are unlikely to ever be 
wrongfully held liable.283 
                                                                                                                 
281 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (imposing sanctions on litigants and counsel under 
apt circumstances if claim is not factually supported or legally cognizable); 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 (permitting imposition of sanctions against litigants or counsel that 
unnecessarily prosecute unfounded claims).  See also ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID 
F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION  §§ 
3.5, 11.5 (7th ed. 2008). 
 
282 Although pleading and motion to dismiss practice is still relatively pro-
plaintiff, recent developments have shown that courts are perfectly capable of 
dismissing claims that are inadequately pleaded or present a far-fetched legal 
theory of relief.  See HAYDOCK, HERR & STEMPEL, supra note 211, §§ 3.3, 4.1-4.4.  
Arguably, the modern ethos, at least in federal court, is too nitpicking in its desire 
to see the complaint plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable chance of 
litigation success.  See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
(dismissing complaint in antitrust action over dissent of Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg).   
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Naturally, if the intermediary has engaged in misrepresentation, 
dishonestly, deceit, gross negligence, recklessness, or sharp practices, a 
liability claim logically should be permitted.  If the intermediary has 
intentionally engaged in unreasonable conduct that deprives a policyholder 
                                                                                                                          
There has also been substantial academic criticism of Twombly.  See, e.g., 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and 
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1561, 1592 (Twombly “imposed a plausibility 
test on pleadings, thereby discombobulating a basic area of law and managing to 
generate 2200 citations in its first five months.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why the 
Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008).  But 
see Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed?  The Economics of 
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 S. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (2008) 
(defending link between heightened review of disfavored antitrust claims at 
summary judgment stage and seeing Twombly as logically extending approach to 
pleading stage of litigation); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How 
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 61 (2007) (similar view approving Twombly as reflecting heightened 
scrutiny given antitrust claims in summary judgment motion practice).  Irrespective 
of whether criticism of Twombly is well-taken, is seems incorrect to say that 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are toothless, particularly if the 
plaintiff is pursuing a relatively recently accepted cause of action such as a claim 
of insurance intermediary negligence.  In addition, where the allegations of 
intermediary error are particularly weak, the case should logically be amendable to 
reasonably inexpensive disposition via summary judgment.  See HAYDOCK, HERR 
& STEMPEL, supra note 211, § 12.3. 
 
283 Because claims by third parties against claims intermediaries have 
historically not been permitted, even those jurisdictions that have relaxed or 
overturned the general rule have rendered decisions very protective of 
intermediaries in light of the facts of the disputes.   See supra text and 
accompanying note 79 and see infra text and accompanying notes 221-223 
(discussing Oklahoma’s Wathor case and Mississippi’s Jeffcoat case).  It is only 
logical that courts will at least subconsciously expect to see relatively substantial 
error or wrongdoing before holding a previously immune entity to account during 
the early decades of recognition of a “new” tort of intermediary negligence.  At a 
minimum, adjusters are unlikely to lose weak cases both at trial and on appeal.  For 
example, in Jeffcoat, the claimant was stripped of a jury verdict even thought he 
adjuster’s conduct was horrendous.  See infra text and accompanying notes 221-
223.  There is simply no good reason to expect that allowing tort claims against 
administrators and adjusters will produce an avalanche of judgments against these 
intermediaries. 
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of the benefit of the insurance bargain or that fails to give equal 
consideration to the interests of the policyholder, the adjuster should be 
subject to a bad faith claim. 
In response to such claims, claims intermediaries should be 
required to defend on the merits if they are to avoid liability.  One available 
defense for the intermediary – at least as respects only the decision to deny 
a claim -- would be that it acted solely upon the instruction of the principal 
and had no discretion to disobey.  Although this is more forgiving standard 
than that applicable to most agents in tort cases, it would respond 
adequately to whatever core kernel of value might remain in the traditional 
approach.  However, even if the adjuster was merely a conduit for the 
insurer’s decision on coverage or payment, the adjuster should be subject to 
liability where it has been negligent (or worse) in its processing of the 
claim. 
In addition, intermediaries might in some cases successfully defend 
on the slightly different ground that although the insurer did not exercise 
iron-fisted control or micromanagement of adjuster activity the nature and 
circumstances of the retention were sufficiently limited that the adjuster’s 
conduct cannot be considered negligent or wrongful in context.  This is 
similar to one majority rule court’s sentiment that “[t]he independent 
adjuster’s obligation is measured by the contract between the adjuster and 
the insurer.  The adjuster that contracts to perform a $200 investigation is 
not obligated to expend the same effort that might be reasonable for a fee 
of $2000, nor is it obligated to continue when the insurer advises it to 
stop.”284   
This sensible case-specific view would prevent small, relatively 
blameless adjusters (who logically would have done little significant harm) 
from being saddled with potentially company-closing liability.  Such a 
context-based defense is a permissible means of softening the edges of tort 
liability but does not support blanket immunity for claims intermediaries.  
Rather, it supports a general rule permitting third party actions against 
intermediaries under the well-established principles of tort law and 
adjudicating them with sensitivity to the overall facts of the adjuster’s 
assignment and performance. 
Independent contractor adjusters and insurers should not be 
permitted to institutionalize negligent or bad faith performance by 
knowingly or routinely contracting for adjuster activity and compensation 
                                                                                                                 
284  See Meineke, 991 P.2d at 271. 
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that is so low as to encourage insufficient care in the claims management 
process.  Neither should an adjuster be insulated from liability where it 
stops investigating under circumstances where this is unreasonable under 
the circumstances or reflects a failure to give adequate attention to the 
interests of a policyholder. 
Moving to wide recognition that insurance administrators and 
claims intermediaries can be liable for negligent infliction of injury to 
policyholders and other reasonably foreseeable claimants would also be a 
healthy step away from the current caselaw’s excessive focus on bad faith 
liability and recognize that an intermediary may do considerable harm even 
if not acting as an insurer and that even where bad faith liability is 
inappropriate, the intermediary should not be completely immune from the 
consequences of its actions.285 
In addition, cases in some jurisdictions, although permitting claims 
against intermediaries under the heightened standards of management 
theory or joint venture, have exhibited perhaps an undue tendency to shrink 
from finding sufficient insurer-like conduct by the intermediary, effectively 
keeping the historical rule of adjuster immunity in place even in cases 
where the intermediary is doing insurer-like adjusting and should be held 
accountable for injury inflicted on foreseeable parties, particularly 
policyholders.286 
                                                                                                                 
285 This has been recognized over the years in cases rejecting bad faith liability 
for claims intermediaries but noting that other causes of action, such as a simple 
tort action sounding in negligence, may under apt circumstances be available to 
those injured by the intermediary.  See, e.g., Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 264 
A.2d 668, 672 n. 3 (Pa. 1970) (plaintiffs’ “allegations as to the adjusters and their 
agents might establish a cause of action in tort” but because instant action framed 
in contract, plaintiffs cannot recover due to lack of privity); Stone v. New Eng. Ins. 
Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (inability to maintain claim 
under insurance contract or unfair claims practices statute may not foreclose other 
claims sounding in tort or based on other statutes). 
 
286 For example, in Wathor v. Mut. Assur. Admin, 87 P.3d 559 (Okla. 2004), 
discussed supra text and accompanying notes 79, 84-86, the court found – as a 
matter of law – that the administrator in question had not acted sufficiently like an 
insurer to permit the insured to bring a claim against the administrator even though 
the facts as set forth in the case report would appear to permit a reasonable 
inference that the administrator had been delegated the bulk of the entire claims 
function by the insurer.  See id. at 563 (“[administrator] unquestionably performed 
some of the tasks of an insurance company in its claims handling process”). 
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The problem with requiring a financial pooling of risk as a 
prerequisite to administer or adjuster liability is that it fails to appreciate 
the degree to which claims intermediaries have plenty of incentive to 
mistreat policyholders and other claimants under straight fee-for-service 
contracts.  Like any vendor, an independent contractor claims intermediary 
wants to please the party that hired it in order to gain continued future 
employment and to continue to charge adequate prices.  Even without 
formal risk sharing or economic partnership per se, the independent claims 
intermediary has substantial incentive to resist claims, knowing that this 
will save the insurer money (at least in the short run) and result in favorable 
reviews of the adjuster’s work (and future business).  Although 
substandard, overly stingy administration and adjusting may result in 
successful litigation against the insurer, this does not provide sufficient 
incentive for optimal adjuster care, certainly not adjuster behavior that 
gives equal consideration to the interests of policyholders.   
First, any litigation consequences of adjuster misconduct are likely 
to come years after the misconduct.  By this point, the adjuster will have 
already attained financial reward from taking a hard line against claims and 
the relationships between the intermediary and insurer personnel are often 
sufficiently close that the insurer is unlikely to hold the adjuster 
accountable and to replace the adjuster.  In addition, by this point, insurer 
and adjuster may be in a “trench warfare mentality” where even after an 
                                                                                                                          
Although the court majority put great stock in the insurer’s apparent final say 
as to claims payment, the dissent correctly noted that the rule of Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 343 was that an agent committing a tort is not relieved of 
liability simply because the agent’s tortuous action was commanded by the 
principal or “on account of the principal.”  See id. at 565 (Opala, J. and Watt, J., 
dissenting).   
The majority was unmoved, however, finding liability inappropriate because 
the administrator did not have its compensation package expressly tied to the 
approval or denial of claims and “did not share the risk of loss with the [insurer, 
here an employer’s health plan].  As discussed in text, the requirement of financial 
risk sharing and entrepreneurial partnership as a prerequisite for administrator 
liability is unnecessarily demanding. 
Equally disturbing is that the court never addressed Brown v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217 (Okla Ct. App. 2002), which recognized that independent 
investigators and adjusters could be liable under simple tort and  negligence 
principles based on duty created by their relation to policyholders and the 
foreseeability that inadequate claims processing could injure the policyholder.  
Brown was not even cited in passing by the Wathor Court.  See generally id.  
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adverse judgment they continue to fail to see what was done wrong in 
dealing with the policyholder or claimant.287 
Second, and perhaps more troubling but more difficult to ascertain 
is the prospect that the insurer, which profits from delay in claims 
resolution and the time value of money, silently is happy to have adjusters 
take an overly hard line.  As previously discussed,288 this permits the 
insurer to “have it’s cake” (funds that do not have to be paid until after an 
adverse court decision) and “eat it, too” through minimizing its potential 
bad faith exposure by pointing the finger at the claims intermediary as the 
actual active agent of misconduct or the purveyor of bad investigation or 
evaluation that led the insurer astray.  In return for continuing to receive 
business from the insurer, the claims intermediary can, under the current 
regime, act as the insurer’s foil because it is unlikely to be held accountable 
under the law unless it has sufficiently supplanted the insurer, perhaps even 
rising to a level of a joint venturer. 
For these reasons, subjecting independent adjusters and 
administrators to the same tort regime that largely governs everyone else 
and their activity seems both modest and justified.  A compromise position 
of sorts would be like that of Mississippi, which immunizes intermediaries 
from claims sounding only in negligence but may find liability where there 
was been gross negligence, recklessness, or some misconduct greater than 
negligence.  Although this would be an improvement over the traditional 
approach, it still permits too much avoidance of responsibility and too little 
incentive for claims intermediaries.  Cases decided under this heightened 
standard of requiring “more than negligence’ can exhibit an alarming 
tendency to characterize even outrageous behavior or missteps as only 
mere negligence.   
For example, in Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Jeffcoat,289 the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held (albeit over a strong dissent) that there was 
                                                                                                                 
287 Perhaps most amazingly and notoriously, the insurer and its agents 
involved in the famous Campbell v. State Farm litigation, despite having been held 
to have acted in bad faith for egregious failure to settle a resolvable claim and 
protect the policyholder, including a $145 million punitive damages award 
(eventually reduced to $9 million) continued to maintain for more than 25 years 
that nothing wrong had been done.  See STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD, supra note 
27, chs. 10, 14-23 (2008). 
 
288 See supra text and accompanying notes 146-47. 
 
289 Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777 (Miss. 2004). 
720 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
as a matter of law nothing worse than negligence in a situation where the 
adjuster:  misrepresented its activities to the claimant; withheld assessing 
the amount of coverage until receipt of a legal opinion; never requested the 
legal opinion; was not licensed in Mississippi; was not trained in 
Mississippi insurance principles, in particular the question of “stacking” of 
policy coverages that was at the core of the dispute; and failed for months 
to take any concrete action to acquire necessary knowledge that it did not 
have (including failing to insist that the insurer provide necessary 
information).290  The evidence of gross negligence, reckless, or intentional 
dereliction of duty by the adjuster was substantial albeit contested (both the 
adjuster and the plaintiff presented dueling expert witnesses) but this did 
not stop the Jeffcoat majority from overturning a jury verdict in Plaintiff 
Jeffcoat’s favor.  So much for the protection provided policyholder’s under 
the “gross negligence” standard of care for claims intermediaries.291 
                                                                                                                 
290 See id. at 780-83. 
291 In fairness to the Mississippi Supreme Court, at least the case was a close 
one, essentially decided as a 4-3 opinion (a three-member majority opinion, one 
concurring justice, and three dissenters).  See id. at 789.  The majority’s reluctance 
to uphold a sizeable verdict against the adjuster may also have been fueled by 
simple legal realism in that Plaintiff Jeffcoat had already received $1.8 million in 
compensation from his injuries from the insurer.  Just the same, even the majority’s 
description of the adjuster’s performance seems to suggest something more than 
mere negligence.  For example: 
Gallagher did not provide training or resources to support its adjusters’ work 
on uninsured motorist claims.  Gallagher failed to give its adjusters any resources 
or training regarding stacking in Mississippi.  Although she was generally familiar 
with stacking, [Gallagher adjuster Juana] Love did not know that stacking was 
available in Mississippi or how it works until Jeffcoat’s lawyer informed her that it 
is and explained how it works.  Love knew that she needed a legal opinion on this 
issue, but she failed to request one.  It escapes us why Love would wait until the 
[policyholder’s truck] fleet schedule was discovered to request an opinion.  
Clearly, Love could have obtained a legal opinion on whether and how stacking 
applies in Mississippi without knowing the number of vehicles in the 
[policyholder’s] fleet. 
    * * * 
Gallagher’s adjustment of this claim evinces a complete breakdown of 
communication and cooperation between two contractually obligated parties, 
supervisors and subordinates within Gallagher, as well as between two 
principals and their agent.  Important documents related to this policy were not 
shared with Gallagher either by accident or willfully.  The [insurance] carrier’s 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Treating insurance intermediaries as mere agents for disclosed 
principals without contract obligations to policyholders or claimants once 
arguably made sense and still arguably makes sense to the limited degree 
that it this approach prevents the intermediary from becoming liable in 
contract to insurance policyholders and other third parties or vicariously 
liable for the misconduct of insurers.  Increasingly, however, the historical 
approach of intermediary immunity has become an anachronism in view of 
the substantial outsourcing of traditional insurer functions to independent 
contractor intermediaries.  In addition, the traditional contract immunity of 
these intermediaries should never have been permitted to evolve into a de 
facto immunity from tort liability in cases where intermediary negligence 
or other misconduct foreseeably injures policyholders or other third parties 
within the intermediary’s zone of duty.   
Many courts have begun to recognize the problem and impose 
liability upon intermediaries who in effect function as insurers themselves 
rather than mere agents or that are in joint venture-like financial connection 
with insurers.  However, this continues to leave these important actors of 
modern insurance under-policed to the detriment of policyholders, 
consumers, and society.  Widespread adoption of the tort law approach 
advocated in this article would improve the incentive structure of 
intermediary activity and align it with that of insurers and similarly situated 
social actors, encouraging more consistently apt claims practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
representatives were uncooperative with Gallagher, bringing the resolution of 
Jeffcoat’s claims to a standstill or as Love described it, an “impasse.”  
 
See id. at 784-85.    
Not surprisingly, a jury of presumably rational persons viewed this situation as 
something more than mere negligence.  The state supreme court’s overturning of 
this reasonable verdict as a matter of law suggests that Mississippi’s “more than 
negligence” standard for imposing liability on adjusters is simply too malleable 
and likely to result in courts straining to avoid adjuster liability.  By contrast, a 
negligence standard would be less susceptible to judicial manipulation. 
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DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND THE  
“RACE TO THE BOTTOM” IN  
CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS   
 
Daniel Schwarcz* 
 
 
*** 
This contribution to a symposium on insurance intermediaries analyzes 
insurers’ compensation of independent agents and brokers in consumer 
markets.  It focuses on various forms of “differential compensation,” 
whereby an intermediary’s compensation differs depending on the insurer 
with which the consumer ultimately purchases coverage.  Such differential 
compensation, the article argues, undermines competition among consumer 
insurers with respect to non-price product attributes.  This, in turn, 
increases the risk of a “race to the bottom” in consumer insurance 
markets, as insurers focus on selling the cheapest coverage possible that is 
consistent with legal restrictions.  To address these problems, this article 
suggests that insurers who rely on independent agents to sell consumer 
lines of insurance should be prohibited from paying different rates of 
compensation to different agents for the sale of the same line of insurance.  
*** 
 
In 2004, a series of lawsuits filed by the New York Attorney 
General challenged insurers’ long-standing payments of year-end bonuses 
to insurance brokers.  The lawsuits alleged that these payments, known as 
contingent commissions, created conflicts of interest that undermined 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. For helpful 
comments, I thank Hazel Beh, Tom Cotter, Sean Fitzpatrick, Kristin Hickman, 
Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Francesco Parisi, Jeffrey Stempel, an anonymous 
referee, attendees of the Insurance Intermediaries panel at the 2008 Annual 
Association of Law Schools, and participants in a research seminar at the 
Department of Risk Management and Insurance at Georgia State University.  This 
symposium piece builds off of my earlier article, Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond 
Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 289 (2007). 
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brokers’ professed loyalty to their clients.1  “If the practices identified in 
our suit are as widespread as they appear to be,” the Attorney General 
stated, “then the industry’s fundamental business model needs major 
corrective action and reform.”2   
Within months of these allegations, the commercial insurance 
industry had indeed changed significantly.  Each of the four largest 
insurance brokers pledged to end their practice of accepting contingent 
commission payments from insurers.3  Because of the concentration of the 
insurance brokerage industry – the three largest brokers, Marsh, Aon, and 
Willis enjoyed more than a 54% market share among the top 100 brokers in 
20044 – this shift dramatically impacted the entire market.  Meanwhile, the 
prominence of these allegations led corporate risk managers and other 
sophisticated insurance purchasers to demand from their brokers 
previously-undisclosed details about contingent commission arrangements.5  
Although many small brokers still accept contingent commissions, many 
other brokers (including the four largest) now publicly tout their refusal to 
accept such commissions in marketing themselves to their clients.6 
                                                                                                                 
1 See generally Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the 
Way to Insurance Market Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3047 (2006) 
(reviewing the trajectory of Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation of contingent 
commissions); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning 
Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2007). 
 
2 Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, New York Attorney Gen., Investigation Reveals 
Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/oct14a_04.html. 
 
3 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 291-92. 
 
4 See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance 
Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 364 (2006). 
 
5 See David Dwanka, Mid-Level Insurance Brokers Defend Contingent 
Commissions Amid Growing Criticism, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2006. 
 
6 Broker Compensation: Hearing Before the New York Ins. Comm’r (2008) 
(testimony of Don Bailey, CEO of Willis) (testifying that Willis does not accept 
contingent commissions because they pose a "clear and obvious conflict of 
interest") available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br_cmp_indx.htm. 
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For all of this reform in commercial insurance markets, virtually 
nothing has changed about the way intermediaries in consumer insurance 
markets are compensated.  In both property/casualty and life/health 
consumer insurance lines, most independent insurance agents continue to 
receive increased compensation from insurers to whom they steer a 
significant amount of business.7  And, unlike sophisticated insurance 
purchasers, most consumers continue to have no real understanding of these 
practices and the impact they may have on the advice that insurance agents 
offer.  
From a doctrinal perspective, this divergence in consumer and 
commercial insurance markets may appear to be perfectly reasonable.  The 
insurance brokers that service commercial insurance markets are generally 
considered to be legal agents of policyholders.8  By contrast, the 
independent insurance agents that populate consumer insurance markets are 
usually described primarily as legal agents of insurers, rather than 
consumers, and therefore have more limited (if any) fiduciary obligations to 
policyholders.9  Consequently, compensation structures that create conflicts 
of interest appear to be more troubling doctrinally in commercial markets 
than in consumer markets.  
But from an economic perspective, the differential reform in 
commercial and consumer insurance markets is bizarre.  Unlike 
sophisticated commercial entities, ordinary consumers generally have 
limited information about the relative quality of different carriers and a 
bounded ability to translate the information they do have into effective 
decision-making.10  As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler recently 
observed, “the benefits from holding . . . insurance are delayed, the 
                                                                                                                 
7 See generally id.; see also Richard W. Cooper, Spitzer’s Allegations of the 
Anticompetitive Effects of Contingent Commissions: A Shot Truly Heard Around 
the World, J. OF INS. REG. 83, 100 (2007). 
 
8 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 56-57 (3d ed. 
2000). 
 
9 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D: LAW OF 
INSURANCE AGENTS § 47.5, at 326 (1998).  See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND 
POLICY 66 (2003); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker 
Liability: Crossing the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002). 
 
10 See Part II, infra. 
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probability of having a claim is hard to analyze, consumers do not get 
useful feedback about whether they are getting a good return on their 
insurance purchases, and mapping from what they are buying to what they 
are getting can be ambiguous.”11  Consumers are therefore much more 
susceptible than commercial purchasers to being steered to insurance 
carriers they would not prefer under ideal market conditions.   
Not only does such steering create mismatches between consumers 
and their insurers, but it undermines the competitiveness of consumer 
insurance markets as a whole.  Although consumer insurance markets are 
ultra-competitive with respect to price,12 they are remarkably non-
competitive with respect to claims handling quality.13  Indeed, many 
consumer insurance markets appear to be characterized by insurer-side 
adverse selection, wherein price competition creates a race to the bottom 
among insurers with respect to claims handling quality.14   This Article 
argues that differential compensation contributes to this insurer-side 
adverse selection.  By corrupting the objectivity of independent agents’ 
advice, differential compensation undermines the primary mechanism by 
which consumers can ordinarily overcome informational and cognitive 
limitations in assessing the quality of complicated financial products.  
As such, this Article proposes that insurers who rely on 
independent agents to sell consumer lines of insurance should be prohibited 
from paying different rates of compensation to different agents for the sale 
of the same line of insurance.  Such reform would be less radical than it 
may initially appear.  Federal regulators have long regulated commissions 
                                                                                                                 
11 CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 76-77 (2008). 
 
12 See J. DAVID CUMMINS, DEREGULATING PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 
2-3 (2002); Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the Property-
Liability Insurance Industry, RAND J. ECON. 375 (1973).   
 
13 See Section II. B., infra.   
 
14 Legal scholarship has long recognized that such price competition can cause 
firms to provide inefficiently poor quality when consumers cannot reliably evaluate 
quality due to information deficits or systematic cognitive limitations.  See 
generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004); 
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas 
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).  
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for the sale of Medigap policies, and they recently announced their 
intention to do the same for Medicare Advantage programs.15  By extending 
these policies to the sale of all consumer insurance policies, lawmakers 
could provide consumers with the same protections that sophisticated 
commercial entities already enjoy.  Even more importantly, they could 
enhance the competitiveness of consumer insurance markets as a whole. 
  
I. INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS AND DIFFERENTIAL 
COMPENSATION 
 
A. INSURANCE AGENTS IN CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS 
 
Consumers can purchase insurance coverage directly from an 
insurer, or through either independent or captive agents.  Captive agents are 
employees of a single insurer and only offer coverage with that carrier.16  
By contrast, independent agents can write business with multiple insurers 
and consequently provide consumers with a choice of carriers.17  Such 
choice can be valuable for consumers, as insurers differ in terms of their 
reputations for claims handling, financial strength, risk management 
services, and scope of coverage offered.18  In addition to these variations in 
                                                                                                                 
15 See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (limiting agent compensation so that first year 
compensation may not be greater than twice renewal compensation, renewal 
compensation must be paid for at least 5 years, and replacement commissions may 
not be greater than renewal commissions for the product); Press Release, Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Proposes New Protections for Medicare 
Beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage and prescription Programs (May 8, 2008) 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ (describing proposed regulation that would 
“require Medicare Advantage organizations to establish commission structures for 
sales agents and brokers that are level across all years and across all [Medicare 
Advantage] plan product types”). 
 
16  HOLMES, supra note 9, at 326. 
 
17 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 375. 
 
18 See id.; Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 296-97.  Independent 
insurance agents market themselves primarily on the basis of their capacity to help 
consumers compare these variations in quality and pricing.  As the website of their 
main trade organization explains, independent agents “work with you to identify 
the insurance . . . that [is] right for you… and use [their] access to multiple 
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“quality,” insurers employ differing underwriting criteria and strategies, 
resulting in price differentials even in highly price competitive 
marketplaces.19   
Consumers may prefer independent agents over captive agents for 
other reasons as well.  First, many insurers do not offer insurance directly 
to consumers or distribute their products through captive agents, meaning 
consumers who want to purchase policies from these insurers must go 
through an independent agent.20  Second, because independent agents 
“own” their customer lists, insurers cannot directly solicit the agent’s 
clients or switch those clients to a different agent.  Some have argued that 
this ownership gives independent agents a comparatively strong incentive 
to serve their clients, though empirical efforts have failed to confirm this 
theory.21   
Of course, there are offsetting costs associated with purchasing 
coverage through an independent rather than captive agent.  First, just as 
some insurers only provide coverage through independent agents, many 
popular insurers, such as State Farm and Allstate, only offer coverage 
through captive agents.22  In general, these insurers tend to be more 
                                                                                                                           
companies to deliver those products.” Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of 
America – Consumer Information, http://www.iiaa.org. A brochure designed by the 
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents similarly explains that “by 
shopping among various companies, your professional agent can find the best 
combination of coverage, price and service -- the best value for your insurance 
dollar.”  National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Straight Talk 
about Choosing a Professional Insurance Agent, 
http://www.pianet.com/Publications/ choosinganagentbrochure.htm. 
 
19 See, e.g., Meg Green, Top of Their Game, BEST’S REVIEW 26 (Dec. 2006) 
(describing how some of the most profitable property-casualty insurers focus on 
underwriting only particularly safe risks, and pass off some of the resulting cost 
savings to their insureds). 
 
20 See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of 
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & ECON. 637, 639 (1996). 
 
21 Helen Doerpinghaus, An Analysis of Complaint Data in the Automobile 
Insurance Industry, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 120 (1991); J. David Cummins & Stephen 
Weisbart, The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Insurance Agency 
Performance (1977) (IMA Education and Research Foundation). 
 
22 See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 638.  
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publicly visible, as large insurers can more easily support a captive 
distribution system and may also have greater advertising incentives.23  
Second, other things being equal, coverage purchased through captive 
agents will tend to be cheaper than coverage purchased through 
independent agents.24  Because captive agents only work with one carrier, 
they spend less time on each sale, meaning that they receive lower 
commissions than independent agents.25  These lower commission rates 
may result in lower premium rates for customers, as studies suggest that 
insurers pass through to consumers most of the cost of agent 
compensation.26   
 
B. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENTS 
 
Independent agents are compensated through standard commissions 
on the premiums consumers pay for their coverage.27  These “ordinary” 
commission rates have always varied based on the underlying line of 
insurance sold, as different lines of insurance require different levels of 
effort by insurance agents.28  But, historically, these commission rates were 
relatively standard within specific insurance lines, as individual insurers 
offered a single commission rate to all agents.  Although new insurers 
                                                                                                                 
23 Id. 
 
24 Itzhak Venezia et. al., Exclusive vs. Independent Agents: A Separating 
Equilibrium Approach, 40 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 443, 444 (1999).  
 
25 See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 648-49. 
 
26 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 380-83. Competing factors, such as 
the improved quality of an insurer’s underwriting criteria which is caused by 
increased premiums, may offset this effect. 
 
27 See id. at 374.  In property/casualty insurance markets, these commissions 
are generally the same each year that a consumer renews a policy, whereas 
commission rates tend to decrease over time for life insurance sales personnel.  
This creates its own conflicts of interest, which are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 
28 See id. at 374-75.  
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occasionally offered above-market rates to break into markets, competition 
ultimately ensured relatively uniform commissions within product lines.29  
In the last few years, the premium commissions that different 
insurers pay independent agents have begun to vary more significantly than 
in the past.  Some insurers now negotiate their commission rates on an 
individual basis with agents, offering higher rates to agents that have 
historically directed a large volume of profitable business to the insurer.30  
As a result, many independent agents receive higher commission rates for 
selling policies from one insurer than another, despite competitive forces.   
Even insurance agents who receive the same premium commissions 
from different insurers may nonetheless receive different contingent 
commissions from those insurers.  Unlike differential premium 
commissions, insurers have long paid contingent commissions to 
independent agents.31 Contingent commissions are year-end bonuses that 
some insurers pay to independent agents based on the performance of the 
agent’s book of business with that insurer.32 Most contingent commission 
contracts link this bonus to certain volume or profitability benchmarks for 
the agent’s book of business.   If the specified benchmarks are met, then the 
insurer pays the agent a contingent commission that usually is calculated 
based on the profitability and/or volume of the agent’s book of business 
with that insurer.33  In life and health markets, agents often receive these 
                                                                                                                 
29 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 301. 
 
30 See, e.g., http://www.chubb.com/marketing/chubb7450.html; MetLife, 
Supplemental Compensation Plan, http://www.whymetlife.com; Rupal Parekh, 
Hartford the Latest to Offer Supplementals as Replacements for Contingent 
Commissions, BUS. INS., 33 (July 2007). 
 
31 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3056 (“Contingent commissions have been 
used by insurers as an incentive mechanism for their agents for a century or 
more.”).   
 
32 Id. 
 
33 In general, the size of an intermediary’s contingent commission is based on 
two variables: (1) the amount of insurance business that a particular intermediary 
refers to the insurer, as measured in total premiums; and (2) the profitability of that 
business, which is usually measured by the insurer’s loss ratio on that business.  In 
most cases, intermediaries are only entitled to contingent commissions if they meet 
threshold levels of both sales volume and profitability.  See Jeffrey Wilder, 
Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial 
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contingent commissions in the form of in-kind benefits, such as vacation 
trips, rather than monetary compensation.34   
However it is structured, differential compensation undermines 
independent agents’ incentives to objectively present consumers with 
information about competing insurance options.35  The reason is simple:  
they incentivize independent insurance agents to steer consumers to carriers 
based on considerations other than those customers’ insurance needs and 
risk preferences.  Most obviously, differential commissions encourage 
insurance agents to steer consumers to insurers who pay the highest 
commissions.  But bec ause differential commissions are almost always tied 
in some way to the volume and/or profitability of the agent’s book of 
                                                                                                                           
Insurance 5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group Working 
Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418061. The loss 
ratio is the “ratio between premiums paid and losses incurred during a given 
period.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (7th ed. 1999). Premiums on both new 
policies and policy renewals are generally treated similarly in these calculations, 
which are almost always made on a yearly basis. Wilder, supra, at 5. In some 
cases, contingent commission arrangements may be based only on volume, not 
profitability. However, “the great majority of the arrangements covering the 
smaller intermediaries is based on the profitability of the business written or 
profitability and volume.” Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 379.  Once 
intermediaries reach these qualifying levels, their commissions typically increase 
with better results along either dimension. See Wilder, supra, at 5. 
 
34 See, e.g., Broker Compensation, supra note 6, at 103-113 (testimony of F. 
James Ginnane) (describing various cruises to the Baltics, Sweden, Montreal and 
elsewhere that MassMutual paid based on annual production, and noting that “all 
of the carriers” he was familiar with offer similar trips), available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br-cmp-tran-buf.pdf.   
 
35 Consumers who purchase insurance via a captive agent have already made a 
decision that they want to purchase their coverage with a particular carrier.  This 
means they will often have already priced out several different carriers and, 
perhaps, asked neighbors or friends about their experiences with those carriers.  By 
contrast, consumers who seek out coverage via an independent agent have typically 
not made any decisions about which carrier best suits their needs.  Although they 
may have had a particular agent recommended to them, they generally do not even 
know which carriers the agent offers, much less the relative characteristics of those 
carriers.  Rather, independent agents offer themselves to consumers as an 
alternative to comparison shopping among different insurers.  They purport to do 
the comparative shopping for the consumer. 
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business with an insurer, they may also create more subtle steering 
incentives for agents.36  For instance, they may lead agents to steer 
customers to an insurer that has a minimum-volume requirement on the 
cusp of being satisfied.37  Alternatively, they may cause an agent who 
believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to steer that consumer to an insurer 
with whom the agent does not have a differential commission arrangement 
tied to profitability.38  Differential commissions may also increase premium 
costs for consumers.39   
 
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEGAL RESPONSE TO 
DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION FOR INDEPENDENT 
AGENTS 
  
Differential compensation of sales agents is common, and often 
understood to be relatively benign in many industries and market contexts.  
For instance, salespeople in retail stores may often receive special bonuses 
or in-kind benefits if they reach sales targets for particular products or 
brands.  Like independent insurance agencies, such stores often carry 
multiple brands and consumers may rely on the advice of salespeople in 
making their decisions.  Given that few suggest lawmakers regulate the 
compensation of sales personnel in these contexts, why would a different 
result be warranted in insurance markets? 
Part of the answer is that consumer insurance markets are often 
regulated in ways that would be unthinkable in other markets. For instance, 
state insurance departments regulate product prices and designs and license 
salespeople and insurers.40  Although the desirability of specific regulations 
                                                                                                                 
36 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 297-301. 
 
37 See Wilder, supra note 33, at 19. 
 
38 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89. For this reason, agents who 
steer “high-risk” consumers to certain insurers may theoretically undermine their 
client’s interest by signaling to the insurer that particular consumers are relatively 
“high risk” and should thus be charged increased premiums.  See Schwarcz, 
Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 324-35. 
 
39 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 383. 
 
40 See generally ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 103 
(1995).  
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is often contentious, the notion that insurance requires robust market 
conduct oversight is generally accepted.  The reasons are two-fold.  First, 
consumer insurance markets are uniquely susceptible to market failure for a 
variety of reasons, including the complexity of the underlying product, the 
cognitive limitations of consumers, the prevalence of information 
asymmetries, and various other external forces that distort the market by, 
for instance, mandating the purchase of coverage.  Second, the 
consequences of such market failure are significant.  Consumers who have 
inadequate coverage typically do not discover that fact until after they have 
suffered a loss, at which point they no longer have the ability to mitigate 
their damages.41     
This Part applies these general rationales for insurance regulation to 
differential compensation arrangements in consumer insurance markets.  It 
concludes the market forces that ordinarily limit the pernicious effects of 
differential commissions are unreliable in consumer insurance contexts.  
Similarly, it suggests that the consequences of the resulting market failure 
are significant, contributing to a race to the bottom over claims-handling 
practices in many consumer insurance lines.   
 
A. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND MARKET FAILURE 
 
In ordinary product markets, an intermediary’s temptation to push 
expensive or high-margin products is counter-balanced by the potential for 
market backlash.42  At least some consumers are likely to arrive at a store 
with some knowledge about competing product options, especially given 
the wealth of such information available on the internet.  This is 
particularly true with big-ticket items – like high definition televisions or 
cars – about which consumers will often invest time in researching.  
Attempts to steer such consumers to inferior or overpriced products may 
backfire, resulting in those consumers shopping elsewhere and sharing their 
                                                                                                                 
41 Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in 
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 505, 583-84 (1998). 
 
42 Howell Jackson, The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in 
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVINGS 
PROGRAMS (Lusardi, Annamaria ed., forthcoming 2009); Howell E. Jackson & 
Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread 
Premiums, 12 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2007). 
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negative impressions with friends and family.43  Although sales personnel 
may attempt to target uninformed consumers, such an approach can be 
risky as it may be hard to distinguish between informed and uninformed 
consumers.  And even consumers that do end up purchasing inferior or 
over-priced products will often fail to discover this in the course of using 
their product.44  Such consumers will not only hesitate before returning to 
the store, but they too may talk to family and friends about their negative 
experience.   
To be sure, these market forces hardly eliminate sales contests and 
inducements that lead to slanted advice – there will always remain sleezy 
car salesmen, stores that sell over-priced and useless gadgets, and chains 
that push consumers to purchase over-priced accessories that add little to 
the overarching product.  But the prospect that routine government 
intervention in these contexts could efficiently improve matters is slim.  As 
this Section shows, these market forces that ordinarily protect consumers 
from excessive steering work poorly in consumer insurance markets.   
 
i. Information in Consumer Insurance Markets 
 
Unlike consumers in most markets, insurance consumers have 
access to few, if any, accurate measures of an insurer’s reliability in paying 
claims fairly and efficiently.45  It is, for instance, impossible for consumers 
to find out how often individual insurers pay claims within 30, 60, 90, or 
120 days of a claim being reported; how frequently they deny claims; how 
frequently they are sued for payment or found guilty of bad faith; and how 
                                                                                                                 
43 For a general discussion of the role of reputation in disciplining sellers’ 
behavior, see Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in 
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981). 
 
44 In economic parlance, insurance policies are thus “credence goods” because 
most consumers cannot evaluate their quality even after they purchase the policy.  
See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 
720-21 (1985) (explaining the differences between search goods, experience goods, 
and credence goods in economic and legal literature). 
 
45 “Information about the reliability of different insurers is hard to come by 
[and] the quality of insurance coverage is almost impossible to assess without an 
expert.”  KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 176 (1986).   
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frequently policies are cancelled or non-renewed.46  While consumers can 
look up how often complaints against specific insurers are lodged with state 
regulators, this data is notoriously unreliable and inconsistent.47 Even the 
data published by Consumer Reports is highly limited, as it does not take 
into account the size and type of each consumer’s claim and it is based on 
each consumer’s subjective experience with the claims process.48  
Although consumers can, and do, carefully scrutinize premium 
differentials from different carriers, the significance of price differentials is 
almost impossible to assess without a corresponding understanding of the 
                                                                                                                 
46  One recent proposal to the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) would empower regulators to publicly disclose most of 
these data elements about the relative quality of insurers’ claims handling, which 
they already collect.  See PROPOSAL FOR CENTRALIZED DATA COLLECTION, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (Market Regulation 
Committee Proposal). Unfortunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal 
under the guise of confidentiality and trade secrets.  See Jim Connolly, NAIC 
Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 25, 
2008, available at http://www.propertyandcasualtyinsurancenews. 
com/cms/nupc/Breaking%20News/2008/09/25-CONDUCTRULE-jc; Chad 
Hemenway, NCOIL Committee Votes Against NAIC Market Conduct Data 
Proposal, BESTWIRE, Jul., 11 2008; Sean Carr, NAIC Sets September Vote for 
Market Conduct Plan, BESTWIRE, Jul. 28, 2008; Letter from Am. Health Ins. 
Plans, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Am. Ins. Ass’n, Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., and Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. to 
Sandy Praeger, President of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (May 27, 2008) 
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_d_data_collection_ 
comments_namic0527.pdf.  
 
47 See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: The 
American and British Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 
735 (2009).  Currently the Market Analysis and Priorities Working Group of the 
NAIC is working to develop better codes for the entire complaint data collection 
effort.  See http://www.naic.org/committees_d_mapwg.htm (last visited February 
8, 2009). 
 
48 Consumer Reports surveys thousands of consumers who filed claims and 
asks them to assess their satisfaction with the claims process.  See Consumer 
Reports Investigates, Surviving the Hard Market in Homeowners Insurance Vol. 
69, Issue 9, Consumer Reports. 36 (Sept. 2004); Homeowners Insurance Report, 
The New Protection Game Vol. 64, Issue 1, Consumer Reports, 16 (Jan. 1999). 
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differences in the underlying products.49    A high-priced insurer may offer 
good coverage for a fair price, while a low-priced insurer may offer 
coverage that is poor, even relative to its seemingly low premiums.  In fact, 
it is precisely for these reasons that independent agents choose to market 
themselves to consumers by focusing on their capacity to offer advice about 
competing carriers.  
This lack of concrete information about the relative quality of 
different insurers undermines a key protection against aggressive steering 
in ordinary consumer markets.  As described above, the fact that consumers 
ordinarily have the capacity to independently research and assess different 
product options limits the capacity of ordinary retail establishments to steer 
consumers to unfavorable deals.  Moreover, it increases the prospect that 
attempting to do so will create market backlash, leading consumers who 
realize they are receiving poor advice to spread the word to others.  But 
because most consumers simply do not have concrete information with 
which to assess the advice about the relative quality of carriers that 
insurance agents dispense, these protections are less robust in consumer 
insurance markets.  This is particularly true given that insurance advice is 
hardly formulaic.  The best insurance options for a customer may depend 
on numerous considerations, including the customer’s risk tolerance, cash 
flow, preexisting relationships with carriers, and numerous other factors.  
This means self-serving advice can often be justified on some basis, and 
will rarely be obviously identifiable, even to experts.   
Not only do consumers have a limited capacity to assess ex ante the 
quality of different carriers’ coverage, but they also have a limited capacity 
to do so ex post.  Unlike almost any other product, only a very small 
percentage of consumers end up using the insurance they purchase.50  When 
they do, it is almost always for relatively small claims, even though the 
most important element of that insurance is the coverage it provides in 
cases of large losses.51  Finally, consumers that do submit claims to their 
insurers are typically ill-equipped to judge the extent to which their insurer 
                                                                                                                 
49 Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 315. 
 
50 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial 
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1413-15 (2007).  
 
51 See id. at 1415.  
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lived up to its legal obligations.52  Consumers may therefore be susceptible 
to insurers’ capacity to “tell a story” that appears to justify the refusal to 
pay a claim or a relatively low settlement of that claim.53   
This limitation in the capacity of consumers to assess insurance 
quality ex post further limits the power of market forces to address the 
steering that may result from differential compensation.  Ordinarily, 
consumers who are successfully directed to inferior or overpriced products 
may discover this fact over time.   Consumers who feel they were so 
victimized can not only choose to shop elsewhere in the future, but can talk 
to family and friends about their experience.  Because most consumers who 
are steered to inferior insurance will never realize this fact, they will not 
exact these market penalties on agents who succumb to the temptation to 
maximize their compensation by directing consumers to inferior 
arrangements.   
  
ii. Consumer Decision-Making about Insurance 
 
In ordinary markets, consumers assess the desirability of different 
product options using a roughly rational process, at least in the aggregate.  
Especially when purchases involve big-ticket items, consumers are often 
willing to invest a significant amount of cognitive energy into making sure 
that they have thought through their options and selected a product that 
meets their needs and desires.  As a result, salespeople can often exert only 
a minimal amount of pressure on shaping consumers’ preferences.   When 
salespeople push inferior or overpriced products, consumers may not only 
resist such practices, but may choose to avoid the establishment in the 
future and tell their friends and families of their experiences. 
Two features of insurance markets substantially undermine this 
reasoned purchasing behavior, and the disciplining impact it has on agents’ 
sales efforts.  First, consumers typically purchase insurance as part of a 
larger event or transaction, such as taking a job, moving, or buying a home 
or automobile.  Unlike with televisions, cars, or refrigerators, consumers do 
not typically decide that they can finally afford a new insurance policy, or 
                                                                                                                 
52 See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, 
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1407-13 
(1994).  
 
53 See id. 
 
738 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
that their old policy is out of style, obsolete, or run down.54  But the 
bundled decision-making that typifies such insurance purchases is both 
difficult and complicated, resulting in consumers “tend[ing] to adopt 
simpler choice strategies to cope with that complexity.”55  Such simplistic 
strategies obviously enhance the capacity of sales agents to steer consumer 
decisions. 
Second, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that 
consumers’ preferences concerning insurance are remarkably malleable.56  
Experimental research has established that framing effects can have 
important implications for consumers’ purchases of insurance policies.  For 
instance, one study found that subjects were willing to pay more than twice 
as much for flight insurance covering “terrorism” and “mechanical failure” 
than they were willing to pay for flight insurance that would pay for losses 
for “any reason.”57  Similarly, consumers tend to have bimodal responses to 
low-probability, high-cost risks, either dismissing them entirely or 
significantly overweighing their significance.58  Which of these outcomes 
                                                                                                                 
54 Evidence suggests that consumers rarely change carriers after they initially 
purchase a policy, especially outside of the auto insurance context.  INSURANCE 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 5, fig. 2-3 
(reporting that only 7% of homeowners or renters changed insurers in the last five 
years, but 23% of auto insurers did).  When consumers do change insurers, they 
overwhelmingly cite price as the reason.  See id. at 6, fig. 2-4. 
 
55 See Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1223-34 (2003) (reviewing literature 
displaying this consumer tendancy to choose simple choice strategies).  
 
56 Consumers’ decision-making processes about insurance are a complicated 
mix of intuitive, emotional, and rational responses that are susceptible to 
manipulation.  See Horward Kunruether & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-
Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 
63 (April 2005); David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to 
Meet the Practice in Insurance, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 
(2004); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 76-77 (2000).   
 
57 Eric J. Johnson, et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39 (1993). 
 
58 Gary H. McClelland, et al., Insurance for Low Probability Hazards: A 
Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J.  RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 104, 108-09 
(1993). 
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obtains often depends on the availability of the underlying risk.  Thus, 
Californians’ purchases of earthquake insurance generally increase 
significantly immediately after an earthquake occurs and then gradually 
decrease (until the next earthquake).59  Finally, consumers’ insurance 
decisions are significantly impacted by their affection for the item to be 
insured.   In general, people prefer to insure against losses that involve high 
affect, even when holding constant the expected value of the insurance and 
the insured’s level of wealth.60  It is for precisely these reasons that insurers 
are among the heaviest advertisers of any industry.61   
Given this malleability of consumers’ insurance preferences, 
experienced or well-trained sales agents are likely to have a substantial 
capacity to steer consumers to insurers by helping to shape those 
consumers’ preferences.  This form of steering is unlikely to generate any 
market backlash, because it involves altering consumers’ preferences.  
Often, this manipulation unambiguously impedes efficient market outcomes 
by skewing consumer assessments of objective information.  This occurs, 
for instance, with the framing of a risk to increase a consumer’s assessment 
of its likelihood.  At the same time, other types of manipulation may 
admittedly operate on consumer insurance preferences in ways that are 
normatively ambiguous.62  Consider an agent who focuses on a consumer’s 
affection for an item in order to increase her desire to insure against loss to 
that item.  Evaluating the desirability of this result within a consequentialist 
                                                                                                                 
59 See Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small 
Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 249, 252, 254-55 (1977); 
HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY 
LESSONS 26-27, 36-41 (1978). 
 
60 Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in 
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 142-43, 148 (2000).  Entire 
markets for insurance have flourished based on this principle:  consider life 
insurance for children, which in most cases is irrational based on standard 
insurance theory.   
 
61 See Baker, supra note 52, at 1404. 
 
62 See Brett H. McDonnell, Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Evaluations, 
5-6, 9-12 (Oct. 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933089.   
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framework is difficult (if not impossible), because there is no exogenously-
defined preference to serve as a benchmark for that evaluation.63   
 
iii. Insurance Agents’ Discrimination Between 
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Purchasers  
 
In any consumer market, plenty of consumers will be relatively 
uninformed and therefore susceptible to inefficient steering.  But these 
uninformed consumers are typically protected by their more informed 
counterparts.  Because aggressive or misleading sales efforts that are 
directed at informed and engaged consumers can have negative effects on a 
business’s reputation, uninformed or rationally ignorant consumers often 
benefit from the presence of their more informed counterparts when sales 
people cannot distinguish between the two.64 
Once again, though, this market protection against inefficient 
steering is less robust in insurance markets.  Unlike most salespeople, 
insurance agents must discuss clients’ personal situations in order to assess 
their coverage needs and facilitate insurer underwriting.65  This process 
enhances agents’ capacity to assess the relative sophistication of their 
consumers, and to offer advice accordingly.  In fact, one of the earliest 
studies of contingent commission payments found just such a pattern of 
discrimination in a large independent insurance agency in Arizona: 
relatively engaged customers were less frequently directed to insurers that 
paid contingent commissions than customers who were less engaged with 
their insurance purchases.66  Such consumer segmentation undermines one 
                                                                                                                 
63 See id. at 12, 18. 
 
64 Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 
636-38 (1979). 
 
65 Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 318. 
 
66 Id. at 317-18; see Wilder, supra note 33, at 2-3, 5, 7. The agency, which 
remained unidentified, employed eight agents with no ownership stake in the 
company and three “equity agents” who received a portion of the agency’s profits. 
Because the contingent commissions that the company received were paid directly 
to the company, the three equity agents stood to gain more from maximizing 
contingent commissions than the non-equity agents.  Additionally, only the equity 
agents handled “house” accounts, which (1) either originated in another agency that 
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of the core protections against undue steering in ordinary markets: the 
capacity of an informed minority to protect the interests of other 
consumers.67 
 
B. THE COST OF MARKET FAILURE FOR DIFFERENTIAL 
COMMISSIONS  
 
Market failures, of course, are ubiquitous.  And many of these 
market failures are better left alone than subjected to the expensive, and 
often ineffective (or worse), forces of government regulation.   But that is 
not the case here.  This Section argues that insurers’ payments of 
differential compensation to independent agents facilitate a “race to the 
bottom” in consumer insurance markets through insurer-side adverse 
selection.68  They do so by undermining the willingness of independent 
agents to inform consumers about insurers’ claims handling practices or to 
counteract consumers’ tendency to discount the value of quality claims 
handling.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
the company subsequently acquired or were originally handled by an agent who 
retired, and (2) did not fit the portfolio or expertise of any non-equity agent.  The 
defining characteristics of these house accounts strongly suggest that they were less 
sensitive than other agency customers to the level of service they received from 
their agent.  This hypothesis was corroborated by the fact that house accounts were 
three times more likely than other accounts to pay their premiums directly to their 
insurer, rather than to pay them through the agency, indicating disengagement with 
their insurance agent.  The study concluded contingent commissions significantly 
impacted the recommendations that the equity agents gave to their less responsive 
consumers, finding that “the prospect of contingency fees [led] equity agents to 
increase the frequency with which they place house accounts with insurers offering 
contingent commissions by more than 50%.”  Id. 
 
67 See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1406-08; R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, 
Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for 
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 672, 674-75 (1996). 
 
68 BAKER, supra note 9, at 7.  Just as insurer’s lack of information about 
consumers can lead to adverse selection, consumers’ lack of information about 
insurers can lead to the “insurer-side” adverse selection described above. 
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i. Insurer-side Adverse Selection 
   
Part A described how insurance consumers’ limited information on 
the relative quality of different insurance options and suspect decision-
making about insurance can lead ostensibly independent agents to steer 
consumers to inferior insurers.  But these two market conditions can also 
have the more general impact of undermining competition among insurers 
with respect to claims handling.   
If a sufficiently large percentage of consumers are ill-informed 
about insurers’ claims handling, insurers that pursue aggressive claims 
handling strategies (lemons) will profit more than other insurers.  These 
insurers can pass on some of these profits to consumers in the form of 
lower premiums.  In the long run, this will force other insurers to either 
drop out of consumer markets or, more likely, adopt low quality claims 
handling practices themselves.69  By contrast, if a sizable number of 
consumers are cognizant of differences in insurers’ claims handling, then 
some insurers will seek to appeal to these consumers by adopting a high 
price, high quality brand.  That, in turn, could force other market players to 
compete over their own claims handling quality.  Of course, insurers’ 
quality/price mix would still vary, with different insurers appealing to 
consumers with different risk preferences.  As a result, the market as a 
whole would compete along both of the two primary dimensions that define 
the insurance-policyholder relationship. 
Through similar mechanisms, insurer-side adverse selection can 
occur if insurance consumers’ decision-making causes them to under-value, 
or under-appreciate, differences in insurers’ claims handling practices.  
There are strong reasons to suspect consumer decision-making about 
insurance generally has this character.70  The relative value to consumers of 
high quality insurance depends on two considerations: (i) the likelihood 
they will suffer a potentially insurable loss, and (ii) the likelihood a low-
quality insurer will poorly handle any such claim relative to a high-quality 
insurer.  With respect to the former, research has consistently found that 
most people judge their own likelihood of suffering a loss to be lower than 
                                                                                                                 
69 See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 14, at 630, 722, 724-25, 746-47 
(exploring how consumers’ under-estimation of risks can compel a similar race to 
the bottom with respect to those risks). 
 
70 Indeed, research has consistently found that there is a “systematic tendency 
for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.”  Cutler & Zeckhauser, 
supra note 56, at 3. 
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the average such risk, so long as they retain even a minimal amount of 
control over the event.71  Thus, people in general are overly optimistic 
about their risk of being injured in an earthquake,72 being involved in a car 
accident,73 suffering health problems,74 and dying young.75  For these 
reasons, they also generally buy less insurance against these risks than they 
should, especially when no outside force – such as legal mandates or loan 
terms – artificially increases demand.76 
Although less evidence exists as to how consumers evaluate the 
likelihood that a low-quality insurer will poorly handle a claim relative to a 
high-quality insurer, there are theoretical reasons to believe people will also 
tend to under-estimate this risk differential.  In part, that is because 
consumers’ choice of insurers involves precisely the minimal amount of 
control over an ultimate risk (the risk of a low-quality choice having 
negative consequences) that leads people in other contexts to believe their 
                                                                                                                 
71 A separate relevant strand of research has found that, when facing low-
probability risks, people tend to either dismiss those risks entirely or overweigh the 
value of insurance against those risks.   See SLOVIC, supra note 56, at 75, 77; 
McClelland, supra note 58, at 95, 108-109. This conclusion, however, has 
ambiguous implications for the extent to which consumers believe they will suffer 
an insurable loss, depending on the side of the bimodal distribution on which an 
insured risk falls. 
 
72 Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of 
Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to 
the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 40-
1 (1992). 
 
73 David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self Evaluation: The Role of 
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2002); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59, at 240. 
 
74 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).  
 
75 See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should 
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 4, 23 (2001-2002).  
 
76 See id. (noting the vast majority of Americans are under-insured against the 
risk of dying young); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59 (suggesting most Californians 
do not purchase earthquake insurance). 
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risk is lower than the average such risk.77  Additionally, however, the actual 
difference between low and high quality insurers is ambiguous, in that it 
involves numerous considerations that are hard to definitively compare 
across insurers, even with all relevant information.78  Research suggests 
people tend to interpret such ambiguous information in self-serving ways.79  
Given that high quality insurance unambiguously costs more than low 
quality insurance, this bias may theoretically manifest itself in consumers 
dismissing potential differences in claims handling quality.   
Of course, the mere fact that economic conditions in insurance 
markets could theoretically lead to insurer-side adverse selection does not 
make it so.  But many consumer insurance markets do appear to be 
characterized by some degree of insurer-side adverse selection, with few 
insurers pursuing high-quality, high-price strategies.  Aside from the 
common (though often anecdotal) observations of commentators 
acknowledging this equilibrium,80 significant evidence suggests prominent 
national insurers such as Unum/Provident, State Farm, and Allstate have 
each recently engaged in systematic, national efforts to cut claims payments 
                                                                                                                 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 71-76. 
 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 45-53. 
 
79 Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: 
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111 (1997). 
 
80 See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 217 F.3d 1291, 1296 
(10th Cir. 2000) (observing Blue Cross had "a financial interest in denying claims 
in order to remain economically viable as well as competitive within the insurance 
industry"); BAKER, supra note 9, at 128 (collecting specific examples of seeming 
insurer opportunism); Schwarcz,  supra note 50, at 1401-26; John Langbein, Trust 
Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of 
Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2007) (“Even when 
insurance is experience rated, the insurer still has an incentive to deny claims, 
because the market for insurance services is intensely competitive.  Low-cost 
providers prevail over high-cost providers.”).  But see Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” 
Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 405, 418 (1996) 
(arguing that “any insurer who frequently refused to pay covered claims would 
likely soon develop a reputation for behaving in this fashion and lose customers,” 
but acknowledging that “it is plausible that insurers might occasionally behave 
opportunistically without suffering a prohibitive reputational penalty”). 
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to policyholders.81  Additionally, the insurance industry plays a significant 
role in limiting public access to information about different insurers’ claims 
handling quality.  For instance, insurers have collectively devoted immense 
energy and resources to ensuring that data about their claims handling 
quality, which is already collected by state insurance regulators, is not 
made publicly available.82  Similarly, studies of insurer marketing and 
advertising suggest that individual insurers do not publicly advertise any 
concrete information about the quality of their claims handling, preferring 
instead vague and unverifiable promises about trust (as well as concrete 
promises about price, of course).83  In a market where insurers sought to 
compete over the quality of their claims-handling, one would expect that 
some insurers would prominently resist these trends. 
 
ii. The Role of Differential Compensation in Explaining 
Insurers’ Race to the Bottom 
 
As described above, the two economic conditions that make insurer 
side adverse selection a plausible, and seemingly accurate, description of 
consumer insurance markets are (i) consumer ignorance about claims 
handling quality and (ii) under-appreciation of the significance of this 
variable.  This Section suggests that differential compensation of 
independent insurance intermediaries is a key contributor to this 
equilibrium.   
Consumer markets are ordinarily able to overcome informational 
problems through the evolution of a network of independent intermediaries 
that digest complicated data and objectively present consumers with 
advice.84  This process allows consumers to make informed choices that 
                                                                                                                 
81 See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE 
FARM (2008) (displaying State Farm’s practices); Langbein, supra note 80, at 1318-21 
(displaying Unum/Provident’s practices); Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Advocates 
Call for Refunds, Rate Reductions, For Allstate Policyholders After Company Releases 
Internal Documents Revealing Intentionally Underpaid Customers, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 
2008 (displaying Allstate’s practices), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
pressRelease/idUS187467+ 07-Apr-2008+PRN20080407.   
 
82 See documents cited supra note 46.   
 
83 See generally Baker, supra note 52. 
 
84 See Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of 
Middlemen, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (2006) (describing several economic 
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reflect their risk preferences despite their relative lack of understanding 
about the underlying market.  Just as importantly, it improves the decision-
making of less sophisticated consumers, by influencing insurers’ 
reputations through word-of-mouth among consumers.85   
In the insurance context, objective and independent market 
intermediaries could accomplish these ends by digesting data on claims 
handling quality, along with repeated first-hand observation of insurers’ 
practices, to accurately communicate information about insurers’ claims 
handling practices.  Such information gathering services are particularly 
significant in consumer insurance markets, not simply because of the dearth 
of public information on insurers’ claims handling practices,86 but also 
because few consumers could independently assess such information, even 
if it were publicly available. The quality of an insurer’s claims handling is 
not a monolithic concept, and could be constructed in multiple ways, with 
differences in metrics appearing significant when they were not, or vice 
versa.  For instance, data suggesting an insurer denied a relatively high 
percentage of claims, or a relatively high number of its consumers sue for 
coverage or complain to state regulators, might simply reflect the insurer’s 
pool of policyholders, rather than its claims handling practices.87   
                                                                                                                           
roles for middlemen, including assisting “consumers by reducing the cost of 
product search and evaluation, helping consumers to find the products that best fit 
their needs, and helping consumers to manage risk.”).   
 
85 This role of market intermediaries in filtering and processing information for 
less sophisticated parties has been extensively discussed in debates on the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis, which is often imagined to achieve efficiency through a 
similar market intermediation mechanism.  See generally Susanna Kim Ripken, 
Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in 
Corporate Forward Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929 (2005) 
(discussing the role of market intermediaries in the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis).   
 
86 See supra Part II.A. 
 
87 Insurers have themselves seized on these difficulties in assessing claims 
handling data as one of their primary arguments against public disclosure.  See 
Letter from Wiley Rein to Sandy Praeger, Pres. of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
6 (April 16,2008), available at  http://www.naic.org/documents/committees 
_d_data_collection_comments_namic0416.pdf (resisting the public release of 
market conduct regulation, because “release of the information in raw form without 
the benefit of evaluation and interpretation would be unfair and potentially 
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Just as independent and objective sales agents can improve 
consumer information, they can also improve consumers’ capacity to 
rationally and thoughtfully assess the trade-offs associated with purchasing 
relatively high quality insurance.  By employing “debiasing” strategies, 
intermediaries may be able to counteract the tendency of consumers to 
under-appreciate the value of high quality coverage.88  For instance, 
research suggests that people who are convinced that a potential loss is 
truly random generally no longer perceive they are relatively less likely 
than average to suffer from those losses.89  By pointing out just how little 
control people have over the financial losses that are the subject of 
insurance, independent intermediaries could convince consumers to pay 
more for more reliable coverage.   Similarly, independent agents might be 
able to concretize information about insurers’ relative claims handling, 
thereby limiting the ambiguity of risk differentials that can trigger a self-
serving interpretation of information.  Even if independent intermediaries 
could not neutralize these biases, they might be able to counteract them.90  
For instance, independent agents could attempt to enhance consumers’ 
evaluations of the risks attendant to low quality coverage by vividly 
describing these risks.  Increasing the availability of risks can counteract 
consumers’ tendency to underestimate them.91 
Differential compensation undermines these market intermediation 
mechanisms by distorting the objectivity of the advice independent 
                                                                                                                           
damaging to insurers, and misleading to policyholders, investors, and the public at 
large.”). 
 
88 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199, 204-05 (2006).   
 
89 Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An 
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 307 (1999); David Dunning, 
Chip Heath & Jerry M. Suls, Flawed Self-Assessments: Implications for Health, 
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 69, 80 (2004) (“One 
of the strongest moderators of unrealistic optimism is perceived control.  The 
greater a person’s perceived control over an event or its outcome, the stronger the 
person’s optimistic bias.”). 
 
90 See Johnson et al., supra note 57, at 48. (“[C]onsumers’ decisions about 
insurance can be affected by distortions in their perceptions of risk and by 
alternative framing of premium and benefits.”).   
 
91 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 88. 
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insurance agents offer to consumers.92  Agents’ capacity to mitigate 
consumer ignorance about insurance and debias consumers in ways that 
promote thoughtful consideration of insurance quality depends on agents 
prioritizing the interests of those clients.  When intermediaries are 
incentivized to steer consumers to insurers in order to maximize their 
compensation, they are also encouraged to manipulate consumer 
preferences and impressions to achieve this outcome.  This short-circuits 
the ordinary market solutions to informational and decision making 
problems in complex consumer markets.  As a result, even insurers that are 
interested in cultivating a high-price, high-quality market strategy have 
limited vehicles for effectively communicating this strategy to potentially 
interested consumers.  This creates circumstances under which insurer-side 
adverse selection with respect to claims handling can (and seemingly does) 
flourish.   
 
III. CRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO DIFFERENTIAL 
COMPENSATION 
 
Given the need for reform described in Part II, this Part briefly 
concludes by considering a simple legal intervention in insurance markets 
that resembles measures adopted in the federally-regulated markets that 
relate to Medicare.93  That reform would limit insurer compensation of 
independent agents selling consumer lines of coverage to premium-based 
commissions, and would require insurers to pay a single, flat commission 
rate to all independent agents in their distribution networks.  It would not 
mandate any particular commission rate, allowing insurers to choose the 
rate they wanted to offer to their independent agents.  Insurers could set 
different premium commission rates for different lines of insurance, 
reflecting the fact that different product lines require different levels of 
effort for agents.  Additionally, insurers could pay different commission 
rates to independent agents in different states to account for premium and 
cost of living differences across states.  
Such reform would largely eliminate the distorting potential of 
differential compensation, leaving independent intermediaries without 
significant financial reasons to promote the policies of one insurer over 
another.  Although some insurers might offer slightly higher commission 
rates than others, competition would ensure that these differentials would 
                                                                                                                 
92 See Section II.A, supra. 
 
93 See Press Release, supra note 15. 
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generally be quite small.94  To the extent that differentials in commission 
rates persisted, they would be much less problematic than current 
commission differentials.  Rather than rewarding individual preferred 
agents who steered consumers to a particular insurer, they would reflect an 
insurer’s decision to offer above market commissions to all independent 
agents who sell a particular product line.  As noted earlier, such a strategy 
might be justifiable for new entrants in a market seeking to establish a 
customer base.95  Moreover, a high commission strategy might also be 
sensible for insurers offering high-price, high-quality products if the sale of 
such products requires comparatively more effort.  Indeed, some economics 
literature suggests that sales agents in the consumer electronics industry 
may receive higher commission rates, on a per-dollar basis, for the sale of 
high quality products than low quality products for this reason.96   
Not only would a flat compensation rate for an insurer’s 
independent agents help to solve the problems identified in Part II, but it 
would do so while imposing few administrative costs.  A ban on contingent 
commissions or other specific compensation arrangements, standing alone, 
only invites insurers to design compensation structures that retain the same 
basic incentivizing function, but technically comply with the ban.  Insurers’ 
switch from contingent commissions to “supplemental compensation” 
arrangements, which retain the same performance-based contingency 
structure, is illustrative.97  Because of its simplicity, a mandatory flat rate of 
                                                                                                                 
94 Tacit collusion among insurers in setting commission rates would be 
unlikely, given the number of insurers who rely on independent agents to distribute 
their products. 
 
95 See supra text accompanying note 29 (noting that this was one reason 
historically that insurers offered higher premium commission rates). 
 
96 See Ajay Kalra, Mengze Shi, Kannan Srinivasan, Salesforce Compensation 
Scheme and Consumer Inference, 655 Management Science (2003). 
 
97 See Sally Roberts, Compensation Shake-Up Continues; Chubb Pays $17M, 
Ends All Contingents, BUS. INS., Dec. 25, 2006  (noting that the Chubb agreement 
states that “a fixed commission paid to a producer, set prior to the sale of a 
particular insurance product, and that may be based on, among other things, the 
prior year’s performance of the producer’ is not considered  contingent”).  
Although some have suggested that these newly-emerging arrangements avoid the 
conflicts of interest associated with contingent commissions because they are 
“retrospective rather than prospective,” this argument is unpersuasive.  The fact 
that supplemental compensation arrangements are retrospective merely shifts 
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compensation for all intermediaries avoids this inefficient gaming.  
Moreover, it would be easy to enforce because it would operate on insurers 
rather than intermediaries.  There are obviously fewer insurers than 
intermediaries (making market conduct observation easier) and insurers are 
less likely to engage in outright fraud than individual intermediaries who 
have less to lose from doing so. 
Of course, mandating that insurers pay their independent agents a 
single commission rate is significantly more intrusive than a disclosure-
based response to the problem.  Not only would it be more costly to employ 
than disclosure, but it might distort consumer insurance markets in ways 
that may be hard to measure, or even predict.  Nonetheless, such an 
aggressive intervention is prudent. 
First, merely enhancing the disclosure requirements of independent 
agents is unlikely to mitigate the risk of steering, and the attendant risks of 
insurer-side adverse selection.  Although I develop the limits of a 
disclosure-based regulatory response elsewhere,98 the basic argument is 
simple:  as described above, the reason that market forces do not prevent 
inefficient steering is that consumers generally have a limited ability to 
independently assess their insurance options.   Merely informing consumers 
that their intermediaries may have a conflict of interest does nothing to 
address this fact.  Of course, such disclosure could facilitate an agent’s 
capacity to eschew differential compensation as a marketing technique.99  
But such efforts would be unlikely to prove profitable because consumers 
would have little sense of the value of such neutrality.   
It is for precisely these reasons that compensation practices in 
consumer insurance markets have not, in fact, changed since 2004, despite 
the very public revelation of agents’ conflicts of interest at that time and the 
adoption of mandatory disclosure laws in a number of states since.100  This 
is particularly noteworthy given that numerous intermediaries in 
commercial insurance markets have voluntarily disclaimed differential 
                                                                                                                           
forward the potential pay-off to intermediaries of steering customers to sub-optimal 
insurance.  See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 292.  
 
98 Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1. 
 
99 As noted above, this is precisely what has happened in commercial 
insurance markets. 
 
100 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3064; Cooper, supra note 8, at 100. 
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compensation to recruit and retain new clients.101  Simply put, if potential 
clients are not attuned to the importance of unbiased advice or the ways in 
which advice can be distorted by incentive structures, they will not be 
swayed to change their behavior by competitors’ promises of neutrality.   
In fact, regulations of structurally similar conflicts of interest in 
other industries have often gone beyond disclosure-based strategies for 
precisely these reasons.  Differential compensation of insurance 
intermediaries is one form of a common type of regulatory problem, coined 
a “trilateral dilemma.”102  In a trilateral dilemma, an end-service provider 
compensates a market intermediary in order to induce the intermediary to 
steer consumers’ business to the end-service provider.103  Regulations of 
such side payments often do more than merely require disclosure, for the 
precise reasons developed above.  Examples include prohibitions against 
certain side payments to real estate settlement providers,104 limitations on 
side payments that brokerage firms can pay to investment managers,105 and 
limitations on attorneys’ receipts of side-payments for referrals to other 
attorneys.106  
Second, none of the proposed economic rationales for differential 
compensation appreciably enhance the efficiency of consumer insurance 
markets.107  The most significant such potential benefit of differential 
                                                                                                                 
101 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 
102 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 312-19; Jackson, supra 
note 42. 
 
103 Jackson, supra note 42.. 
 
104 See 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).  
 
105 See D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The Agency 
Costs to Soft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 82-83 (1994); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 78b (2008).   
 
106 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2(b) (2009). 
 
107 Aside from the enhanced underwriting theory addressed in the text, 
contingent commissions have also been defended because they: (i) may expand 
coverage for non-verifiable losses, Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, 
Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts 18 (Ctr. for 
Fin. Studies, Working Paper Nov. 24, 2005) available at http://www.ifk-
cfs.de/papers/05 24.pdf.; (ii) protect small agencies, Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 
3042; and (iii) facilitate economies of scale by encouraging intermediaries to work 
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compensation is that it can improve the “front-line underwriting” of 
independent agents by giving them a stake in insurers’ profitability.108  
According to this theory, agents often possess information about the 
riskiness of customers that insurers cannot directly observe, as they interact 
directly with their customers and may have long standing relationships with 
them.  Differential compensation that is linked to insurer profitability gives 
agents an economic reason to convey truthful information to the insurer.  
Alternatively, such compensation may facilitate improved underwriting 
simply by causing an agent who believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to 
steer that consumer to a different insurer that does not pay differential 
commissions.   
Whatever purchase this theory may have in commercial insurance 
markets, it is simply implausible in the context of consumer insurance lines.  
The theory assumes agents do indeed have important underwriting 
information about their clients that insurers cannot observe directly.  But 
insurer underwriting in consumer insurance markets is generally 
standardized and based on simple and easily administrable algorithms.109  
Even if independent agents did possess information that could not be 
captured in an insurance application, it is unlikely that insurers would find 
                                                                                                                           
with fewer insurers, Cummins & Doherty, supra, note 4, at 386-89.  For reasons 
developed in Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 305-11, these 
justifications are not persuasive. A final defense of contingent commissions – that 
they help small insurers to break into the market – is not in conflict with the 
proposal suggested herein, which would permit insurers to offer above-market 
premium commission rates.  
 
108 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89; see also Regan & Tennyson, 
supra note 20, at 639 (“The agent is the first contact the insurer has with a potential 
policyholder and may be able to obtain information about the customer which 
would be difficult or costly for the firm to verify. It is widely acknowledged that 
agents often employ subjective criteria in evaluating insurance applicants.”). 
 
109 See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 45, at 78 (“[A]n efficient 
classification system does not strive to make its premiums equal expected costs 
beyond the point where that goal is worth achieving.”). RICHARD V. ERICKSON, 
AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 241 (2003) 
(“Individual companies are increasingly less likely to undertake their own home 
inspection or direct field investigations of an applicant.  Instead, more risk 
assessment is centralizing into data system operated by information service 
companies that supply the insurance industry.”).   
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incorporating that information into their underwriting to be cost efficient.110  
This is especially true given the lack of adverse selection in most consumer 
insurance markets.111 
Of course insurance markets, like all markets, change over time.  
Thus, rationales for differential compensation that may not be compelling 
now may prove significant later.  Consequently, any market intervention 
should be accompanied with continued monitoring and supervision.  But 
the need for continuous re-assessment does not absolve lawmakers from 
ignoring conflicts of interest in consumer insurance markets that have been 
addressed in commercial and federally-regulated insurance markets.  The 
failure of state lawmakers to act not only undermines the efficiency of 
consumer insurance markets, but it blunts the claim that consumer 
protection is best secured through the continuation of state-based insurance 
regulation.112   
 
                                                                                                                 
110 See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 135 (1970) (explaining how insurers must 
adopt easily administrable rules of thumb to operate effectively). 
 
111 See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An 
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224-5 (2004). 
 
112 See, e.g., Press Release, NAIC Still in Opposition to Federal Regulation 
(Jan. 20, 2009) (On file with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners).   
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